Weapon Program:
- Nuclear
Related Country:
- Iran
. . .
Q: Let's turn to Iran. How optimistic are you about achieving a solution to the nuclear issue?
A: After three years' negotiations on Iran you learn to keep your expectations low. The only route to a solution has to be via diplomacy, and the prospects for success are at their highest prior to the initiation of a UN Security Council procedure. I only hope Tehran understands this.
Q: What do you expect from the Iranian President's speech to the UN General Assembly?
A: Nothing, but let's wait and see. I hope President Ahmadinejad doesn't jeopardize the rapprochement achieved during the talks between EU High Representative Javier Solana and Iranian nuclear negotiator Larijani.
Q: Is there a deadline before the Security Council gets involved?
A: No, but this process won't drag on for many more weeks if Iran doesn't make a move.
Q: Tehran is clearly hoping to split the Security Council.
A: There has always been unity on Iran among the countries concerned, also within the Security Council. In 2006 alone fears have been uttered at least five times that this unity would fall apart. It hasn't happened. So Iran shouldn't place its hopes on a split.
Q: Do we need to revisit the problem of uranium enrichment?
A: We must certainly give this issue further consideration because the task will not be over once the conflict with Iran is resolved. Many countries are thinking of using nuclear energy and are toying with the idea of building their own uranium-enrichment plants. To avoid similar problems to those with Iran in other threshold countries and to strengthen the NPT we need to multilateralize the fuel cycle. There must be international supply guarantees for nuclear fuel. This could stop countries wanting their own enrichment plants.
Q: Russia has already made such offers.
A: But these weren't successful, perhaps also because countries didn't want to be dependent on a single supplier. Another idea is, therefore, to place this multilateral uranium enrichment under the auspices of the IAEA and its export controls. To that end a third country could provide an exterritorial site for an uranium-enrichment plant, which would have a status similar to that of the UN in New York. The plant could be financed by those countries, who would then have the right to acquire nuclear fuel.
Q: A uranium-enrichment plant on an exterritorial site - aren't you thinking a little too far "out of the box" here ?
A: Let me remind you that the statutes of the IAEA, which was founded fifty years ago, give that body the option of building and running its own facilities.
