

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
15 December 2017

Original: English

**Letter dated 15 December 2017 from the Security Council
Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), my six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 16 June to 15 December 2017.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Sebastiano Cardì**
Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of
resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)



Fourth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) set forth practical arrangements and procedures for the Council for carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.
2. In the note, it was established that the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its facilitator for the functions specified therein. On 3 January 2017, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2017 (see S/2017/2/Rev.1).
3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on his or her work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.
4. The present report covers the period from 16 June to 15 December 2017.

II. Summary of the activities of the Security Council in “2231 format”

5. During the reporting period, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) held three informal meetings (meetings in the “2231 format”), in addition to conducting their work through written procedures.
6. On 23 June and 13 December 2017, respectively, the Security Council met in the “2231 format” to review the findings and recommendations contained in the third and fourth reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). During these meetings, the Secretariat briefed the representatives on the reports’ key findings and recommendations.
7. On 29 June 2017, the Security Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs on the third report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/2017/515); by me on the work of the Council and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/2017/537); and by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on the report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group’s decisions and on any implementation issues (see S/2017/495).
8. On the same day, a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2017/560) was received by the President of the Security Council. The letter was circulated to the representatives of the “2231 format” of the Council. This letter transmitted the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the third report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/515).
9. On 14 July, I held an open technical briefing to inform Member States about the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and to enhance their understanding of

opportunities and obligations related to the resolution. The Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission and the Secretariat also participated in the briefing.

10. On 8 September, the Security Council held a meeting in the “2231 format” to discuss the 27 July 2017 Simorgh space launch vehicle (SLV) launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the various letters addressed to the Council regarding this launch (see paras. 20 and 21).

11. During the reporting period, there were no changes to the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which, at present, includes 23 individuals and 61 entities. Since Implementation Day, no travel or assets freeze exemption requests have been submitted.

III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

12. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), in August and November 2017 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, reports on its verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) (see [S/2017/777](#) and [S/2017/994](#)).

13. In both quarterly reports, the Agency affirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran had not pursued construction of the existing Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 reactor) based on its original design; that it had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water; that no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges remained installed in 30 cascades at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant; that it had not enriched uranium above 3.67 per cent U-235; and that it had not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development activities at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and that there had not been any nuclear material at the plant.

14. The Agency further reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had continued to permit the Agency to use online enrichment monitors and electronic seals, which communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices; that it had issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors designated for the Islamic Republic of Iran as requested by the Agency, and provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran; and that it had accepted additional Agency inspectors designated for the Islamic Republic of Iran.

15. The Agency also reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement and that the Agency continued its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through the conduct of complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran which it needed to visit. The Agency also reported that it was continuing to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities, and locations outside facilities where nuclear material has been customarily used, declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran under its Safeguards Agreement.

16. On 28 August, a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General ([S/2017/739](#)) was received by the President of the Security Council. The letter was circulated to the representatives

of the “2231 format” of the Council. This letter conveyed the concern of the Islamic Republic of Iran over the implementation by the United States of America of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and of several paragraphs of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

17. On 13 October, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed a letter to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/862](#)) enclosing a statement by the Iranian authorities conveying Iranian concerns regarding the policy of the United States towards the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as incorporated in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

Ballistic missile launches

18. On 28 June, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/555](#)) regarding a ballistic missile test on 15 November 2016 and launches on 18 and 19 June 2017 by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The letter stated that the test and launches were in violation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In response, on 17 August, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed a letter to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/719](#)) stating that the Israeli allegations were baseless and Iranian military capabilities, including ballistic missiles, had not been designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons and thus were outside the purview of the Council resolution. Both letters were circulated within the “2231 format” of the Council.

19. By means of a letter dated 2 August, the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States to the United Nations submitted a report to the Security Council on the Simorgh SLV launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 27 July. On 16 August and 23 August, respectively, letters concerning the launch from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations ([S/2017/720](#)) and the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran ([S/2017/731](#)), both addressed to the Secretary-General, were received by the President of the Security Council. Both letters were circulated within the “2231 format” of the Council.

20. On 8 September 2017, the Security Council held a meeting in the “2231 format”, during which the Council considered the Simorgh SLV launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 27 July 2017. The meeting’s discussion reflected various views among the 2231 representatives. Some representatives considered that this launch was inconsistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) because the technology used in SLVs was closely related to ballistic missiles, and the Simorgh, if configured as a missile, was “inherently capable” of delivering nuclear weapons. Other Member States noted that the Simorgh was not designed to and could not be modified to deliver nuclear weapons, and that the language in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) contained a “call” to refrain, but not a “ban” on ballistic activities.

21. In the light of the various views expressed by the representatives, I noted that there was no consensus on how this particular launch related to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Hence, I underlined the importance, for all parties, of continuing to maintain an attitude conducive to confidence-building among Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action participants, and encouraged all representatives to use available mechanisms provided by resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

Ballistic missiles and arms-related and other transfers

22. On 20 July, a Member State submitted to the Security Council a confidential report about an alleged transfer of weapons and training by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

23. On 7 November, the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2017/937). The letter was circulated within the “2231 format” of the Council. The letter referred to missiles launched at Saudi Arabia from within Yemeni territory on 22 July and 4 November, and the alleged role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in manufacturing these missiles in violation of resolution 2231 (2015).

24. On the same day, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed a letter to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2017/936). The letter was circulated within the “2231 format” of the Council. The letter stated that the accusations by Saudi Arabia that the Islamic Republic of Iran had supplied missiles to Yemen for the purpose of attacking Saudi Arabia were baseless and unfounded.

25. On 22 November, the Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/986). The letter was circulated within the “2231 format” of the Council. The letter communicated the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States on 19 November, which referred to alleged violations of resolution 2231 (2015) regarding the ballistic missile programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

26. On 28 November, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2017/1000). The letter was circulated within the “2231 format” of the Council. The letter referred to a recent statement made by the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and noted the continued support by the Islamic Republic of Iran of certain activities in the Middle East.

27. On 5 December, in reference to the letters from the Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the United Nations (S/2017/986) and from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations (S/2017/1000), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary General (S/2017/1019). The letter stated that the allegations of Israel were baseless, and stressed the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in combating terrorism in the region. The letter was circulated within the “2231 format” of the Security Council.

28. On 5 December, the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed a note verbale to me, in my capacity as Facilitator. The note verbale was circulated within the “2231 format” of the Security Council. The Facilitator notes that one Council member questions whether the information contained in the note verbale strays from the scope of resolution 2231 (2015).

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

29. During the reporting period, eight new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council. Four of these proposals have been approved, two have been rejected and two have been withdrawn.

30. In addition, the Security Council approved two and rejected one of the four proposals that were still under consideration at the date of issuance of my previous report (S/2017/537). The fourth proposal has been withdrawn.

31. Since Implementation Day, a total of 24 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been

submitted to the Security Council by four Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The continuous submission of nuclear-related proposals to the Council shows a steady confidence by Member States in the procurement channel. I am also pleased to note that, on average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in less than 49 calendar days.

32. According to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), certain nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. In this regard, since my previous report, four notifications were submitted to the Council in September, October and December 2017, respectively, in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment and technology covered by annex B, section 1, of INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 intended for light water reactors. In addition, one notification was submitted to the Council in November 2017 for an activity related to the necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production.

33. On 1 August, the Security Council updated the lists of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology whose supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran require approval in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Council, in accordance with paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Consequently, the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 is superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1, and the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2 is superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2. A Council press release dated 26 September (SC/13008) and a note verbale informing Member States of these updates were issued. The updated lists of items are also available on the Council's webpage dedicated to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

34. On 29 September, the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission transmitted to the Security Council, for publication on its website, updated versions of the procurement channel documents offering practical information on the procurement channel for the review of proposals by States seeking to engage in certain transfers of nuclear or dual-use goods, technology, and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran. A Council press release dated 16 October (SC/13030-DC/3745) and a note verbale informing Member States of these updated versions were issued and are available on the Council's webpage dedicated to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).¹

35. On 1 December 2017, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to me for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) its fourth six-month report of the Joint Commission (see [S/2017/1009](#)), in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

V. Other approval and exemption requests

36. Since 16 January 2016, no proposal has been submitted by Member States to the Security Council to participate in and permit the activities set forth in paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

37. During the reporting period, no proposal has been submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

¹ See www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-nuclear.shtml.

38. Since 16 January 2016, no proposal has been submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

39. Exemptions to the assets freeze provisions and travel ban provisions are contained in paragraphs 6 (d) and 6 (e), respectively, of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). No exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to the 23 individuals and 61 entities currently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

VI. Transparency, outreach and guidance

40. As we approach two years after Implementation Day, transparency, practical guidance and outreach remain a priority. In this regard, the open briefing for Member States on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) held on 14 July 2017 was one of the many efforts to raise awareness. Similar briefings could be held regularly, in cooperation with the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Secretariat. Further outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated by the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/44](#)), have been an additional instrument for fostering awareness of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

41. The website on resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat, plays a key role in providing relevant information on resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). During the reporting period, the number of page views in all official languages of the United Nations was more than 75,000 for a total of more than 250,000 since the creation of the website. I welcome and encourage the Secretariat to regularly maintain, update and improve the website on resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to promote better awareness and information-sharing.

42. In my role as Facilitator, I also held several bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). As I approach the end of my annual mandate as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), I am confident that the international community will continue to act in line with paragraph 2 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which calls upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Programme of Action.