Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options

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Richard P. Cronin, Coordinator
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Alan Kronstadt
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
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Summary

In calling for a clear, strong, and long-term commitment to support the military-dominated government of Pakistan despite serious concerns about that country’s nuclear proliferation activities, *The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* cast into sharp relief two long-standing contradictions in U.S. policy towards Pakistan and South Asia. First, in over fifty years, the United States and Pakistan have never been able to align their national security objectives except partially and temporarily. Pakistan’s central goal has been to gain U.S. support to bolster its security against India, whereas the United States has tended to view the relationship from the perspective of its global security interests. Second, U.S. nuclear nonproliferation objectives towards Pakistan (and India) repeatedly have been subordinated to other U.S. goals. During the 1980s, Pakistan successfully exploited its importance as a conduit for aid to the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahidin to deter the application of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation law. Not only did Pakistan develop its nuclear weapons capability while receiving some $600 million annually in U.S. military and economic aid, but some of the erstwhile mujahidin came to form the core of Al Qaeda a decade later.

Congress has endorsed and funded for FY2005 a request from the Bush Administration for a new five-year, $3 billion, package of U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Some Members of Congress and policy analysts have expressed concern that once again the United States will be constrained from addressing serious issues concerning Pakistan’s nuclear activities by the need for Islamabad’s help — this time to capture or kill members of Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. A crucial U.S. policy challenge is to gain Pakistani cooperation in shutting down the network of nuclear suppliers established in the 1990s by the self-designated “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, which facilitated illicit sales of nuclear enrichment technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea, while simultaneously supporting stability in Pakistan and maintaining maximum cooperation against terrorism. Press reports indicate that the network is far more extensive than previously thought, and that Pakistan has denied access to Khan, who is now under house arrest, by U.S. intelligence officials.

This report: (1) briefly recounts previous failed efforts to reconcile American nuclear nonproliferation and other policy objectives regarding Pakistan; (2) documents Pakistan’s role in supplying nuclear technology to “rogue” states and how these activities escaped detection by U.S. intelligence agencies; (3) considers issues regarding the objectives, and viability of the military-dominated government headed by President Pervez Musharraf; and, (4) outlines and evaluates several U.S. options for seeking to gain more credible cooperation from Pakistan’s regarding its nuclear activities while still maintaining its counterterrorist cooperation. This report will not be updated.
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Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options

In calling for a clear, strong, and long-term commitment to support the military-dominated government of Pakistan headed by President Pervez Musharraf despite serious concerns about that country’s nuclear proliferation activities, The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, otherwise known as The 9/11 Commission Report, cast into sharp relief two long-standing contradictions in U.S. policy towards Pakistan and South Asia. First, in over fifty years, the United States and Pakistan have never been able to align their national security objectives except partially and temporarily. Pakistan’s central goal has been to gain U.S. support to bolster its security against India, whereas the United States has tended to view the relationship from the perspective of its global security interests. Second, U.S. nuclear nonproliferation objectives towards Pakistan (and India) have repeatedly been subordinated to other U.S. goals. During the 1980s, Pakistan successfully exploited its importance as a conduit for aid to the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahidin to deter the imposition of economic and military sanctions that were prescribed by U.S. nuclear nonproliferation laws.

Ironically, not only did Pakistan develop its nuclear weapons capability while receiving some $600 million annually in U.S. military and economic aid, but the leadership ranks of Al Qaeda and the Taliban include some of the very same radical Islamists nurtured by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization and supported and armed by the CIA in the successful effort to drive the Russian Army out of Afghanistan. Some observers view this reality as cause for not losing sight of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and other interests when seeking to forge closer antiterrorism ties to a country that has been a major and recent source of the proliferation of nuclear technology and materials, and which also faces some degree of risk of itself falling under the control of radical Islamists.

Both the 9/11 Commission Report and the legislation enacted to implement its recommendations for intelligence reform, P.L. 108-458 (S. 2845), and the foreign assistance appropriation for FY2005, P.L. 108-447 (H.R. 4818) address the issue of strengthening U.S. military and economic support of Pakistan in the interest of counterterrorism cooperation and stabilizing the country against Islamist extremism. Neither the report nor the legislation adopted by the 108th Congress, however, includes comprehensive policy recommendations or specific measures for dealing with Pakistan’s nuclear activities. This report seeks, in part, to shed light on whether there may be ways for gaining more leverage with Pakistan on the proliferation issue without jeopardizing Islamabad’s cooperation on terrorism.
Congress has now endorsed and funded for FY2005 a request from the Bush Administration for a new five-year, $3 billion, package of U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan, this time to gain Pakistani cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Some Members of Congress and policy analysts have expressed concern that once again the United States will be constrained from addressing serious issues concerning Pakistan’s nuclear activities by the need for Islamabad’s help — this time to capture or kill members of Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.

Figure 1. Country Map of Pakistan

Press reports in late December, 2004, underscore the challenge of addressing the terrorist and nuclear threats simultaneously in U.S. policy towards Pakistan. The New York Times reported on December 26, 2004, that both the Bush Administration and the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) have gathered evidence in the Middle East and Asia indicating that the illicit nuclear supply network set up in the 1990s by Pakistan’s most celebrated nuclear scientist, Dr. A. Q. Khan, may be much more extensive than previously assumed. The
evidence is said to include the discovery in Libya of plans for an atomic bomb and other elements of a “nuclear starter kit.” Reported, some U.S. experts strongly suspect that Khan’s network, rather than Russia, as had been long assumed, has been the source of most of Iran’s nuclear know-how and technology. Underscoring the American dilemma, some contend that concerns about the stability of Pakistan, a key ally in the war against terrorism, have made the Administration reluctant to pressure the military-dominated government of President Pervez Musharraf to gain access to A. Q. Khan.1

In theory, achieving the two most critical U.S. policy objectives relating to Pakistan — defeating radical Islamic terrorism and deterring nuclear proliferation — are complementary, since the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is, in the words of the Vice-Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, former Representative Lee Hamilton, “the ultimate nightmare.” In practice, however, the historical record shows that the dual American objectives often have been operationally incompatible, especially democracy promotion and nuclear proliferation. From that perspective, Vice-Chairman Hamilton observed at an August 24, 2004 hearing of the House International Relations Committee, “I think Pakistan represents as tough a problem as there is in American foreign policy today.”2

A key U.S. policy issue raised in this report is whether there should be any nuclear nonproliferation conditions on U.S. aid to Pakistan and under what circumstances, if any, the President and Congress might recalculate the relative importance of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and anti-terrorism policy objectives. The issue of policy tradeoffs is especially acute given the discovery in 2003 of A. Q. Khan’s network. Most nuclear proliferation experts contend that Khan must have had significant logistical support from elements in the Pakistani military and the civilian nuclear establishment, whether acting in support of Pakistani security policy or his own desire for private gain, or both. In what appeared to be a carefully worded response at a December 21, 2004 press interview, Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that the Administration accepted President Musharraf’s statement that he had no knowledge of Khan’s activities, but it also appears that the Administration has not been able to gain access to Khan.3 Even if the reluctance of the Administration to confront Pakistan directly over its nuclear activities is warranted in view of the seriousness of the terrorist threat, there may be other ways the United States can reduce the dangers posed by Pakistan’s continuing proliferation potential.

Pakistan’s cooperation with the war on terror is not directly a subject of this report, in part because the relative value of such cooperation, as compared to the inhibiting effect on U.S. nonproliferation policy, cannot be assessed from open

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source information. However, the value of such cooperation could be an important factor in determining the extent to which the United States should compromise its nonproliferation objectives in the interest of gaining Pakistan’s cooperation against terrorism. Although Pakistan has captured or facilitated the capture of hundreds of alleged terrorists, including some very high level Al Qaeda figures, persistent reports question whether Pakistan has given as much assistance as it could, and they suggest ongoing relationships between Pakistan’s military intelligence officers and some key Taliban leaders who are thought to live openly in northern Pakistan.4

This report briefly recounts previous failed efforts to reconcile conflicting American regional security and nuclear nonproliferation policy objectives regarding Pakistan; (2) documents Pakistan’s most recent role in supplying nuclear technology to “rogue” states and how these activities escaped detection by U.S. intelligence agencies; (3) considers issues regarding the nature, objectives, and viability of the military-dominated government headed by President Pervez Musharraf; and, (4) outlines a series of unilateral and multilateral U.S. options, with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each, for gaining further nuclear nonproliferation cooperation from Pakistan and forestalling future exports from Pakistan of nuclear and dual-use components, materials, and technology. This report will not be updated.

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: “Hard Choices” or the Same Choices5

The 9/11 Commission Report emphasizes the need for “hard choices” and “difficult long-term commitments” to Pakistan. The Report explicitly notes that the need for a pragmatic approach inevitably involves compromises with other important U.S. interests such as democracy and nuclear non-proliferation. The Report does not address the issue of where the balance should be struck between supporting the Musharraf government as a necessary means of fighting terrorism. Instead, the Report emphasizes Musharraf’s “moderate” views and the grave danger if radical Islamists gained control of the Pakistani state and its stock of nuclear weapons. Nor does the Report address substantively the question of how the United States should respond if Pakistan engages in significant nuclear proliferation activities in the future.

Instead of hard choices, some observers judge that the Bush Administration and Congress have no option but to provide substantial assistance to Pakistan to bolster Musharraf and to gain the closest possible antiterrorist cooperation from Islamabad, without regard to issues such as democracy and nuclear proliferation. From this

4 These reports are most apparent in the Indian press, but statements by some U.S. officials appear indirectly to validate the reports. The State Department’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism, released on April 29, 2004, lists several groups that appear to operate across the de facto border, though the report does not address the issue of any official Pakistani involvement with the groups. See section on Pakistan in the South Asia chapter, and “Appendix C — Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups.” See also CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia. Updated Dec. 13, 2004 [by K. Alan Kronstadt and Bruce Vaughn], p. 28-31.

5 This section was prepared by Richard Cronin.
perspective, the issue may be less one of choices than unpleasant realities. The hardest choices may in fact be those faced by President Musharraf, given the broad public antipathy in Pakistan towards U.S. policy in the Middle East, including the war in Iraq and support of Israel, and the widely held misperception that the U.S. war on terrorism is in fact a war against Islam.

Also, because of its mandate, the 9/11 Commission focused more on the urgency of maintaining a stable and cooperative government in Islamabad that would remain a partner in the war against terrorism and less on Pakistan’s role as a source of nuclear proliferation. In the view of the 9/11 Commission, maintaining close cooperation with Pakistan in the fight against Al Qaeda and keeping Pakistani nuclear capabilities out of the hands of terrorists depends critically on supporting President Pervez Musharraf’s vision of a moderate, modernizing Islamic state.

The 9/11 Commission addressed in an oblique manner the issue of Pakistan’s past nuclear proliferation activities and the risk of further proliferation emanating from Pakistan. The Report’s section on Pakistan acknowledges, but does not dwell on, Pakistan’s continuing potential to be a source of technology and know-how for other states or terrorist groups intent on acquiring nuclear weapons. It noted President Musharraf’s repeated assurances that “Pakistan does not barter with its nuclear technology,” but also observed that “proliferation concerns have been long-standing and very serious.”

Another section of the 9/11 Commission Report dealing more generally with the threat of nuclear proliferation takes note of Khan’s role in establishing illegal covert networks for global transfer of nuclear technology and materials, but its recommendations are not Pakistan-specific. Rather, the Report emphasizes multilateral solutions based especially on “an international legal regime with universal jurisdiction to enable the capture, interdiction, and prosecution of smugglers” by any state that finds them operating covertly in its territory. The Report specifically calls for expanding the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the 1991 “Nunn-Lugar” Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR). The PSI emphasizes international cooperation to interdict WMD and ballistic missile shipments, while the CTR concentrates on securing nuclear weapons and other dangerous materials scattered throughout the territories of the former Soviet Union, which could fall into the hands of terrorists.6

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6 Eleven industrialized democracies — nine NATO countries plus Australia and Japan — endorsed a “Statement of Interdiction Principles” in Paris in September 2003. Since then, many additional countries have also endorsed the principles, and several exercises have been conducted by U.S., European, Australian, and Japanese forces. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, “Proliferation Security Initiative.” [http://www.state.gov/t/np/c10390.htm]. See links for additional information.
Past as Prologue: Pakistan and the Recurrent Dilemma of Conflicting U.S. Policy Goals

The effort to reconcile U.S. nuclear proliferation objectives towards Pakistan with more immediate American regional and global security concerns has a long and less than encouraging history. References by the 9/11 Report to Pakistan’s perception of the United States as an unreliable ally relate directly to fundamental differences in U.S. and Pakistani expectations of the alliance, and the consequent unwillingness of several U.S. Administrations to support Pakistan in its wars with India in 1965 and 1971.

India’s 1974 Nuclear Test and the Beginning of the U.S. Policy Dilemma

Pakistan emerged as a major source of nuclear proliferation concern following India’s underground test of 1974, which itself was a delayed response to China’s 1965 nuclear test. Because its technological base was far smaller than India’s, Pakistan concentrated on obtaining nuclear materials and technology from abroad. Successful U.S. diplomatic efforts in the late 1970s to prevent France from delivering a uranium reprocessing plant to Pakistan marked the beginning of a long struggle to prevent Pakistan from acquiring what some, including the then-Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, even then called the “Islamic bomb.”

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7 This section was prepared by Richard P. Cronin and Sharon Squassoni.

8 When India and Pakistan went to war in 1965 and 1971, the United States not only refused to assist Pakistan but cut off military assistance to both countries, an act which hurt Pakistan far more than India. Pakistani resentment of U.S. policy in the 1971-1972 war was particularly deep, since a diplomatic “tilt” towards Pakistan carried out by President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger failed to prevent the loss of the country’s rebellious eastern wing, which became Bangladesh. President Nixon ordered a “tilt” towards Pakistan in a building confrontation between India and Pakistan over a rebellion in East Pakistan after the West Pakistani-dominated military government refused to recognize the achievement of an absolute majority by the main East Pakistani party following 1970 elections. The Administration valued Pakistan’s assistance in the U.S. opening to China in 1971, including facilitating a secret trip to Beijing by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and believed that India, viewed as pro-Soviet, was exploiting the situation. Nonetheless, as the confrontation developed the Administration was not willing to provide active military support. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan: Disenchantment of a Crisis. Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. P. 194.

9 Bhutto was an urbane Pakistani aristocrat and a Muslim from the Shi’a minority, but by no means a radical Islamist. In his autobiography written in a jail cell following his overthrow by General Zia al-Huq in 1977, Bhutto partly justified his role in seeking a nuclear weapons capability for Pakistan by observing that there was a Christian bomb, a Jewish bomb, and a Hindu bomb, and vowing that Pakistan would build an Islamic bomb. In this particular context, Bhutto’s use of the phrase appears related to his resentment of the perceived discrimination against Pakistan on the part of the United States and other western countries, and his belief that Israel and India enjoyed western favor because of bias against (continued...)
eventually were overtaken by Cold War developments that caused successive U.S. administrations and Congress to flinch repeatedly as Islamabad transgressed each new U.S. “red line.”

From the time of India’s first nuclear test in 1974, Congress has played the leading role in formulating the legislative parameters governing U.S. nonproliferation policy. Pakistan’s efforts to acquire technology from abroad, as well as concern that the Ford Administration had not responded adequately to India’s abuse of U.S. and Canadian peaceful nuclear assistance, led Congress in the late 1970s to enact two landmark nuclear nonproliferation provisions to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, amended. Section 669 (Symington Amendment), of the FAA, first enacted in 1976, banned U.S. economic, and military assistance, and export credits to countries that have not placed all of their nuclear facilities and materials under the inspection regime of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that deliver or receive, acquire or transfer nuclear enrichment technology. Section 670 (Glenn Amendment), first adopted in 1977, provided the same sanctions in the case of countries that acquire or transfer nuclear reprocessing technology or explode or transfer a nuclear device. These provisions, amended, are now contained in Sections 101 and 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).10

Congress had India as well as Pakistan in mind when it enacted the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978, which also generally enjoyed the support of the Carter Administration. The NNPA, among other things, bans the sale of U.S. uranium fuel to countries that do not accept the imposition of “full-scope” IAEA inspections and safeguards. Because of India’s unwillingness to accept these terms, the United States abrogated a 30-year bilateral agreement under which it had committed to sell low-enriched uranium fuel for India’s U.S.-supplied Tarapur Atomic Power Station.11

**Alternating U.S. Policy Priorities Towards Pakistan**

The United States chose its nuclear proliferation interests over its regional security interests in April 1979, when President Carter cut off U.S. assistance to Pakistan under Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act, but this prioritization

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9 (...)continued
Islam. He also appeared to believe that Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability would garner more economic and political support from Middle East and Persian Gulf countries. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, “If I Am Assassinated...”. New Delhi, India, etc.: Vikas Publishing House, 1979.


proved short-lived. Carter’s action followed the revelation that the then young A. Q. Khan secretly had acquired the plans for uranium enrichment technology while working at a European nuclear facility in the Netherlands. Later, in November of the same year, U.S.-Pakistan relations reached a nadir after a mob attacked and burned the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and several other U.S. facilities in response to false reports, possibly spread by the Iranian revolutionary leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, that the United States was somehow involved in a takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Islamic extremists.\textsuperscript{12}

As in the case of the 9/11 attacks some three decades later, the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a compete reversal of U.S. nuclear proliferation and other security policy priorities. President Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, set the tone in a memo of December 26, 1979, when he reportedly told the President that the United States had no choice but to repair its then-tattered relations with Pakistan. Reportedly, Brzezinski told the President that gaining Pakistan’s support against the Soviet occupation “will require ...more guarantees to it [Pakistan], more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy.”\textsuperscript{13}

The primacy of Cold War concerns remained the policy of the Reagan and George H. W. Bush Administrations as well. Congress supported this reordering of U.S. policy priorities in 1981, by adding a new Section 620E of the FAA, which gave the President qualified authority to waive for a period of six-years the provisions of Section 669. Congress supported a six-year, $3.2 billion program of economic and military assistance, much like the five-year, $3 billion program requested by the Bush Administration for the period FY2005-2009. Despite Washington’s warnings and contrary to repeated denials by the country’s military ruler, President Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan not only continued to develop a nuclear weapons capability but companies connected with its nuclear program were caught trying to export dual-use materials in violation of U.S. export control laws.

**Failed Efforts to Reconcile U.S. Cold War and Nuclear Proliferation Objectives: The 1985 “Pressler Amendment” and the 1990 Aid Cutoff**

In 1985, in the face of incontrovertible evidence that Pakistan was continuing to develop a nuclear weapons capability, despite repeated denials by President Zia ul-Haq, the Reagan Administration agreed to accept a new provision to U.S. foreign assistance law, the so-called Pressler Amendment, Sec. 620E(e) of the FAA, requiring the President to certify annually that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear

\textsuperscript{12} Two Americans, a Marine defending the embassy and an airman in his apartment, and two Pakistani employees died in the attacks, but more than one hundred Americans and Pakistanis narrowly escaped burning to death. The Pakistani army stood by for several hours and only arrived on the scene after the riot was over. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004): 21-23.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 51.
explosive device as a condition of U.S. assistance. President Reagan and President George H. W. made such findings for three years after passage of the amendment, but each was successively more circumscribed. In 1990, President Bush informed Congress that he could no longer make such a certification, and that most economic and all military assistance to Pakistan would be suspended.14

The 9/11 Commission’s references to Pakistan’s belief that past U.S. support has been self-serving relate in large part to this development, even though Islamabad had ample warning that its nuclear activities were putting its assistance in jeopardy. Although the U.S. Government denied the charge, Pakistani commentators asserted that the imposition of sanctions was directly related to 1989 withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan, which made Pakistan no longer critical to U.S. regional security policy.15


When India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, Congress and the Clinton Administration moved with a haste surprising to many observers to waive most of the economic sanctions required by U.S. foreign assistance law on both countries. The reaction of the President and Congress appeared to reflect several factors, including a decline in the belief of the efficacy of sanctions once the tests were a fait accompli, efforts by U.S. agricultural interests to prevent a loss of markets, and the rising influence of the India caucus in Congress.

Legislation passed in July 1998 made Pakistan eligible for agricultural export credits to buy U.S. winter wheat, while legislation signed into law in October that year, “The India and Pakistan Relief Act,” gave the President the authority to waive various economic sanctions for one year. Later in October 1998 Congress made this authority permanent and also extended it, with conditions, to include military assistance, foreign military sales credits, and exports to high technology entities, in the FY2000 Department of Defense appropriation. India was able to take advantage of many of these relaxations of sanctions but Pakistan remained ineligible for most U.S. assistance on two other grounds: General Musharraf’s October 1999 military coup; and the fact that Pakistan had fallen into arrears in its debt repayments to the United States.16


New U.S. Policy Reversal After 9/11

The 9/11 terrorist attacks, as in the case of the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, immediately changed Pakistan’s status from that of a problem country with which the United States had strained relations to a critical regional ally, but they put the U.S. Government once again at a disadvantage in dealing with Pakistan’s nuclear activities. A number of nonproliferation experts agree with the critical importance of keeping Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials out of the reach of terrorists, but they disagree with the Commission’s assumption that President Musharraf is a sufficiently reliable partner, absent a more forthcoming attitude from the Pakistani government on the activities of A. Q. Khan and his network. Others question the whether Pakistan is fully committed to fighting the war against terrorism, let alone exercising nuclear restraint.

Among the most serious sources of concern is the well-documented past involvement of some members of the Army’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the possibility that some officers retain sympathies with both groups. In the words of one analyst, “...Pakistan’s official alliance with the United States in the war on terror has only increased the danger posed by al-Qaeda sympathizers within its nuclear establishment.”17 These considerations are seen as a significant factor in Musharraf’s refusal to provide adequate information about A. Q. Khan’s network. Some observers argue that without additional nonproliferation policy initiatives beyond those already adopted by the Bush Administration, embracing and supporting Musharraf is an inadequate response to danger posed by Pakistan’s nuclear establishment and its past role as possibly the most important single source of nuclear proliferation to radical states.

Even if President Musharraf’s assurances are taken at face value, Pakistan remains a significant source of proliferation risk. Still outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Pakistan is not bound by that treaty’s prohibitions on nuclear weapon states transferring nuclear-weapons related technology or materials to any other state (or encouraging or assisting any state). It also is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, an informal organization of countries producing nuclear materials and technology that has established guidelines for nuclear exports. While Pakistani leaders have proclaimed that their nuclear weapons are secure and that Pakistan has not been involved in selling or transferring nuclear weapons technology, this claim is cast into doubt by the activities of Dr. A. Q. Khan over more than a decade.

Details on Pakistan’s Proliferation Activities18

Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan and several other scientists from the Khan Research Laboratories sold nuclear technology from the 1980s through 2002 to several

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18 This section was prepared by Sharon Squassoni.
countries, including Iran, Libya, and North Korea. President Bush, in a speech that focused on proliferation at the National Defense University on February 11, 2004, outlined some aspects of Khan’s network:

- Khan led the network, operating mostly out of Pakistan
- A factory in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, manufactured centrifuge parts (Scomi Precision Engineering)
- BSA Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman, ran SMB computers in Dubai as a front company
- Network operatives in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa purchased other components.

Much of the information about exactly what Khan sold has been gathered from press accounts; although Khan reportedly signed a 12-page confession in early February 2004, the text of that confession has not been made public. Moreover, it appears that the confession was written under pressure, which could further distort the truth about Khan’s activities.

Khan’s confession came at the end of a two-month investigation by the Pakistani government into his activities, which was sparked by two related proliferation investigations: Iran was pressured by the IAEA in the fall of 2003 to reveal its foreign sources of centrifuge equipment, if only to support its argument that the presence of highly enriched uranium came from foreign contamination and not its own production of HEU; and Libya renounced its WMD programs in December 2003, revealing all its foreign sources of procurement. Only in February 2004 did Pakistan admit that nuclear technology was sold to those two countries. The Pakistani government and the North Korean government continue to deny any transfers of nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea. Yet, U.S. officials have testified before Congress that Khan provided such technology to North Korea. President Bush stated in his February 11th speech that “Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan’s older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models.” One popular theory is that Pakistan bartered uranium enrichment technology for missile

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19 Pakistan’s investigation also included Mohammed Farooq, who supervised Khan Research Laboratory (KRL)’s contacts with foreign suppliers; Yasin Chohan, a metallurgist at KRL; Major Islam ul-Haq, a personal staff officer; Nazeer Ahmed, a director at KRL; and Saeed Ahmed, head of centrifuge design. Between 11 and 25 employees of KRL were questioned, as well as the generals in charge of security at KRL, General Beg, and General Karamat. Simon Henderson, “Link Leaks,” National Review Online, January 19, 2004.

20 See, for example, George Tenet’s testimony on February 24, 2004 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “We...believe Pyongyang is pursuing a production-scale enrichment program based on technology provided by A.Q. Khan.” The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Environment.

21 “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD,” Remarks by the President, Fort Lesley J. McNair, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html]
Khan reportedly sold a full range of technology — from blueprints and components to full centrifuge assemblies, uranium hexafluoride feedstock, and, reportedly, a nuclear weapon design. Assistance to Iran began in the late 1980s and continued at least until the mid-1990s. Assistance to Libya began in the early 1990s and continued into 2002. Assistance to North Korea reportedly began in the mid-1990s and may have continued until 2003. However, a German intelligence investigation concluded as long ago as 1991 that Iraq, and possibly Iran and North Korea, obtained uranium melting information from Pakistan in the late 1980s. A Pakistani official involved in Khan’s investigation reportedly said North Korea ordered P-1 centrifuge components from 1997 to 2000. Beyond blueprints, components, full assemblies of centrifuges, and low-enriched uranium, Libya also received — startlingly — a nuclear weapons design. In the case of Iran and Libya, Khan provided technology for an advanced centrifuge design (the P-2). There is no confirmation that the nuclear weapon design Libya received in 2001 or 2002 is from Pakistan, but some sources have reported that the design contained Chinese text and step-by-step instructions for assembling a 1960s HEU implosion device, which could...
indicate that Khan passed on a design Pakistan is long-rumored to have received from China.\textsuperscript{28}

**Intelligence Issues**

It is not possible to describe from open sources what the U.S. intelligence community may have known, and when, about the A.Q. Khan network, but it is possible to date some U.S. approaches to Pakistan on this matter from press reports. In addition, it is possible to piece together hints of Pakistani collaboration in the nuclear field with the three countries in question. Finally, semi-annual, unclassified reports to Congress on proliferation (so-called Section 721 reports) from 1997 to the present may indicate what the intelligence community might have known.

U.S. officials reportedly approached Pakistani officials in 2000 with suspicions about activities conducted by Khan Research Laboratory (KRL) scientists. Pakistan reportedly responded with an investigation, forcing Khan into early retirement in March 2001.\textsuperscript{29} Shortly after Khan’s dismissal, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage was quoted by the *Financial Times* as saying that “people who were employed by the nuclear agency and have retired” could be spreading nuclear technology to other states, including North Korea.\textsuperscript{30} However, a senior U.S. nonproliferation official explained weeks later that Armitage’s statement led to confusion about the cooperation; that it was really limited to missile cooperation.\textsuperscript{31} President Musharraf told reporters in 2004 that the information U.S. officials gave him several years ago was not specific enough for him to take action.

Reports of extensive official cooperation between Pakistan and the three countries might also have informed the intelligence community’s assessment. Pakistan reportedly signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran in 1986, although the terms of that agreement are unknown, and Iranian scientists received training in Pakistan in 1988. Libyan funding of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program in the early years long has been alleged, most notably in a 1981 book by Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney called *The Islamic Bomb*.\textsuperscript{32} Finally, Pakistan’s well-documented missile cooperation with North Korea beginning in the early 1990s,


\textsuperscript{29} “Pakistan informed US of ‘personal’ nuclear technology transfer,” Agence France-Presse, December 25, 2002 (based on report from *Jiji Press* news agency). According to this and other reports, the apparent tip-off was tens of thousands of dollars deposited into the personal bank accounts of Pakistani scientists at Kahuta (Khan Research Laboratories).


as well as A.Q. Khan’s dozen or so trips to North Korea were certainly known to the intelligence community.

**Pakistan’s Absence in U.S. Intelligence Reports on Proliferation**

Despite the existence of intelligence information and rumors in the open literature concerning significant Pakistani contacts with radical states known to be seeking nuclear weapons, Congress has received little information on this issue in unclassified reports from intelligence agencies. The CIA’s semi-annual reports to Congress on the acquisition of technology related to weapons of mass destruction (Section 721 of FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act) do not highlight Pakistani involvement in supplying WMD technology. Pakistan is addressed as a country acquiring technology from 1997 to the first half of 2002 and then no longer appears in the reports as a country of proliferation concern.\(^{33}\) China, Russia, and North Korea, are regularly included as key suppliers, but Pakistan has never been included in this list. The first time Pakistan is mentioned as a potential new supplier of technology is for the report ending June 2000.\(^{34}\) The report covering the period to June 2002 addresses “Emerging State and Non-State Suppliers,” but Pakistan or A.Q. Khan are not mentioned by name. The text states that traditional recipients of WMD technology might follow North Korea’s lead in supplying such technology to other countries or non-state actors. Additionally:

Even in cases where states take action to stem such transfers, there are growing numbers of knowledgeable individuals or non-state purveyors of WMD-related materials and technology who are able to act outside the constraints of governments. Such non-state actors are increasingly capable of providing technology and equipment that previously could only be supplied directly by countries with established capabilities.

South Asia is first mentioned as a region of key suppliers in the report covering January to June 2003. However, even in that report, there is no mention of a connection between South Asia, Iran, Libya, or North Korea. In the sections on Iran and North Korea, there is no information on foreign suppliers, and the section on Libya refers just to Libya seeking “technical exchanges” for dual-use equipment. A.Q. Khan is finally mentioned in the Section 721 report ending December 2004 (publication mid-2004):

> The exposure of the A. Q. Khan network and its role in supplying nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea illustrate one form of this threat, but commercial purveyors of dual-use technologies who routinely seek to circumvent

\(^{33}\) This may be because countries with substantial advanced conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction programs are excluded from the reports, as well as countries with little acquisition activity of concern.

\(^{34}\) In the section called “Trends” of the January to June 2000 Section 721 report: “... as their domestic capabilities grow, traditional recipients of WMD and missile technology could emerge as new suppliers of technology and expertise. Many of these countries — such as India, Iran and Pakistan — do not adhere to the export restraints embodied in such supplier groups as the Nuclear suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.” p. 11.
international export control regimes to deliver WMD-related equipment and material to WMD-aspirant countries are of grave concern as well.\textsuperscript{35}

**Transfers to Iran.** By and large, the U.S. intelligence community appears not to have identified Pakistan as a significant source of nuclear technology for Iran. Concerns about a potential Iranian nuclear weapons program date back to the 1970s, with a hiatus during the years of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1989). With the end of that war, the attention of the Iranian government turned back to recreating its nuclear program, including the reactors at Bushehr. When many governments were persuaded not to participate in the project, Russia stepped in to fill the gap, and U.S. attention focused on the nuclear technology Iran might glean from Russian scientists and engineers. Although centrifuge enrichment techniques were a concern, the intelligence community had not focused on Pakistan as a particular supplier. In the Section 721 reports, Russia and China are repeatedly mentioned as suppliers to Iran’s nuclear program. From 1999 to 2001, the report admits that Iran has sought technology from a variety of sources, but especially Russia. Only in the report for the first half of 2002 is there mention that the U.S. intelligence community suspects Iran is interested in acquiring foreign fissile material and technology for weapons development.

**Transfers to Libya.** Although the U.S. intelligence community long had suspected Libyan interest in developing nuclear weapons, most analysts attributed the limited Libyan success to sanctions and lack of an indigenous scientific and engineering base. The IAEA reported in February 2004 that Libya began receiving centrifuge components from A.Q. Khan in 1997. Yet, the Section 721 reports did not contain any text about a Libyan nuclear program until 2000. Then, the report noted that the suspension of U.N. sanctions “has accelerated the pace of procurement efforts in Libya’s drive to rejuvenate its ostensibly civilian nuclear program.” That report hinted that a nuclear cooperation agreement with Moscow would play a key role. Not until the report for January to June 2002 did the text note that Libya used its secret services “to try to obtain technical information on the development of WMD, including nuclear weapons.” If this was referring to Libya’s procurement of a nuclear weapons design from A.Q. Khan, it seems to imply less willingness by Khan to provide the plans than apparently was the case. The reports for the last half of 2002 and first half of 2003 only mention technical exchanges related to dual-use equipment.

**Transfers to North Korea.** At the time the October 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea was negotiated, there was concern about, but scant evidence of, North Korean interest in uranium enrichment.\textsuperscript{36} Reports of North


\textsuperscript{36} North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 but did not implement its nuclear safeguards agreement until the early 1990s. When North Korea refused a request for a “special inspection” by the IAEA, it threatened to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993. The U.S.-
Korea’s procurement of enrichment-related equipment, particularly from Pakistan, date back to the mid-1980s (see above), but apparently U.S. intelligence agencies had no evidence of an actual enrichment program. Although a senior North Korean official reportedly admitted that it has an enrichment program to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly during a confrontational meeting in Pyongyang in October 2002, Pyongyang has continued to deny it publicly.37

It is clear that the U.S. intelligence community knew of multiple trips by A.Q. Khan to North Korea, beginning in the mid-1990s. Whether the intelligence community attributed this to missile or nuclear cooperation is unclear, but the role of KRL in both nuclear and missile technology could point to collaboration in one or both areas.

In November 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency distributed a one-page, unclassified white paper to Congress on North Korean enrichment capabilities, which noted that the United States had “been suspicious that North Korea has been working on uranium enrichment for several years,” and that it obtained clear evidence “recently” that North Korea had begun constructing a centrifuge facility.38 The CIA concluded that North Korea began a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program in 2000. Further, the paper noted that, in 2001, North Korea “began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities. It also obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems.” The CIA, the report said, had “learned that the North is constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational — which could be as soon as mid-decade.”39

One media report in 2002 cited Western officials as stating that Pakistan’s aid included a complete design package for a centrifuge rotor assembly; another stated that Pakistan had exported actual centrifuge rotors (2,000-3,000).40 In October 2002, the Washington Post reported that North Korean efforts to procure high strength

36 (...continued)
DPRK Agreed Framework, negotiated by the Clinton Administration, was a response to this crisis. In return for North Korea’s agreement to freeze its nuclear program and eventually to dismantle and remove these facilities from North Korea, the United States agreed to lead an international consortium to construct two light-water nuclear power reactors and also provide interim supplies of heavy fuel oil. “U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.” Fact Sheet, Bureau of Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, Feb. 15, 2001. [http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/2001/5284.htm].

37 Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan told an unofficial U.S. delegation to Pyongyang in January 2004 that, “We do not have a highly enriched uranium program, and furthermore we never admitted to one.” Testimony of Dr. Sigfried Hecker before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Update on the North Korean Nuclear Issue,” January 21, 2004.

38 Untitled working paper on North Korea’s nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment distributed by CIA to Congressional staff on November 19, 2002.

39 Ibid.

aluminum and significant construction activity tipped off the United States.\textsuperscript{41} Apparently, North Korea attempted to obtain materials from China, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, and Europe, but Pakistan provided most of the assistance related to the rotors.

In the Section 721 reports to Congress, however, there has been little mention of a North Korea-Pakistan connection in the nuclear area. In the first report in 1997, the text states that North Korea does not require significant outside assistance to produce WMD. In the 1998 report, there is no mention of any procurement related to the nuclear program, and the report for the first half of 1999 states that “Pyongyang sought to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its nuclear program, but we do not know of any procurement directly linked to the nuclear weapons program.” This statement was included in both reports for 2000, but dropped in reports for 2001. The report for the first half of 2002 notes that North Korea began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities in 2001 but makes no mention of where it procured those items. The report covering the last half of 2002 states that “we did not obtain clear evidence indicating that North Korea had begun acquiring material and equipment for a centrifuge facility until mid-2002.”

Although the intelligence community might place emphasis on “clear evidence” and the threshold of a “centrifuge facility,” this admission comes after media accounts in October and November 2002 of North Korea’s centrifuge procurement from Pakistan and perhaps seven years after that procurement apparently began. Only on February 24, 2004, weeks after Khan confessed to his activity, did CIA Director George Tenet tell the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “We ...believe Pyongyang is pursuing a production-scale uranium enrichment program based on technology provided by A.Q. Khan, which would give North Korea an alternative route to nuclear weapons.”

**Role of A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani Government and Military\textsuperscript{42}**

Whether the Musharraf government can be trusted to go forward with the United States as a security partner, let alone a Major Non-NATO Ally, while not putting the United States further at risk from nuclear proliferation, depends in part on the degree of culpability of the Pakistani government and military in A. Q. Khan’s activities. Even if, as has been alleged by the Pakistani government, Khan’s aggressive marketing of nuclear materials and technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya was designed to further Khan’s outsized ego and financial interests, he could not have functioned without some level of cooperation by Pakistani military personnel, who maintained tight security around the key nuclear facilities, and possibly civilian officials as well. This section discusses the available information on Khan’s role and assesses the credibility of Pakistan’s denial that his activities were authorized or supported at the policy level in Islamabad.

\textsuperscript{41} “U.S. Followed the Aluminum; Pyongyang’s Effort to Buy Metal was Tip to Plans,” *Washington Post*, October 18, 2002.

\textsuperscript{42} This section was prepared by K. Alan Kronstadt.
Khan’s Motives

A. Q. Khan’s celebrity status and the degree to which he enriched himself by his activities have been cited by some as evidence that his activities were not government policy. In return for assistance provided by Khan and laboratory director Farooq Mohammed (a close associate of Khan), Iran allegedly funneled millions of dollars into foreign bank accounts held by the two men. Reportedly, Khan then used the money to purchase valuable real estate in both Pakistan and Dubai.43 Khan reportedly made numerous trips to Tehran to share his expertise on uranium enrichment procedures. Compensation also may have included the gift of a villa on the Caspian Sea. Khan denies ever having traveled to Iran.44 One unnamed aide to Musharraf reportedly said that “Khan had a completely blank check” while in charge of the Khan Research Laboratory (KRL). “He could do anything. He could go anywhere. He could buy anything at any price.”45

Khan’s reputation as a Pakistani “national hero” appears be manufactured, produced at the expense of several other Pakistani scientists who played equal or greater roles in the country’s nuclear weapons program. One leading American expert called Khan an “egomaniac” who had mastered the press to transform his image to that of national hero.46 Although Khan apparently did make Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program possible by illegally acquiring the plans for an uranium enrichment facility, this is only one — albeit a critical one — of many steps required in the production of nuclear weapons. According to one source, much of the nuclear weapons production process was overseen by a lead scientist at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), which did not enjoy KRL’s high public profile. That scientist, Samar Mubarikmand, may have known of Khan’s activities and may even have used Khan and KRL as a decoy to divert attention from PAEC, where the most critical work on nuclear weapons was being carried out.47

Whether President Musharraf’s delicate treatment of Khan following the revelations of his activities reflects some level of official culpability is arguable. It has been pointed out that, despite evidence that he had committed serious breaches of Pakistani law, Khan was allowed (by Musharraf himself) to keep the many millions of ill-gotten dollars, while two former elected Prime Ministers had been exiled and barred from political office for corruption charges involving far less money.48

47 “Fission Smokescreen,” Outlook India (New Delhi), February 23, 2004
48 “What is the ‘National Interest,’” Friday Times (Lahore), February 6, 2004.
Likewise, it appears that the Pakistani government was, at a very minimum, incredibly lax in responding to rumors of his activities. Even before Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear test, several scientists working with Khan at KRL reportedly warned government officials that Khan was involved in suspicious activities.\(^{49}\) There have been reports that Khan’s daughter smuggled out of Pakistan documents and a tape-recorded statement indicating that senior Pakistani military officers, including Musharraf, were aware of her father’s proliferation activities.\(^ {50}\)

On the other hand, Khan’s self-promoted reputation as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program created a motive not only for overlooking his transgressions, but also for seeking to share in his reflected glory. At a formal dinner marking Khan’s March 2001 retirement from KRL, President Musharraf lavished praise on the famed metallurgist: “Dr. Khan and his team toiled and sweated, day and night, against all odds and obstacles, against international sanctions and sting operations, to create, literally out of nothing, with their bare hands, the pride of Pakistan’s nuclear capability.”\(^ {51}\) Given Musharraf’s relative unpopularity, some observers suggest that his lavishing praise on Khan does not necessarily imply approval or complicity in his proliferation activities.

**Pakistani Government Role\(^ {52}\)**

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca reportedly met with Musharraf in Islamabad in October 2003 to present him with substantive evidence implicating Khan and several other scientists in a proliferation ring. One unnamed Pakistani official said that U.S. intelligence on Khan’s movements was so detailed that it seemed a tracking device had been planted on his body.\(^ {53}\) In the same month, the network began to unravel at the other end: centrifuge equipment shipments to Libya were intercepted in the Mediterranean in October and by December 2003, Libyan leader Qadaffi renounced his weapons of mass destructions programs. Libya revealed, to the United States and to others, the assistance that Khan had provided.

On December 11, 2003, a Pakistani daily reported that two senior KRL scientists had “gone missing under mysterious circumstances.” Later, it became known that laboratory director Farooq Mohammed had been the first Pakistani nuclear scientist to be “detained” for questioning by government authorities on November 27, following the delivery to Islamabad of an IAEA letter on Iranian


\(^{52}\) The balance of this major section was prepared by K. Alan Kronstadt.

\(^{53}\) “Islamabad Received CIA Report on Dr Qaedeer in Oct,” *News* (Karachi), February 8, 2004.
uranium enrichment facilities. Islam-ul Haq, a director at KRL, reportedly was picked up for questioning as he was dining at Khan’s home on January 17, 2004.

As the investigation expanded in January 2004, many citizens criticized the Pakistani government for making scapegoats of lower-level scientists to “appease” the United States. Said the relative of one detained KRL scientist, “It’s all to praise or make happy the U.S.A. by framing innocent people.” Opposition political groups were near-unanimous in their dismissal of proliferation charges, claiming they were part of U.S.-led effort to denuclearize Pakistan; they typically portrayed Musharraf’s cooperation with the United States on this and other issues as capitulation to a foreign power.

On January 20, Pakistan barred all scientists working on its nuclear weapons program from leaving the country. The officially-stated reason was to ensure that these individuals would be available for questioning, but many believed that the true purpose was to prevent them from talking to foreign investigators or journalists. One day later, Khan himself was fired from his position as science advisor to the prime minister, and ensuing reports indicated that Khan was under house arrest in the Pakistani capital. On February 1, Khan reportedly signed a detailed confession indicating that he had provided Iran, North Korea, and Libya with uranium enrichment technologies and materials.

After conceding that some Pakistani scientists had been involved in proliferation, Musharraf suggested that personal gain was the central motivation, but other motives have been mentioned. When asked about motive, one unnamed senior Pakistani official did not mention greed at all, but rather indicated that Khan had transferred technologies to divert attention from the Pakistan’s nuclear program, as well as to bolster Islamic solidarity. Key Pakistani investigators reportedly have opined that Khan was motivated to defy the West, make himself a hero to the Islamic world, and gain wealth. Khan’s proliferation ring is reported to have earned $100 million in deals with Libya alone.

**Pakistani Military Role?**

In February 2004, as the Khan story was breaking in the international media, the *Washington Post* reported that Khan had told a friend and a senior Pakistani investigator that top Pakistani military officers, including Gen. Musharraf, had known about Khan’s assistance to North Korea’s uranium enrichment efforts. Khan also reportedly told investigators that General Mirza Aslam Beg, the former Army Chief (1988-1991), was aware of similar assistance being provided to Iran and that “two other Army chiefs, in addition to Musharraf, knew and approved of his efforts on behalf of North Korea.”

Publicly, Khan accepted all of the blame. In his televised confession to the Pakistani people, Khan sought to “atone for some of the anguish and pain” he had caused by offering his “deepest regrets and unqualified apologies to a traumatized nation.” He took “full responsibility” for the proliferation “activities” and emphasized that the Islamabad government had “never ever” authorized them. On the next day, in what appeared to many to be part of a scripted unfolding of events, President Musharraf granted and upheld a recommendation from his cabinet that Khan not be subjected to any proliferation-related criminal prosecution. Yet within a week, the Pakistani government announced that the pardon was “conditional” and “specific to charges made so far.”

Subsequent actions by the Pakistani government underscored doubts that Khan could have operated without some level of support by military officers and officials, whether acting on their own or carrying out government policy. Following Khan’s public confession, the Musharraf government announced that it had arrested at least five scientists and administrative officials from KRL, including Farooq Mohammed and Islam-ul Haq. On February 11, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister said that “nobody would be spared” in the ongoing criminal investigation, including Khan. On the same day, four civilian scientists and three retired military officers—including KRL department heads and brigadiers in charge of security there—were formally charged with proliferation-related crimes.

President Musharraf himself raised more questions when, on February 9, he acknowledged that he had long suspected that Khan was involved in proliferation activities, but argued that the United States had failed to provide convincing evidence.

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until the fall of 2003. Why Musharraf had not followed up on his own alleged suspicions has not been explained.

Politically, the Khan affair put President Musharraf in a difficult position. When the Pakistani Parliament met on February 16, opposition parties accused the government of covering-up the military’s role in proliferating, humiliating Khan, appeasing the United States, and by-passing the country’s elected representatives.

Some Pakistani commentators argued that the Pakistani state could in no way be held accountable for the actions of Khan himself. They pointed to Khan’s allegedly “total control” of KRL, the alleged fact the facilities were off-limits to both civilian politicians and the ISI, and an absence of evidence that Khan’s actions were ever transformed into KRL policy.

General Beg, in particular, has long been suspected of having anti-U.S. and pro-Iranian tendencies. Henry Rowan, at the time a U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, has related a January 1990 meeting with Gen. Beg, who, he says, “said something like, ‘If we don’t get adequate support from the U.S., then we may be forced to share nuclear technology with Iran.’” Another source attributes a similar statement by General Beg to late 1990, following the decision by President George H. W. Bush that he could not make the required certification to Congress that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons, thus invoking the “Pressler Amendment,” Sec. 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, 1961, as amended, requiring a cutoff of military and economic assistance to Pakistan.

Beg reportedly has strongly denied having ever having had control over A. Q. Khan — a role he assigned to former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990, 1993-1996) and former President Ghulam Ishak Khan (1988-1993). The accusations concerning Benazir Bhutto and Ghulam Ishaq Khan have been made by others, as well. Former Pakistani President Farooq Leghari (1993-1997) insisted that he, former President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and both former Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto were fully informed about the country’s nuclear weapons program as “nothing was kept secret from us.” Leghari claimed that he had no knowledge of proliferation activities while in office and put responsibility squarely

69 See, for example, “Has Dr Khan Breached Pakistan’s Nonproliferation Obligation?,” Friday Times (Lahore), February 6, 2004.
on the shoulders of A.Q. Khan. Benazir Bhutto’s chief defense advisor from 1988 to 1990, the late Gen. Intiaz, reportedly pressured Khan to transfer out-dated P-I centrifuges to Iran.

Others find Beg’s denials less than credible. Addressing Gen. Beg’s statements denying knowledge of transfers to Iran in the 1980s and 1990s, one former Pakistani nuclear scientist claimed that “nothing moves in the Pakistani nuclear spectrum without the knowledge of the chief of army staff.” Beg himself has claimed that the Pakistani Army has “never been in control” of the country’s nuclear weapons program except during periods of military rule. He insisted that the ultimate authority was always the “Chief Executive”——in this case Benazir Bhutto. Bhutto herself claimed that Khan could not have been acting alone and that senior government or military officials were seeking to cover-up their own complicity. She even asserted that, as Prime Minister, she had turned down several requests by military officials and scientists to export Pakistan’s nuclear technology.

An aide to then-PM Nawaz Sharif claimed that Beg approached him in 1991 with a proposal to sell nuclear technology to Iran. Reportedly, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, said that Beg told him that same year of an “understanding” with the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps that Pakistan would help Iran with its nuclear program in return for conventional weapons and oil. Beg’s alleged motive was to form a “grand alliance” of Islamic countries with the ability to resist American power in the wake of the U.S.-led military successes in Kuwait and Iraq in early 1991. Beg denies all claims that he sought to provide nuclear assistance to Iran.

The public reaction to the accusations against Khan was predictably nationalistic and anti-American. Many Pakistani observers accused the “foreign media” of bias in singling out Pakistan while ignoring the roles played by the citizens of other countries, including those in the West. They also criticized the IAEA and the United States for turning a blind eye to the nuclear weapons programs of Israel and India. Representative media commentary in Pakistan warned of a “clear and present danger that the West is threatening to dismantle [Pakistan’s] nuclear program” through the establishment of “intrusive inspection regimes.” Former ISI chief Lt. Gen. Hamid

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75 “Dr. Qadir’s Fate Hangs in Balance,” News (Karachi), January 24, 2004.
78 See, for example, “Countering Proliferation,” Dawn (Karachi), February 3, 2004.
Gul suggested that the United States would “exploit” the situation to gain joint custody of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons “to the total satisfaction of Israel.”

Seemingly in contradiction to the nationalistic and anti-Western response, a number of politicians and analysts from across Pakistan’s political spectrum were quick to suggest that Khan was “falling on his sword” to protect others in the Pakistani government and military who also were involved in proliferation activities, perhaps even including Musharraf himself. Others suggested that the series of events leading up to Khan’s confession and pardon appeared to have been tightly scripted, and may have been privately endorsed by a U.S. government keen to protect a key counterterrorism ally.

**Bush Administration Statements**

The Bush Administration has maintained that “there was no evidence that the top officials of the Pakistani government were complicit in or approved of [Khan’s] proliferation activities.” The Bush Administration has found insufficient evidence to trigger U.S. nonproliferation laws, even though U.S. officials claim neither to have asked for access to Khan nor believed that such access was necessary. Senior U.S. officials have insisted that the United States is receiving the cooperation it needs from Pakistan, but in testimony to Congress on April 29, 2004, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said that the Administration was “impatient for even greater efforts from President Musharraf.” In a feature article on December 26, 2004, the New York Times reported that the Administration had received little new information from Pakistan to its questions about where Khan obtained the plans for a nuclear weapon. The article also maintained, based on unnamed sources, that the Administration had not gained access to his chief assistant, Buhari Sayed Abu Tahir, who has been jailed in Malaysia as a consequence of the discovery of Khan’s network.

In view of the domestic political sensitivity of the issue for President Musharraf other statements by U.S. officials also appear designed to minimize American concern about the light treatment given A. Q. Khan by Musharraf, despite the gravity of his actions. Responding to a question during a CNN interview about President

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80 See, for example, “Pakistan Broadcasts Scientist’s Confession,” Los Angeles Times, February 5, 2004.


Bush’s claim during the September 30, 2004 presidential debate, that “the A. Q. Khan network has been brought to justice.” National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice reportedly noted the difficult situation for President Musharraf and that “A. Q. Khan, in a sense, has been brought to justice because he is out of the business that he loved most.” Rice reportedly stated further “And if you don’t think national humiliation is justice for what he did, I think it is. He’s nationally humiliated.”

Rather than publicly demanding that the Musharraf government make a full revelation of A. Q. Khan’s activities, Secretary of State Colin Powell and other State Department officials insisted that the United States should play no role in judging Musharraf’s handling of the matter. A State Department briefer on February 5, 2004, said he was “impressed by the seriousness of the investigation” being conducted in Pakistan and expected that Pakistan would share with the international community the information that is gleaned through the investigation. Secretary of State Colin Powell explicitly described the investigation as “a Pakistani internal matter” at a press conference in Islamabad on March 18, 2004, though he also said that he was confident that the Pakistani authorities would provide “full disclosure” so that the United States and Pakistan could work together to completely eliminate Khan’s network. Many Pakistani analysts voiced their approval of the conclusion that Khan’s activities breached no international laws, thus justifying Musharraf’s “prerogative” to pardon.

Other observers have not expressed the same level of confidence that the investigation would achieve the stated objectives. The Director-General of the IAEA called Khan “the tip of an iceberg” and claimed that his case “raises more questions than it answers. ... Dr. Khan was not working alone.” A New York Times editorial asserted that “Pakistan’s military — and that means General Musharraf — was, without question, aware of and part of this illicit and perilous commerce. Yet the Bush administration’s reaction,” the editorial continued, “has been one of grateful acceptance.” Indian reactions were predictably dismissive of the Khan pardon as a “grand charade” designed to protect the Pakistani military. Many were equally discomfited by the Bush administration’s quickness to call Khan’s activities an “internal matter.”

87 “Sorry Saga of Nuclear Proliferation,” Daily Times (Lahore), February 8, 2004.
90 “Pak Scientist’s Pardon a Grand Charade,” Times of India (New Delhi), February 9, 2004.
Issues Concerning the Viability of the Musharraf Government As a Long-Term U.S. Security Partner

The critical importance of gaining cooperation against terrorism has been the Bush Administration’s main justification for largely setting aside U.S. nonproliferation concerns in the case of Pakistan. Not only does the United States need Pakistani cooperation, but Musharraf’s survival has been seen by both the Administration and the 9/11 Commission as an essential requirement for maintaining and increasing Pakistani cooperation. Given the troubled history of U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation, the 9/11 Commission Report emphasizes, in particular, the necessity of avoiding a repetition of the past cycle of engagement, disengagement, and reengagement with Pakistan. The following section addresses the stability of the Musharraf government and the prospects for a continuation of current Pakistani policy should President Musharraf leave the scene, for whatever reason.

Near-Term U.S. Security Needs Versus Longer Term Human Rights and Democracy Goals

U.S. interest in Pakistani democratization exists in tandem with the perceived need to have a stable and effectively-administered ally in the international anti-terrorism coalition. However, while many observers believe that U.S. interests in combating terrorism and weapons proliferation in South Asia entail a “trade-off” with regard to other concerns, some contend that the human rights situation in Pakistan may itself be a crucial aspect of the incidence of terrorism and religious extremism. Congressional oversight of U.S.-Pakistan relations in a March 2003 hearing included Member expressions of concern about problems with Pakistani democratization and the danger of the United States “giving full recognition to a military takeover” through continuous waivers of coup-related aid restrictions. The military continues to dominate Pakistan’s centralized decision making process and, while in office, Prime Minister Jamali referred to President Musharraf as being his “boss.”

While it is possible to argue that Pakistan is more democratic since the October 2002 elections, many analysts note that the country’s democratic institutions and processes are inflexible and unaccommodating of dissent, and they see Pakistan’s political parties seriously weakened in recent years, with the military’s influence

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91 This section was prepared by Alan Kronstadt.
92 A House panel received expert testimony indicating that Pakistan’s worsening religious freedom situation is “part of the larger problem of the suppression of democratic freedoms” there ("House International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights Holds Hearing on State Department Report on International Religious Freedom,” FDCH Transcripts, February 10, 2004).
correspondingly more profound. Moreover, numerous commentators reject the 9/11 Commission’s “best hope” label for Musharraf himself as myopic and repetitive of past U.S. reliance on Pakistani military regimes, especially in light of their view that Pakistan’s allegedly decreasing political stability is rooted in Musharraf’s policies and in the personal support he receives from the United States.

President Musharraf remains generally a popular figure in Pakistan, but he has been an object of hatred for Islamic radicals, including those affiliated with domestic and international terrorist organizations. A March 2004 survey found that 86% of Pakistanis view Musharraf favorably (with 60% viewing him very favorably), but 65% also said that they support Osama bin Laden. Musharraf’s government depends on an alliance of six Islamist parties, which use the acronyms MMA (“United Action Front,” in English) to maintain a majority in the national parliament. The same alliance controls the assemblies in two provinces bordering Afghanistan — Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The support of the Islamist parties has been brought into question by Musharraf’s decision to break his commitment to step down as Army commander at the end of the year, a promise he made in 2003 to secure the support of a six Islamic parties in parliament.

The bargain struck with the Islamic parties served both to maintain a governing majority in the national assembly and to secure passage of an amendment, the 17th to the Pakistani constitution, which, among other things, legitimatized Musharraf’s 1999 military coup. The response to Musharraf’s indication that he would remain Army chief until the end of his presidential term in 2007 suggests that his popularity may have declined. Musharraf has justified keeping his uniform as necessary to maintain stability.

Overall, the events of September 11, 2001 and after appear to have assisted Musharraf in strengthening his grip on power. One former Pakistani political advisor and diplomat notes that, “Each of Pakistan’s patriarchs have based their claim to power on grounds of U.S. support and their own ability to provide good governance.” The perceived U.S. need for a stable and reliable regional ally in its ongoing counterterrorism efforts in South Asia have some analysts concluding that Musharraf remains in a position to take further domestic political advantage of current geopolitical dynamics.

97 For more background on Pakistani politics see CRS Report RL32615, Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
100 “Replaying the Old Marching Tune,” Indian Express (Bombay), July 10, 2002.
Many analysts believe the advance of democracy and civil society in Pakistan is key to the long-term success of stated U.S. policy in the region, although the 9/11 Commission Report implies that in the short run, anyway, supporting Musharraf is an absolute necessity. At a July 2004 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, all three private witnesses, who were veteran Pakistan watchers, agreed about the potential problems inherent in a perceived U.S. preference for bolstering Musharraf’s authoritarian leadership at the expense of Pakistan’s democratic institutions and civil society. One witness offered that Musharraf is best seen as a “marginal satisfier” who will do only the minimum expected of him. He recommended that, “The United States must alter the impression our support for Pakistan is essentially support for Musharraf.”

Doubts about Musharraf’s popularity have been echoed by a leading Pakistani analyst, who contends that all of the Pakistani president’s major policy shifts after September 2001 have come through compulsion by external pressure or events and that, while the direction of Pakistan’s policy change has been appropriate, “the momentum of change is too slow and awkward and unsure to constitute a critical and irreversible mass.” Many leading Pakistani commentators insist that only by allowing the country’s secular political parties fully into the system can the country realize stable and enduring democracy.

American policy makers, however, generally agree with the 9/11 Commission that U.S. interests are for the time being best served by the presence of a strong and secure Islamabad leadership. Thus, while early optimism about Musharraf’s potential as a reformer has waned considerably, there are those who still conclude that the existence of an unstable and possibly Islamicized or failed state between Afghanistan and India — a state in possession of nuclear weapons — is a far less desirable circumstance than the present one in which a powerful and secular military institution maintains a reasonable degree of order in Pakistan. For some, this argument has become less persuasive as the country’s law-and-order situation has deteriorated in 2004. Pakistan’s fragile democratic institutions are under continuous threat from the authoritarian influences of the country’s powerful military and quasi-feudal economic structures. Given a stated U.S. position that, “Democratic institutions are required if Pakistan is to thrive economically and to develop further into an enlightened and moderate Muslim state,” Pakistan’s domestic political developments likely will be closely monitored by the United States.

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101 Statement of Professor Marvin Weinbaum, “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on Pakistan and Counterterrorism,” FDCH Transcripts, July 14, 2004. At the same hearing, Ambassador Teresita Schaffer concurred, saying that the United States is attempting to deal with Pakistan through “policy triage and by focusing on the personal leadership of President Musharraf,” both of which are “flawed concepts.”


103 “Agenda for Pakistan’s New Prime Minister,” Nation (Lahore), September 1, 2004; “What the Country Needs,” Friday Times (Lahore), September 12, 2003. See also “Musharraf’s Successor,” Friday Times (Lahore), March 19, 2004.

Sucession Issues

An acute concern of many U.S. policy makers is the issue of political succession in Pakistan, especially as it relates to potential domestic upheaval and control of that country’s nuclear arsenal. The constitutionally designated successor to the President is the Chairman of the Senate, currently a member of the military-friendly Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) party and Musharraf loyalist Muhammadmian Soomro, an international banker from a well-known Sindhi family. It is the President’s prerogative to appoint Army Chiefs. The consensus view among analysts has the Pakistani military maintaining its substantive administration of the country in the event of President Musharraf’s premature removal. The nature of such a potential removal likely would influence the scope and intensity of military governance. For example, if Musharraf were removed through violent means, it is quite possible that the army would declare martial law and rule directly for a period. In any case, it is widely assumed that the hierarchical solidarity and historic professionalism of Pakistan’s military would result in its continued effectiveness as a stabilizing force, at least in the short- and perhaps middle-term. Despite the apparent sturdiness of the military’s command structure, there remains widespread pessimism about the ability of political institutions built by Musharraf to survive his sudden removal, and doubts remain about the viability of political succession mechanisms.

After his September 2001 policy shift, Musharraf moved to purge pro-Taliban Islamists from the higher ranks of the military. Vice-Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Mohammed Yusuf, a moderate, was seen as the most likely successor to the position of COAS, although some observers identified the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen. Mohammad Aziz, as a contender. While considered fully loyal to the army, of Pakistan’s 30 highest ranking officers, Gen. Aziz may have been the only remaining with meaningful links to Islamist groups. Both Gen. Yusuf and Gen. Aziz retire in October 2004. President Musharraf has named two close allies to replace them: Lt. Gen. Ahsan Salim Hayat, the Karachi Corps Commander, will be the new Vice-COAS and the senior-most army officer after Musharraf; ISI chief Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, a moderate who oversaw the removal of pro-Taliban officers from Pakistan’s intelligence service after September 2001, has been appointed Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Committee. Gen. Hayat narrowly escaped assassination in a bloody June 2004 attack on his motorcade, an event which appeared to confirm his status as an enemy of Islamic extremists. The


106 “First or Second Class?” Friday Times (Lahore), October 15, 2004.

newly-promoted four-star general is believed to be one of Musharraf’s closest allies in the military and his most likely successor as Army Chief.108

Policy Discussion: More Constraints Than Options109

Whatever the current policy of the Musharraf government — Islamabad insists that it is not involved in proliferation activities — Pakistan continues to be an established source of vertical (new levels of capability) proliferation and a potential source of onward horizontal proliferation (transfers to other states.) Moreover, if not carefully handled, U.S. policies aimed at strengthening Pakistan militarily could unintentionally lead to the breakdown of the current unstable nuclear deterrence situation between Pakistan and India, with catastrophic consequences.

Given that imposition of sanctions seems unlikely in the current situation, the Bush administration appears to be focusing on improving the global community’s ability to interdict dangerous shipments through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and in shrinking access worldwide to capabilities needed to produce fissile material crucial for nuclear weapons. In a speech on February 11, 2004, President Bush proposed a mix of measures to respond to the threat of the nuclear black market.110 In addition to expanding interdiction efforts (under the Proliferation Security Initiative) to “shut down labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets,” the President also proposed criminalizing proliferation in a new UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR 1540); expanding cooperative threat reduction measures to states like Libya; banning enrichment and reprocessing capabilities beyond those states that already have them; making the Additional Protocol (to the NPT) a prerequisite for nuclear-related imports; and creating a special committee at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate compliance.

In June 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) as provided for by Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Thailand, another important antiterrorism ally, was given the same status in 2003. The designation, long enjoyed by Japan, South Korea, Australia and other allies, makes Pakistan eligible for expedited access to excess defense articles and other privileges.111 The designation also appears related to Pakistan’s decision to purchase several major weapons systems. On November 16, 2004, the Department of Defense notified Congress of possible military sales to Pakistan of six Orion P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, 2,000 TOW-2A missiles, 14 TOW Fly-to-Buy missiles, six


109 This section was prepared by Sharon Squassoni and Richard P. Cronin.


PHALANX Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), and an upgrade of six earlier models of the Phalanx shipboard anti-missile defense systems, along with associated equipment for all of the systems.\footnote{Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, News Release, Nov. 16, 2004, Transmittal Numbers 05-05, 05-06, and 05-07.}

Thus far Pakistan appears to have been stymied in its effort to gain approval to purchase about 20 used F-16 fighter-bombers from the Belgian Air Force. (Any resale or transfer of U.S. controlled technology requires U.S. approval.) Press reports in early December 2004, following a visit to Washington and a meeting between President Musharraf and President Bush, indicate that the Pakistani leader did not get the answer he wanted on the aircraft.\footnote{“Musharraf Discusses F-16 Fighter Jet Deal With Bush.” \textit{Agence France Presse} (AFP), Dec. 4, 2004.}

As if to underscore the possibility that U.S. arms sales to Pakistan could be destabilizing, Pakistan tested a Shaheen nuclear-capable short-range (700 kilometers) ballistic missile on December 8, 2004, on the same day that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld arrived in New Delhi for meetings with Indian leaders where he was expected to discuss U.S. arms sales and military cooperation with India. Reportedly, one of the most important items on the Indian agenda was to acquire the U.S. Patriot ballistic missile defense systems (PAC-2 and/or PAC-3), and to explore the possibility of obtaining approval to acquire Israel’s Arrow battlefield missile defense system which includes U.S.-licensed components and technology. India reportedly expressed strong objections to the sale of the P-3C surveillance aircraft and the TOW anti-tank missiles.\footnote{“Another Pak Missile Test.” The Statesman (India): Briefs, Dec. 9, 2004. “U.S. Could Sell Arms to India and Pakistan.” \textit{Forecast International/Missile Forecast}, \textit{Forecast International Defense Newsletters}, Dec. 8, 2004.}

Within the constraints imposed by dependence on antiterrorist cooperation from Pakistan, U.S. policymakers still may have several options for pursuing a stronger antiproliferation policy while maintaining Pakistan’s status as a “front line” state in the war against terrorism.

**Option 1 — Fully Support Musharraf on Condition of Continued Counterterrorism Support**

While the United States may appear to have little choice but to support Musharraf, the degree of U.S. support matters greatly. One option is to support Pakistan fully, conditioned only on continued cooperation in the counterterrorism effort. The 9/11 Commission Report argues that President Musharraf is “the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan” and an advocate of “enlightened moderation.” The Commission recommends that “As the United States makes fresh commitments now, it should make promises that it is prepared to keep for years,”
provided “Pakistan’s leaders are prepared to make difficult choices of their own.” The advantages of this course are that it reduces Pakistani suspicion that, in the words of the 9/11 Commission Report, the United States views Pakistan as an “ally of convenience.” The underlying rationale for this option is that the more confidence that President Musharraf has in the U.S. commitment to Pakistan, the more ready he will be to confront terrorism.

For several reasons the risks of this option may be high. This option does not fully address the limits of Musharraf’s authority, and it ties Pakistan’s “hard choices” to the fight against extremists,” not its nuclear behavior. Despite its strong support for the Musharraf government, the Bush Administration has not yet obtained full Pakistani cooperation against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. If Musharraf should adopt a zero-tolerance policy of shutting down all terrorist networks he risks a possibly fatal backlash both from the ISI and militants carrying out an insurgency in Indian-occupied Kashmir, as well as the loss of support from his political allies among the Islamist parties.

Even if Musharraf or a comparable military successor continues to maintain political dominance for the next few years, there is no absolute guarantee that Pakistan will continue its “front line” status against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Much could depend on Pakistan’s volatile political situation. Already, Islamist political forces are impatient with Musharraf’s vision of a moderate, modernizing Islamic state and measures, however incomplete to suppress domestic jihadists in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province, and terrorist groups operating in Kashmir.

Even now, some in the Pakistani hierarchy are not prepared to support U.S. policy to the point of compromising, in their view, Pakistan’s long-term fundamental interests. Some analysts judge it unlikely that the ISI would ever completely alienate the Taliban. Evidence that more than one assassination attempt against Musharraf involved collusion between radical Islamists, possibly Al Qaeda operatives, and lower level Pakistani Air Force personnel, underscores that there are ideological fissures in the regime. Radical political change may be unlikely under present circumstances, but a violent Islamist campaign against the government or an internal coup cannot be completely ruled out.

Questions about Musharraf’s ability to control events appear to be underscored by reported rumors that he has been engaged in secret negotiations on a power sharing agreement with the leaders of the two previous governing parties, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), led by Nawaz Sharif. Under the rumored deal, Musharraf would remain President at least until 2007, but he would give up his position as Chief of the Army Staff, a move also demanded by his current MMA allies, and hold fresh parliamentary elections in 2005. Both Bhutto and Sharif had alternated as civilian prime ministers during the 1990s, but both had been overthrown by military coups and both are now in exile. While such a development would likely be viewed as a positive step towards democratization, a decision by Musharraf to end his alliance

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with the MMA could provoke a new political crisis. Moreover, the very fact that the arrangement has been rumored raises questions about Pakistan’s stability.

At the same time, questions remain about Pakistan’s nuclear policies. The U.S. Government cannot verify the Musharraf government’s assurances that Khan’s nuclear sales were not state policy and would not be repeated. Moreover, Pakistan has firmly ruled out any limits on its vertical proliferation activities, i.e., building more nuclear weapons and deploying more capable ballistic missiles. After the revelations concerning A. Q. Khan’s covert sales of nuclear technology and materials to North Korea, Iran, and Libya, the Musharraf government assured the United States that the incidents were not state policy and would not be repeated. This policy seems consistent with the current alignment of Pakistan with U.S. antiterrorism policy, but new circumstances could change Pakistan’s nuclear calculus. No matter what the United States does at this point it will have to live with consequences of its past inability or failure to check Pakistan’s proliferation and the potential fragility of the stability and moderation offered by Musharraf.

**Option 2 — Multilateral Nonproliferation Strategies**

This approach, recommended in the 9/11 report, involves concentrating on the recipient or end-user side of the equation as the most effective way to deny nuclear weapons and materials to terrorists. That is, it emphasized measures to seek to eliminate global supply networks rather than penalizing Pakistan or even demanding a full account of A. Q. Khan’s activities and networks.

As noted above, the Bush administration appears to be focusing on improving the global community’s ability to interdict dangerous shipments through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and in shrinking access worldwide to capabilities needed to produce fissile material crucial for nuclear weapons. In a speech on February 11, 2004, President Bush proposed a mix of measures to respond to the threat of the nuclear black market. The President has proposed expanding interdiction efforts under the PSI, which aims to “shut down labs, to seize their materials, [and] to freeze their assets.” The multi-national agreement was announced by President Bush in May 2003 and inaugurated in Paris, in September 2003, by the United States, eight European NATO allies, Australia and Japan. Additional countries have joined since. Undersecretary of State John Bolton has described the initiative, which now enjoys the support of some 60 or more countries, as “foremost among President Bush’s efforts to stop WMD proliferation.”

The 9/11 Commission recommends expanding the PSI, including persuading Russia and China to join, and providing participating member countries with NATO alliance “intelligence and planning resources.” It is probably crucial to include Russia and China to make the PSI effective, but it will also be important to include, where possible, supplier states. While it is doubtful that Iran or North Korea would

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agree to restrictions, making sure that Pakistan no longer engages in proliferation activities would appear critical to the effectiveness of the PSI. From this perspective, critics charge that it is past time that Pakistan reinforced its promises with concrete measures.

Proliferation specialists have welcomed the PSI but say that its potential is limited by several factors, including its “ad hoc” nature, which depends on the political will of participating countries. Some critics view the PSI as a supplement to a more robust nonproliferation regime and one which needs to be bolstered by changes in international law. This includes adopting amendments to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988), and the adoption of a draft U.N. resolution that would provide for interdiction activities under Section VII of the U.N. Charter, which allows the Security Council to authorize sanctions or the use of force to compel states to comply with its resolutions.  Although UNSC Resolution 1540 was adopted under Section VII of the U.N. Charter, it was not specific either about interdiction or penalties.

It may be possible to ban the further spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities without a new treaty such as a fissile material production cutoff treaty (FMCT), but new voluntary agreements remain difficult to enforce. The international community is already working on making the Additional Protocol (to full-scope nuclear safeguards agreements) a prerequisite for nuclear imports through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, but Pakistan is not a member of the NSG. Finally, for political reasons, it is unlikely that the IAEA will create a special committee for compliance, although Director General ElBaradei has set up a study group to evaluate several recommendations that have emerged as a result of the exposure of the Khan network.

In testimony before Congress one non-official witness deemed that efforts to combat nuclear proliferation remained the “stunted pillar” of the President’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The witness, Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, compared FY2004 funding for non-proliferation programs at less than $2 billion, with $41 billion for Homeland Security and $81 billion for military counter-proliferation efforts, including ballistic missile defense and the war in Iraq.

Effectively shutting down the black market trade in nuclear technology, materials, and components may be possible with adequate cooperation from host governments, but this objective would be easier to accomplish if Pakistan would provide access to A. Q. Khan or otherwise provide more information on the extent of his network. Iran’s current defiance of the IAEA and the UN Security Council also underscores the limitations of multilateral approaches to countries with sufficient financial and technological resources, and significant reverse leverage.

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121 Ibid.
Expanding the cooperative threat reduction program to Pakistan could be difficult for several reasons. Significant barriers to assistance include U.S. domestic and international legal and political restrictions on cooperation with states outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); the low level of transparency exhibited by Pakistan; lack of incentives for Pakistan to pursue threat reduction measures; and potentially competing objectives of threat reduction and nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis India.

**Option 3 — Condition High Value Assistance on Access to A.Q. Khan**

The United States might insist on the following actions by Pakistan as a price for obtaining valued military equipment, especially weapons systems that are not directly related to counterterrorism cooperation, such as F-16 aircraft, anti-tank weapons, and other weapons systems that Pakistan is seeking to offset or exceed Indian capabilities. This option could require Pakistan’s agreement to:

- full cooperation on Khan’s network,
- absolute commitment on no future transfers of nuclear or missile technology, and
- no new nuclear tests and restraint on nuclear and missile competition with India

This option could also include longer-term waiver authority on U.S. nuclear and missile proliferation sanctions beyond the current year-to-year extensions in appropriations bills.

A key rationale for this option is that providing Pakistan with such high value weapons systems is only warranted if the benefits exceed the cost. In this case, the cost to the United States is not just the dollar value of the weapons systems but also the inevitable complications for relations with India, a country with which the United States also has developed a de facto strategic relationship. The record of the past half century shows that every increase in Pakistan’s military capability sooner or later will be matched by India (or vice-versa). Given the growing closeness of U.S.-India relations in recent years, India is likely also to seek U.S. high technology weapons systems. One question that Congress may wish to consider is whether the United States is paying too high a price, including a cost to its own foreign policy interest in a stable and peaceful India-Pakistan relationship, for what it is getting from Pakistan.

A potentially significant problem with this option is that so long as Musharraf or a successor perceives that the Bush Administration needs him more than he needs the United States, Pakistan is in a position to turn the tables on U.S. policymakers. That is, instead of treating the F-16’s or other weapons systems as a “carrot,” to be earned by additional cooperation, Pakistan could reduce or limit its cooperation on terrorism as a lever to get the United States to agree to allow the purchase of the

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122 For more details, see CRS Report RL31589, *Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan*, by Sharon Squassoni.
aircraft and other desired hardware. In fact, some of President Musharraf’s remarks at a press conference during a visit to Washington in early December 2004 could be interpreted as effort to put counter-pressure on the United States to approve the sale of the F-16’s. Musharraf told reporters that he had discussed the F-16 issue with President Bush and senior U.S. officials, but that the Administration had not yet agreed to the requested purchase. At the same time, Musharraf also implied declining enthusiasm about using Pakistani forces to hunt for Al Qaeda in tribal zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan, where many believe bin Laden and other senior terrorist leaders may be hiding. He reportedly criticized the U.S. invasion of Iraq and said that the trail of Osama bin Laden had gone cold, “in large part” because of a decline in operations by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and delays in the training of Afghan forces.

As of early 2005, the Bush Administration has notified Congress of its intention to go ahead with a number of major weapons sales to Pakistan, but not the F-16’s. Whether the Administration’s failure to approve the request might be the result of a strategy to gain more cooperation on A. Q. Khan’s network and Al Qaeda, concern about the reaction of India, or other reasons cannot be determined from open sources. However, some press reports in late 2004 appear to indicate growing impatience in the Administration with Pakistan’s unwillingness to shed much light on A. Q. Khan’s past activities, and alarm about evidence that the network may be much more extensive and dangerous than previously assumed. The Indian government, meanwhile, strongly protested the sale of the F-16’s and other major military hardware during a visit to New Delhi by Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld in early December 2004.

Although trying to use the sale of F-16’s to Pakistan as leverage for more cooperation regarding A. Q. Khan’s network might be risky, Musharraf’s domestic political vulnerabilities noted above might give the United States the upper hand in any test of wills. In any event, withholding approval of the sale of the F-16’s until Pakistan provides better cooperation on A. Q. Khan’s network may be the least risky of various options to pressure Pakistan to be more responsive to U.S. nuclear proliferation concerns.

Option 4 — Reimposition of Nuclear Nonproliferation Sanctions

For reasons noted above, neither Congress or the Administration has shown much enthusiasm for nuclear non-proliferation sanctions, apart from expanding the scope of existing laws to include terrorist acts and threats of attacks with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Sections 6801, 6802, and 6803 of P.L. 108-458 (S. 2845), the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004, amend provisions of

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the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and other laws to expand their scope to include penalties for the participation of individuals, either inside or outside the United States, in “the development or production of any special nuclear material,” or terrorist threats of the use of WMD.\textsuperscript{126}

Either the President or Congress could reimpose sanctions on Pakistan. In the case of the President, he could decline to use his general authority under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which gives the President broad powers to waive, subject to consultation with Congress, nonproliferation sections of the Foreign Assistance Act that would otherwise apply to Pakistan. He could also decline to use waiver authority provided annually in successive foreign operations appropriation acts since 2001 to waive provisions of appropriations acts that forbid assistance to countries in default of their debt repayments or whose democratic government has been overthrown in a military coup. Congress also has the power to block the President’s use of waiver authority under Section 614 and other legislation. Additionally, Congress could decline to renew the annual foreign operations appropriations authority to waive the ban on aid to countries that are in default on their debts or have governments that took power by military coups. Congress could also condition U.S. aid to Pakistan on specific requirements such as full cooperation by the Musharraf government in efforts to learn the full extent of A. Q. Khan’s network. Under present circumstances the President could be expected to resist strongly any effort to constrain his freedom of action regarding Pakistan, both on policy grounds and the defense of executive branch authority.

\textsuperscript{126} These sections add a new Section 832 to Title 16, Part I, Chapter 39.