Speeches and Testimony

Speeches and Testimony
April 21, 2016
The nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 was officially implemented in January 2016.  As a result, Iran has agreed to restrict the most worrisome parts of its known nuclear program—in particular, its uranium enrichment capability—for a period of about ten years.  It is wrong to assume, however, that the proliferation problem has been...
Speeches and Testimony
June 19, 2015
Throughout the ongoing talks on Iran’s nuclear program, the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control and Iran Watch have been supportive of a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue but concerned about the potential ramifications for the future of the non-proliferation regime.
Speeches and Testimony
March 3, 2014
Last week, my organization received a call from a staff member on Capitol Hill who had an interesting question: how much nuclear energy could Iran produce with its current stockpile of enriched uranium? The staff member, like most journalists and even the public, was under the impression that Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium might be...
Speeches and Testimony
March 5, 2012
The assessment of my organization is that Iran will have limited nuclear weapon "breakout" capability by the end of this year, meaning the ability to produce fuel for one or more nuclear weapons in a short time. To be clear, this doesn't mean a nuclear arsenal by the end of the year - more work would be necessary. Rather, the basic requirements...
Speeches and Testimony
July 9, 2009
The Export Administration Act (EAA) is the foundation of our system for controlling the export of dual-use, militarily sensitive technologies from the United States. For most of the last two decades, this key statute has been in lapse. The dual-use export control system has continued to operate on an emergency basis, under the authority of the...
Speeches and Testimony
May 20, 2008
For over a decade, we have seen a consistent push by industry to weaken U.S. controls on the export of militarily sensitive technologies. Though tasked with protecting U.S. national security, successive administrations have succumbed to the pressure to "modernize" export controls and to make them less "burdensome" and more "efficient." The result...
Speeches and Testimony
July 25, 2007
First, I should say that our best opportunity to stop, or at least slow down Iran's nuclear progress was in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan was supplying the foundation for Iran's present centrifuge program. Khan was a known nuclear smuggler, having stolen designs from Europe for a uranium enrichment plant in...
Speeches and Testimony
April 26, 2006
The Committee is right to emphasize the strategic nature of the plan. The legislation to implement it goes to the heart of our national security. The bill now before Congress would change our export control laws - laws that have been in effect for almost thirty years, and that were adopted in response to India's nuclear test in 1974. It is worth...
Speeches and Testimony
March 8, 2006
As the committee knows, the Iranian nuclear dispute has reached a turning point. Iran has rejected efforts by Britain, France and Germany to resolve things diplomatically. It has not accepted Russia's offer to shift Iran's nuclear enrichment work to Russian soil. And it has rejected repeated calls by these four countries, by China, and by the...
Speeches and Testimony
May 19, 2005
I will concentrate my remarks upon the present negotiations Iran is conducting with Britain, France and Germany. First, I would like to point out that the deal struck among these countries in November should be seen as a tactical step. It was intended to buy time, and to provide an opening for continued talks. It should not be seen as a answer to...

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