EXPOSING LIBYA AND THE EMERGING AXIS OF EVIL:
PAKISTAN-LIBYA-IRAN
By Jack Boureston, Yana Feldman, and Charles Mahaffey
December 27, 2003
Overview
On December 20, 2003, after a series of intense diplomatic overtures on the
part of the British and American governments, representatives from the IAEA
and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) met and discussed Libya's decision to eliminate "materials,
equipments and programmes which lead to the production of internationally proscribed
weapons," including nuclear weapons. Days later, Libya agreed to
sign the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, allowing
for more thorough inspections of its nuclear facilities. With these
new promising revelations, it is
prudent to review Libya’s past nuclear ambitions and origins of its current
programs.
In 1969, almost immediately after he gained power by toppling King Idris al-Sanusi, Colonel Muammar Al Qadhafi expressed his desire to obtain nuclear weapons. A follower of Egyptian President Nasser's Arab nationalist ideology, Qadhafi saw the Arab unity movement as an opportunity to create a pan-Arab bomb that would match the nuclear efforts of Libya's archrival, Israel. Towards this goal, Qadhafi hoped to realize Libya's nuclear ambitions by working simultaneously on two fronts: first, by establishing relationships with Egypt, Pakistan the USSR, and other potential nuclear suppliers, to develop a nuclear fuel cycle within Libya, and, second, by shopping for a nuclear weapon "off the shelf."
Libya's nuclear relationship with Egypt was most likely precipitated by the latter's own failure to create a nuclear infrastructure. In the early 1970s, even as official relations between Tripoli and Cairo deteriorated, links with high-level, high caliber Egyptian nuclear scientists endured. Salah Hedayat, Nasser's scientific adviser, worked persistently, through Design Consultants Association, a company he created in 1965, to build a nuclear infrastructure, including a 40MW dual-purpose nuclear reactor, that would have benefited both countries. Qadhafi, however, was interested in quick results. In 1970, he unsuccessfully approached China to buy a small, "tactical" weapon. The exposure in 1974 of the Libyan-backed plot to assassinate President Sadat ended the cooperation between two the countries. Despite the official rift, Egyptian nuclear scientists continued to work through the 1970s and into the 1980s in various academic positions in Libya, and essentially served as the backbone for Libya's scientific base.
After the union with Egypt collapsed, Libya began courting Pakistan, which at the time was getting over the shock of India's nuclear test of May 1974. The cooperation between Libya and Pakistan involved Libya financing, in part, Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, and supplying it with uranium concentrate, also known as yellowcake, which was purchased from Niger. In return, Libya received full access to Pakistan's nuclear program. According to Egyptian nuclear scientists who worked in Libya from 1975 through the early 1980s, the number of Pakistani nuclear scientists visiting Libya steadily increased, presumably to provide assistance in Libya’s program.[1] Beginning in the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s several other countries were approached for assistance in establishing a nuclear infrastructure in Libya: Argentina, Brazil and Belgium for the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle (uranium prospecting and conversion), France, India, and an Italian subsidiary of an Argentine firm for power reactors and reprocessing technology. However, under pressure from the United States and out of proliferation concerns, all foreign cooperation with Libya was limited to training in the nuclear sciences. The acquisition of nuclear technology was increasingly and effectively hampered by the embargo that the major nuclear suppliers imposed on nuclear exports to Libya.
Despite Libya's expressed commitment to nuclear nonproliferation – it ratified the NPT in 1975, concluded a formal safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1980, and became a party to the Treaty of Pelindaba, the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone - western intelligence analysts have long believed that Libya, under Qadhafi's leadership, continued to pursue nuclear weapons. Over the years, and most recently in March 2002, Qadhafi has explicitly praised the element of nuclear deterrent in the Middle East. Now, with nuclear weapons material within his grasp, the Libyan leader has changed course. He recently declared that Libya would, “become only the second country, after South Africa, to disarm voluntarily.[2]"
Present Nuclear Capabilities
Despite its shortage of resources and lack indigenous technical expertise, Libya has managed to establish a number of nuclear research facilities and engage in numerous projects to increase its understanding of nuclear fuel cycle operations.
The Tajoura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) is Libya’s largest known nuclear research facility. TNRC was established in 1982 with the help of the Soviet Union. Its stated purpose was to "solve problems of economic significance to the country via peaceful application of atomic energy." The facility encompasses an area of 700 square meters and is comprised of six buildings. TNRC's activities include fundamental and applied research and training in the field of nuclear science and engineering. In 1984, visitors to TNRC described the Center's equipment as "state-of-the-art." However there appears to be some controversy over Libya’s ability to fully utilize its resources. As was stated earlier, Libya’s lack of expertise severally hampers its ability to operate its facilities at optimum capacity.
At the heart of TNRC's activities is the Soviet-designed 10MW IRT pool-type research reactor, used for isotope production and nuclear research. In addition to the 10MW reactor, TNRC houses a "critical facility," which presumably includes a critical assembly, a neutron generator complex, and a TM4-A Tokamak fusion reactor. Other facilities at TNRC include radiochemical laboratories complete with equipment for the production of isotopes, nuclear metallurgy laboratory, featuring a Russian 50-to-100 kV electron microscope and a U.S. Instron device for measuring material stress, a physical research facility, which is comprised of laboratories for nuclear physics, solid-state physics, neutron physics, material science and engineering, radiation biophysics, mass spectrometry, activation analysis, and physical research using the neutron generator. In addition to its research laboratories, TNRC is equipped with support facilities, such as computers and electronic workshops, machine shops and test laboratories. Since the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999, Russia has revived negotiations with Libya to modernize TNRC and the 10MW, IRT-2 research reactor located there. Those negotiations are yet to be finalized.
In recent meetings with the IAEA, Libyan representatives explained that the country had imported natural uranium, centrifuge and conversion equipment, and constructed pilot-scale centrifuge facilities. According to the Libyan representative to the IAEA, these centrifuge facilities have since been dismantled.
Beginning in the 1980s and lasting through the 1990s, Libya managed to build pilot-scale centrifuge facilities and experiment with uranium enrichment technologies without being noticed. Although open sources have not yet reported on the size and status of the facilities, Libya’s representative to the IAEA stated that his country’s enrichment program “was at an early stage of development and no industrial scale facility had been built, nor any enriched uranium produced.”[3] However, upon inspection by several teams of British and American intelligence officers, one officer said, “They had centrifuges turning and were making enriched uranium…This was a serious programme, and one that was not bought off the shelf.”[4] The inspection teams were escorted to “dozens of sites, where they saw centrifuges and parts for centrifuges that appeared to be in working order.”[5] Although one intelligence officer commented that Libya had made a strategic decision to minimize its dependence on outside assistance, it does not imply that Libya had become self sufficient for its nuclear program development.
In October 2003, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon stated that Libya under Qadhafi’s leadership “is trying to develop nuclear weapons with help from countries such as North Korea and Pakistan.” This assistance, according to Sharon, is “not help as in buying a bomb, but help in acquiring technology and know-how to build a bomb.”[6]
No one is certain from where Libyan scientists received its centrifuge technology, but a number of different possible sources exist. The technology may have come from the Soviet Union, at a time when the two countries had military and economic ties. Libya is also known to have contacts in North Korea, which is suspected obtaining its own enrichment technology from Pakistan. Libya would then be an indirect recipient of Pakistani technology. Additionally, as was mentioned earlier, Pakistan and Libya had a direct relationship in the mid-to-late 1970s via an extensive nuclear cooperation agreement. According to a senior European diplomat who had access to detailed intelligence information the Libyan program had “certain common elements" with the Iranian program and with the pattern of technology leakage from Pakistan to Iran. The CIA has not yet confirmed who it believes to be Libya's primary source, however the Agency has stated that “it looks like an indirect transfer.”[7] Lastly, the Libyans may have obtained its centrifuge know-how by participating in Iraq's programs or becoming the recipient of some of that country’s technology following the first gulf-war.
Should Pakistan emerge as a direct or indirect supplier of centrifuge technology to Libya, either through Libya’s declarations, international weapons inspections or Pakistan’s own admission, the US should take advantage of its current close relationship with Pakistan to pressure it to come clean on any cooperation with Libya and, no less importantly, Iran. President Musharraf’s recent announcement that he will step down as the country’s Commander-in-Chief, appeasing the anti-American Islamic opposition, sheds light on the possible internal struggle between Musharraf and the nuclear lobby, as Pakistan tries to distance itself from any involvement in technology transfers to present and potential members of the nuclear axis. As US intensifies its pressure on Musharraf to investigate possible transactions by its nuclear technicians to Iran and other countries, it should tread lightly, as not to add to Musharraf’s appearance as a puppet of the US and thus strengthen the anti-American stance of his opposition.
As for Libya, the international community needs to be thorough and proceed with cautious optimism. In the past, the major limitation of Qadhafi's plans to develop a nuclear weapon was his country’s lack of indigenous natural resources, the rudimentary state of its nuclear infrastructure, and lack of trained scientists. However, it appears that Libya’s new agreements with the international community will facilitate admissions to western universities to study in fields previously restricted to them. Also promised to Libya for dismantling its program is a greater influx of economic assistance. Additionally, with the help of Russian technicians, Libya plans to upgrade the Tajoura complex, and improve other components of its nuclear infrastructure. Libya’s new disarmament overtures may be a smokescreen for easier access to foreign technology. With the lifting of decade-long sanctions on nuclear exports to Libya in September 2003, and with Libya's opening up to the international community, it appears that foreign technical assistance will be much more readily available to Libya in the future than it has been at any point in its post-monarchical existence.
Jack Boureston is managing director and senior research analyst at FirstWatch International (FWI), a private WMD proliferation research group in Monterey, California (http://www.firstwatchint.org). He has worked as a safeguards information analyst at the IAEA and researcher at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in Monterey California. Yana Fieldman is a senior research analyst and Charles Mahaffey is a research analyst at FWI.
About FirstWatch International (FWI)
FWI is a research consultancy that supports the nonproliferation efforts of government agencies, international organizations, and commercial enterprises. FWI serves its clients by conducting proliferation and WMD threat assessments. We use open sources to examine the proliferation potential of states, non-state actors, industries, and companies. More information about FWI and our past research projects can be found at our website http://www.firstwatchint.org or you may call/fax us at +1-831-372-5319.
[1] Bhatia, Shyam, Nuclear
Rivals in the Middle East, (London: Routledge, 1988).
[2] Roula Khalaf and Mark Huband, “UN weapons team
set to visit Libya,” The Financial Times, December 21, 2003.
[3] "IAEA Director General to Visit Libya," International
Atomic Energy Agency, December 22, 2003.
[4] Roula Khalaf and Mark Huband, “UN weapons team
set to visit Libya,” The Financial Times, December 21, 2003.
[5] Tabassum Zakaria, “Secret U.S. Trips to Libya
Led to Weapons Pledge,” Reuters, December 20, 2003.
[6] "Sharon: Libya could be first Arab country with nukes," Jerusalem
Post, October 14, 2003.
[7] William J. Broad, David Rohde, and David E. Sanger, “Inquiry
Suggests Pakistanis Sold Nuclear Secrets,” The New York Times,
December 22, 2003.