AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN
CO-CHAIRS
PROJECT DIRECTOR
Speaker: Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser,
1977-81
Speaker: Robert M. Gates, Director of Central Intelligence,
1991-93
Speaker: Suzanne Maloney, Director, Independent
Task Force on Iran
Moderator: Lee Feinstein, Senior Fellow and Executive
Director, Task Force Program, Council on Foreign Relations
LEE FEINSTEIN: Good morning. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. I'm Lee Feinstein. The occasion today is the release of the independent task force report on U.S. relations towards Iran. Unlike most Council sessions, this meeting is on the record.
This task force, sponsored by the Council, was established in January 2004, 25 years after Iran's revolution, the hostage-taking, and the rupture in relations between Tehran and Washington. Today, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have positioned American troops along Iran's borders, making the United States and Iran wary competitors and neighbors who, nonetheless, possess some overlapping interests.
This task force met four times to discuss these issues. Its starting point, and what distinguishes this effort from several others, is the task force's focus on Iran's domestic situation in order to illuminate and clarify the context for U.S. foreign policy toward Iran.
To discuss the report, we have the leadership of the task force, Drs. Brzezinski and Gates, and Suzanne Maloney, the task force director. You have their bios in your packet. But I'll just briefly say that Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter and author most recently of "The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership." Dr. Gates served as director of central intelligence from 1991 to 1993, and he is president of Texas A&M University. And Suzanne Maloney, a former fellow at the Brookings Institution, is the author of the forthcoming book, "Ayatollah Gorbachev: The Politics of Change in Khatami's Iran."
On behalf of [Council President] Richard Haass and the entire Council, I want to thank our three panelists for all of their excellent work on this report and our task force members, several of whom are with us today.
If you haven't already, please turn off your cell phones. The format for today's meeting will be that Dr. Brzezinski and Dr. Gates will make brief opening comments, then I'll be happy to recognize you and all three of our panelists will be happy to field your questions. With that, we'll begin with Dr. Brzezinski.
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Let me make just a few preliminary and somewhat general comments. The fact is that the United States is now engaged on a very significant scale in a huge swath of Eurasia. Much like American engagement in Western Europe when the Cold War started, the United States has undertaken a very major task: to contribute, hopefully, to the stabilization of a very volatile region of the world, one in which we have major interests which are threatened by conflict, violence, terrorism.
That area is enormous. It ranges from the Suez Canal to the western Chinese frontier in Xinjiang, from the southern Russian frontier along the line with Kazakhstan all the way down to the Pakistani shores on the Arabian Sea. Five hundred and fifty million people live in that area.
And we're engaged in Iraq. We are involved in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. We are concerned about stability in the Arabian Peninsula. We are militarily engaged also in Afghanistan. We are indirectly involved in the future of Pakistan and to some extent even some parts of Central Asia.
In the middle, in the very middle if that huge region--which I call the global Balkans because it is like the 19th century European Balkans, an area of internal insecurity that draws in major powers--in the middle of these global Balkans lies Iran, a country of 70 million people, a country with a grand history, with a sense of its own worth, with its own security concerns, with its own political, perhaps even theological, ambitions.
Therefore, the American relationship with Iran is of importance to the outcome of that grand undertaking in which we have become involved. And we have to ask ourselves how best to handle that relationship with Iran. It has been a relationship of intense antagonism. It could become a collision, but perhaps there are the makings of somewhat ameliorating the relationship in between the two sides.
In the approach that we have developed, we exclude two very major options as either counterproductive to our interests, or as unattainable. A direct military collision would have far-reaching effects for the region. Certainly Iran, while militarily massively inferior to American military power, has the potential for greatly complicating what we're trying to do in that entire region. Just think of what the Iranians could do relative to Afghanistan or to Iraq, just to mention two.
We also tend to be skeptical about the possibility of a grand bargain that would promptly and sweepingly resolve the issues in the American-Iranian relationship. We feel that while that has some attraction, the issues are so complex, so deeply rooted, so interwoven that an attempt at a grand bargain might well produce not only a failure but even a setback.
And it is in this context that we are urging a policy of cautious, selected, probing, national interest-oriented engagement with Iran to see if it is possible to begin to address some of the issues in the relationship between us. Iran ultimately cannot have an interest simply in massive unrest in that region, because it, too, has security problems and security risks. It is surrounded by neighbors who in different ways could place in jeopardy Iranian interests. So perhaps there is something to explore.
And therefore we advocate a process of seeking to establish whether some areas in this complex relationship could become the subject of a dialogue, whether perhaps it might be possible to formulate some principles that will guide the further evolution of the relationship, as was done between the United States and communist China in 1972. You might remember that the statement of principles between the United States and China in 1972 did not resolve any of the major issues, but pointed a way towards the resolution, and subsequently they were resolved [inaudible] seven years later through normalization of relations. Perhaps an exploration of a statement of principles regarding the region, regarding also the bilateral relationship, may be a feasible way of proceeding.
In effect what we are advocating is what we feel is a tough-minded, realistic approach to a complex relationship in which we have no illusions as to whom we're dealing with, but a relationship which perhaps can gradually be moderated, and central contentious issues be effectively addressed, mitigated, perhaps eventually resolved. And we believe that it is better to see whether it is possible to draw Iran into contributing to regional stability rather than to be attracted by the idea of undermining the region and combating our efforts to stabilize it.
FEINSTEIN: Thank you. Dr. Gates?
ROBERT GATES: I'd like to--before summarizing the task force's conclusions on Iran's nuclear program and its involvement in regional conflicts and terrorism, I'd like to make several personal observations about our conclusions and recommendations.
First, this report is not intended to be critical of current or previous U.S. administrations, each of which, since the Iranian revolution, has attempted to engage with Tehran. The task force and the recommendations both originate from the fact that U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have dramatically reshaped the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and in so doing, have perhaps created new opportunities.
As Zbig suggested, we have no illusions about Iran's policies, its politics, or its behavior. We are fully aware of its nuclear ambitions, its history of involvement with and support for terrorist groups, its ambiguous behavior with respect to the changes in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its record on human rights. The issue is how to bring Iran to alter these policies and behaviors.
One option is to try to force a change in regime. But absent major military action, I believe this is highly unlikely to be attempted, and if attempted, to be successful.
Second is the use of military force. But given current U.S. military commitments and the political environment, this possibility also seems remote.
The third option is some form of engagement. Our involvement on the nuclear issue could ensure more rigorous inspections, it could move the Europeans toward multilateral sanctions if Iran is unwilling to curtail its activities, and it could offer some inducements that might actually have prospects of success. Engagement could encourage Iran to adopt a more clear, positive attitude toward the new governments in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and it could also create opportunities for greater interaction between Iranians and the rest of the world.
In all candor, the history of the last 25 years does not offer much encouragement that any part of this will be successful. However, a serious attempt could result in greater international support, should the failure of diplomacy necessitate reliance on other means.
The realistic alternative to our suggestions, it seems to me, is U.S. isolation and impotence in dealing with Iranian behaviors of concern, a situation characterized by no military action, no involvement in diplomacy and no influence over developments or outcomes. Our effort has been aimed entirely at how to advance U.S. security interests.
Now let me summarize--these are, again, my personal views. Let me just quickly summarize our recommendations with respect to the nuclear program and regional conflicts. Recent revelations have given rise to new doubts about Iran's commitment to its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty (http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/). According to the IAEA (www.iaea.org) [International Atomic Energy Agency], Iran has achieved a practically complete front-end of a nuclear fuel cycle and appears to have assembled a multi-pronged effort to acquire and or produce fissile material. Iran's nuclear ambitions reflect its perceptions of potential threats, as well as the view that a nuclear capability would have utility as a deterrent.
The program has broad support among different political factions in Iran and dates back to the pre-revolutionary period. For this reason, we believe that regime change in Tehran would not necessarily produce an abandonment of these nuclear ambitions. In the short term, we recommend working with our allies to press Iran to fulfill its October 2003 commitment [to the IAEA] to fully suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and urging the IAEA to exercise its rights under the additional protocol vigorously, to prevent clandestine activities.
Over the long term, we recommend pursuing an agreement with Iran that would represent the type of more-for-more approach outlined several years ago in a study chaired by Deputy Secretary of State [Richard] Armitage with respect to North Korea. Such an agreement would demand more from the Iranians in terms of rigorous oversight of their nuclear program, including permanent renunciation of uranium enrichment and other fuel cycle capabilities, and ratification of the additional protocol, an expanded set of safeguards intended to verify the peaceful intentions of its nuclear program. In return, the U.S. would remove its objections to a civil nuclear program under stringent safeguards and, along with our allies, would commit to providing fuel at reasonable rates for Iran's reactors. Such an agreement would also commit both sides to enhancing political and economic relations.
Throughout any dialogue, Tehran must clearly understand that unless it demonstrates real, uninterrupted cooperation with the IAEA process, it will face the prospect of multilateral sanctions by the U.N. Security Council. Over the longer term, we should aim to convene a dialogue on issues of cooperative security involving Iran and other nuclear-armed neighbors.
The task force also devoted considerable time to Iran's involvement in the conflicts of the region, particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq, and between Israelis and Palestinians. We believe that Iran has considerable influence in all three arenas and can play an important role in either assisting, or impeding, U.S. objectives.
Broadly speaking, we advocate engaging with Iran in a direct dialogue on specific issues of regional stabilization, to encourage a constructive Iranian posture in Iraq and Afghanistan. We also urge Washington to play an active role in the Middle East peace process, and to press Arab leaders to support that process and any ultimate agreements, as these efforts will help marginalize the destabilizing forces that Iranian hard-liners continue to support. Thank you.
FEINSTEIN: Thank you. The floor is open for questions. I ask everybody to ask questions and to be brief, to wait for the microphone; identify yourself and your organization. Yes? Woman in the back. Yes? Please wait for the microphone and identify yourself and your affiliation.
QUESTIONER: My name is Manda Zand-Irvin. My question is that the last 25 years, quarter of a century, we have been doing the same policy of engagement, dialogue, negotiations. Europeans have kept telling us, the Iranian people, that engagement with the government of Iran would improve the life of Iranians and will stop the regime from their dictatorship. Twenty-five years--the United States, every administration, has followed the policy of engagement, policy of negotiation, from sending cakes and Koran to--
FEINSTEIN: Question, please.
QUESTIONER: --apologizing for the past sins of the United States, but nothing so far. Twenty-five years, all of these engagements, dialogues, have failed. Can you tell us, what is the difference between this new dialogue and engagement and all the different kinds of dialogues and engagements that we have had before in the last 25 years?
FEINSTEIN: Thank you.
QUESTIONER: Thank you.
BRZEZINSKI: Well, first of all, I would say that the characterization of our policy over the last 25 years as one of consistent engagement is not entirely correct. One might recall, just by way of example, the policy of dual containment with a variety of implications, as well as even congressionally mandated consequences. So that's hardly been a policy of sustained engagement. So that's one point to be made.
Secondly, even if one takes the formula of 25 years as one's point of departure from analysis of policy, one has to acknowledge that 25 years is a fairly long time, and a great deal has changed in the course of those 25 years. A great deal has changed in the region. A great deal has changed in Iran. A whole new generation has emerged in Iran; a generation which, according to all indications, is not swept up by theocratic fervor, but is in fact increasingly aspiring for more and more evolutionary change.
Last but not least, circumstances in the region are much more dynamic, and even problematic, not only for our national security interests, but ultimately also for Iran's national security interests.
So all of that, I think, does create a context which is different than in the past, and it does call for some exploration of alternative policies. We're not blind to the fact that area probes initiated by either side at different stages did not succeed. But things change, and I think a good illustration, again, is the history of the American-Chinese relationship, which involved at one point direct military hostility, and which nonetheless was then transformed into varying degrees of cooperation, and in any case normalization.
GATES: I would just--I would add one additional point in terms of what's changed, and that is that the United States over the past two-and-a-half years has eliminated two of Iran's greatest security threats, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. American forces are now on both of Iran's borders, east and west, with 140,000 American troops just to the west. That alone, I think, has created a different situation, a different environment in the region, and potentially creates an opportunity where Iran might see its own interests advantaged by engaging in a dialogue. But as I indicated in my remarks, there is no assurance that these changed circumstances will lead to progress, but we think they create the opportunity to at least try.
FEINSTEIN: Yes, sir? Please wait for the microphone.
QUESTIONER: Picking up on the question and the answer just given, my question is, do you think there was a chance--a
BRZEZINSKI: We can't hear you very clearly.
QUESTIONER: Do you think there was a chance in 2001 to 2002, in that period, to help the Iranians change the form of their government? Not the government itself; the form of the government.
BRZEZINSKI: I don't have any opinion on that, frankly, and that's not the issue addressed by this task force. We're looking at the situation as it exists today, and we're looking forward, beyond 2004.
GATES: Yes, on the left?
QUESTIONER: David Goldwyn, Goldwyn International Strategies. I'm not sure if this is working.
BRZEZINSKI: It is.
QUESTIONER: Some would question, if Iran is such an enormous oil and gas power, why it needs a civilian nuclear power program at all. And I wonder, in your deliberations, why you chose to compromise for supporting the civilian nuclear power program with inspection rather than capping it, and why you believe, given our experience elsewhere, that inspections would be effective.
GATES: I think it basically is embracing reality. They are going forward with this program. They are going forward with it with the help of France and Russia. We have tried for more than 10 years to stop it. When I was director of central intelligence and in Moscow in 1992, I took them on directly about their Russian help--Soviet help and Russian help for the Iranian nuclear program, and it was clear that they had no intention of abandoning it. And they have continued that.
So if that is the reality that we face, then what role can we play in trying to make sure that that program is in fact used for peaceful purposes and not for nuclear weapons? Our ability to stop that program, for the reasons that I suggested earlier, is very limited.
FEINSTEIN: The gentleman on the far right.
QUESTIONER: Thank you so much. Can you hear me? Can you hear me?
FEINSTEIN: Yes.
QUESTIONER: There is a significant factor that is missing from this report which I would like to question. It is not politically, or for that matter, economically, prudent to dismiss this factor, and this factor is the people of Iran. As you know, as you mentioned, Iran has one of the most dynamic civil societies in the region. It is not possible for the regime to suppress them indefinitely. Why did you not take into consideration this significant factor, which will only gain in strength over time?
BRZEZINSKI: Well, I can say, though, we certainly did, at least in the back of some of our heads, and certainly in the back of my head. I had a lot to do with dealing with a regime that was totalitarian, that was hostile, that was threatening us, but in which I knew there were growing forces within, social forces that were pressing for change and that were not partaking of the extreme dogmatism of that regime. I think you can probably imagine which one I'm talking of.
And it was my view for a long time that we ought to pursue a policy on two levels; one of having a sort of sympathetic attitude towards aspirations of society and endorse them--and that's in the report; but at the same time, deal with the regime, because that itself promotes then more fissures, more openings, more potential for peaceful change. And that certainly is, at least in the back of my mind, as I think of the future of the relationship--because I recognize also the fact that Iran has a high level of literacy, as compared certainly to most Muslim countries; it has a high level of participation of women in social affairs, in spite of the outward and very negative symbolic trappings that have been imposed on the women in the course of the last 20 or so years; it has a tradition of its own role in the region, which is not uniformly and one-sidedly aggressive; it has a sense of its history. And as a consequence, as one thinks of the future of that region and hopefully of transformation within that region and stabilization of that region, Iran can be an important element. So that is very much at least in the back of my head--I can't speak for other members of the task force--but we certainly do acknowledge and encourage in our report the evolutionary pressures which are manifest.
GATES: We spent one-fourth of our time--of our four meetings, we spent an entire meeting on the internal situation in Iran and the forces that are at work there. And there was a general agreement that the current situation cannot continue. And I think that the report talks about the pressures on the regime to bring about economic change, to provide jobs for the million-plus young people entering the workforce in Iran every year, and that the only way they can really deal with these economic pressures is in fact to open the country up to foreign investment and to foreign interaction.
One of our recommendations is that the U.S. government lift its ban in terms of nongovernmental organizations being able to operate in Iran. It seems to us that the approach that we are suggesting potentially would have the impact of beginning to open opportunities, as I had suggested in my remarks, for greater interaction between Iranians and the rest of the world. And as we saw in the Soviet Union and as we have seen elsewhere, that then sets the stage for the kind of internal change that we all hope will happen there.
FEINSTEIN: Suzanne?
SUZANNE MALONEY: If I can just add a comment on this. I would encourage you to read the report. I don't suspect most of you have had the opportunity to do that at this time. But if you look in one of the very first sections--in fact, pages 15 and previous to that--there's an entire section on the Iranian people, on what we perceive, what the task force members concluded was actually at work in Iran. And in fact, as you cited, the Iranian people are not in such a state that they are likely to be kept in a repressed position for a very long time. It's something that we do anticipate in the report--that the Iranian people themselves are quite capable and in fact are, we suspect, mobilizing on some level to change very nature of the regime to one that reflects their wishes and their aspirations for a more democratic order.
FEINSTEIN: Janine Zacharia, third row.
QUESTIONER: Hi. Janine Zacharia with the Jerusalem Post. Two questions, if I may. First, if it proves true the 9/11 Commission is going to report that some of the hijackers passed through Iran or if there was Iranian involvement, would that affect your recommendations in any way? And secondly, given the--is it OK, Lee?
FEINSTEIN: Yeah.
QUESTIONER: Secondly, if, given the IAEA's assessment of how far along the nuclear program is, given your assessment that the U.S.--that the best we could hope for is multilateral sanctions, do you anticipate that Israel will take unilateral action in some way against the nuclear program? And what impact would that have, do you think, on the region?
BRZEZINSKI: Do you want to take--
GATES: Go ahead.
MR. BRZEZINSKI: On [the] 9/11 [Commission], we have not seen the report, and we don't know exactly what is in the report. All that's been indicated so far is that there is some evidence that al Qaeda operatives passed through Iran, and there's no indication that this was connected specifically with Iranian complicity in the 9/11 events. We just don't know. We do know, however, that Iran has been hostile to the antecedent Iraqi government--Saddam Hussein's government--and to Saudi Arabia, as was al Qaeda, and one has to take that into account also in terms of what might have been the Iranian calculations in permitting al Qaeda operatives to pass through Iranian territory.
As far as Israel taking unilateral action, we do say in the report that the United States should convey to Israel that American interests would be adversely affected if Israel took unilateral military action against Iran, and I should think that would be of some relevance to the calculations of the Israeli government if it were to be undertaking, in a sense, unilateral action. Moreover--and that's not in the report; this was just an aside by me--it is difficult to imagine an Israeli military strike against Iran without Israel overflying airspace that's controlled by American military forces. And, therefore, one would have to either assume that there would be some reaction or that there would be, in effect, complicity if there was no reaction. So the matter, therefore, is one in which the United States, whether it likes it or not, is engaged.
An argument that we make in the report is that it's unlikely that such a strike would be all that effective. But it is very likely that it would produce extremely adverse consequences, first of all in terms of the prospects for change within Iran because it would galvanize a degree of unity between the ruling elite and the broader sectors of society that favor constructive political change; and it could precipitate very adverse, negative Iranian actions directed against our interests, U.S. interests, in Iraq and in Afghanistan. So, on balance, it is not an advisable policy.
GATES: Two quick points. First, the report acknowledges the likelihood that Iran has allowed safe passage and facilitation for al Qaeda and other terrorists to move through the country. So I think we have taken that into account in what we have discussed and recommended.
Second, on the nuclear issue, there are two things that make the situation in Iran different in terms of the effectiveness of a strike, such as was carried out [on orders from then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel] against the Osirak [nuclear] reactor in Iraq several decades ago. The first is that Osirak was a single facility located in a fairly isolated area. Iran has a number of nuclear-related facilities around the country, most of them located very close to or in cities. So the difficulty of producing a strike that would have the effectiveness that the attack on Osirak did, I think, is considerably different and the likelihood of significant collateral damage much higher.
FEINSTEIN: The gentleman in the second row.
QUESTIONER: Hi. My name Nassir Rahimi, sir. In response to--[inaudible]--question, why can't you--what you have in back of your mind, bring it up in front and have regime change by people of Iran?
BRZEZINSKI: If there is a regime change in Iran by the people of Iran, it's an Iranian decision. It's as simple as that. But it's very different, if you have something in mind like what has transpired in Iraq, and we are certainly not advocating that.
FEINSTEIN: The gentleman on the left side.
QUESTIONER: Mohammed Almali with Al-Jazeera Television. Gentlemen, just following up on--[inaudible]--question. What if the mere mention of Iran in the upcoming report could be used by some new cause in this town, or some pro-Israeli circles in this town who want nothing less than confrontation with Iran?
GATES: Was there a question there?
QUESTIONER: Yeah. Are you concerned that might be used, the mere mention of Iran in the report.
GATES: Oh, I have no doubt that various pieces of the report will be used by a variety of people--[laughter]--probably across the entire spectrum.
FEINSTEIN: The gentleman in the third row from the back towards the right in the center. Yes, you.
QUESTIONER: May I translate for him, please, because he doesn't speak English? He speaks very good German.
FEINSTEIN: Absolutely. Please try to be brief.
QUESTIONER: Yes. His name is Ayatollah Hireh. He spent four years in the jail in Iran after he fought the system and demanded separation of church and state, as is the wishes of Shi'ism, as is the tenet of Shi'ism. And he had two attempts on his life in Germany. The German police have told him he has to leave the country, and he has now come to America.
FEINSTEIN: OK, thank you.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, I have two questions.
FEINSTEIN: If you could repeat the question briefly, please. Thank you.
QUESTIONER: Yes. What he stated is, is the United States going from a position of weakness? Obviously, it seems to be from a position of weakness that you're approaching, rather than strength, because over 20 years the European governments have been attempting dialogue without any kind of result within the country whatsoever.
BRZEZINSKI: Well, we can only repeat--I assume that's the question?
QUESTIONER: He said even [Clinton Secretary of State Madeleine] Albright apologized for America's involvement in 1953, and absolutely nothing was the result of that.
FEINSTEIN: OK, thank you. We have the question.
QUESTIONER: Also, he said Clinton administration tried by--[inaudible]--and other things to create this dialogue.
BRZEZINSKI: We have acknowledged in the report that previous efforts at developing dialogue haven't worked. We know that. The point we're making is conditions around Iran have changed, conditions in Iran are changing. There are certain issues that are bound to be on the minds of the Iranian leaders. There are certain issues that concern us regarding the region and Iran. And perhaps there is the possibility of some sort of a selective engagement which begins to define some principles for the relationship and then over time begins to expand the scope of the issues discussed and eventually perhaps resolved.
That's basically what we're saying. We're saying that staying put and saying nothing is not productive, that advocating regime change simply mobilizes resistance, and that it cannot be pursued militarily, for obvious reasons. We're not advocating an accommodation or an acceptance of Iran on its terms. We're not accepting some of the terms that the Iranians occasionally articulate. We're saying let's explore whether, in the present circumstances, there are areas in which it would be fruitful to undertake some sustained contacts.
GATES: I think the thing to keep in the forefront and the real purpose of this report is how do we advance American national security interests? That's what this is all about.
We have forces engaged in Afghanistan and in Iraq. We have a nuclear program going forward in Iran that looks very dangerous. And our view is, do we sit on the sidelines and watch those things happen, including negative things, or do we try and do something about it, for our own interests?
We can debate a lot about what's going on inside Iran, how soon things might change in Iran. But what we have to focus on is what is in America's national security interest now and in light of our commitments that we now have in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.
BRZEZINSKI: And let me just add one more point to that. The issue is also in what fashion. If need be, we can put more pressure on Iran. Unless one wishes to stand up and advocate that we do in Iran what we did in Iraq--entirely on our own, without international support--then one has to ask, what is also a more effective way of mobilizing international support? I think the policy we are advocating actually increases the likelihood that others will then be more cooperative also in putting pressure on Iran. And one of the questions pertaining to the nuclear programs is that if we can address that issue in a fashion that engages the support of our allies, we're likely to increase also the costs to the Iranians of noncompliance. So that is also a factor involved here.
MALONEY: I'll just expand on that for one moment and suggest, while this isn't a forum to debate the relative success or failure of the European approach to Iran, there have been isolated instances where the European ability to use their economic relationship with the Iranians as leverage has been somewhat effective in creating a change in Iranian behavior. And there I would cite the 1997 Mykonos trial [of five men for the 1992 assassination of three members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and an interpreter in Berlin] and subsequent withdrawal of European ambassadors from Tehran, which is cited by many in Iran as having conditioned a change in the Iranian approach toward assassinating dissidents in Europe.
So I think that one of the issues that this task force was most concerned with was identifying opportunities for new and more effective tools for American diplomacy in influencing Iranian behavior, and that is why we look toward a dialogue to create those opportunities and those tools.
FEINSTEIN: Rose Gottemoeller.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Dr. Brzezinski, you mentioned the potential requirement for some kind of strengthened sanctions regime in the future, and indeed your last comments pointed to seeking enhanced cooperation from some of our potential partners. I just wondered how the task force viewed this potential possibility in the future, given the high demand for Iranian gas and oil and the interest of the Japanese, European companies and so forth in expanding, and indeed the progress they've made in expanding, into Iran in the recent years. What hope do you hold out for strengthened sanctions in that environment?
BRZEZINSKI: Basically, if we can engage the Iranians in this kind of an exploratory relationship, and if we--[inaudible]--interest of the Japanese and the Europeans in the Iranian assets, in natural gas and so forth. That's all very true. But don't forget, that's only one side of the coin. The other side of the coin is the Iranian interest in having these investments and being able to sell that. And if that is impeded, delayed--not to mention the possibility, which we explicitly mention in the report, of sanctions by the U.N. Security Council--Iranian interests will be hurt.
So this is a way of trying to take advantage of a very complex set of relationships in which we cannot resolve the problem entirely on our own, nor can we resolve it by totally unilateral policy--and certainly not by the policy that some people favor, which is either total ostracism or, in effect, a military coalition.
GATES: I would just add one thing. I think it's important not to exaggerate the potential leverage that oil and gas gives Iran. The fact is the Iranians can't eat oil and gas. They are going to have to--it's the only thing they have going for them in their economy. And if they're not going to sell oil and gas to the Europeans or the Japanese or us, it's not entirely clear who's going to buy it. So I think they have some limited options in that respect themselves.
QUESTIONER: Raymond Tanter, Georgetown University and the University of Michigan. There's been general acknowledgment that previous attempts at engagement have been inconsistent, but by and large have failed on the part of the United States. And one of the issues is why did these previous attempts fail? And I would suggest that they might have--they might have not succeeded because of the fact that they--of the imbalance of carrots in relation to sticks.
For example, the Clinton administration made concessions on caviar, pistachios, carpets; we won't call you a rogue state anymore, and we'll put the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/mujahedeen.html )[an Iraq-based group founded to fight Iran's regime] on the foreign terrorist organizations list, and we're calling for some kind of a dialogue. Where was the stick?
And on page--and I'm almost finished, Lee--on page five of the report, there's the statement that Washington should work with the interim government of Iraq to conclusively disband the Iraq-based Mujahedeen-e-Khalq organization, ensure that its leaders are brought to justice. I'm not sure that that's much of--that's too much of a carrot and too little of a stick, because that group--the armed Iranian opposition--could be used as some kind of an implicit threat to the government of Iran to help change that government.
FEINSTEIN: OK, too many carrots, not enough sticks. Who would like to address that?
GATES: Well, first of all, I think that the report deals in some detail with the possibility that one of the inducements that we offer, particularly on the nuclear program, is that there would be--if the Iranians complied with what the United States and the Europeans were seeking and signed-on and enforced--or adhered to the additional protocol and allowed the inspections, and so forth, that there would be the prospect of some easing of the economic sanctions against Iran. So I think we have looked at the possibility of additional inducements for Iran, particularly in the economic area, but only in return for actual changes in behavior on the part of the Iranians.
We're not--the thrust of this report is not to sit and talk with the Iranians and sort of sing "Kumbayah" together. What we're looking at here is if there is in fact change in Iranian behavior, then there would be some easing of sanctions and some reaction on the part of the United States, but only in exchange for real change in behavior on the part of the Iranians. And I think part of the problem in the past is that there has been--there has not been that kind of a change on the part of the Iranians. In my view, my personal view, it's very similar to the kinds of discussions that have been going on with North Korea in the respect of more for more. And only if the Iranians respond do we then perhaps offer them additional inducements.
BRZEZINSKI: Let me just add one more point to that, which is focused specifically on the issue of the Iranian group operating out of Iraq against the regime in Iran. The point of the recommendation we make is directly related to our concern about the Iranian support for al Qaeda, and the possibility of that support, and the existence of some al Qaeda operatives either transited through Iran or operated or exist in Iran, we relate to, after all, we're concerned about the al Qaeda because it's a terrorist group that's trying to destroy us.
But we're saying that we should--[inaudible]--look at the relationship in a broader sense, that is to say--[inaudible]--they have to address our situation--[inaudible]--or normalization, obviously, they cannot give support to terrorist activities, especially those directed against us, but we can't then support movement out of Iraq which is designed to overthrow them.
MALONEY: Let me just add to that--
GATES: And also, it's just a tad awkward for the United States to support a group that is characterized by the Department of State as a terrorist group.
MALONEY: That was my point. But also to add that, in fact, the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq is not a group that enjoys a wide base of support within Iran, largely because of its collaboration with the regime of Saddam Hussein during the war between Iraq and Iran. And so not only would it be inconsistent with our goals in the war on terrorism to somehow do something other than fully demobilize the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, but it would be inconsistent with our aspirations for a more democratic government in Iran that reflects the wishes of its people. The Mujahedeen-e-Khalq is not a group that in any way could aspire to lead such a democratic government in Iran.
MR. FEINSTEIN: OK. We're coming up towards the end. Why don't we take two questions at a time. We'll start with the woman in the back.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. My name is Mahtab Farid. I'm from Voice of America Persian Service. Mr. Brzezinski, I'd like to get your reaction on this editorial newspaper. It's printed in Persian in Los Angeles on Friday, July 16 edition. There is an editorial--I'm going to just read two lines, the exact translation. It says, "Your greenbelt has bended the Iranian people's back," meaning basically in this editorial it criticizes your policy towards Iran to engage in a country which is called state sponsor of terrorism. Could you give us your reaction on that, please?
FEINSTEIN: Why don't we just take one more question.
BRZEZINSKI: Well, I haven't--
FEINSTEIN: Please, go ahead.
BRZEZINSKI: I haven't read the editorial, so I can't really comment on it. I think the report speaks for itself, and we have tried to explain the rationale behind that report today.
FEINSTEIN: Very good. In the center. Alex, do you want to--
QUESTIONER: My name's Alex Lennon. I'm the editor of The Washington Quarterly from CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies].
There's been a lot of attention in the Iranian elections to who was not allowed to run for office, but little subsequent attention to who won the elections. And a number of Iranian experts, including a couple members of your task force, have identified a third political force, other than the ideological hard-liners and the reformists, as a set of pragmatic conservatives that are emerging within Iran.
Did the task force discuss the prospects that there is this third political force? Do you, as an individual, believe that such a force is a factor leading to your consideration to promote the limited engagement that the task force recommends in the end? In other words, is there an emergent third political force of pragmatic conservatives in Iran that is increasingly gaining power?
FEINSTEIN: Let me try to squeeze one additional question. All the way in the back. Yes? Here you go. That's it.
QUESTIONER: Jim Lobe, Inter Press Service. I wanted to know whether you thought, on balance, the U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation and current situation in Iraq has weakened or strengthened the U.S. position vis-à-vis its influence on Iran?
FEINSTEIN: OK. And we'll make this the final set of questions.
GATES: OK. First, we had considerable discussion of the political forces at work in Iran and the different hues of conservatives in the regime, including some discussion of pragmatic conservatives. I remember considerable discussion in the mid-1980s in the U.S. about pragmatic conservatives and various others.
Clearly, there are differences in shadings among the different conservatives in the regime. But I think that what we have to wait and see is if it has--if that emergence or if their voice has an impact on the proposed engagement that we advocate.
In terms of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, I think it probably--my personal opinion is that it has probably strengthened our position vis-à-vis Iran. After all, we've--we now have a military presence on both sides of Iran. We have 140,000 troops next door. Clearly the Iranians have to look at that and see that the strategic situation in their neighborhood has changed in a significant way.
BRZEZINSKI: Well, I'll just add one comment and, just for the sake of diversity, take a somewhat different position on one issue.
On the third force in Iran, I think the fact is that under the facade of political and theological uniformity, there's a growing pluralism in Iranian society. And I'm not even sure that it's possible to reduce it into three forces, you know. It's a question of how closely you look at the picture. One could talk about five forces, seven forces. The point is there's growing pluralism and change in Iran, which we cannot ignore and which is beginning to make itself felt. On the issue of--
GATES: Actually, I agree with that.
BRZEZINSKI: Right. [Laughter.] I thought you might.
On the second issue, I take a somewhat different view, in that I think what we have done certainly increases the salience and the urgency of taking a look at the relationship, and does so for us, for obvious reasons. We are in the region. And I suspect it does that for the Iranians as well.
On the other hand, they know very well that we are engaged in a more complex enterprise in Iraq than obviously was assumed by the decision-makers at its outset. And they may feel, therefore, that our military options are somewhat narrowed. I dare say this would also apply to the North Koreans, if you look at the deployment of our forces and the shift in the deployments away, for example, from the potential use in the North Korean theater to actual use in Iraq.
So I think it has a kind of dual effect. On the one hand, it may give the Iranians the sense that military force is not a real option, although I'm not sure it ever really was an option, because I don't think we ever contemplated invading Iran. On the other hand, I think it does increase the salience of the issue for both, and I'd be very surprised if people in Tehran weren't also asking themselves what is the meaning of all that has happened; what are its implications; how does it affect our relationship with the United States; what might it be useful from the Iranian standpoint to explore? I think that kind of discussion probably is taking place, though I would not presume to prejudge the outcome of these discussions.
FEINSTEIN: I want to thank the panel for an outstanding discussion of these issues, as well as the audience for an excellent range of questions. Thank you very much. [Applause.]
Founded in 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, national membership organization and a nonpartisan center for scholars dedicated to producing and disseminating ideas so that individual and corporate members, as well as policymakers, journalists, students, and interested citizens in the United States and other countries, can better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other governments. The Council does this by convening meetings; conducting a wide-ranging Studies program; publishing Foreign Affairs, the preeminent journal covering international affairs and U.S. foreign policy; maintaining a diverse membership; sponsoring Independent Task Forces; and providing up-to-date information about the world and U.S. foreign policy on the Council's website, www.cfr.org.
THE COUNCIL TAKES NO INSTITUTIONAL POSITION ON POLICY ISSUES AND HAS NO AFFILIATION WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. ALL STATEMENTS OF FACT AND EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION CONTAINED IN ITS PUBLICATIONS ARE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHOR OR AUTHORS.