A report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), leaked on June 3, 2004, claimed that Iran was still making parts and materials that could be used in the manufacture of nuclear arms. Iran also admitted, according to the dossier, that it imported parts for advanced centrifuges. These can be used to enrich uranium, even though Iran promised last year to halt all such acitivities. The Islamic republic, however, continues to insist that its nuclear program is meant for peaceful energy purposes. That very claim has been the focus of IAEA's attention for more than a year now, and its board of governors will meet on June 14 to discuss collected information. This new twist highlights Iran's enduring sense of insecurity in a highly unstable and volatile region. As long as the state feels threatened from regional as well as global powers, it will persist in acquiring nuclear weapons, a goal it set out to achieve more than thirty years ago.

Ambitious Beginnings

The Iranian nuclear program dates back to the early 1970s, when events in the region alarmed the Shah, a key American ally. The Shah was supplied with Iran's first nuclear reactor by the United States in 1967, to help Iran cope with its electricity needs as well as to provide reactor-building American companies with lucrative contracts. The 5-megawatt reactor was set up at Amirabad Nuclear Research Center (now called the Amirabad Technical College) in Tehran, and has operated since. It uses a core with 93 percent enriched uranium which is suitable for some forms of nuclear weapons, and can produce up to 600 grams of plutonium per year in its spent fuel. Soon, the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, and the subsequent increase in the price of oil, provided Iran with an incentive to develop a more ambitious nuclear program. The Shah quickly established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974. Soon, extendible ten-year contracts for nuclear fuel were signed with the United States, Germany, and France. Even though Iran ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970, the Shah authorized a clandestine low-level nuclear research program at the Amirabad Research Center. This research effort included programs to study weapons designs and plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel, as well as laser enrichment which began in 1975. Concurrently, Iran devised ways to obtain plutonium, and set up a secret reprocessing research program to use enriched uranium.

Foreign Assistance

In 1976, Iran signed a secret contract to buy $700 million worth of yellow cake from South Africa, and appears to have reached an agreement to buy up to 1,000 metric tons annually.  It is unclear how much of this ore South Africa shipped before it agreed to adopt IAEA export restrictions in 1984, and whether it honored them. Some sources indicate that South Africa still made major deliveries as late as 1988 or 1989. In the late seventies, Iran also tried to purchase 26.2 kilograms of highly enriched uranium but failed to do so. By the time the Shah fell in 1979, he had "six reactors under contract, and was attempting to purchase a total of 12 nuclear power plants from Germany, France, and the United States. Two 1,300 megawatt German nuclear power plants at Bushehr were already 60 percent and 75 percent completed, and site preparation work had begun on the first of two 935-megawatt French plants at Darkhouin. Thousands of Iranians were training in nuclear technology in France, the Germany, India, the UK, and the United States."[i]

Out with the Old

After the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian nuclear program was ignored. The government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan decided that Iran did not need nuclear energy, and therefore the work at Bushehr was halted. French and German contracts were terminated, and soon all nuclear programs collapsed. According to some records, the nuclear cadre was reduced to only 13 people. But when the Iran-Iraq war broke out, the Iranian government began to rethink its nuclear policy. During the campaign, Iraq bombed Bushehr six times while also using missiles from 1986 to 1987 to target Iran's industrial centers. The Khomeini government was extremely agitated at the lack of international condemnation of Iraqis' use of chemical weapons against Iran and felt betrayed by the global community. A nuclear deterrent was thus, considered vital for preserving Iranian sovereignty and national pride. During the 1980s, therefore, the nuclear program was not only revitalized but underwent rapid development.

Rejuvenation of the Program

The Iranian government provided new funds to the research teams operating the U.S.-supplied reactor at the Amirabad Nuclear Research Center. With French assistance, experts and equipment from the research center were moved to a new nuclear weapons research facility near Isfahan in the mid-1980s, while a new research center was established by the University of Isfahan in 1984. Iran sought French and Pakistani help for a new research reactor for this center, which was built "at a scale far beyond the needs of peaceful research."[ii] Unable to achieve a reactor from these two states, it had more luck with the People's Republic of China. Still, during this period all Iranian nuclear facilities except the one at Isfahan followed IAEA regulations and were subjected to standard inspections.

Iran's nuclear programs accelerated even more in the late 1980s, when it established a yellow cake plant in the uranium-rich Yazd Province in 1987, and a possible uranium processing or enrichment facility at Pilcaniyeu. Iran may also have opened a new uranium ore processing plant close to its Shagand uranium mine in March 1990 and it possibly extended its search for uranium ore into three additional areas. Furthermore, Iran may have also begun to exploit stocks of yellow cake that the Shah had obtained from South Africa in the late 1970s while obtaining uranium dioxide from Argentina by purchasing it through Algeria. By 1990, the new Jabir Ibn al Hayyan laboratory had been set up to train Iranian nuclear technicians. Reports surfaced that Iran had at least 200 scientists and a work force of about 2,000 devoted to nuclear research.

Secret Collaborations

Throughout the last decade, Iran was able to acquire from other countries various parts and machinery used in the production of nuclear weapons. China and Russia were chief suppliers. China supplied two subcritical reactors, an open tank facility and a graphite moderated reactor in 1992 for the Isfahan Research reactor, while providing information on plutonium separation in 1994.  The Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG) assisted Iran with uranium exploration but, most importantly, the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Plasma Physics built and installed a tokomak fusion research reactor in 1993 to 1994 at Azad University, which could potentially be applied in designing thermonuclear weapons. Also during the 1990s, Iran signed numerous deals with Russia concerning its nuclear program, including an attempt to purchase fissile material. Under severe American pressure, Russia agreed to cancel its deals with Iran, but later may still have supplied 2,000 tons of natural uranium to Iran. It is suspected that Iran acquired URENCO centrifuge designs from Pakistani scientists in the late nineties, and tried to buy highly enriched fissile material from Kazakhstan.

American Pressure and Scrutiny

It was due to intense U.S. demands that many states such as India, Germany, Ukraine, and France agreed to cancel their agreements with Iran on several programs related to nuclear technology. China also pledged in October 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran but said it would complete cooperation on two ongoing nuclear projects- a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Isfahan that Iran would use to produce cladding for reactor fuel. So far, the pledge appears to be holding. As a party to the NPT, Iran is required to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but safeguards are not required for the zirconium plant or its products. Iran also signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. A Department of Defense report in January 2001 accused Iran of seeking fissile material and technology for weapons development and not for the purpose of civilian programs as Iran has often claimed. It declared that Iran's biggest hurdle in manufacturing nuclear weapons is procurement of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. For this purpose, one of Iran's primary goals is the acquisition of a heavy water-moderated, natural uranium-fueled nuclear reactor and associated facilities. These could be acquired through foreign assistance, especially from China and Russia.

Cause for Alarm

The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) estimates of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons have been ever-changing. In 1992, the CIA estimated that Iran would have the bomb by 2000, but in 1995, that estimate was pushed to 2003. In 1997, it was declared that Iran could have the bomb by 2005-2007. In 2000, however, the CIA warned that Iran might already possess the ability to make a bomb. The diversity of these estimates highlights the lack of substantial intelligence available concerning the Iranian nuclear program. Nonetheless, the CIA maintains that Iran has the design but lacks fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Thus, as soon as it acquires the material, it theoretically could produce weapons in one to two years; or if it develops the capability to either process plutonium or enrich uranium, then it theoretically could take Iran five to ten years to acquire nuclear weapons. The CIA has warned repeatedly that Iran is persistently trying to purchase nuclear technology as well as uranium-enriching materials.

Denials and Contradictions

Iranian officials maintain that all such efforts are directed solely at establishing electricity-producing nuclear power plants, and are not linked in any way to Iran's military programs. The government likes to claim that it is the victim of an American propaganda war. In August 2002, however, an Iranian opposition group disclosed that Iran was secretly building a heavy water production plant and a "nuclear fuel" plant. Press reports later in the year confirmed the existence of two facilities and clarified that the "fuel" plant was most likely a large uranium centrifuge enrichment facility located at Natanz. Commercial imagery showed that Iran was burying the enrichment facility presumably to hide and harden it against military attack. Thus, it is of critical importance for the IAEA to continuously monitor and inspect Iranian facilities as well as its procurement of nuclear technology to ensure compliance with the NPT as well as IAEA regulations.

The Latest Report

The IAEA has been involved for more than a year in gaining official records and conducting inspections of Iranian facilities. During this process, Iran has been less than honest about its procurements, often providing contradictory statements. A year ago, it agreed to halt enriching uranium at its facilities, and two months back, pledged to suspend its nuclear program. But the recently-leaked report by the IAEA contradicts Iran's declarations. It confirms that Iran has been doing research on P-2 centrifuges for years, including the production of sample parts, and has provided photos and information to the IAEA. More significantly, Iran has finally admitted that it did import critical parts for advanced P-2 centrifuges, which can be used for energy purposes or to enrich uranium to weapons grade. Earlier, Iran had insisted that these centrifuges were built domestically, but now have conceded that they were indeed imported. Also, the report said Iran's explanation for how its earlier P-1 centrifuges became contaminated with highly enriched uranium appeared to be false. The Iranians said the contamination had been on the equipment when it arrived from Pakistan. But earlier this year inspectors discovered that the equipment contained traces of 36 percent enriched uranium, evidence that it might have come from Russia, where 36 percent enrichment is used in certain submarine engines and research reactors. This ruled out the Iranian assertions.

The IAEA claims that three workshops in Iran were still making centrifuge parts despite Tehran's claim on April 9 to have suspended uranium enrichment and related activities. In addition, it says, Iran is preparing to make uranium hexafluoride, the material that is fed into centrifuges to produce enriched uranium. As the centrifuges spin, they enrich uranium to a purity that is useful for nuclear reactors and, in higher concentrations, for nuclear weapons. The report also said the Iranians had secretly sought to obtain magnets to make at least 4,000 P-2 centrifuges, a second-generation Pakistani model. Lastly, the leaked report claims that Iran has now admitted achieving much higher levels of laser enrichment than it had previously told the IAEA. The dossier has highlighted the falsity of Iranian claims, and has brought its nuclear program back into focus. Therefore, when the IAEA board of governors meet on June 14, the report will be discussed and a possible course of action against Iran be laid out.

An Atmosphere of Insecurity

Iran has had the misfortune of being located in a tough neighborhood. Possibly the world's most unstable and volatile region, Iran is sandwiched between American-dominated Afghanistan and Iraq. Its arch-rival Israel has a massive nuclear arsenal, the only one in the region, with effective delivery systems that exacerbate Iranian insecurities. Furthermore, Iran is alarmed by the nuclearization of South Asia, growing ties between Israel and Turkey, and anxious bids for oil access in the region. Sanctions by the United States, continued calls for democracy, and including Iran in the infamous "axis of evil" have likely worked toward reaffirming Tehran's belief in the utility of unconventional weapons as ultimate guarantors of security. Some Iranian leaders have come to see weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic and cruise missiles together as their vital allies.

Some believe that the Iranian government wants to develop nuclear weapons in order to boost national pride and gain international recognition. Many Iranian do in fact buy into those reasons, but they are merely tools used by the Iranian leadership in gaining public support and are not really motivating factors. Many countries have avoided plunging into the nuclear world, even though they possess the capability to do so and the most crucial variable seems to be the level of insecurity felt by states. The more threatened a state feels in its own neighborhood, the more the incentive to develop the ultimate deterrent. Therefore, states such as South Africa, Japan, Germany, and Brazil (now under pressure due to Argentinean efforts) have avoided following the same path, as they don't perceive an immediate regional threat.

Iran suffers from an enduring sense of insecurity that must be alleviated if the world wants to see the country disarm its nuclear program. Its security and territorial integrity must be assured, while actively engaging with the current reformist regime to roll back its nuclear plans. As with Libya, a strategy of 'carrots and stick' must be employed to help Iran reach political and economic openness, while avoiding hostile labeling and aggressive rhetoric.

Sources:

Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons," Center for Strategic and International Studies,

http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/countries/country.asp?ID=2&country=Iran

Anthony H. Cordesman, "Proliferation in the "Axis of Evil": North Korea, Iran, and Iraq," Center for Strategic and International Studies,

http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/countries/country.asp?ID=2&country=Iran

Andrew Koch, Jeanette Wolf, "Nuclear Facilities: a Profile" and "Appendix: Selected Iranian Nuclear Imports," Center for Nonproliferation Studies,

www.cns.miis.edu/

Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, Miriam Rajkumar, "Deadly Arsenals," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/countries/country.asp?ID=2&country=Iran

Marshall Breit, "Carnegie Fact Sheet: Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/countries/country.asp?ID=2&country=Iran

William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "Iran Still Making Nuclear Materials, U.N. Agency Says," The New York Times, June 2, 2004

"Nuclear Report Casts Doubt on Iran's Centrifuges," CNN, Tuesday, June 1, 2004, www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/01/nuclear.iran/index.html

"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," CIA, August 10, 2000. 1 July through 31 December 1999 internet edition,

http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2001.htm

"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Director General, IAEA, June 1, 2004.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2004/040601-iaea.pdf

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