Cochran
Opening Statement
-

Walpole
Statement
Prepared Testimony

Cambone
Statement

Eisenstadt
Statement


IRAN'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS

STATEMENT BY

NORMAN SCHINDLER
Deputy Director of the Non-proliferation Center

Hearing Before the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

September 21, 2000

 

Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Walpole indicated, I will provide a summary of Iran's WMD programs-the programs designed to produce the weapons to be delivered by the missile systems Mr. Walpole described, as well as by other delivery means. The Iranians regard these as extremely sensitive programs and go to great lengths to hide them from us. As a result, our knowledge of these programs is based on extremely sensitive sources and methods. This precludes me from providing many details on the programs in open session. But I hope this summary will be of use to the Committee, and we are prepared to provide additional details in classified briefings.

Nuclear

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to begin with a few comments on Iran's nuclear and nuclear weapons program. The Intelligence Community judges that Iran is actively pursuing the acquisition of fissile material and the expertise and technology necessary to form the material into nuclear weapons. As part of this process, Iran is attempting to develop the capability to produce both plutonium and highly-enriched uranium.

Iran is seeking nuclear-related equipment, material, and technical expertise from a variety of foreign sources, especially in Russia. Tehran claims that it is attempting to master nuclear technology for civilian research and nuclear energy programs. However, in that guise it is developing whole facilities--such as a uranium conversion facility-that could be used to support the production of fissile material for a nuclear weapon.

Cooperation with foreign suppliers is helping Iran augment its nuclear technology infrastructure, which in turn will be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and development. The expertise and technology gained, along with the commercial channels and contacts established-even from cooperation that appears strictly civilian in nature-could be used to advance Iran's nuclear weapons effort.

Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Community continues to monitor development in the Iranian nuclear and nuclear weapons programs carefully. We regularly provide classified assessments of the progress Iran is making to the Administration, US warfighters, and the Congress. We are reluctant to provide additional details on the Iranian program - including when Iran might develop a nuclear weapon - in an unclassified setting.

Chemical

I'd like to turn now to Iran's chemical warfare (CW) program. Iran launched its offensive CW program in the early 1980s in response to Baghdad's use of CW during the Iran-Iraq war. We believe the program remains active despite Tehran's decision to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Iran has a large and growing CW production capacity and already has produced a number of CW agents, including nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents. We believe it possesses a stockpile of at least several hundred metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent.

Tehran's goals for its CW program for the past decade have been to expand its production capability and stockpile, reach self-sufficiency by acquiring the means to manufacture chemical production equipment and precursors, and diversify its CW arsenal by producing more sophisticated and lethal agents and munitions.

Biological

Iran's BW program also was initiated in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war. The program is in the late stages of research and development, but we believe Iran already holds some stocks of BW agents and weapons. Tehran probably has investigated both toxins and live organisms as BW agents, and for BW dissemination could use many of the same delivery systems-such as artillery and aerial bombs-that it has in its CW inventory.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to say a word about Iran's motivations for pursuing it's WMD programs.

We assess that Tehran-no matter who is in power-will continue to develop and expand its WMD and ballistic missile programs as long as it perceives threats from US military forces in the Gulf, a nuclear-armed Israel, and Iraq. In addition, the deterrence posture or prestige factor associated with some of these programs are probably viewed by Iranian leaders as a means to achieve their goals of becoming the predominant power in the region, asserting Iran's ideological leadership in the Muslim world, and diminishing Western--particularly US--influence in the Gulf.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. Mr. Walpole and I will attempt to answer the Committee's questions within the constraints imposed on us by the need to protect sensitive sources and methods. We would be delighted to present the committee-or committee Members-with a more detailed assessment of Iran's WMD programs in a closed setting.