ENERGY AND THE IRANIAN ECONOMY
Hearing before the
U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee
July 25, 2006
JIM SAXTON
A Congressman from New Jersey, and
Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee
REP. JIM SAXTON (R-NJ): Good morning. It's a pleasure to welcome Mr. Simons and the members of the second panel of witnesses before the committee today.
Given the course of events in the Middle East, this hearing on energy and the Iranian economy is very timely. Iran is a country with immense wealth in the form of oil and gas reserves. Iran has the third largest oil reserves and the second largest natural gas reserves in the world. Unfortunately, despite the country's great economic potential, the government of Iran has adopted policies that have undermined the country's economic development and standard of living.
Despite Iran's huge oil and gas reserves, the Iranian regime is intent on extending its nuclear program, supposedly for peaceful purposes. However, the regime's deception regarding the nuclear program, its aggressive promotion of terrorism, and its president's recent statement concerning Israel obviously constitute a grave threat to world peace.
The facts before us today concerning Iran's large energy reserves undercut assertions by the Iranian regime that the nuclear program is needed to peaceful nuclear power generation.
Iran's leaders have also sought to intimidate oil-consuming nations by threatening to cut off Iranian oil. However, Iranian oil exports generate a high percentage of Iranian export earnings and finance a significant portion of government spending. In short, the Iranian government and economy are highly dependent on oil exports, and threats to cut off these oil exports do not seem credible.
The Iranian economy labors under a heavy burden of government mismanagement, cronyism and corruption, facilitated by government- affiliated foundations and enterprises. The Iranian people pay a high price for the failures of the regime's economic policies, but the prospects for reform of these policies are bleak in the near term.
In view of the Iranian regime's aggressive behavior, the feasibility of sanctions against the regime must be considered. Iran's reliance on imported gasoline is one potential pressure point. However, the effectiveness of sanctions would depend on the willingness of a much broader group of nations acting in concert with the United States to contain Iran's threats. The coming weeks and months will reveal whether a broader attempt to impose sanctions will be tried and produce positive results.
At this point, I would like to yield to Senator Reed for any comments he may have.
JACK REED
A Senator from Rhode Island, and
Ranking member of the Joint Economic Committee
SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think this is a very timely and important hearing and I commend you for calling it.
As we monitor diplomatic developments surrounding the nuclear standoff with Iran, and as the current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah continues to destabilize the region, this hearing on energy and the Iranian economy is very important and very timely.
Iran has recently enjoyed strong economic growth, primarily due to high oil prices. Despite some progress in reforming certain aspects of its economy, the Iranian economy continues to suffer some significant structural weaknesses. First, its heavy reliance on oil revenues makes it extremely vulnerable to oil price shocks. Second, entrenched political interests impede substantive economic reform. Lastly, the country continues to rank poorly in various indicators of foreign investment risk.
Such vulnerabilities lead some observers to conclude that the United States and its allies may have some leverage, primarily through sanctions, possibly backed up by the threat of military action in convincing Iran to abandon any nuclear weapons ambitions. However, oil prices are expected to remain high, at least through 2007, and with a global oil market, Iran will always find alternative customers in countries that are willing to violate sanctions to advance their own interests.
Even if Iranian oil exports were to slow somewhat, the higher prices that result would, at least temporarily, cushion the revenue impact. And Iran's vast energy reserves promise that the country will remain attractive to foreign investors.
Russia and China recently signed on with the United States and its European partners in seeking a United Nations Security Council resolution ordering Iran to freeze its nuclear program or face possible sanctions. To be truly effective on their own, sanctions must target the oil exports that are central to the Iranian economy. Given tight oil supplies, however, it is highly unlikely that all six negotiating partners would ultimately agree to such comprehensive sanctions.
In fact, a decade's worth of experience with the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, or ILSA, which was implemented during a period when oil was relatively cheap and plentiful, suggest our allies' reluctance to further rattle the global oil market. Further, both Russia and China have indicated they will not support military action against Iran.
The experience with the United States sanctions against Iran suggests that a unilateral approach simply will not work. U.S. sanctions have not prevented Iran from developing what International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors believe to be a potential military dimension to its clandestine nuclear program, or from continuing to sponsor terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas.
Some analysts believe that the United States sanctions have done more to isolate the United States than to isolate Iran. Rather than taking a unilateral approach, the U.S. much continue to work with the United Nations community.
If universal comprehensive economic sanctions are not feasible, we must focus on a more effective mix of targeted sanctions that our negotiating partners can agree to. Targeted sanctions may not cripple the Iranian economy to the point where it is financially incapable of developing a nuclear weapon. However, coupled with concerted diplomatic efforts, the right mix of sanctions has the potential to convince Iran to abandon any nuclear weapons ambitions it may harbor.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses here today. In addition to hearing about the state of the Iranian economy and its energy sector, I hope to discuss ways in which sanctions could be effectively applied, preferably as part of a multilateral diplomatic effort.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you, Senator Reed.
I am very pleased to be able to welcome the Honorable Paul E. Simons, deputy assistant secretary for Energy, Sanctions and Commodities at the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. Mr. Simons, thank you for being with us. We appreciate it very much. And at this point, we would like to hear from you.
PAUL E. SIMONS
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy, Sanctions, and Committees
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
U.S. Department of State
MR. PAUL E. SIMONS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. Thank you for your initiative in calling this hearing on this important issue.
Let me also congratulate the staff for the preparation of an excellent committee report on Iranian energy that I think helped us get prepared for the hearing this morning.
Iran, as you have noted in your report and as we have noted in our written testimony, does play a significant role in international oil and gas. But Iran is also a country whose policies and actions have long been cause for deep concern to the United States and our international partners. Given its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, its place as leading state sponsor of terrorism, its support for violent opposition to the Middle East's peace, its unhelpful role in Iraq, and its oppression of its own citizens as well as its abysmal human rights record, Iran does pose, as Under Secretary of State Burns recently said, a profound threat to U.S. interests.
Iran's concerted effort to develop a nuclear weapons capability has become the focus of particular concern, not only for the U.S. but also for the broader international community, as reflected in the resolution adopted in February by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors and in the March statement by the U.N. Security Council.
On June the 6th, the governments of the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany -- referred to as the P5+1 countries -- offered Iran a set of far-reaching proposals that presented that country with a clear choice between two paths. One path would lead to important benefits for the Iranian people if Iran suspends all its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and enters into negotiations on the basis of the P5+1 offer. Secretary Rice has made clear that the United States would be willing to join the negotiations if Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment program. However, if Iran chooses the other path and continues on its current course, it will face greater international isolation and strong U.N. Security Council action.
Iran has failed to take the steps needed to allow negotiations to begin, specifically the suspension of all of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. And absent such a positive, concrete response from the Iranian government, we and our international partners really have no other choice but to return to the Security Council to adopt a resolution that would make that suspension mandatory.
Let me turn now briefly to the issue of energy.
And I would ask that my full statement be admitted to the record and I'll make some brief comments.
On the energy issue, as you have noted in your opening statement and in the report, Iran is the world's second largest holder of natural gas reserves and it ranks second or third in conventional oil reserves. It does have a current oil production capacity of just over 4 million barrels a day, making it OPEC's second largest oil producer and its second largest oil exporter at about 2.6 million barrels.
What is striking, though, and as you've noted in your report and a view that is endorsed as well by the State Department, is that Iran is not as prominent a player in the international oil and gas scene as its geological potential would suggest. So despite its huge gas reserves, Iran basically has a very limited gas export potential at present. It also hasn't really moved very intensively towards developing a liquefied natural gas export capability.
And as we note in our statement, this contrasts with the situation in Qatar, Iran's small neighbor just across the Gulf, which has moved very aggressively, has attracted massive foreign investment, and is very actively developing LNG and other gas projects, with the assistance of the international investment community.
Iran has expressed its intention to expand its production of both oil and gas. There have been various notional targets put out. But its efforts to attract foreign investment through buy-back arrangements -- which are explained in some detail in your report -- which were initiated in 1995, have met with only limited success. Foreign investment in this sector does appear to be slowing. There (are ?) a combination of factors. Certainly, one factor is a strong perception of heightened political and financial risk due to Iran's own behavior.
In addition to the discouraging impact of Iran's problematic policies, its pursuit of nuclear weapons has also raised the possibility of international sanctions, which several of the members have noted here. And as a result, international companies have found it difficult to reach agreement with Iranian negotiators on terms that would, essentially, offset this high level of political risk.
Iranian oil refining capacity is also inadequate to meet demands. There has been inadequate investment in the downstream sector. So this is also an issue.
Let me just conclude briefly with a couple of remarks about the nuclear side. The P5+1 package that I mentioned earlier in my statement, and which was put forward in May, reaffirms Iran's right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with Iran's obligations under the nonproliferation treaty, the NPT. And both the president and the secretary have made that point quite clear. We are not seeking to deny peaceful nuclear energy to the Iranians. However, Iran's long history of deception and non-compliance with its NPT commitments and its IAEA safeguard obligations have created something of a loss of confidence in Iran's intentions.
So as the president has said, civilian nuclear energy is a legitimate desire. We do believe the Iranian people should enjoy the benefits of a truly peaceful program to use nuclear reactors to generate electric power. And as the president noted, America does support the Iranian people's rights to develop nuclear energy peacefully, but with proper international safeguards. This is the important point.
Let me conclude by stating that, with its enormous natural resource endowments and its very talented people, Iran really ought to be among the more prosperous countries in the world. I think this point is also reinforced in the committee report. But counterproductive economic policies, mismanagement, corruption and misguided goals, such as the danger quest for nuclear weaponry, have in fact dimmed Iran's economic prospects.
Iran's economic problems reflect, in some ways, its negative political culture, with all the problematic manifestations which were outlined earlier in my statement.
But as President Bush recently noted, Americans do admire the rich history, the vibrant culture of Iran and its many contributions to civilization. The president recently said that the people of Iran, the people everywhere, also want and deserve an opportunity to determine their own future, an economy that rewards their intelligence and talents, and a society that allows them to pursue their dreams. Thus far, these dreams have been sadly thwarted.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you, Mr. Simon.
Let me begin. Let me just get right to the matter that is of concern to us. You said in your testimony, as I did in my statement, that Iran is richly endowed with the third largest -- second or third actually, you said, largest -- oil reserve, and the second largest natural gas reserves and that this becomes an extremely important economic factor to that country. As a matter of fact, Iran's revenue from oil exports were about $47 billion in 2004 and '05, and that is -- the oil, therefore, accounts for about -- the way we count it -- 80 percent of Iran's export revenues.
In addition, the central government's revenue is accounted for by oil exports to the tune of about 50 (percent) or 60 percent, according to indications that we have. And oil and gas exports amount to about 20 percent of GDP.
With oil supplying such a high percentage of revenue to support the Iranian government's budget and military spending, how credible do you think are their threats to cut off the oil supply?
MR. SIMONS: Well, clearly, I think you've outlined the importance of oil and energy to the Iranian economy and to the Iranian economic engine. I don't think I can really speculate here in an open session about the motivations behind a potential unilateral shut-off of oil by Iran. There has been extensive press speculation on this. Perhaps we could have a closed session where we could get into a little bit more details.
But I would just like to make a couple of points here. First, while Iran is an important contributor to global energy stability -- it does export about 2.5 million barrels a day, we do have capabilities in place to handle a potential shut-off of these flows were that to occur. So the United States and other members of the global energy community are certainly prepared if the situation goes that way. But beyond that, I really wouldn't want to speculate in this group behind the possibility that Iran might take a unilateral step in this direction.
REP. SAXTON: Well, I appreciate that, but I guess maybe these facts kind of speak for themselves: $47 billion in 2004 and '05 in exports, which amounts to 80 percent of Iranian exports -- not just oil exports but all exports; and the central government depends on these oil exports for something like 50 (percent) or 60 percent of its resources; and that oil and gas exports amount to about 20 percent of GDP. That means that exporting oil is a critical factor in the Iranian economy.
And the reason that I emphasize this point is that, every time the Iranian leadership rattles its oil drum, the price goes up here at the pump. And perhaps that's not a necessary reaction. So I just wanted to make this point. Wouldn't Iran's economy and government be crippled without the revenues produced by oil exports?
MR. SIMONS: Once again, there is no question that oil is -- oil and gas are the centerpiece of the Iranian economy and that, were there to be some type of interruption in Iranian oil production, there would be a significant impact on the Iranian economy. As I mentioned, the impact on global oil economy could be accommodated by various measures that we could put into place. But certainly for the Iranians, there would be a significant impact.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you. I think that one could conclude -- and every time I try to think like an Iranian does, I'm wrong. So let me make that point. But this is a very strong suggestion that Iran's threats to cut off oil exports from time to time are mostly, if not entirely, empty, in my view. So in any event, we'll leave that there. But I think this is an extremely important point because, in the past, they have been able to affect Western economies by issuing, from time to time, these threats. And I think that when we understand the nature of and importance of petroleum exports to their country, it becomes a matter within a context which it appears to me at least that Western investors and Western business people and Western governments have not put it in that context to the extent that we might have.
With its immense and undeveloped resources in oil and natural gas, do you believe there is a compelling need for Iran to develop nuclear power -- a nuclear power industry for peaceful energy production?
MR. SIMONS: Mr. Chairman, I think the committee's done good work laying out the scope of potential that Iran has were they to fully develop their oil and natural gas reserves. And as Secretary Rice recently pointed out, we fundamentally don't understand why Iran has to have a civilian nuclear power capability. From an economic standpoint, they would be able to develop -- they could develop -- on the electricity side, sufficient gas power generation to meet their needs.
However, as the secretary also pointed out, nuclear power is part of an energy strategy for many countries that seek to decrease their exclusive dependence on hydrocarbons. So we have been pursuing in this country a diversification strategy, where we look to different elements of the technology basket to meet portions of our electricity needs. And many other countries around the world do this.
So I think what we've really been stressing is that, in order for this civilian nuclear program to be acceptable, it has to contain the proliferation risk, and this is really what our focus has been. Both the secretary and the president have noted that we are not really seeking here to deny the Iranians access to this civilian nuclear technology, or not necessarily either to particularly second-guess how they define their desirable mix in terms of how they would define their energy security. So it's an option that's out there, and we just want to make sure it's made available in ways that protect global nonproliferation concerns.
REP. SAXTON: Let me turn, for just a couple of minutes, to the issue of potential economic sanctions which, incidentally, Senator Reed and I both agree have to be international and multifaceted in nature. The economic incentives offered to Iran for refraining from uranium enrichment are quite substantial, as I believe you mentioned in your testimony. Can you comment on them and why Iran has not accepted them?
MR. SIMONS: My understanding, Mr. Chairman, is that the Iranians have indicated that they will respond later in August to the package that has been put forward. As I mentioned in my opening statement, we do think that they have a fairly stark choice in front of them. They can choose a path of cooperation, which would create a series of incentives for them to work with the international community to develop a civilian nuclear capability if they so choose and to afford them these rights, which are part of their membership in the NPT. So these are options that are out there that fulfill some of their economic and political aspirations and some of the aspirations of their people in terms of putting Iran on the global stage.
On the other hand, if they choose the other route, we do feel that we have a group of countries, probably for the first time in many years -- a strong multilateral coalition -- that would take this issue to the Security Council and seek to more actively deny Iran some of those same options.
REP. SAXTON: Does the fact that Iran imports refined gasoline create a vulnerability that could be used to pressure the regime?
MR. SIMONS: I think you've point out in your statement, Mr. Chairman, and in your report that Iran does import something around the order of 170,000 barrels a day of gasoline. The Iranian government -- over the last couple of months, there has been some internal discussions inside of Iran of ways in which they could reduce that dependency by initiating conservation measures, by boosting local refined product capability. But for the time being, I think the point you make is basically correct. Iran is an extensive exporter of crude petroleum and imports a large chunk of its refined products.
Again, in open session, I wouldn't want to get into a detailed discussion of how these trade-offs might play when one takes a look at sanctions options. But perhaps, again, we could discuss that in a closed session.
REP. SAXTON: Sure. Let me just ask one final question and then we'll go to Mr. Hinchey. How vulnerable is Iran to the loss of other products, specifically agricultural products? And what other economic pressure points or vulnerabilities might Iran have?
MR. SIMONS: I'm sorry -- if I could ask you to clarify. Are you talking about loss of access on the import side or on the --
REP. SAXTON: Import side.
MR. SIMONS: -- export side? On the import side, well, Iran is a significant agricultural importer.
United States' law and policy exempts agricultural products -- certain kinds of agricultural products -- from our sanctions regime, so we are able to export certain types of agricultural products to Iran and to other countries that are under sanctions. So generally speaking -- again, I wouldn't want to speak for the Congress, but in terms of the sanctions world -- the trend has been to focus our attention away from the food side and the medicine side of the equation. That has generally been the focus of the administration as well as successive congresses.
REP. SAXTON: Other than gasoline, are there other elements of the economic -- broad economic -- spectrum in Iran that would be affected by sanctions, or could be?
MR. SIMONS: Well, it all depends on what you decide to target. I think the scope -- the scope is rather large. But as I think Senator Reed mentioned when he was here, again we have found that sanctions that are applied multilaterally and that are targeted not at the broader population but more at those portions of the regime that are responsible for the undesirable behavior, tend to be more effective.
So I think when you take a look at some of these broader brush types of sanctions options, you do have to keep in mind what type of impact that you might have. And I think you want to make sure, when you design these programs, that the impact is focused in on the group whose behavior you want to affect.
REP. SAXTON: I apologize to Mr. Hinchey, but every time you give an answer it raises another question in my mind.
Many of the businesses, particularly which are involved in import, export and development of energy and perhaps even nuclear pursuits, are very closely related to the government, aren't they? They are not businesses as we think of them. They are either owned by or very closely associated with or controlled by the regime. Is that right?
MR. SIMONS: That's correct.
REP. SAXTON: And those are the elements of the economy that we would want to perhaps target?
MR. SIMONS: Well, again, I would prefer to get into the details of any kind of targeting discussion --
REP. SAXTON: Just being able to ask --
MR. SIMONS: -- in another session.
REP. SAXTON: Just being able to ask the question.
MR. SIMONS: But I think one way to look at it would be government-owned companies. Another way to look at sanctions would be -- one way, as I say, would be government companies, say, in the energy sector; but another way of looking at it, which is really the way that the administration has focused on this issue initially, has been taking a look at those companies that are directly participating in Iran's weapons of mass destruction-related activities, and trying to pinpoint those companies and to shut down their operations and their ability to function.
So there's a -- I think there's subset of these government-owned companies that are more directly related to the nonproliferation stream that has been our initial focus. And we have an executive order, and we have designated certain companies under that executive order for sanctions.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much, Mr. Simons.
Mr. Hinchey, please feel free to take as much time as you need.
REP. MAURICE D. HINCHEY (D-NY): Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your holding this hearing and giving us this opportunity to learn more about what the State Department, in this particular case, is doing in this situation.
And I very much appreciate your testimony and your response to our chairman's questions, Mr. Simons. Thank you very much for being here.
The Middle East is, of course as we know, the most volatile and dangerous part of the world. And Iran is one of the most significant countries in the Middle East, even if you were to just limit that to the possession of huge amounts of oil and natural gas. But they are significant for other reasons, including a very large population, and a very strong country, even considering the context in which they operate. The sanctions which were imposed by the United States -- even though those sanctions have not really been carried out -- I believe date back to the 1980s. Am I mistaken about that or can you give us the exact date?
MR. SIMONS: Well, the principal set of unilateral sanctions that the U.S. --
REP. HINCHEY: Unilateral sanctions --
MR. SIMONS: -- placed on Iran were put into place 1995 through 1997.
REP. HINCHEY: Aren't there sanctions that go back, however, to the 1980s? Weren't there some actions taken back in the 1980s at the same time that Iran-Contra was a great controversy here?
MR. SIMONS: There were. There were some financial-related sanctions. There were some asset freezes. But the broad prohibitions on U.S. business involvement in Iran actually date to the Clinton administration.
REP. HINCHEY: What took place back in the early-1980s specifically? Can you tell us what happened?
MR. SIMONS: I'd have to get back to you on that. I don't have that at my fingertips.
REP. HINCHEY: Well, the relationship that Iran has with other countries is seemingly much more normal. They have good relations with China, with Russia, and with a number of European countries, if not most or all of the European countries, particularly mainland Europe. So it would seem that any attempt that we might take to impose some economic problems on that country by initiating sanctions would have a great deal of difficulty in succeeding, given the fact that other countries are very likely to step in and increase their economic relationships with Iran. Don't you believe that that's the case?
MR. SIMONS: I think the -- I think we're really in a fundamentally different situation than we were back in the 1990s. When we imposed the unilateral sanctions back in the mid-90s, the United States was seeking to move ahead the Middle East peace process. And I believe, Congressman, that you played a role in that. In fact, if I'm not mistaken, we had some contact on this back in the '90s. I think you came out to Israel when I was out there.
REP. HINCHEY: That's correct.
MR. SIMONS: And so you're very familiar with the issue. And Iran was a major obstacle to forward movement in the peace process. And also we saw a number of demonstrations of Iran's support for international terrorism that were very troublesome. And this is what led the Clinton administration to impose, at that point, the unilateral sanctions. And I would agree with you that, at that point, many of our partners around the world were not choosing to go this route and were pursuing more normal economic ties with Iran.
But what has happened in the last couple of years, and I think what represents something of a sea change, is that, today, in 2006, we have been able to mobilize a fairly robust international partnership and coalition of countries that are prepared to take a tough look at Iran and that have been speaking with one voice to the Iranians. And that culminated in the package that was put forward at the end of May and the two choices that I outlined earlier.
And the difference this time around is that we do have the international community speaking with one voice on Iran, probably for the first time in many, many years. And our -- we've been able to work this diplomacy effectively. I think it's one of the signature achievements of this administration -- that for the first time, we have been able to have a common multilateral definition of the Iranian problem and of a possible solution.
REP. HINCHEY: Well, I think it's true that anyone who thinks about it would much prefer that the Iranians and a great many other people, other countries, around the world were not developing nuclear weapons because, the more nuclear weapons there are in the world, the more likelihood is that one of them is going to go off some place and cause some serious problems, including the possibility of one going off here in the United States. So it's pretty evident that most people are concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And I think in a country like Iran that that makes some sense.
But in terms of the way in which we are dealing with Iran and the imposition of sanctions -- and those sanctions which were imposed during the 1990s have never really taken place. Nothing really has ever been done to implement those sanctions. Is that correct?
MR. SIMONS: No, I don't think that is correct. Certainly, the pace -- certainly U.S. businesses are not active in Iran currently and have not been active for the past decade.
REP. HINCHEY: Well, that --
MR. SIMONS: And we would also argue, from the administration perspective, that there has been a lot less involvement by the rest of the world than there otherwise would have been if we had not gone down this road. So a lot of the conclusions I think that the committee report came to in terms of the rather slow development of the Iranian oil and gas sector, there were many reasons for this. And certainly you can't put the entire monkey on the back of sanctions. But the sanctions regime played some role in slowing the development of Iran's oil and gas sector.
REP. HINCHEY: Well, in the context of the discussions within the Department of State with regard to this situation, to what extent do you regard the reaction of Iran to the United States to be a result of the president's inclusion of Iran in the so-called axis of evil with Iraq, and then having attacked Iraq?
MR. SIMONS: Well, I think the president's statement, you know, stands for itself and is an accurate description of the threats that Iran does pose, which I outlined as well in my opening statement. So this administration and previous administrations have had very, very significant concerns with Iranian behavior. This is really what motivated the Clinton administration to put in place the sanctions back in the '90s. So there has been a history of U.S. executive branch as well as congressional concerns with a wide range of Iranian behaviors -- the terrorism issue, human rights, peace process and now the proliferation issue. So I think that the president's statement was quite consistent with policies that have been adopted before and after.
REP. HINCHEY: When did Iran sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty?
MR. SIMONS: I'm sorry. I don't have the exact date that they signed, but they've been a member for many years.
REP. HINCHEY: Are we aware of significant violations of the NPT by Iran?
MR. SIMONS: Well, I think what we are trying to do here is to construct a set of incentives that would oblige Iran to carry out its civilian nuclear responsibilities in ways that are consistent with the NPT and that would draw the International Atomic Energy Agency into a supervisory role to ensure that Iran does abide by its NPT obligations.
REP. HINCHEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Simons.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SAXTON: Mr. English.
REP. PHIL ENGLISH (R-PA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Simons, we have seen an international effort to engage Iran that has included, I think, a powerful set of economic incentives that have been offered to Iran to refrain from uranium enrichment. I guess, looking at this, I've seen very little evidence that Iran has responded to those incentives. Do we have any reason to believe that Iran would respond differently to other economic incentives, including sanctions? And can you detail for us any change in Iranian behavior that has result so far from the sanctions that have been included in ILSA?
MR. SIMONS: Thank you, Congressman English. I believe that the discussion of sanctions and the fact that the international community has stood with a united front over the last six months in keeping a sanctions option available has had a lot of impact and has affected thinking around the world, including in Iran. I think it's a little difficult to point to any specific evidence of this, but certainly going back to Mr. Hinchey's observation, we had situation for the past decade in which European countries were pursuing economic engagement with Iran and not really availing themselves of a sanctions option. Now, the sanctions option is very much up front and center as the consequence of Iran choosing not to cooperate with the international community.
So I do think that that has had a significant impact on thinking. I think it has, to some extent -- and the secretary has made this observation as well -- it has affected the political risk calculus of businesses and banks that might otherwise be thinking of expanding or continuing their involvement with Iran. And we have seen some evidence of a slow-down in investment. We have seen Iran's credit rating being downgraded, for example, in the OECD. And we've seen some other evidence that, by stoking up the level of political risk and by not offering economic incentives to offset that political risk, that Iran already, even before sanctions are imposed, is becoming a less desirable place to do business. So I do think that having the sanctions option in full view has been very important.
You raised a second question about ILSA. And in this regard, the administration did send a mid-term report up to Congress last year in which we detailed what we believe to have been the impact of ILSA in terms of investment. And here, too, as I mentioned earlier, we do believe that ILSA has played some role in terms of slowing the pace of investment in Iran's oil and gas sector.
REP. ENGLISH: Well, that -- in other words, you're suggesting that ILSA has had an effect on the international business community's interactions with Iran. Have you seen any change of behavior on Iran's part either at the government level or has this had any impact on economic players below the government level within the country and its economy?
MR. SIMONS: I think I might defer to some of our following witnesses who might follow this a little more carefully. But I would just note that, in looking at some of the Iranian government's statements that have been made since the sanctions option has been out there, the Iranian government appears to have been making a lot of efforts to suggest that all is well on the investment front, and has been seeking out opportunities to present a normal face, a kind of positive face, in terms of investment. And I think the fact that they are engaging in that type of campaign suggests, perhaps, that all is not so well.
REP. ENGLISH: I appreciate that, Mr. Simons. I realize the questions I have raised here are very difficult, because this is a very difficult area of policy. But I am grateful to the administration for pursuing the aggressive course it has, and the diplomacy it has, in dealing with the thorny issue of Iranian enrichment.
And I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for giving us an opportunity in this hearing to fine-tune how we approach engaging Iran and encouraging them to play a more active and positive role in the international community. So I thank you and I yield my time.
REP. SEXTON: Thank you very much, Mr. English.
We'll move now to Ms. Sanchez.
REP. LORETTA SANCHEZ (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Simons, for testifying before us. Do you really believe that -- what do you think the real impact would be if we do have a stand-off and we're not able to come to an agreement with respect to the enrichment issue in Iran if the world powers got together and say we're going to have sanctions against this country? First of all, do you really believe places like China and Russia would actually follow that or their business interests would follow that? And secondly, what would be the impact if there was leakage, in particular from let's say those two -- those two areas?
MR. SIMONS: Thank you, Congresswoman Sanchez. It's a little difficult for me to get into a speculative realm here. I would just note, though, that China, Russia and other countries did stand up with us in the IEA -- two very important IEA votes -- over the past six months. They stood with us and with the rest of the international community in terms of insisting that Iran meet its commitments. And the secretary and Under Secretary Burns have made it their highest priority to work with this P5+1 group that I described in my opening statement.
And it is one of the highest priorities for this administration's diplomacy. So I do think that the fact that we have assigned this priority and that we have been able to speak with one voice to this point is a very important achievement.
REP. SANCHEZ: With respect to China and the fact that, if you take a look at what it has been doing in the last few years, and having long-term contracts for energy availability -- have you seen them have any interaction with respect to Iran in that situation?
MR. SIMONS: Well, that's a good question. I actually was in Beijing last week for some discussions on energy issues. And there's no question that China faces daunting challenges meeting its future energy requirements if it is -- the projections of explosive economic growth -- you can just see it all around. So they are looking abroad. They are launching upstream investment activities in many parts of the world.
But at the same time, as former Deputy Secretary Zoellick pointed out in a speech that he gave, we are seeking to work with the Chinese to develop a responsible stakeholder role for China, whereby they would take a close look at the political and security consequences of their energy policies.
REP. SANCHEZ: That sounds nice, but my question was have you seen any contract, any deals going on with Iran, with respect to securing energy for the future from China.
MR. SIMONS: Well, I think many countries around the world -- China, India, others -- are engaging in discussions with Iran.
REP. SANCHEZ: But we haven't seen anything signed or anything?
MR. SIMONS: Discussions.
REP. SANCHEZ: Okay.
MR. SIMONS: And as with --
REP. SANCHEZ: But the reason we kind of --
MR. SIMONS: -- many of the -- let me continue for a minute. As with many of these discussions, they go on for many years. And as the chairman has pointed out, Iran is the second largest holder of gas reserves, second largest -- third largest oil reserves in the country. So you will not be able to shut off this process of discussion that goes on and of keeping doors open. And so our job in the executive branch is to ensure that some of these other factors that you point out are brought to the attention of the Chinese authorities and other authorities and they take them into account.
REP. SANCHEZ: Mr. Simons, I'm going cut you short because you're really running through my time on, you know, answering -- really giving me answer I didn't -- of questions I didn't ask.
With respect to any economic reforms, have you seen -- have you seen any going on in the economy for Iran? And I ask that from the whole sense that there are a lot of people have thought -- that believe that the most moderate people in that region would be the Iranians -- the people. I'm not talking about who controls the government. Have you seen -- what type of economic reforms, if any, have you seen in that country? And with the -- and the second question with respect to the rise of price in gas, what -- in getting that money back into the economy, what has the government or the Iranians done with those moneys? Has it gone to military spending? Has it gone into infrastructure or building? What have you seen?
MR. SIMONS: As to your first question, we have not seen much evidence of economic reform. But countries that receive surges of oil income rarely have the incentives to undertake economic reform, so it's not unexpected that the Chinese would not push ahead on reforms.
With respect to the use of funds, these monies -- some of them -- go back into the general budget and they finance a variety of development expenditures, security expenditures, everything that would go into a general-purpose budget. So there has been some focus -- additional focus -- on development issues, because there has been a budgetary surplus as a result of the oil revenues. But this is consistent with revenues that would come from tax or other sources.
REP. SANCHEZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much.
Mr. Cummings.
REP. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS (D-MD): Iran has said that it will respond on August 22nd to the -- (off mike).
REP. SANCHEZ: What are you doing up there?
REP. CUMMINGS: Yeah, here we go.
REP. SAXTON: Just hang on for a second of two.
REP. CUMMINGS: Thank you very much.
Iran has said that will respond on August 22nd to the incentives being offered by the United States and our allies to entice it to give up its nuclear weapons program. If Iran responds by withdrawing from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, what leverage would be available to the U.S. and or the United Nations to try to slow the Iranian nuclear program, particularly if the countries like Russia and China remain opposed to sanctions and to other measures that they consider to be provocative?
MR. SIMONS: Thank you, Congressman. I'm afraid that question is a little bit out of my area of expertise, which tends to be more on the oil and the energy side. So I may have to respond in detail for the record on that question. But I would just note that we have given the Iranians a choice of paths that they can follow. And it has been fairly clearly enunciated. And we do have all the major powers of the world aligning themselves -- the P5+1 -- in the direction of a path of cooperation, which would enable the Iranians to access civilian nuclear technology, admittedly under safeguards. But this is something that the Iranians will need to take a -- obviously a close look at. But these are the choices that are ahead.
So either they can pursue that path or they can pursue a path of isolation. But in terms of the options under the isolation, I would have to get back to you on that.
REP. CUMMINGS: Well, thank you, I'd appreciate that. Particularly as the United States has virtually no contact with Iran now and has imposed unilateral sanctions since the 1980s, could additional sanctions even be imposed against Iran if they were not fully supported by the U.N. and by countries like Russia and China?
MR. SIMONS: Well, I think you make a good point, Congressman Cummings, in the sense that the U.S. sanctions are already quite comprehensive.
So the approach the administration has followed is to take a look at how other countries around the world could basically look at those kinds of options and could, to some extent, associate themselves with some of the things that maybe we have already had on the table for some time.
REP. CUMMINGS: Well, I mean, when you consider Iran's role with regard to terrorism, do you -- I mean, have you seen any effect with regard to Iran's behavior since we've been imposing sanctions since, you know, the 1980s? Have you seen any effect of that -- those sanctions?
MR. SIMONS: As mentioned in my opening statement, we still have very, very significant concerns with Iranian support for terrorist organizations up until the events in the past few weeks, and clearly the supply of Hezbollah has been a huge problem. So I think this is an issue we continue to work on. And it's a concern. And it's a concern now that we have -- I think the important factor now is that we have a broader coalition of countries that kind of take a look at the issue the same way that we do, which is a significant advance over where we had been for the prior decade.
REP. CUMMINGS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Simons, thank you for being with us this morning. I would just like to conclude with one thought and that is that -- you just mentioned the events of the last few weeks. And one of the outcomes of the events of the last few weeks that have been noted is a different attitude toward Iran, even among -- or maybe particularly among -- Middle Eastern governments. I'm thinking of Saudi and Egypt and Morocco, of course, in northern Africa who have, I believe in each case, failed to condemn the actions of Israel, which is unusual, against the Hezbollah -- Iranian-backed Hezbollah. And I find that is a very interesting development, subsequent to the actions in Israel and Lebanon.
So thank you for being with us. We appreciate it very much. Your perspectives are very valuable to us. And thank you for what you do and keep up the good work.
MR. SIMONS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SAXTON: We are now going to move to our second panel. And let me just briefly introduce each of the four members of the panel.
Dr. Kenneth Katzman -- Dr. Katzman is a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, Congressional Research Service in the Library of Congress. Second, Mr. Ilan Berman -- Mr. Berman is vice president for policy at the American Foreign Policy Council. Third, Mr. Andrew Davenport -- Mr. Davenport is vice president, Conflict Securities Advisory Group here in Washington, D.C. And Mr. Jeffrey J. Schott -- he's a senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics.
Thank you for being with us. And why don't we start with Mr. Katzman and we'll just kind of move across the dais here.
Dr. Katzman, the floor is yours.
DR. KENNETH KATZMAN
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Library
of Congress
MR. KENNETH KATZMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for asking me and CRS to appear at today's hearing. I'll summarize my remarks and request the full statement be placed in the record.
To summarize, I am going to focus today primarily on the politics of Iran's economy, rather than the hard facts of Iran's economy. Iran's economy is highly resistant to reform because it is in the interests of those governing the regime to keep the economy exactly the way it is.
Iran's leaders are able to steer the proceeds of parts of the economy to provide patronage, build their constituencies, particularly among the lower classes. Because Iran's political leaders benefit from the structure of Iran's economy, there is little chance, under the current system, of major structural economic reform.
What I would like to talk about as the engine of this system that the clerics run are the quasi-state -- the state-funded, state- directed foundations called bonyads -- a Persian word meaning foundation. These are informal networks. They are controlled by key clerics or former -- or current government officials. They are technically not under the authority of the ministry of welfare and social security. And they do play a role in social welfare, however, their criteria are arbitrary, which in many ways explains the conclusions of the World Bank, which said that Iran's system of social welfare is inefficient.
And, in fact, many Iranians receive benefits from the system who are, in fact, not even below the poverty line, because the bonyads -- the foundations -- their criteria are arbitrary. And in many cases they reward with social welfare, families who are politically loyal to the regime rather than hard facts of demonstration of actual economic need or poverty.
The bonyads -- these foundations -- actually account for about an estimated one-third of Iran's GDP. And I would argue that they distort normal market forces in Iran. In many cases, they have -- these bonyads, because they are so politically well-connected, have cornered entire segments of the market for import and export of certain goods and have developed monopolies in some of these goods -- trading in some of these goods.
Iran's economy fundamentally is a trading economy. Iran doesn't really manufacture really anything -- much of anything. It survives -- it runs on trading -- buying, selling, mark up, discount. That's Iran's economy, essentially.
The most controversial allegation about these bonyads is whether or not their funds have been used because they're not really under any ministry, as a sort of circuitous way to generate extra funds to procure weapons of mass destruction technology and other technology. This allegation has long surrounded the largest foundation -- the Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled -- which has consistently been run by hardliners and former officials of the Revolutionary Guard, including Mohsen Rafiqdust who was the first minister of the Revolutionary Guard. It is now run by a former chief of staff of the Revolutionary Guard, Mohammad Foruzandeh.
The Foundation for the Oppressed is so large it manages about 400 companies and factories, with a total estimated value of about $12 billion. And it is considered the largest single economic entity after the government itself. It is active in the following sectors: food and beverages, chemicals, shipping -- the Bonyad Shipping Company -- metals, petrochemicals, construction, dams, towers, faming, horticulture, animal husbandry, tourism, transportation, hotels -- two major hotels in Tehran -- commercial services, financing. It produces the best-selling soft drink in Iran called Zam Zam. It uses profits -- it does, however, provide social welfare. It helps about 120,000 poor families and veterans of the Iran-Iraq war.
Another foundation based in Mashhad in north-eastern Iran is the Shrine of Imam Reza Foundation. It uses donations from 8 million pilgrims to the shrine. It has used that to buy up to 90 percent of the arable land in its area. The estimated value of this land could be as much as $20 billion. And it is the largest employer in Khorasan Province. It runs 56 companies, including a Coca-Cola factory and two universities, and is now getting into automobile manufacturing. It is headed by Ayatollah Abbas Vaez-Tabasi, who is on the powerful Expediency Council that is headed by former President Akbar Hashemi- Rafsanjani who lost the presidential election in 2005. Vaez-Tabasi's son is married to a daughter of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
The Noor Foundation imports sugar, pharmaceuticals and construction equipment. It has substantial real estate holdings. It is headed by Mohsen Rafiqdust who formerly was the head of the Foundation of the Oppressed.
The last foundation I'd like to mention is the 15 Khordad Foundation. It is the bonyad -- the foundation -- that offered the $1 million to anyone who would kill author Salman Rushdie. And the bonyad has not -- although the government has said they have no issue with Rushdie any more, the 15 Khordad Foundation has not actually rescinded that offer for the killing of Rushdie.
A few other elements of the economy -- the political economy -- I want to mention -- the cooperatives -- another sector of the economy. The most well known is the Rafsanjan Pistachio Growers Cooperative run by the cousin of Mr. Rafsanjani again, who is chairman of the Expediency Council.
The cooperative represents about 70,000 pistachio farmers and has a large estimated value. Many believe it was Rafsanjani's wealth from the Rafsanjan cooperative that has led him to prominence and allows him to pay off supporters, although it did not carry him to victory in the 2005 election. He still lost to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
The Revolutionary Guard -- I've done a lot of work on the Revolutionary Guard in my career -- very loyal to the clerical leadership -- increasingly playing an economic role. As we've seen, it's getting its tentacles into the economy. And in fact, a firm owned by the Revolutionary Guard, called Ghorb, is being awarded a $2.3 billion deal to develop two phases of the large South Pars gas field, which is Iran's large natural gas project. That project was going to be awarded to Norway's Aker Kvaerner, but the Guard, using its political influence, overturned that. It was re-tendered and it was won by this arm of the Revolutionary Guard. Again -- and certainly Ghorb is much less capable of developing the South Pars gas field than Norway's Aker Kvaerner. So this is another way of how the Guard and the regime have basically captured -- cornered -- large parts of the economy.
The implications for reform are clear. There is a big debate in Iran over reform, because the conservatives are very divided. And I'll conclude with that.
Ahmadinejad represents really the lower class. He believes in state control of the economy, that the state should drive employment. Other conservatives, such as Rafsanjani, they represent the bazaaris -- the traders. They are really, almost in many ways, pure capitalists. They want very few restrictions. They want to be able to trade in and out freely and mark up their goods. They don't want state control of the economy. And they don't want really foreign investment in the economy because, if foreign investment comes in, the investor from a multinational company will probably make a better product than they do, or do a better job than they do, and will displace their monopoly. So the bazaaris want to keep out foreign investment.
So in many ways, considering sanctions on investing in Iran, outside the energy sector, may not necessary be unpopular in major segments of the Iranian leadership because, as I said, the bazaaris don't want this investment anyway because it will hurt them.
So in summary, I see very little prospects for political reform. I think the structure of the system is the way it is. It allows the clerics to build patronage, to control their supports, to keep people loyal. And I think the system serves that interest and, repeatedly, efforts to reform have been thwarted.
Thank you.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much, Dr. Katzman, for those important perspectives. We appreciate it.
Mr. Berman.
ILAN BERMAN
Vice President for Policy, American Foreign Policy Group
MR. ILAN BERMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Katzman spoke about the Islamic republic's political economy and I'd like to take a somewhat different tack and I'd like to talk about economic avenues that are available for the United States and its allies in confronting Iran. And I'd really like to focus my oral remarks on three vulnerabilities or, if you will, points of entry into the Iranian economy by which we can exert pressure.
The first -- and I do this in order of escalating effectiveness, at least in my opinion. The first is foreign direct investment. Iran today produces 3.9 million barrels of oil daily -- pardon me, 3.9 million barrels of oil a day and exports 60 percent of that -- approximately 2.5 million. In order to maintain this level of production, it requires approximately $1 billion of FDI annually. In order to increase that capacity, Iran requires approximately $1.5 billion.
In context, though, this is not a lot of money. Iran has signed contracts worth dozens of billions of dollars with foreign powers over the past several years -- addressing a question that was posed to the secretary earlier. China, alone, has signed at least two massive exploration and development deals with Iran worth a cumulative $100 billion over 25 years since 2004. And Iran, as a result of this contact -- Iran is no longer an economic pariah the way it was in the mid- to late-1990s. Iran now has very vibrant economic ties with a whole number of foreign countries.
Iran has amassed huge amounts of money as a result of the high price of oil. The average that I've heard is -- that I've heard from the Iranian press is -- that Iran has approximately $50 billion in hard currency reserves as of March of 2006, the end of the Iranian calendar year.
So what does this mean? This means that legislation, such as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which we have in force and is coming up for renewal next week -- even if there is a political will to implement it more fully, it will not be able to alter Iranian behavior by itself. There are simply too much hard currency reserves that the regime can tap into, and there are too many foreign actors that are invested, in order to rely on this alone. Iran will find $1 billion or $1.5 billion somewhere.
What the U.S. can do, however, is try to (determine ?) where Iran gets its foreign direct investment from and force them to draw down their hard currency reserves. And I would argue that that is a worthwhile effort in its own right because, if Iran has less money available for its nuclear program, for terrorism or for interference in Iraq, that's an aggregate benefit for American foreign policy.
However, this is not, by itself -- and I'd like to emphasize this -- it's not, by itself, a solution to the nuclear issue. We should not rely on curbing FDI as a solution to the nuclear issue.
The second point of vulnerability which is, I think, more effective -- and Dr. Katzman touched on this to a great extent -- is the economic hierarchy that exists in Iran today. The vast majority of regime wealth is concentrated in the hands of a very small number of people. For example, as Dr. Katzman alluded to, the extended family of former Iranian president, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, virtually controls copper mining, the regime's lucrative pistachio trade, and a number of profitable industrial and export-import businesses.
And then you have -- parallel to that, you have the bonyads -- the charitable foundations which are sprawling. They are largely unregulated. They are accountable really only to Iran's Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei. And these account for 20 percent or more of Iranian national GDP and as much as two-thirds of the country's non-oil GDP. So there is a substantial financial base that can be targeted that has very deep ties to the regime.
Targeting financial measures that restrict the ability of these individuals and organizations to access international markets and curtail their ability to engage in international commerce are likely to have immediate and pronounced effects on regime decision making. This is a large domestic constituency. And there is likely to be a lot of domestic pressure that is exerted upon the Iranian government if these people can no longer live in the manner to which they have become accustomed.
But the real, most solid point of entry, at least is in my opinion, is commodities. Iran maintains a socialist energy sector. Gasoline is pennies on the dollar. It costs approximately 40 cents to buy a gallon of gasoline in Tehran today. Iran consumes 64.5 million liters of gasoline a day -- a year, excuse me. And it imports close to 40 percent of that. I think 38 percent is the average that I have heard. More importantly, it does not have the equivalent of a strategic gas reserve. There have been studies out of think tanks in analytical centers in Iran that suggest that Iran only has a 45-day supply of gasoline in country, after which there will be shortages at the pump, in a very destabilizing manner.
So on this issue, it is my opinion that economic pressure can work. We are already beginning to see this. Sanctions have not yet been applied in any way. But we think parliamentarians in Iran have already told the government that it needs to spend an extra $5 billion this year alone to maintain its established policy of deep subsidies and to avoid rationing.
So it's quite clear that simply this international pressure -- the international climate -- is creating additional fiscal requirements for the regime to maintain state subsidies.
And we can exploit that. That is a point of entry for us.
But it's useful to note that none of this is occurring in a vacuum. Iran is already making very substantial economic counter- moves. And I'll just give you a few examples.
First, Iran has carried out large-scale transfers of financial assets from Europe to institutions in China and South East Asia, where the belief is they will be less likely to be exposed if sanctions are applied. Those sanctions are going to be mostly a European sort of endeavor.
Second, the regime has begun the initiation of a large-scale privatization of government funds -- transferring to offshore accounts, transferring them into private hands, selling off gold reserves, things like that.
And most importantly -- and I think this needs to be emphasized -- the regime, about a month ago, passed a new budget which goes into effect in the fall, in which -- which calls for a halt to imports of refined petroleum products and the institution of gasoline rationing this fall.
So in the aggregate, all of these are geared towards the same thing. These are all efforts to minimize economic vulnerabilities on the part of the Islamic republic. And they are an attempt by Iranian leadership to deny the West the ability to influence Iranian behavior, specifically on the nuclear issue.
Therefore, and I say this advisedly, the sanctions track that we're currently pursuing at the United Nations is likely to be ineffective. First of all, we have a problem with timing. The delays that we have experienced so far, and the delays we are likely to experience moving forward, allow the regime time to make these economic counter-moves that make sanctions, when they are applied, likely to be less effective than they are today.
And the second is a problem with scope. There is a need to -- (off mike) -- stragglers in our economic coalition. The Russians and the Chinese have made no secret of the fact that they are very hesitant to apply economic sanctions and, therefore, any measure that emerge as a result of the U.N. track will need to be tailored to make sure that they don't warrant a Chinese or a Russian veto. It means that they are going to be narrow in scope.
My conclusion here is that the way the administration, unfortunately, is currently pursing economic policy towards Iran is almost a guarantee that sanctions will fail. What the administration need to do and, in my opinion, needs to do in short order is to create an economic coalition of the willing in which is can go outside of the confines of the U.N. and focus on those measures that will be most effective in changing Iranian behavior, and do so absent a response from Iran in late August with regard to their nuclear program.
I say all of this advisedly, because it's not guaranteed at all that sanctions will work. In fact, the political will of the regime to acquire a nuclear capability is very strong. And historically sanctions are not isolated events. They tend to have a very strong positive correlation with escalations to the use of force.
But I think sanctions are an important step and they are a step that should be attempted because, if we don't attempt effective sanctions and if we acquiesce to the current U.N. track, this will make other options -- chief among them the eventual use of force, either by us by another country -- all the more likely. Right now, we still have the ability to attempt to use economic pressure on Iran to slow down and to curb Iran's atomic ambitions. A year from now, it is not at all guaranteed that we will have that opportunity.
Thank you.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much, Mr. Berman.
We'll move now to Mr. Davenport.
MR. ANDREW K. DAVENPORT
Vice President, Conflict Securities Advisory Group
MR. ANDREW K. DAVENPORT: Mr. Chairman, thank you for the privilege of appearing before this committee.
I'd like to speak first about the central role that Iran's oil and gas industries play in supporting virtually all facets of the Iranian government, and then focus my time on the company-specific dimensions of that equation. I'll also touch on the impact of U.S. policy on corporate decision making regarding the pursuit of these business opportunities.
In our view, three central issues define Iran's oil industry today. First, it's clear that Iran's oil exports played a key role in financially underwriting that country's government. As oil prices increase, Tehran experiences economic windfalls that have a direct impact on the government's discretionary spending across the board.
Second, despite the lucrative nature of Iran's oil exports, its energy industry as a whole has distinct weaknesses that have prevented it from reaching its full potential. Iran's oil industry is state controlled, aging, inefficient, and in need of significant upgrades that only foreign companies with their access to large-scale capital and advanced equipment and technology are capable of providing. These upgrades in foreign investment are essential for Iran to cushion the blow of increasing domestic oil consumption and aging oilfield that, together, are putting downward pressure on the country's oil exports.
Third, the country's gasoline-related expenditures have put added strain on Iran's budget. Despite booming revenues, Iran's lack of refining capacity has forced the country to spend billions of dollars importing gasoline. Moreover, the decision by Iran's parliament to lock domestic gas prices at 2003 levels has led to billions more dollars in state subsidies.
Over the coming years, the intersection of these three important energy industry pressures will put the Iranian government, and the companies that do business there, at a crossroads. With Iran almost completely dependent on its energy exports for revenues, and in desperate need of foreign investment to keep these revenues flowing, foreign companies will become even more central to the prosperity of Tehran than they are today.
The summary statistics regarding the role of oil in the Iranian economy of course tell the story. Its oil exports generate 80 (percent) to 90 percent of the country's total export earnings and 40 (percent) to 50 percent of its total government budget. Although the state-owned national Iranian oil company largely runs the country's oil industry, we understand that oil export revenues are effectively funneled straight to the country's central bank. As might be expected, oil-related revenues quite literally equate to discretionary funds for Tehran.
Although Iran's military and nuclear spending is largely unknown, it can be reasonably expected that both are benefiting directly from recent oil windfalls.
To maintain these higher revenue flows, however, not only will oil prices need to remain high, but Iran will be required to invest heavily in its existing and prospective energy projects. Most would agree that the future success of Iran's oilfields requires billions of dollars in foreign investment, capital and technology in the coming years.
Our research shows that there is no shortage of corporations currently working in Iran's oil industry. In our view, even considering the outrageous pronouncements of Iran's new president, short of international sanctions no significant number of companies will forego the country's business opportunities. History has shown time and again that companies will do what the law allows. As long as operating in Iran is legal, the draw of a growing economy and the country's vast oil and gas resources will lure them in.
There are, however, a few important exceptions.
A number of companies have correctly identified a growing sensitivity in the U.S. to business associations with Iran. The prospect of being labeled as, quote, "doing business with the enemy," unquote -- the title of a 60 Minutes segment on this issue that has aired twice over the past two years -- has influenced the behavior of some companies that place more value on their corporate reputation in the U.S. than on their business prospects in Iran. For most companies, however, this calculation is still in flux.
For at least five prominent U.S. companies, Comptroller William Thompson of New York City made this calculation a good deal easier by registering public shareholder resolutions calling for a board-level review of corporate ties to Iran and other terrorist-sponsoring states. After some wrangling, these companies made adjustments to corporate policy and, in certain cases, renounced any future business ties to Iran whatsoever.
The impact of corporate reputational concerns and market forces, however, should not only be measured by whether or not a company chooses to exit completely from Iran. One positive development -- stimulated by these concerns and increased attention to this issue from investors, the government and the media in the U.S. -- has been a new sensitivity by companies to the structure of their corporate ties to Iran. Some companies have begun to self-police their operations at standards above and beyond the requirements of their national laws to protect their reputations from potential Iran-related harm. For example, companies are substituting equipment and technology to minimize dual-use concerns and, in some cases, posing questions regarding certain local partners.
In fact, our firm is witnessing corporations insisting on certain contract terms with Iran rather than vice versa. While this may be short of what some policymakers would prefer, it demonstrates an innovative market-oriented reaction that has a high likelihood of reducing the security risks that these corporate ties can represent. In our view, this increased security consciousness, when it occurs voluntarily, should be viewed as a good thing.
Given the importance of foreign companies to the Iranian economy, one might ask what role does U.S. foreign policy play in the considerations of these companies. For a long time, the answer for non-U.S. companies has been very little. President Clinton's '95 executive order banned U.S. involvement in Iran's energy sector but had little to no impact on foreign companies, according to our research. Congress then passed the '96 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, or ILSA, which sought to sanction non-U.S. companies investing more than $20 million annually in Iran's oil and gas industries. ILSA, however, was never enforced.
Soon after the act was passed, several large companies, including France's Total and Russia's Gazprom, violated its provisions and, following an official review, went unpunished. These early precedents cleared the way for other companies to do the same. And today there are, by our estimates, over 20 companies in technical violation of ILSA.
With U.S. sanctions policy toward Iran remaining fairly consistent since the mid-'90s, one might further ask what's changed over the past years, causing changes to corporate behavior that we've been witnessing. Our findings demonstrate that, after September 11, the stigma associated with corporate ties to terrorist-sponsoring states increased significantly. This stigma reverberated in the local and national press and state and municipal governments in the U.S. began analyzing how their retirement and other public investment funds were invested in these companies.
Grassroots attention to state sponsors of terrorism raised substantially the reputational risk associated with these corporate ties. This grassroots movement continues today. For example, the Missouri Investment Trust just recently became the first public fund in the country to institute a policy that, after careful review, screens out certain companies with business in Iran and other terrorist-sponsoring states. A so-called terror-free mutual fund, the Abacus Bull Moose Growth Fund, has likewise been created in response to market demand.
As a result of this trend, some companies are rightfully seeking to safeguard their corporate operations from these types of associations. Top be clear, this is market-oriented cause and effect. According to our Global Security Risk Monitor product, over 300 publicly-traded companies have carried out business with Iran during the past three years.
As stated, short of strong multilateral sanctions, there will continue to be companies looking to enter the Iranian market or expand their corporate presence. As reputational risk increases, so too will corporate self-policing. Such new corporate governance guidelines and due diligence measures will not be lost on the state-owned companies that will have to learn to be responsive to the reputational burden that they bring to each of their prospective and existing business partners.
Thank you.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much, Dr. Davenport.
Mr. Schott.
MR. JEFFREY J. SCHOTT
Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics
MR. JEFFREY J. SCHOTT: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this committee.
My testimony today draws on my personal experience as a U.S. government official many years ago involved in the formulation and implementation of sanctions policy back in the late-'70s and early- '80s, and since then also as a researcher who has spent 25 years documenting the use of economic sanctions around the world, with my colleagues, Gary Hufbauer and Kimberly Elliott. And I think we've probably produced the most extensive study of the use of economic sanctions, where they can be successful, and their limitations, and I hope that that analysis will help the committee in its deliberations, and the Congress as it pursues legislation in the coming weeks.
There has already been very extensive discussion of Iran and sanctions and petrodollars. The questions that were raised by you and the other members of the committee in the first panel were very insightful. And I will try not to duplicate that discussion.
But there is an important point to bear in mind. Iran now pockets about an extra $30 billion of oil export revenues annually compared to a decade ago. And this oil profit, as has been said in the panel, fuelled the Iranian economy. They also finance Iranian investment in weapons development and support for terrorism.
What is good news for the ayatollahs is not good new for the United States. We are paying for these developments, and not just at the pump.
Petrodollars make Iran more capable of pursuing its nuclear ambitions and funding Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations. And importantly, it makes Iran more immune to U.S. economic coercion. And I have some differences with comments that have been made about the effectiveness of expanded sanctions, in part because I have concerns about the viability of stronger, multilateral support for our initiatives.
We have had sanctions for several decades, as Mr. Hinchey implied in his questions in the opening panel. Fortunately, one only has to look back 22 years to the bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon and the sad fact that our Marines had to return to Lebanon for the first time in 22 years just the past week or so to help the evacuation of U.S. citizens. That led to sanctions against Iran -- the first time since the hostage crisis of '79 to '81. And that put Iran on the list of state sponsors of terrorism where it belongs and where it has remained for the past 22 years.
We have had extensive unilateral sanctions. We have had very modest international support for those sanctions. And as a result, we have not achieved the very ambitious and difficult objectives that our sanctions policy has sought.
Now the question is what more can be done. I think that question makes this hearing very timely, very important, but there is no easy answer to the questions that you have raised this morning.
In the interest of time, I will jut note that, in terms of our past sanctions policy, I have appended to my statement a list or a chronology of key events in the decades-long sanctions effort. If you read that, it will be troubling, because it goes back over many events that now resonate in the headlines of the newspapers that we read every day. It's like Yogi Berra said, it's deja vu all over again. The same problems confronting U.S. policy two decades again now dominate the headlines: funding of terrorists in Lebanon; testing North Korean missiles; and Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Economic sanctions have not blunted Iran's foreign adventurism during these two decades, though they have, undoubtedly, inhibited the task and made it more costly to pursue.
Now, the Congress is considering the extension or expansion of the ILSA sanctions against Iran. I think that law should be extended -- renewed as is -- but we should be careful to assess what can be done through the use of sanctions.
Can sanctions stop Iran from eventually developing a nuclear weapon? I don't think so. I think we've let the cat out of the bag in our reactions to developments in India and Pakistan. I think the Iranians, with a very strong dose of nationalism, that would involve leadership, even if the ayatollahs were not in power -- you know, that leaders in Iran feel that nuclear weapons will bring them regional dominance and that, just like with India and Pakistan, the West will grudgingly accept their accession to the nuclear club without significant retribution.
Nonetheless, history shows that targeted sanctions can push back that day of reckoning. India, Pakistan and North Korea have all been subject to very extensive sanctions and some multilateral measures. The sanctions did not prevent proliferation, but collective denial by Western power of key ingredients and the bomb maker's art -- the reprocessing technology, centrifuges, and the like -- substantially slowed the process.
I have studied a lot of sanctions, and I know that there are lots of ways you get around sanctions. Sanctions will not prevent a determined and a well-financed country from eventually crossing the nuclear threshold. Even the tightest sanction regime can be evaded with sufficient incentive. And Saddam Hussein showed that during his reign when billions of dollars were smuggled into Iraq, sometimes with the complicity of Iran.
Land borders are porous, especially in the Middle East, and sea and airfreight are difficult to monitor effectively without intense military operations. With Iran's petrodollar bonanza, it would be difficult -- it would be able, over time, to procure the necessary material and technology to achieve its nuclear ambitions.
This is a sad reflection. And we ought to be planning how to deal with this. Now, the comments that were raised earlier that we should ratchet-up the sanctions cause me some concern, because this is not the same situation we had back in the '90s when ILSA entered into force.
Given tight global supplies, Iran has greater leverage to counter-sanction major oil-consuming nations, and it can counter- sanction in several ways. One is by cutting back its level of oil exports. It doesn't have to cut them off. It can just reduce a bit. It can do non-oil-related measured by ratcheting-up tensions in the Middle East, as it is now doing in Lebanon. And it could also do the same in Iraq. And perhaps they are doing it at the same time. That non-economic response also has to be put into the calculation of what we do.
Now, few producing nations have the spare capacity to increase shipments to offset potential Iranian cut-backs, so prices would likely rise sharply. Now, as you implied, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Simons implied in his answer to you, you could utilize releases from the SPRO -- from the strategic petroleum reserve. It's not an automatic process, especially if you want an internationally- coordinated action using the IEA's emergency sharing plan.
I sat on the governing board of the IEA on the U.S. delegation trying to do that during the second oil shock in 1980, '81, and it was a difficult process. We ended up doing nothing. The crisis was over before there was international agreement to take action. Prices went up, and then they went down as a result of global recession.
That may be the satisfactory response. But in the short term, certainly, Iran will sell less and earn more. For that reason, there are a lot of politicians who find it hard to stomach the idea of more sanctions because of its short-term impact on prices, and because it would undoubtedly trigger, at least in the short term, a global recession.
Europe, China and Japan have similar concerns and would likely only follow a very modest path of sanctions escalation. Russia will be even more ambivalent, and so will China. The Russians have a lot to gain from the -- have gained a lot from the oil price spikes that have already been generated by Mid-East tensions. They are one of the major oil producers and, indeed, they have increased their production over the last decade. And they also want to continue to cultivate Tehran as its best foothold in the Middle East. I would be very wary of thinking that we will get strong support in multilateral actions from the Russians.
So what should we do? Let me conclude with a brief commentary.
The most immediate and obvious task is continued denial of critical components for Iran's nuclear industry. The policy already receives support from major powers, but there is a lot of leakage that comes in from second-tier powers, and we ought to be concentrating our diplomacy on getting those states to try to join in the broader sanctions effort.
Other targeted sanctions against Iran's ruling class should also be considered. I think these are more annoyance -- travel restrictions, overseas asset freezes -- but Dr. Katzman perhaps can comment more on the impact that that would have on domestic Iranian politics. But the strategy of limited sanctions, accompanied by coordinated diplomacy is not going to achieve the result of denying Iran, eventually, the -- its objectives. It is to delay. And hopefully, over time, that delay will mellow Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
This is less than a satisfying result, but effectively what we can achieve given current conditions in world energy markets.
Thank you very much, sir.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you very much, Dr. Schott. That was a very good statement of observations and we appreciate it very much.
You each heard Dr. Schott. Other panelists obviously heard Dr. Schott talk about the effect of -- potential effects of sanctions. Within the context of what Dr. Schott had to say, Mr. Davenport and Mr. Berman and Mr. Katzman, would you just kind of respond and give us your thoughts relative to the context within which Dr. Schott put the subject?
MR. DAVENPORT: Sir, I'll do my best. I would have to say that, from our perspective, we spend a lot of our time at the company that I represent researching which companies in the world are -- which companies around the world are doing business in Iran and what they are doing there, and hence the focus of my testimony on the importance of those companies. And I think it has been supported really in the testimony of some of the other witnesses, which is that, you know, at present and for the future, the Iranian oil economy is highly -- and going to be highly -- dependent on the investments of foreign companies. That's really how they are going to keep up their current revenues, and it's how they are going to keep producing more and more oil in order to compensate for currently aging oilfields and their increasing domestic consumption. And as long as that's happening, I think you're going to see Iran's economy, short of oil prices falling, continuing along apace, even with U.S. sanctions in place.
So really I think that, you know, what would affect Iran's economy most substantially would be international sanctions, if they were to occur, or a severe drop in the oil price, which would impact them, I think, increasingly so as they ramp-up their budget and get rather spendy, given the current revenues that are going on now and the current president's economic policies. You're seeing -- they have -- I believe they have a budget deficit -- at current -- even given their enormous windfalls that they're experiencing from the high oil prices. So I think, you know, either oil prices fall or international sanctions are put in place. And those are really the two biggest things that I see having, you know, a negative impact on -- or a, you know, significant impact on -- their current economic situation.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you.
Mr. Berman.
MR. BERMAN: Well, thank you very much. I tend to agree about 50 percent with Mr. Schott, and let me explain why. I think he is exactly right in terms of goals. Economic sanctions cannot change the calculus of the Iranian leadership. The Iranian leadership has made it very clear that they have made a strategic choice in favor of nuclear possession.
And it's -- they have also made it clear, as a result of the last two decades, that they're willing to stomach very painful economic measures inflicted upon them from the international community, in order to achieve their goals, in order to perpetuate policy.
But I think -- let me draw in here something that hasn't been mentioned so far yet today. The goal of sanctions should not be to stop the nuclear program. If that's the goal, then we have failed. We have failed before we started. The goal should be to impress upon the Iranian people -- the 85 (percent) to 90 percent of the Iranian people that are disenfranchised from the government -- that their government, their ruling regime's goals, have concrete economic consequences, because the one thing that's very important here, and had I had more time I would have talked a little bit about public diplomacy, is the degree to which economic measures are not economic measures done in isolation. They have a diplomatic component. They have a political component.
The most important component here, in order to accentuate the effectiveness of sanctions, is to deny the regime the ability to rally the people around the flag. And that means that any economic measures have to be coupled with very robust public diplomacy that talks about the concrete consequences for their regime's adventurism.
The second point -- and this is where I part ways with Mr. Schott -- is Iranian oil power. And Mr. Chairman, you alluded to this when you asked the question of the secretary in the first panel, about what can Iran do. Is it likely to expect an oil trade disruption? And I think there are a couple of factors that mitigate strongly against that.
The Iranian regime has made very clear, and they've blustered very publicly, that they will reduce the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. They will cut off the flow of oil from the Strait of Hormuz. And they have the military capability to do that. But it's useful to remember here that Iran is dependent on, I would say, less-than-savory international customers who are its primary customer base for its energy. And it is very clear that, if Iran is no longer on the table, countries like China and countries like India will waste no time with finding more stable suppliers.
But the second point, and I think the more important point is here that, if Iran begins fiddling with the oil tap, this will do something that so far American strategy has not been able to do, which is to galvanize an international consensus about the need for a fundamental change of government in Tehran. Countries that are very dependent on Iran for oil will simply not stomach someone tinkering with a passageway through which two-fifths of the world's oil trade passes through. So I think the Iranian officials can -- the goal of what they say -- the goal of their bluster -- is to have us self- censor, to have us begin thinking about what the costs are.
But it's a very far cry for them to be actually able to do that. In fact, I think they understand. In their public and private discussions, they understand that doing so in a very robust fashion might actually be regime-threatening.
Thank you.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you.
Dr. Katzman.
MR. KATZMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My view is that Iran is single-mindedly determined to achieve a nuclear capability and they will not be deterred by economic measures. And the Iranian -- view of Iranian strategists all across the spectrum -- the perfomus (ph), the hardliners, every stripe of hardliners, others -- Iran has been humiliated by outside powers throughout its history. It has been crisscrossed by every invader imaginable. The only way to reverse this sense of vulnerability is to achieve a nuclear capability, in which case they would no longer be vulnerable, in their perception, to this type of manipulation, in their view, by outside powers.
I believe they can endure substantial economic privation. Remember, Iran -- I think -- I believe there is a perception in Washington and popularly here in America that the Tehran elites are Iran. That is not Iran. Iran is rural villages -- very poor. It is not a rich country. It is not really a well-educated country. In Tehran there are very well-educated elites who would be quite harmed and quite injured by economic privation. But the vast majority of Iranians are used to economic privation their entire lives. And I don't personally believe that any sanction will deter them from this course of pursuit.
Thank you.
REP. SAXTON: Thank you.
Mr. Hinchey.
REP. HINCHEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And gentlemen, I want to thank you very much. I think your insight today that you have provided us is very, very valuable. I wish the entire member of the House -- entire numbers of the House of Representatives could have been here to hear you. I think it would have been very beneficial to them.
Have any of you been to Iran recently? Not recently? Any of you been to Iran at all? I think that's a major problem. And I don't -- I don't say that in any way to diminish what you just said. I think what you've just said is very, very valuable and I don't mean to diminish it at all. I'm just -- I just asked that question inquisitively, because there is very little contact between our countries -- any real meaningful contact between our countries. And the situation has gotten worse over the course of the last 25 now -- almost 30 years.
Mr. Schott, you said that a lot of people, politicians particularly, have a difficult time stomaching sanctions. I think that's right. I have a hard time rationalizing them. When you look back on the history of our involvement with this country, it seems to have been deplorably unsuccessful. And it is because the relationship has been a very aggressive one. And the aggression has been primarily from our side.
I can remember, you know, when I was very, very young watching television news programs over the weekend where the Shah of Iran was the principal guest. And at that time Iran was a major ally and close friend of the United States through the shah. But the shah, over time, became less and less popular within his own country and, when that happened back in the Carter administration, we reacted in a favorable way toward the shah and an unfavorable way toward the people who deposed him. And that was really the beginning of the decline of this relationship.
And it's an unfortunate situation, because I think that the people who are making policy could very much benefit from the insights that you provide. I don't know what kind of opportunity you have to talk to this administration or particularly to the State Department. I hope it's -- I hope that you do have the opportunity because I think that there could be a great benefit from that kind of interaction.
But I would just like to ask you, I guess, one question basically. The approach that we have taken to Iran has been very unsuccessful, it seems to me -- completely unsuccessful. The likelihood of the situation improving under the present set of circumstances, I think, is remote. The response of the Iranian people to the actions that we have taken with regard to their country has been very reactionary. They have, increasingly, elected more and more reactionary leaders who are increasingly hostile to the United States and to other countries, particularly Israel.
So the circumstances that prevail today are worse than they were 10 years ago -- substantially worse than they were 30 years ago. Everything that we have done has made the situation worse -- well, I don't know about everything, but most of the things that we have done has made the situation worse.
What is it that we should be doing to make the situation better? I think it was Mr. Berman who said that he didn't have an opportunity to talk about diplomacy in his opening remarks. It seems to me that that's exactly the problem we all have. None of us have had an opportunity to talk very much about diplomacy let alone to engage in a serious diplomatic initiative with this very significant country. So I'd appreciate anything that you might care to respond to that.
Dr. Katzman, if you'd like to begin.
MR. KATZMAN: Well, I would just begin by saying that there is -- there has been engagement. And actually in the last four years, there has been substantially more engagement with Iran than ever before. Actually in 2003 for the first time, the two countries acknowledged that they were conducting an open dialog under the -- during the Clinton administration there had been talk of what the conditions might be for entering a dialog with Iran.
But the last four years, we've actually had a dialog with Iran on -- starting with Afghanistan. And Iran was extremely helpful in putting together the Karzai government at the Bonn Conference in late- 2001.
And then, there were talks with Iran on Iraq and how Iran might be helpful.
REP. HINCHEY: Dr. Katzman, if I could interrupt you.
MR. KATZMAN: Yeah.
REP. HINCHEY: What you've just said is absolutely true. Iran was very helpful with regard to Afghanistan.
MR. KATZMAN: Right.
REP. HINCHEY: And that was very important to us, because Afghanistan was the appropriate focus of our attention at that particular moment. What strikes me -- what is difficult for me to understand is why we allowed our relationship to deteriorate with them after they had been so helpful to us in Afghanistan. I was in Afghanistan in December of '01. I had a sense to see what was going on there. I understand the kinds of things that Iran and other countries did working closely with us.
Why then did the president say, for example, in his speech just a couple of months later -- or a month later -- that Iran was part of the axis of evil?
MR. KATZMAN: Well, the Iranians -- (off mike) -- as one -- something that bothers them greatly. But I would also say the dialog was suspended in May 2003 when al Qaeda activists who were in Iran were responsible for the bombing of a big housing complex in Riyahd, Saudi Arabia. Sayf al-Adl and Bin Laden's son and Sulaiman Abu Ghaith are believe to be in Iran, possibly under Iranian protection there.
REP. HINCHEY: Respectfully, though, Doctor, you take a big jump in time between '01 and now '03. The curious question is, what did we allow to happen or what did happen in that intervening period that caused the situation to deteriorate so much.
MR. KATZMAN: Again, I'm not speaking for the -- there were -- there was -- I -- what I understand is there was consideration of building on the Afghan initiative, the Iraq initiative, but there was a sense that Iran was still doing things we found objectionable, such as the nuclear -- remember in '02,, late-'02, the revelation of the major nuclear sites was unveiled. And so, while Iran may have been helpful on Afghanistan and Iraq, we had this other track happening where it suddenly became apparent that Iran was much more advanced in its nuclear program than we had previously thought. And that might have factored into why this dialog was not built on.
MR. BERMAN: Sir, a couple of points -- you made the case that our approach has been spectacularly unsuccessful. I would argue that we haven't really had much of an approach at all. In fact, for the last eight years, 10 years, what you've actually had in Washington is two competing camps -- one camp that thought that we could do business with the Iranian government, first manifested by reformist cleric Mohammad Khatami, and then even some people who said that we could talk to the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
On the other hand, you have a camp of people who say that this is a government that is un-reformable and we simply can't talk to them. And the result of that clash, predictably, has been policy inertia. And I think that's actually been translated very much into some of the things that this administration has done. That legacy is still there.
So I would say that your point is well taken, but I think it might not be because we've tried everything at our disposal. It might be because we are putting heads with ourselves.
The second point is, you made reference to the election of Mohammad Khatami, and I think the more appropriate term here is selection, because what's important to remember here is there weren't two presidential run-offs. There was one in June and there was one in July. There was -- actually three months before that in March -- a situation where the Iranian government's vetting authority excluded more than 1,000 potential candidates for president. The eight that remained, that participated in the first round, might have talked a different talk, but they all walked the same walk. None of them were going to pursue policies that would be threatening to the longevity of the Islamic republic.
And in the final stage, in the run-off between former President Rafsanjani and the now-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it's important to remember why Ahmadinejad won. All politics is ultimately local. Ahmadinejad ran on a campaign that was populist. It was against corruption. It was basically pointing to his opponent and saying, these people have robbed you, the Iranian people, of your deserved wealth. Stick with me and I'll make it better. He hasn't. And this is where I think there is an opportunity for the United States.
Ahmadinejad, for the last year, had the opportunity to pursue very populist policies, and he's done some sort of things, tinkering on the margins of agrarian reform and land reform. But what he hasn't done is actually reconstruct, as he promised to do, the relationship between the government and the people in terms of trickle-down economics, if you will.
That's an opportunity for the United States, because the Iranians substantively are still economically disenfranchised from the government. That doesn't mean that they will be moving into the future. If Ahmadinejad is smart, and he begins implementing social policies that address some of those needs, you will see a fracturing of that base of Iranians that, right now, does not see any economic opportunity for them in the perpetuation of the Islamic republic.
But it's useful to remember, as we go into this deliberation process, that so far that hasn't happened.
MR. DAVENPORT: I'll have to defer to some extent to the other witnesses up here, as my company has skipped that part here. But we're impartial data providers and we don't have a policy angle on the things we do.
But what I would like to say is whether or not, you know, you would agree with the government track of the government here with respect to Iran. What we're witnessing is, in the private sector, a number of Americans at the local level and most notably in the investment community taking matters, to some extent, into their own hands via a form of, what has been called in the past, socially- responsible investing, which is also termed values-based investing. And based on their own opinions of what's going on, are going, in some cases, where American policy and regulatory regimes can't, which is taking actions with respect to U.S. and foreign companies doing business in these countries, taking a look at exactly what they're doing, and deciding for themselves whether or not they want a part of it.
And in some cases they are screening out, you know, on a range of criteria; and in other cases, they're screening out these companies all together. And I think that is an element -- is becoming an element in the international dynamic as that community grows.
MR. SCHOTT: As in the first panel, Mr. Hinchey, you have put your finger on the key question. Are we make -- is U.S. policy making things better, or moving us towards meeting U.S. objectives, or is making things worse?
And I strongly disagree with some of the commentary on this panel that we haven't had a policy. We have had a very clear policy dealing with a very difficult and volatile situation.
The policy started back, as you rightly mentioned, in the '70s when we played Iranian politics the wrong way -- ended up in the hostage crisis -- and we used economic sanctions very intensively and, ultimately, somewhat successfully to provide bargaining chips to get our people home after 444 days.
But that created a sense of tension and animosity that carried over. Clearly, the Iranians had the capability to export their adventurism, and they did so, and that led to the sanctions regime starting in '84. That was manageable. We followed a policy of containment as opposed to a policy of military response. And given the situation in the Middle East, given the lack of strong multilateral support back in the '80s and the '90s and even today, it probably was the best of a bad set of options to follow.
Any containment policy is going to have tensions among domestic groups. There is going to be cheating. There is going to be those who say,