BASIC: O'Sullivan on US and EU Approaches to Iran

PRESSURE FOR ENHANCED IAEA INSPECTIONS GROWS: UPDATE ON RESPONSES TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
BY LYNNE O'SULLIVAN

BASIC NOTES:
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

June 19, 2003

IAEA Report

Dr. ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, led the IAEA inspection team in Iran in February 2003 to investigate claims that Iran had violated its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments. Dr. ElBaradei had previously met with the Board in March 2003 to report his ongoing communication with the Iranian government regarding its nuclear programme. Subsequently, the inspection team commenced "extensive verification activities"[i] in Iran. The results of the investigations were in Iran was contained in Dr. ElBaradei's report to the IAEA Board of Directors on 16 June.

In his introductory statement, Dr. ElBaradei summarised the main findings of the investigation in Iran to date. He concluded that Iran has neglected its responsibility to report certain nuclear materials and activities. He stressed that the IAEA is continuing efforts to ensure that the nuclear material in Iran could be identified, declared and placed under international safeguards. Dr. ElBaradei listed some aspects of the Iranian nuclear programme that require further examination including the "research and development work relevant to [Iran's] uranium conversion and enrichment programme and its programme for the use of heavy water".[ii]

Dr. ElBaradei outlined the investigative processes the IAEA team is utilising in Iran: technical discussion, inspection of specific sites and environmental sample analysis. He briefly referred to the existence of a site that required further examination. The inspection team has not yet been granted full access to this site by the Iranian government and has been unable to take environmental samples. He acknowledged the allegations that there were "enrichment activities"[iii] within the site but this cannot be confirmed without additional samples.

Dr. ElBaradei stated, "corrective actions are being taken in cooperation with the Iranian authorities".[iv] However, he also urged Iran to bring an Addition Protocol into operation so that the IAEA could confirm its peaceful nuclear aspirations and stated that the investigation into the Iranian nuclear programme would continue.

US Fears

The next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors is scheduled for September 2003. Many international state actors, most notably the Bush administration, will be seeking a definitive response before then to encourage Iran to sign the Additional Protocols stipulated by the IAEA. The United States is eager for IAEA inspectors to have complete access to all nuclear sites and ascertain if the activities at these sites are in keeping with Iran's NPT commitments. The fear remains that Iran is pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme without the knowledge of IAEA investigators. This is possible, given that Iran has already made advances in nuclear technology without the international community being aware of it.

The United States is seeking multilateral cooperation on this issue and seems to be encouraging an IAEA response that recognizes US concerns with the Iranian programme and credibly addresses those concerns. Although it is already the organisation's largest donor, the United States aims to increase the IAEA's budget by twenty-five per cent by donating an extra $30m.[v] This would allow the IAEA to strengthen its monitoring of nuclear activities in Iran and be more effective in ensuring NPT compliance.

EU Response

The IAEA was one of the main topics of discussion at the EU foreign ministers meeting on 16 June. The outcome of this meeting was an unprecedented agreement on a common policy on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The "Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD" document was issued in conjunction with an "Action Plan" to facilitate its implementation.[vi] These common policy documents are significant as they declare the possible use of "coercive measures" to prevent the proliferation of WMD. These measures would only be utilised after diplomatic and economic measures have been exhausted and would be carried out multilaterally under the auspices of the United Nations. Prevention of proliferation will be initially addressed through non-military channels, including political dialogue and multilateral treaties. The documents also state that economic sanctions, blockades and export controls can be imposed before the use of force is considered. These two policy documents reaffirm the EU's commitment to international institutions and stipulate that the use of force must only be taken "in accordance with the United Nations Charter". Nevertheless, the EU's commitment to consider joint military action represents a departure from previous European policies.

In a Radio 4 interview on 17 June, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw outlined the UK's policy towards Iran. He stated that the British government would continue to pursue "constructive and conditional engagement" with the Iranian government. But in a rapidly developing story the stakes were raised the next day, with reports that to comply with demands to halt its nuclear programme. The proposed sanction would be the loss of a valuable trade deal with the EU. While Britain appears to be trying to avoid another damaging rift between Europe and America, Although in its policy with regard to Iraq, the British Government is the United States' greatest European supporter in the US-led 'coalition of the willing', it has not reacted to the situation in Iran as strongly as the Bush administration. It is likely that the British Government will adhere to the strategy defined by the EU and only consider military options once all other alternatives have been exhausted.

Opinion among European governments regarding Iraq was divided and the EU was unable to issue a cohesive policy response. The EU's inability to present a policy alternative to the US-led war in Iraq may have encouraged member states to go the extra mile to formulate a collective strategy in addressing WMD proliferation. The EU has also advocated increased funding for the IAEA to facilitate more intrusive inspections. Although the foreign ministers did not specifically refer to the Iranian situation, the unfolding circumstances doubtless influenced their discussions.

Conclusion

The continuing US support for the IAEA's role in Iran indicates that the Bush administration may be willing to let international efforts lead the way on Iranian policy, at least for now. Or, it may indicate that the Bush administration has not yet formulated a clear policy, especially as its military is currently so widely dispersed. Simultaneously, the EU has seemingly accepted the possibility of using force against a potential 'rogue' nuclear state. It is therefore possible that the United States and the EU may arrive at a common policy regarding Iran.

The EU policy document can be seen as a positive development. The proliferation of WMD has become a divisive issue and it is important that the EU has a stated and coherent policy. It is vital that viable policy alternatives are developed and pursued before military options become necessary. The EU's proactive response provides tools for conflict prevention and may decrease the potential of unilateral US action. Russia has been intrinsically involved in the Iranian nuclear programme but has cooperated in diplomatic efforts to encourage Iran to declare its nuclear intentions. Russia's collaboration with the United States and the EU has become part of a cohesive international endeavour to resolve the ambiguous situation in Iran.

The unfolding situation in Iran should be distinguished from the recent conflict in Iraq and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea. It is essential that the EU and US establish and analyse the situation before taking authoritative action.The IAEA will play a vital role in evaluating the Iranian nuclear programme and determining the intentions of the Iranian government.At the moment, administrations on both sides of the Atlantic are awaiting a definitive statement from the IAEA, which is likely to precede any further transatlantic upping of the ante in Iran.

Endnotes

[i] Full statement available at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n011.shtml 16 June 2003
[ii] ibid.
[iii] ibid.
[iv] ibid.
[v] Tett, Gillian, Dempsey, J. and Bozorgmehr, Najmeh, 'US seeks more cash for nuclear watchdog'
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1054966154745&p=1012571727102
16 June 2003
[vi] Council of the European Union, Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10352/03, Brussels, 10 June 2003; and Council of the European Union, Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10354/1/03, Brussels, 13 June 2003.