



## *Iran Policy Committee*

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1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 6<sup>th</sup> Floor, Washington, DC 20004  
202-742-6517 (o); 202-742-6501 (f); [info@iranpolicy.org](mailto:info@iranpolicy.org) [www.iranpolicy.org](http://www.iranpolicy.org)

# **White Paper**

## **U.S. Policy Options for Iran and Iranian Political Opposition**

**13 September 2005**

# Table of Contents

## **Executive Summary**

### **Chapter One: Iran in the Global War on Terrorism and Proliferation**

Introduction

Role in the War on Terrorism and Proliferation

Globalists vs. Regionalists in the War for Washington

Islamist Export of Revolution via Terrorism

    Iraq

    Al Qaeda

Regional Instability: Israel, Iraq, Levant, Gulf

MEK Capabilities in Comparison with those of Other Groups

Active Proliferator of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Conclusions

### **Chapter Two: The Case for Removal of the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) from the U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) List**

Introduction

Legal Criteria for FTO Designation

Allegations against the MEK

Killing of Americans

Support for the U.S. Embassy Takeover

Suppression of Kurds

Cross-Border Attacks and Assassinations

Terrorist Capability and/or Intent

Accusation of “Cult”

Conclusions: Legal Allegations

Background on the MEK

The MEK’s Relationship with the U.S. Military in Iraq

The MEK relationship with Iraqis

MEK Capabilities

Delisting the MEK Serves U.S. National Security Interests

Conclusions

## Appendix Documents

### **Appendix A: Methodology and Content Analysis of Iranian Opposition Groups**

### **Appendix B: US-MEK Interaction After the 2003 War in Iraq**

- A) US says Iran opposition in Iraq agrees to disarm, AFP, May 10, 2003
- B) Letter from General Tommy Franks to Mr. Mohammad Mohaddessin, Chair of the National Council of Resistance of Iran Foreign Affairs Committee, April 28, 2003
- C) Statement issued by CENTCOM on May 17, 2003

### **Appendix C: Allegation of the Murder of Americans in Iran**

- A) Iran Says Guerilla Trained in Cuba, Washington Post, May 11, 1976
- B) US Men Killed in Ambush, Washington Post, May 22, 1975
- C) Iran Kills Man Accused in Slaying of Three Americans, Washington Post, November 18, 1976
- D) MEK Logo/Marxist Statements on Killing of Americans

### **Appendix D: MEK and the United States**

- A) Judge criticizes CSIS, Crown over siege trial, Ottawa Citizen, September 10, 1994
- B) Iran US MKO, BBC World, June 5, 1998
- C) U.S. extends restrictions on Iranian opposition, Reuters, October 14, 1999
- D) National Security Archive Document, Threat Analysis Group, June 14, 1979

### **Appendix E: MEK and Iraq**

- A) Excerpts from Congressional Briefing by Iran Human Rights and Democracy Caucus Hon. Tom G. Tancredo (Extensions of Remarks - May 19, 2005)
- B) Iranian Influence, The Washington Times, May 12, 2005

### **Appendix F: MEK Positions**

- A) Middle East Research and Information Project, Interview with Masood Rajavi, March-April 1982
- B) Copy of the NCRI Constitution.

### **Appendix G: MEK and the Kurds**

- A) Saffi Yasseri's Statement, May 27, 2005
- B) United National Economic and Social Council, Implications of Humanitarian Activities for the Enjoyment of Human Rights, August 22, 1995
- C) US says Iraq-based Iran opposition aids Iraq govt., Reuters News, May 23, 2002

# Executive Summary

## **From Axis of Evil to Global War on Terrorism**

As a charter member of the Axis of Evil club, Iran also should be a member of the global war on terrorism (GWOT), even without applying. But only if one takes into account its proliferation history does Tehran's Axis membership automatically carry over to the GWOT. Combine Tehran's intent and capability to create catastrophic weapons with its record of state sponsored international terrorism, then the name "Iran" rises to the top of the GWOT list.

When Mohammad Khatami became President of the government of Iran in 1997, Washington decided to strengthen "moderates" within the Iranian clerical establishment. By designating Tehran's most important domestic adversary—the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK)—as a member of the Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list maintained by the Department of State, the U.S. Government attempted to reinforce the Khatami faction. But in doing so, Washington inadvertently shifted the focus away from Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism to the Iranian opposition as a "terrorist" entity.

By 2005, the Bush Administration has begun to support the Iranian people in their quest for self determination and to recognize the role of the opposition in facilitating regime change in Tehran. To reinforce this trend, this White Paper presents results of three studies of the Iranian opposition.

The first study is on the negative references and attention Tehran pays to opposition groups as an indicator of how threatening each group is to the regime.

The second is an analysis of legal charges against the main Iranian opposition group—the MEK—to assess whether it belongs on the FTO list.

The third is an evaluation of political benefits that would accrue to the United States if it were to remove the MEK from the FTO.

## **Iranian Opposition Group Research: Regime Fears of the Opposition**


Using English and then Farsi language websites, an IPC research team performed content analyses of Iranian leadership statements about opposition groups. The greater the number of times the regime mentions a specific group, the higher that group is on the regime's agenda. In this regard, it is remarkable to note that the MEK is the topic of discussion over 230% more often than all other groups combined. The results suggest that the regime is worried about the MEK because of the latent and overt support the group has within the Iranian population and the capability of the MEK to facilitate regime change. In addition, the research team conducted a content analysis to determine the intensity of regime references about opposition groups. In this respect, the MEK receives the highest negative rating from the regime with the score of 4.7 out of a maximum of

5.0. The next organization, Freedom Movement of Iran, has a score of 3.0, which is the neutral point on the “Antipathy Scale,” created by the IPC team for this White Paper.

For a visual of the content analysis findings, see the following charts.


### Frequency of Iranian Regime References to Opposition Groups

The data are for the period of Jan 1 to Sep 5, 2005



FMI=Freedom Movement of Iran; IIPF=Islamic Iran Participation Front; RP=Reza Pahlavi; ML=Marxist-Leninist groups; MEK=Mujahedin-e Khalq; other groups not listed did not appear.

### Opposition Group Antipathy Ratings by Iranian Regime



The statements are ranked according to their intensity: (1) being the *Most Favorable*, (2) being *Favorable*, (3) being *Neutral*, (4) being *Unfavorable* and (5) being *Most Unfavorable*.

### Legal Allegations

The second IPC study concerns allegations made by the Department of State, to justify the FTO designation of the MEK. State levies four main charges against the MEK.

- Killing several Department of Defense officers and contractors during the 1970s
- Supporting the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran in 1979
- Collaborating with Saddam Hussein to suppress Kurds in northern Iraq and Shi'ites in the south
- Launching terrorist attacks against the Iranian regime

The IPC research team finds that allegations against the MEK charging involvement in the killing of Americans in Iran in the 1970s, support for the Tehran Embassy seizure and hostage crisis, collusion with Saddam Hussein in suppression of the Kurds and Shi'ites, and launching of cross-border terrorist attacks against Iran are unsupported by the facts.

### Killing Department of Defense Officers and Contractors during the 1970s

The IPC investigation included an open-source review of declassified U.S. Government documents, newspapers reports from the time of the killings, and books by a variety of American, Iranian, and other authors. The team supplemented these sources with in-

person interviews of current and former MEK members, input from Iraqi officials and citizens, plus discussions with U.S. military officers who served at Camp Ashraf, Iraq.

The bottom line is that a few individuals hijacked the MEK, killed Americans, and it only appears as if the MEK were to blame. The IPC concludes that the murder of the six Americans in the 1970s was entirely the responsibility of individuals who had carried out a bloody coup d'état in the MEK, and the legitimate leadership and members of MEK rejected the assassins.

### **Supporting the Takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979**

Independent academic research by an IPC Task Force uncovered primary source documents of the period that cast serious doubt on the likelihood that MEK members supported the U.S. Embassy takeover or subsequent seizure of Americans. Understanding of the political situation was so limited that many groups were easily confused and mistaken for rival and even hostile organizations. In particular, the American Embassy was confused about the identity and role of the MEK during this period of the Iranian Revolution.

To illustrate this puzzlement, consider one example of IPC Task Force material, a declassified document, originally classified "Secret." The document comes from the Office of Security of the U.S. Department of State, titled, "Threat Assessment: Iran," dated June 14, 1979. The 22-page report states that when the American Embassy was first attacked on February 14, 1979, it was the forces of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) "that came to the aid of the Americans." In fact, the Khomeini elements ostensibly "protecting" the U.S. Embassy in June 1979 were actually special Komiteh security forces of the Iranian government, led by Mashallah Kashani. By this time, these forces were in open conflict with the MEK and brutally attacked MEK members on the street.

The historical record and recollections of those actually involved make clear that the MEK neither supported nor benefited from the American Embassy crisis. The adversarial position in which the MEK found itself vis-à-vis the faction of Ayatollah Khomeini at the time of the takeover was described in very clear terms by Massoumeh Ebtekar, spokesperson for the student group that took over the Embassy and later Vice President for the Department of the Environment in the administration of President Khatami. Her book, *Takeover in Tehran*, provides an eyewitness account of the crisis. She states that they had completely excluded the MEK and its members from participation in the embassy takeover.

### **Collaborating with Saddam Hussein to Suppress Kurds in Northern Iraq and Shi'ites in the South**

The IPC Task Force also conducted its own investigation of charges of MEK collaboration against the Kurds. The IPC collected statements from credible Iraqi sources and American military officers who served at Camp Ashraf, Iraq. The IPC also held

direct discussions with current and former MEK members. The findings confirm Iraqi and MEK denials of any such role by the MEK in suppression of the Kurdish people.

In 2002, Reuters obtained a document from a civil suit being conducted in the Netherlands testifying that the MEK had no part in Saddam's brutal operations against the Kurds. The document, signed by a principal Kurdish political official, said that the MEK was not involved in suppressing the Kurdish people neither during the uprising nor in its aftermath.

### **Launching terrorist attacks against the Iranian regime**

Although the MEK has not been involved in any violence against western targets, it has taken part in a long struggle to free Iran from the rule of its clerics. During that time, the record shows that the MEK attacked only regime military and security targets and has no history of attacking innocent civilians or other noncombatants. In fact, even the State Department *Country Reports on Terrorism* notes that the MEK had only targeted members of the clerical regime and its enforcement officers, particularly those who were in charge of interrogations and torture in the Iranian prison system.

### **U.S. National Security Benefits of Removing the MEK from the FTO**

On the basis extensive research, the IPC supports delisting of the MEK because it would serve U.S. national security interests. This paper and earlier IPC white papers have described in detail the nature and urgency of threats posed by the clerical regime in Tehran, now in position to deploy its Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps with a renewed mandate to pursue its extremist ideology, in threats against the West.

Foremost among these threats are Iran's nuclear weapons program; support for transnational terrorism and the extremist terrorist groups fighting to prevent a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict; increasingly brazen support for insurgent forces seeking to destabilize Iraq; and an unapologetically-appalling record of human rights abuses at home.

Delisting of the MEK from the FTO list is the first step to addressing such threats from Iran. The IPC expects the first step to be a trigger for a number of positive outcomes. Delisting of the MEK from the FTO list would:

- Reinforce President Bush's promise that America stands with the people of Iran in their struggle to liberate themselves and send a strong message to the Iranian people that America is on their side.
- Signal the unified resolution of the U.S. administration to support a policy of regime change in Tehran, thereby putting the clerical rulers on notice that a new option is now on the table, and that America is not limited to an infeasible military option or the failed diplomatic option. The Iranian regime would know that it faces an enabled and determined opposition on its borders; this will shift



the attitude of the Ahmadinejad presidency from an offensive mode to a defensive one.

- Encourage a similar move on the part of the European Union (EU). The EU and especially the EU-3, which has been at the forefront of efforts to negotiate with Iran on the subject of its nuclear program, would benefit from the knowledge that a backup plan is now in place should their diplomatic initiatives reach a dead end. In the short term, such knowledge would bolster the negotiating position of the EU-3 with Iran, improving the chances of eliciting better cooperation from Tehran.
- Improve the ability of the MEK to collect more intelligence about Iran's nuclear program by encouraging more potential intelligence sources inside Iran to provide information. The outcome would certainly inhibit Tehran's efforts to move ahead with its nuclear weapons program.
- Serve to support an expansion of the MEK's intelligence network inside Iran on a variety of important collection requirements, including information about Iran's terrorist network throughout the Middle East, its support for terrorist groups in Iraq, and a more detailed understanding of the political situation in Iran, including leadership issues and popular sentiment. By creating doubt in the minds and commitment of lower level regime officials, the likelihood of defections to the camp of regime opponents would rise.
- Help to energize the majority who are either undecided "fence-sitters" or heretofore have been uncommitted in the absence of an active policy in favor of regime change.
- Allow it to assume a role among leaders of pro-democracy groups in Iran shifts the financial and organizational responsibility for regime change from external entities to the Iranian people themselves and empowers the MEK and other opposition groups to play their rightful role in organizing anti-government demonstrations and other political activity among women, students, merchants and other groups naturally interested in regime change.
- Facilitate the ideas of the majority of Iranian clerics, who are not associated with the regime, and who are sympathetic to the MEK's secular Islamic ideas about government. These clerics would be encouraged to take a more positive attitude toward the United States.
- Provide an ability to raise funds that would also greatly assist the MEK to mount expanded satellite television and radio broadcasting into Iran and to develop an integrated publication and information program not only inside Iran, but abroad as well.

- Help bring secure democratic development to Iraq. An Iranian government, especially the IRGC, MOIS, and other security services, would be thrown on the defensive and forced to scale back their large assistance to terrorist and insurgent forces inside Iraq as well as those perpetrating terrorist attacks against Israel.
- Coerce other pro-Iranian groups, such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its armed militia wing, the Badr Corps to adopt a lower profile in southern Iraq, permitting the forces of federalism, integration, moderation and democracy to advance.
- Encourage Iraqi Shi'ites to behave more moderately if their principal sponsor in Tehran were threatened; by the same token, Iraqi Sunnis would be able to join the political process more easily and with enhanced prospects for meaningful participation once the Shi'ites adopt a less entitled attitude.
- Allow the MEK to operate as a legitimate opposition group in Iraq, thereby providing a cultural, political, and religious counterweight to the rising tide of Islamist extremism there, much of which is funded and sponsored by Tehran. This positive effect would aid the United States efforts to strengthen the position of moderate forces overall in Iraq, sending a signal to radical Iranian proxy groups that their efforts are not welcome.
- Signal regionally, and especially among the Gulf States, that small, weak neighboring countries do not have to put up with Tehran's bullying pressures and destabilization operations.
- Allow the MEK and its associated larger coalition of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) to open offices in the United States and organize the American-Iranian community in line with U.S. Government efforts to spread democracy and establish representative government in Iran.
- Explore a decision about whether the Coalition should return the MEK's weapons, confiscated at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Once the MEK is no longer an officially-designated "terrorist organization," the United States might relieve the American military of its responsibility for the protection of MEK camps and personnel.

This list of potential benefits for removing the MEK from the FTO list is impressive—and all the more so as it is merely suggestive and hardly comprehensive. It is clear that many of the most important national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States are engaged in the Middle East in general and in Iraq and Iran in particular. It is not often that a single administrative decision can affect so much that is at stake in a region as is the case with delisting the MEK. This is an opportunity the United States cannot afford to miss. The chances for freedom and democracy in Iran as well as U.S. national security are riding on this issue.

## **Iran in the Global War on Terrorism and Proliferation**

### ***Introduction***

The role of Afghanistan is more obvious in the global war on terrorism than how Iraq and Iran fit into that war. But introduce proliferation into the mix with terrorism and the role of states like Iraq and Iran becomes clearer. Within the U.S. Government, globalists in contrast to regionalists recognize that if nonstate actors collude with state sponsors on terrorism, the two might also cooperate in the area of weapons as well. Globalists also understand how states and nonstate actors use religion for political purposes, maintain power at home by exporting terror abroad, create or tolerate superficial opposition groups to provide the appearance of dissent at home, and use the promise of nuclear-weapons status to throttle dissent and maintain power for the rulers.

### ***Role in the War on Terrorism and Proliferation***

At issue is the role of Iran in the global war on terrorism and proliferation. As both a prime-time state sponsor of terrorism and world-class proliferator, it would seem as if Iran would be a unique candidate for this global war. But for some reason, scholars, journalists, and many policymakers give Iran the benefit of the doubt, such that it is even difficult to create an American policy of regime change for Tehran. Perhaps it is because only those who view terrorism and proliferation together also see why Iran belongs as a target in the war.

With the ascension of power in the United States of those concerned with the intersection of terrorism and proliferation, Iran's candidacy in the global war on terrorism and proliferation is again on the rise. The meaning of the 9/11 assaults for this group within the Bush administration is that it recognizes the near impossibility of deterring or defending against terrorist groups willing to use any delivery system, including civilian aircraft, as weapons to attack the United States.

Because it is difficult to deter or even defend against assaults by individual terrorists and nonstate actors, the administration targets rogue states, terrorist-harboring regimes, and nations about to achieve nuclear-weapons status with the capability to launch ballistic and cruise missiles at the United States. Hence, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America is a proactive campaign against terrorists, state sponsors, and proliferators, all of which describe the Government of Iran.<sup>1</sup> Enter the Bush doctrine.

The administration's unique contribution to the global war on terrorism and proliferation is the Bush doctrine. It calls for rolling back rather than simply deterring nations engaging in state-sponsored terrorism and proliferation to replace them with peaceful democracies. The Bush national security strategy calls for preemptive and preventive military action against hostile states and terrorist groups seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iran is a case study awaiting American action to help its own

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<sup>1</sup> The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17 SEP, 2002.

people take down their rulers. But first, Washington has to get its policymaking house in order among globalists who prevail on high policy and regionalists who dominate lower level analysis and intelligence.

### ***Globalists vs. Regionalists in the War for Washington***

In the war for Washington, the order of battle pits globalists against regionalists over the future of Iran policy. Globalists are former cold warriors who wished to roll back communist gains in Eastern Europe and prefer rogue-state rollback to negotiating with states like Iran, which seek weapons of mass destruction and are state sponsors of international terrorism.

This school of thought sees the war on terrorism as the global threat of the decade, placing Afghanistan and Iraq in the same category in the war on terrorism. They perceive links between nonstate terrorist networks like al Qaeda and rogue state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran, and they focus on the potential for transfer of catastrophic weapons from states to networks.

Globalists argue that rogue regime change should lead to democratic peace: The road to Jerusalem goes through Tehran: Regime change in Iran should allow Palestinians and Israelis freedom from Tehran-inspired terrorism to negotiate an end of conflict two-state solution in Palestine. Finally, globalists are inclined to believe that the “Enemy of my enemy is my friend,” which would justify removing from the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list the main adversary of the rulers of Tehran, the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK).

Regionalists are area specialists who were more willing to wait for the Soviet empire to collapse than to give it a shove. They prefer negotiations over rogue-state rollback regarding Iran. This school views the war against Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, which provided safehaven to al Qaeda, as a reasonable response to the 9/11 attacks.

But regionalists believe that pursuing Osama bin Laden would have been a more effective contribution to the war on terrorism than taking down Saddam Hussein. Unlike globalists, regionalists downplay assumed linkages between nonstate terrorist networks like al Qaeda and rogue state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran, and they doubt the potential for transfer of weapons of mass destruction from states sponsors to terrorist networks.

In addition, regionalists strongly doubt that regime change would lead to democratic peace: They would argue that the road to Tehran goes through Jerusalem: The United States has to broker a peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians before organizing a moderate Arab coalition to coerce Iran.

Regime change in Iran would destabilize the region, causing more harm than good for U.S. interests, according to regionalists. Finally, they believe that the “Enemy of my enemy is my friend,” does not apply in American-Iranian relations because Tehran is not

necessarily an enemy of Washington, only an adversary with which to bargain. And if this thesis were applicable, it would not justify removing the MEK from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list. Instead, regionalists would retain the MEK on the list as a bargaining chip to trade with Iran in order to secure regional peace and stability. Indeed, just as regime change is a core element for globalists, stability is the core concern of the regionalists.

The war for Washington between globalists and regionalists about whether to redesignate the MEK is about the future of U.S. policy toward Iran. Tools of this war include National Intelligence Estimates and interagency policy reviews. Regional bureaucrats mainly control the estimation process.

Allied with the intelligence community, regionalists prefer stability as the main goal of American foreign policy in the Middle East. Intelligence analysts in Langley and area experts on the 6<sup>th</sup> floor at the State Department argue against regime change in Tehran because it would be destabilizing for the region as a whole. This coalition also favors negotiation over confrontation with Iran and would have Washington tradeoff the MEK for improved relations with Tehran.

Policy differences among decisionmakers in the first Bush administration term made it difficult for globalists to assert their preference in favor of regime change for Iran. Fewer differences between Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld over Middle East policy make it possible for Iran to be incorporated into the global war against international terrorism.

As the Cold War ended, threats to the United States emerged from a witches' brew of failed states, rogue states, and nonstate actors. These threats culminated in hot wars to oust Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait, 9/11 attacks, war against the Taliban-ruled regime in Afghanistan that provided safehaven to al Qaeda, and the war to change Saddam's regime in Baghdad.

Such assaults and wars also coincided with the growth of radical Islam—Islamism—both in the Arab world as well as in Iran. Indeed, during the opening years of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the liberal democracies of the world face an existential threat from a resurgent and militant Islam, which, freed from the restraints of the Cold War years and unable to cope with the fast-paced demands of modernization, has returned to the violent aggression of its early years in the 7<sup>th</sup> Century.

### ***Islamist Export of Revolution via Terrorism***

Globalists understand how states and nonstate actors use religion for political purposes. While separation of mosque and state is not characteristic of Islam, radical versions of Islam make an effort to merge the two so that those from the mosque can control the state, according to globalists. In this respect, two strands of militant Islam predominate: the Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam (favored by Osama bin Laden), whose 18<sup>th</sup> century founder, Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab, was influenced by the 13<sup>th</sup> century philosopher, Ibn

Tamiyeh; and, the *Velayat-e Faqih* version of Shi'ite Islam, which was created in the early 1960s in the Iraqi city of Najaf by an exiled Iranian cleric named Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The alignment between Sunni and Shi'ite extremists is a political marriage of convenience as a means for the mosque to rule, rather than an accord over religious doctrine. With respect to Iran, one of the primary objectives of the *Velayat-e Faqih* ideology is expansion, a goal that meshes conveniently with radical Sunni aspirations to establish a new global Caliphate. With such an agenda, the Tehran regime's drive for nuclear weapons can only be viewed with serious concern.

The Department of State identifies Iran as the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Iran provides safehaven to top al Qaeda leadership figures; sends a constant flow of explosives, weapons and intelligence and security operatives to support the insurgents in Iraq; supports terrorist attacks against the State of Israel, whose existence it has threatened repeatedly; and, employs brutal security services to suppress its own people.

Globalists also recognize how Iranian politicians use religion to help control the increasingly restless populations. Every indication is that Iran's administration in 2005 intends to pursue an aggressive diplomatic and military program, both overt and covert, to expand its sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf region and beyond. Iran's strategy centers on the creation of a greater Iranian Shi'ite empire that includes much of southern Iraq.

In February 2005, Iraq's deputy Foreign Minister Hamid Al Bayati said, "If Iran wanted, it could make Iraq hell for the United States." A *Time* magazine investigation, published in the 15 August 2005 issue, describes in compelling detail how Iran is doing just that. Early statements by Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, coupled with activities in Iraq by Iran's Qods force, intelligence and security operatives and other regime agents point, if anything, to an intensification of such measures going forward.

According to *Time*, Iran's IRGC has created a special network of insurgents in Iraq, dedicated specifically to targeting U.S. and coalition forces. Speaking in mid-August 2005, moreover, Secretary Rumsfeld charged that Iranian weapons "clearly, unambiguously" are being found in Iraq; an intelligence official claimed that newly-manufactured bombs are coming from the IRGC.

American military commanders cite new and more lethal bomb-making techniques evident in the sophistication of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are taking such a toll on U.S., Iraqi and other coalition troops. In August 2005, the chief of Iraq's National Intelligence Service, moreover, Gen. Muhammed Abdullah al-Shahwani, publicly accused Iranian-backed cells of hunting down and killing his officers.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born Sunni terrorist, long has been operating inside Iraq, ever since crossing over Iranian territory on the way out of the battlefields of

Tora Bora in Afghanistan in late 2001. The relationships he established with the IRGC at that time facilitated the expansion of his Iraq network from Ansar al-Islam, to other groups, such as Ansar al-Sunna, Jama'at Al-Tawhid wa'al Jihad (Unity and Jihad Group), and finally the Tanzim Qa'idat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers). Al-Zarqawi officially pledged his allegiance to al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, in October 2004.



The ease with which al-Zarqawi and his men cross back and forth over the Iraqi border with Iran indicates official Iranian approval for his activities as well as the close support of Republican Guard elements on the ground. It is especially important to note the extent of the ties between the Sunni al-Zarqawi and Iran's hard line Shi'ites despite his often-strident Wahhabi polemics against the minority Islamic sect. Al-Zarqawi personifies the terrorist nexus among jihadi forces present in Iraq, the far-flung al Qaeda network, and the clerical regime in Tehran. Loss of Iranian sponsorship likely would significantly erode the effectiveness of this terrorist nexus.

The clerical regime in Tehran took the decision as long ago as 2002, according to *Time's* Michael Ware, that in the wake of Saddam Hussein's expected ouster, Iran would move to establish the domination of its interests in Iraq. Accordingly, by mid-2003, Iranian intelligence operatives, including numerous Hizballah agents, were pouring over the newly-opened border with Iraq, often intermingled with religious pilgrims on their way to the important shrines of Shi'a Islam, located in Karbala, Najaf and other cities of southern Iraq.

Large amounts of funding flowed to Shi'a Iraqi political parties and militias, including that of the upstart Shi'ite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, whose "Jaysh Mahdi" (Mahdi Army) network is supplied by Iran. It is clear, as well, that Iran backs Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and a rival of Moqtada al-Sadr. Documents smuggled out of Iran show that Iran also was paying the salaries of at least 11,740 members of the Badr Shi'ite militia that controls much of southern Iraq. In fact, Badr fighters in the region along the Iran-Iraq border actually are integrated into the IRGC.

Key to Iran's objectives in Iraq and the region is the radical Islamist ideology of Velayat-e Faqih, created by Ayatollah Khomeini, which forms the blueprint of Iran's own Revolution. Among the core dictates of this ideology is that it be exported, aggressively, and violently if need be. This brings the clerical regime in Tehran, its Supreme Leader

and its president Ahmadinejad, into direct conflict with the objectives of the United States for the region, which include a stable, secular, and democratic Iraq.

Because regionalists tend to stick close to the evidence derived from the locales in question, they are reluctant to imagine how two men who despised each other—Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden—might collude against the United States. Although the 9/11 Commission found no evidence that Iran had advance knowledge of the September 11 plot, the Commissioner’s report does note that Iran allowed Saudi al Qaeda operatives to transit the country without putting stamps in their passports. In addition, al Qaeda operatives trained in explosives, security, and intelligence under Iranian sponsorship at least twice during the 1990s.

Credible reporting continues to indicate that a number of top al Qaeda operatives, including Saif al-Adel, al Qaeda’s military commander, and Osama bin Laden’s son, Saad, are living in Iran. Hundreds of lower-level al Qaeda operatives may also be present in the country.

Respected news outlets, including the *Agence France Presse*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the London-based Arabic daily, *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, as well as Iranian officials themselves, confirm that al Qaeda members are present in the country despite explicit denials from top levels of the Tehran regime.

In addition, Western intelligence officials reportedly suspect that al Qaeda leadership in Iran has directed a series of terrorist attacks, including the May 2003 attacks on the expatriate compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; suicide bombings against Western and Jewish targets in Casablanca, Morocco a few days later; November 2003 Istanbul bombings; and, even Madrid train bombings in March 2004.

While skeptics express reluctance to believe that the militantly-Shi’ite Iranians could possibly harbor Sunni Wahhabis, some explanation may be found in the factionalism among different elements of the Tehran regime. Even as MOIS officials arrested and extradited al Qaeda suspects, it was the IRGC that continued to provide assistance and safe haven to al Qaeda operatives. With the IRGC’s 2005 success in achieving a complete sweep of power centers in Iran, it may be expected that al Qaeda and other terrorists will continue to find Iran a generous and tolerant host.

### ***Regional Instability: Israel, Iraq, Levant, Gulf***

Because globalists see links within the Middle East region, they also have scenarios for how governments like Iran encourage instability in the region for the sake of enhancing their rule at home.

Iran’s aggressive involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been documented for many years. Tehran’s support for key Palestinian terrorist organizations like Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) takes the form of funding, training, and logistics, including provision of false documents, weapons, and transport. According to



Matthew Levitt of The Washington Institute, U.S. officials contend that Iran assigned Imad Mughniyeh (Hizballah's international operations commander) to support Palestinian terrorist groups that had launched the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, especially the Hamas militant wing, Qassam Brigades.

That support remained constant over the course of the Intifada and was punctuated by certain key events, such as the June 2002 Tehran conference, convened to bring together the various Palestinian groups, at which Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pledged special funding to the PIJ for carrying out suicide bombings.

Iran's IRGC has been directly involved in the formation and running of terrorist cells against Israeli civilian targets on the West Bank and in Gaza. Iranian weapons are shipped and smuggled to an array of terrorist groups, many of them on cargo planes which make regular flights to Damascus from Tehran. The capture of the Karine-A weapons-smuggling ship in January 2002 displayed the extent and closeness of Iranian support to the Palestinians before the entire world.

The clerical regime's consolidation of power under the banner of the IRGC, therefore, signals a renewed commitment to its determination to undermine the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace just as Israel's withdrawal from Gaza has offered new opportunities for the Palestinian people to effect a transition from violence to nationhood.

The IRGC Qods Force, the extra-territorial division assigned to support Palestinian terrorist groups, continues to channel an estimated \$100-200 million per year to Hizballah alone and also provides support to other groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), with some funds, in fact, specifically earmarked for suicide bombings against Israeli civilian targets.

The continued dedication of the Tehran regime to suicide operations, whether against Israeli civilians or Iraqi and American forces, is indicated by the establishment of a special military garrison in Iran to recruit and train volunteers for "martyrdom-seeking operations," as announced to the Iranian media in July 2005. That announcement was followed days later by a televised appearance by Ahmadinejad, in which he praised the "art of martyrdom" and expressed the hope that "Allah willing, Islam will conquer...all the mountain tops of world."

Appointment of Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar as Defense Minister in Ahmadinejad's Cabinet indicates that continuing, and likely increased, close support will be provided to the IRGC's extra-territorial activities to direct Iran's proxy groups, not only in Iraq, but in Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories. Mohammad-Najjar formerly served as the commander of the Revolutionary Guards' Middle East branch, the Qods Force. Ominously, he told Iranian Majlis deputies on 22 Aug 05 that he would pay special attention to the "production of equipment related to asymmetric warfare."

Yet, while the world has been preoccupied with the on-again off-again progress of nuclear talks among Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and EU-3

(France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), a development at least as threatening as Iran acquiring “the bomb” has been taking place behind the scenes of that secretive country—an enhanced effort to export the Iranian Revolution via state-sponsored international terrorism.

But rising popular dissatisfaction, encroaching influence of democratization and reform, and paralyzing internal factionalism combine to stymie implementation by Iran’s hardliners of the full scope of Ayatollah Khomeini’s aggressive strategy to export the Revolution. The extremist clerics of the regime in Tehran rightly realize that the tide of history is not on their side and thus move decisively to achieve radical, expansionist objectives in the Middle East region and beyond, before it is too late.

In order to accelerate the export of the Revolution, there has been a consolidation of power in Iran between the clerics and paramilitary groups.

On one hand, the ascension to power of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2005 consolidates Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali al-Khameini’s personal control over all key branches of the Iranian government. Organized in secret at the highest levels of power, Ahmadinejad’s surprise, late emergence as the victorious presidential candidate in fact bears the hallmarks of a “bloodless coup.”<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, some analysts detect indicators of serious division among the ruling elite in Tehran: They suggest that before Ahmadinejad became president, threats against Khamenei came from the so-called reformist front, which sought to curb his absolute power. With the departure of reformist Khatami, challenges to Khamenei come from sources he did much to empower—the military, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij militia.<sup>3</sup>

Ahmadinejad, a former commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has been deeply involved in extra-territorial assassinations, the export of terrorism, and countless internal murders. He leads a regime dominated by current and former members of the IRGC, its armed street militia, Bassij, and security forces, including the Ministry of Intelligence Services (MOIS). The internal clampdown already has begun and plans for terror attacks against Israel, inside Iraq, and elsewhere are in motion.

Ayatollah Khameini’s plan to wrest complete domination over Iranian society dates to the incipient reforms of the previous Khatami presidency, when a small and very gradual reform movement began to gather support. Such reforms, however, carried as they were on the leading edge of a youthful population wave and welcomed readily by Iranians fed up with oppressive social measures and a declining economy, spelled threat for the totalitarian clerical regime in Tehran.

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<sup>2</sup> Mehrdad, Ardeshir and Mehdi Kia, “New-conservatives, regime crisis and political perspectives in Iran.” ZNet Iran, August 15, 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Mehdi Khalaji and Mohsen Sazegara, “Challenges Facing Iran’s New Government,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,” PolicyWatch Number 1022, 11 August 2005.

Steps to halt and reverse reforms were critical for retaining power by Ayatollah Khamenei and his top clique of radical clerics. The steady, if slow, steps toward democratic reform in the neighborhood, especially those in neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq, which rode in on American tanks, likely added to the mounting concern in Tehran.

The clerics' response began with the massive manipulation of the February 2004 parliamentary elections, in which thousands of candidates were banned from even running; the outcome was a Majlis dominated by conservatives. Also during 2004, Khomeini appointed former IRGC commander, Ali Larijani, to head the state-controlled Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting; there is no private radio or television broadcasting in Iran. Finally, the Ahmadinejad presidency in 2005 ushered in a Cabinet full of IRGC commanders and supporters.

By way of example, the new defense minister, Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, an IRGC brigadier-general, took part in the bloody campaign to suppress the Kurds in 1979-80 and also led IRGC units in Lebanon in 1983, when the Marine barracks were blown up by the Guards and Hizballah. The minister for intelligence and security is Hojjato-Islam Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ezhei, who is known as a "particularly vicious and barbaric head" of Islamic tribunals that regularly issued brutal sentences. The foreign minister is Manoucher Mottaki, whose long diplomatic career includes service in Ankara, during which tenure numerous Iranian dissidents in Turkey were murdered and kidnapped. The transfer of power to the IRGC is intended to shore up the rule of the leading clerics—under the ultimate authority of the Supreme Leader, Khamenei.

What is important to recognize at this juncture, however, is that the Ahmadinejad presidency signals a direct and serious threat to U.S. national security. Sensing that Washington is bogged down in next door Iraq, fully occupied in the fruitless hunt for Osama bin Laden along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, reeling under the double economic burden of an expensive war and rising oil prices, and increasingly unwilling to support the agenda of President Bush, the Iranian regime has shifted into high gear to achieve its objectives on a range of issues.

Primary among these issues are: acquisition of nuclear weapons, foiling any solution to the Arab-Israel conflict that does not include the destruction of Israel, imposition of hegemony over the emerging Iraqi government, and maintenance of a position of influence in Lebanon, Syria, and the Persian Gulf.

The threat to U.S. interests is patent in each of these as is the apparent determination by Iran's leadership that it can prevail through a sharply more aggressive policy abroad coupled with an ever-more savage reign of terror at home.

### ***MEK Capabilities in Comparison with those of Other Groups***

While there is limited bargaining within the ruling Iranian elite, at issue is power rather than policy. That is, Iran is more of a unitary actor on policy issues after the rise of

Ahmadinejad than during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, 1997-2005. During the Khatami presidency, there was some diversity of opposition groups. After consolidation of power around Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei via his selection of President-Elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the variety decreased.

Because of basic unity between clerics and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps around the export of terrorism and proliferation of catastrophic weapons, there is a need for Washington to reconsider the policy of putting all of its eggs in the one basket of diplomacy.

An American policy of regime change for Iran is a way to avoid the puzzle of having to choose between failing European-led diplomacy and infeasible American and Israeli military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities. If the United States were to adopt a regime change policy, however, it also would need to decide which opposition groups should receive overt and covert American support.

Consider some groups that achieved relative prominence in the Khatami era. The Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF) was a reformist party headed by the brother of former president Khatami. But this group had so little influence that the president could not even get his brother on a list approved by Supreme Leader so he could run again for Iran's parliament in 2004: Khamenei objected.

In addition, Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI) was another group critical of the ruling clerics but also not able to get on the ballot for 2004 elections to the Iranian parliament. And because the Office for the Consolidation of Unity tried to stop student demonstrations during 1999, this group lost credibility on the Street.

Other oppositionists during the Khatami period are heirs to the Shah of Iran. They are even less influential than the Office for the Consolidation of Unity. Monarchists (headed by the son of the Shah, Reza Shah) claim support within Iran; however, that support is mainly "virtual," i.e., on the Internet. Recall the 1960s American anti-war phrase, "The Revolution will not be televised." So too, the revolution in Iran will not occur by clicks on monarchists' Worldwide Web sites.

One opposition group that cuts across the Khatami era into the Ahmadinejad period is the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK)—an externally-based organization that also operates within Iran. The MEK is a group that the Tehran regime fears most and which receives the bulk of its attention. Upon hearing the name MEK, however, some western officials may assert that they have a problem with the MEK, supposedly because it has too little support within Iran to warrant American support.

But if the MEK lacks internal support, why would the Iranian regime pay so much attention to it in comparison with all other opposition groups? And how could the MEK be the largest, most organized, and most dedicated Iranian opposition group? It is because the regime fears MEK has support among the Iranian people and capability to assist in regime change that it seeks to destroy the MEK.

Likewise, if the MEK has little support within the Iranian population, its leadership would be unable to obtain secrets of Iran's nuclear violations. These include revelations in 2002 of Natanz uranium enrichment facility, Arak's heavy water facility, and a host of other nuclear secrets.

The MEK also is able to obtain sensitive intelligence on Iran's plans to destabilize Iraq, e.g., by assassinating Iraqi Sunni leaders. A theme underlying the questions raised above is that the MEK indeed has latent support, which would become public once the Great Powers remove the MEK from the terrorist list and hence bestow legitimacy upon this group.

In order to evaluate the capabilities of the MEK and other Iranian opposition groups, including those that do not favor regime change, an IPC Task Force formed a special research committee that included students from Georgetown University, volunteers, and IPC staff to carry out research on the Iranian opposition.

To conduct an analysis of the clerical regime's attitude towards the MEK and other opposition groups, the IPC research committee performed a content analysis of statements referring to such groups in the regime's global news agency: the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). IPC also surveyed the domestic regime-sponsored Farsi-only news agency, "Fars News" and the "Baztab" website, to obtain perspective on how the regime portrays these groups to internal constituencies.

The IPC research committee conducted both searches for the period January 1-September 5, 2005 (although the research committee only reviewed Fars News July 5-September 5). The committee obtained each article that referenced each group from the list available in Appendix B. The committee broke these groups down into two categories: those that favor regime change and those dedicated to working within the system. IPC then extracted all the statements from these articles that referred to the groups and sorted them on the following five-point "antipathy scale."


This study provides insight into how the clerical regime in Tehran views opposition groups. From the number of times the regime mentions a specific group, we can hypothesize that dealing with that group is on the regime's agenda. In this regard, it is remarkable to note that the MEK is the topic of discussion over 230% more often than all of the other groups combined.

Researchers combed IRNA articles mentioning such terms like MKO or MEK, Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF), Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI), as well as other opposition groups for statements regarding these groups. The research committee broke each story down into statements, while still attempting to preserve the basic point of the story. From 1 January, 2005 through 5 September, 2005, 173 statements mentioned these opposition groups. The MEK had 121 statements (contained in 58 articles) about the MEK in the IRNA database. The IIPF had 44 statements (from 31 articles). FMI had 8 statements (from 8 articles). Monarchists/Reza Pahlavi and the Marxist-Leninist

Fedayeen, RWOI (Revolutionary Workers Organization of Iran or Organization of Revolutionary Workers of Iran—ORWI), and other opposition groups were not mentioned at all.

These statements were then coded using a 1-5 scale of favorability to unfavorability. Staff took averages of each group to demonstrate the relative measure of dislike and attention given to various Iranian opposition groups. Only the MEK scores exceedingly high on both the amount of attention it receives and the negativity of that attention.


While the IIFP receives a fair amount of press time it must be mentioned that it is considered a legitimate opposition group operating from within the current political system.



FMI=Freedom Movement of Iran; IIPF=Islamic Iran Participation Front; RP=Reza Pahlavi; ML=Marxist-Leninist groups; MEK=Mujahedin-e Khalq; other groups not listed did not appear.

But not only is the MEK apparently on the minds of the Iranian regime, the clerics are also worried about the MEK. Across the board, the MEK averages an antipathy score of 4.7 out of a 5 point score, whereas the next closest group scores only a 3.0, which qualifies as neutral. Regime sources mention the MEK 121 times, whereas the next closest groups, Islamic Iran Participation Front, headed by the brother of Iran’s former president Khatami, and tolerated by the regime, was mentioned only 44 times.

### Opposition Group Antipathy Ratings by Iranian Regime



The statements are ranked according to their intensity: (1) being the *Most Favorable*, (2) being *Favorable*, (3) being *Neutral*, (4) being *Unfavorable* and (5) being *Most Unfavorable*.

IPC conducted a companion study using Farsi Language websites of the Iranian regime, Fars News Agency and Baztab website. In the Farsi websites, the MEK and related names appear 136 times. The next closest group—Islamic Iran Participation Front—headed by the brother of Iran’s former president Khatami, appears only 25 times. The MEK groups average an antipathy score of 4.17 out of a 5 point score, whereas the next closest group scores only a 2.5, which qualifies as marginally favorable.

These results demonstrate that the regime is going out of its way to attack and condemn the MEK. In short, of all of the groups in Iran, the only one that receives serious attention and provokes fear and anger among regime figures is the MEK and related groups.

This research corroborates the view of many scholars and Iran experts, some not particularly favorably inclined toward the MEK, who consider the group “the best-organized and probably the most dedicated of the opposition groups,” and “the only organized Iranian opposition ...[with] highly devoted adherents inside Iran,”

#### *Active Proliferator of Weapons of Mass Destruction*

Finally, globalists view Iran as a country intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction and only use negotiations as a cover for the pursuit of such armaments. Regionalists are inclined to give Iran the benefit of the doubt on charges of nuclear violations and to go

the extra mile in order to strengthen those in the regime interested in a negotiated settlement with the international community.

On the nuclear front, consider developments in the year 2000. Iran declared the existence of its uranium conversion facility (UCF) to IAEA officials and, in 2001, submitted to the IAEA a design information questionnaire for the UCF. The IAEA, in consultation with experts from the United States and other countries, began in 2002 to develop a robust safeguards approach for the UCF. As part of this effort, IAEA safeguards experts visited the UCF.

Iran has conducted research, in some cases extensively, in several enrichment technologies, including gas centrifuge, and laser isotope separation. In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed the existence of two covert nuclear facilities under construction in Iran—a heavy water production plant at Arak and a “fuel production” plant at Natanz.

As subsequently detailed by the IAEA acting on the basis of the August 2002 revelations, Iran had embarked years before upon a hugely ambitious production-scale centrifuge program.

Iran confirmed to the IAEA in February 2003 that the Natanz site is intended to be an industrial-scale centrifuge enrichment facility, ostensibly to supply nuclear fuel for three 1,000-MWe nuclear power plants. The Director General in February 2003 visited the plant and viewed a pilot-scale centrifuge plant under construction with a number of centrifuges spinning under vacuum and many more in various states of assembly.

The IAEA was unable at that time to take samples that would provide specific evidence of the materials that had been introduced into the facility. Prior to the public revelations, Iran had failed to declare this and the Arak facilities to the IAEA, despite public statements by Iranian officials that all their nuclear activities were being undertaken with the supervision of the IAEA.

That said, the nature of the regime in Tehran is of greater import than its nuclear weapons capability: an Iran with truly representative institutions with a nuclear weapons capability would not be as destabilizing as nuclear weapons in the hands of the unelected, expansionist theocracy.

The nightmare scenario is that an aggressive and expansionist regime in Tehran attains a nuclear weapons capability and then collaborates with transnational networks (such as those currently sheltered on its territory) to carry out nuclear terrorism. Even the threat of nuclear terrorism would have to be taken seriously were the clerical regime to acquire "the bomb," potentially setting the scene for nuclear blackmail. Such a scenario, in fact, may be the more plausible, in which Tehran attempts to implement an aggressive regional policy, confident in the deterrent capacity of its nuclear arsenal.

Despite differences in estimates of the amount of time necessary for Tehran to acquire



nuclear weapons, there no longer appears to be much disagreement that Iran is driving toward just that capability. A senior intelligence official, quoted by the *Washington Post* in August 2005 said, “it is the judgment of the intelligence community that...Iran is determined to build nuclear weapons.”<sup>4</sup> The question, then, is about how much time remains to stop Iran. The answer depends upon U.S. national security strategy towards Iran.

A May 2005 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, leaked to the press in August, puts the Intelligence Community (IC) estimate of Iran’s progress toward acquiring a nuclear weapons capability up to 10 years out in the future. Israeli estimates run closer, to about 3 years, at the earliest. A senior Israeli military commander, quoted in the *Jerusalem Post*, indicated that Iran was running both a civilian and a military nuclear weapons track, but that a weapon would be possible “...not earlier than 2008.”<sup>5</sup>

Nuclear developments, revelations by opposition groups, and statements by Ahmadinejad and other ranking regime figures increasingly support the contention that Iran has significantly stepped up the pace of its nuclear weapons development program. The following provide a sampling of such indicators.

- The unilateral decision by Tehran to restart its uranium conversion facility at Isfahan in early August 2005 broke an agreement to halt conversion activities which Iran had reached with the EU-3 in November 2004. Breaking the seals on equipment at Isfahan enabled Iran to proceed with transforming raw uranium yellow cake into a gas ready for the enrichment process.
- On 2 Sep 05, an IAEA report: stated that Iran has produced 15,000 lbs of uranium hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>), <sup>6</sup> which is enough to make one atomic bomb after a process of enrichment in centrifuges.
- A 9 August 2005 press statement by Alireza Jafarzadeh, a prominent Iranian exile who has helped uncover nearly two decades of covert nuclear activity by Tehran, revealed that Iran has manufactured about 4,000 centrifuges capable of enriching uranium to weapons grade purity.<sup>7</sup> Iranian IRGC commanders also met with A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, to acquire nuclear-capable missile technology, according to Jafarzadeh. Jafarzadeh also highlighted earlier reports on the Ukrainian sale of cruise missiles to Iran in the period 1999-2001.<sup>8</sup>
- According to a late August 2005 statement from a spokesman for the Iranian opposition coalition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Iranian agents have tried to obtain from South Korea a substance that can be used to boost

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4 Linzner, Dafna, “Iran is Judged 10 Years from Nuclear Bomb.” *Washington Post*, 2 August 2005.

5 Halpern, Orly, “New Estimates on Iranian Nukes,” *Jerusalem Post*, 1 August 2005.

6 Bloomberg, “Iran Has Gas Type Used in Atom Bombs, Report Says”, 2 September 2005.

7 NewsMax.com, “Dissident Says Tehran Has 4,000 Centrifuges.” 9 August 2005.

<sup>8</sup> Salhani, Claude, “Iran’s nuke missiles.” UPI, 29 August 2005. *See also*: “Cruise Missile Row Rocks Ukraine,” BBC, 18 March 2005.

nuclear explosions in atomic weapons – a hydrogen isotope known as tritium – which is especially important for use in warheads that fit on the nosecone of missiles.<sup>9</sup>

- Iran state television announced on 30 August 2005 that its scientists had mastered a biotechnology technique for converting uranium ore to a concentrated form of uranium known as “yellow cake,” which is the basic feed material used at the start of the nuclear fuel process to create weapons grade uranium.<sup>10</sup>
- From the pace and sequence of Iran’s recent nuclear activities, globalists conclude that the regime is speeding up its nuclear weapons program, perhaps seeking to take advantage of a window of opportunity that they may perceive is closing. With the domination of Iranian society now firmly established under the control of the IRGC and his hand-picked disciple, Ahmadinejad, ensconced in the presidency, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini may feel himself in a position of strength vis-à-vis his European interlocutors and the IAEA.
- Statements by leading regime figures also underscore Iran’s apparent determination to defy the international community as well as the regulatory powers of the IAEA.
- Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of Iran’s Guardian Council, declared in a Friday prayer sermon on 25 August 2005 that Iran had won out over the U.S. on the nuclear issue, saying “No matter how much they confront us, accuse us and put barriers in our way, it might only slow our movement, but they cannot stop us.”<sup>11</sup>
- Students demonstrating in late August 2005 in front of the French Embassy in Tehran carried placards that read “NPT—We Will Leave You Soon” while chanting “Nuclear power is our right.”<sup>12</sup> That no club-wielding Bassij forces appeared to break up the demonstration may have been due to the presence of the demonstration’s principal speaker, Ibrahim Motavalian, the chief of all university Bassijis in Tehran.
- In a major speech to present his Cabinet choices to the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, on 21 August 2005, Ahmadinejad lashed out at the EU-3 (France, Germany and the U.K.) for their slowly-stiffening resolve in the face of Tehran’s intransigence over its nuclear obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He indicated that Tehran’s future foreign policy would make far more

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<sup>9</sup> John, Mark, “Iran seeking nuclear bomb ‘booster,’ say exiles.” Reuters, 25 August 2005. Ali Safavi, a senior NCRI official, speaking before a news conference in Brussels, cited what he called “high-placed” but unnamed sources “in the Iranian leadership.”

<sup>10</sup> Rechnagel, Charles, “Iran: Tehran Claims Breakthrough in Nuclear Processing.” Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 31 August 2005.

<sup>11</sup> Aljazeera.com, “Iranian cleric: we won nuclear standoff.” 26 August 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Escobar, Pepe, “The nuclear rap.” Asia Times Online, August 26, 2005.

aggressive use of its oil wealth, complaining that as Iran is importing “billions of dollars from certain countries,” “these countries must be grateful to us, because we are helping to revive their economies” but instead “they make demands and adopt a hostile posture against us on political issues.” He added that henceforth Iran would more closely link its economic and political foreign policies.<sup>13</sup>

### *Conclusions*

If state sponsored international terrorism were taken into account along with intent and capability to create catastrophic weapons, Iran becomes a clearer candidate in the global war on terrorism absent a consideration of proliferation.

Globalists in contrast to regionalists recognize if nonstate actors collude with state sponsors on terrorism, the two might also cooperate in the area of weapons transfers as well.

Globalists also understand how states and nonstate actors use religion for political purposes, maintain power at home by exporting terror abroad, create or tolerate superficial opposition groups to provide the appearance of dissent at home, and use the promise of nuclear-weapons status to throttle dissent and maintain power for the rulers.

In short, globalists have a better grasp on the threat from Iran and policies to address those threats than regionalists in the war for Washington.

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<sup>13</sup> Iran Focus, “Iran’s president charts hard-line agenda.” 21 August 2005.

# **The Case for Removal of the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) from the U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) List**

## **Introduction**

Legal Criteria for FTO Designation

Allegations against the MEK

Killing of Americans

Support for the U.S. Embassy Takeover

Suppression of Kurds

Cross-Border Attacks and Assassinations

Terrorist Capability and/or Intent

Accusation of “Cult”

Conclusions: Legal Allegations

Background on the MEK

The MEK’s Relationship with the U.S. Military in Iraq

The MEK relationship with Iraqis

MEK Capabilities

Delisting the MEK Serves U.S. National Security Interests

Conclusions: Delisting of the MEK Supports U.S. National Security

## ***Introduction***

Since the State Department placed the MEK on the Department's Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list in 1997, legal charges have been the ostensible rationale for designation. A thorough review of the facts by an IPC Task Force demonstrates that contrary to the MEK designation, this organization patently does not meet the legal criteria for listing as an FTO. One purpose of this White Paper is to assess each and every one of the legal charges used as the rationale for placement on the list.

The IPC findings one of two conclusions: Either the MEK should be delisted on legal grounds, or the FTO listing rests on criteria other than those required by law, e.g., diplomatic grounds. Assuming for the moment that diplomacy rather than law forms the basis for designation, at issue is whether the diplomatic benefits of designation outweigh the cost of listing. The IPC holds that whatever diplomatic gains accrued to Washington in the past for the designation of MEK as an FTO, have been diminished by the consolidation of power under the faction led by the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the newly-elected president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Indeed, continued designation inadvertently strengthens the faction that prior designation was designed to weaken.

With respect to diplomatic benefits, American media source have cited U.S. Government sources who suggested that they placed the MEK on the FTO list for political reasons related to the Clinton administration's decision to present the Iranian government with a supportive gesture.

Washington hoped that such a gesture might encourage the incoming administration of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to adopt moderate, reformist positions.<sup>14</sup> The use of diplomatic criteria while posing as if legal standards held sway, challenges the integrity of the designation process. Indeed, Magnus Ranstorp, head of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews University in Scotland, says: "The terrorism designation process is often hijacked for political purposes..."<sup>15</sup>

In the case of the MEK moreover, there is an inherent contradiction in designating as "terrorist" an organization dedicated to democratic principles. Also, it is foolhardy to label an organization terrorist when it opposes a regime labeled by the United States as the foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world.

Designation of the MEK thus deprives U.S. foreign policy of a major political-military option, not only for prosecuting the global war on terrorism and proliferation, but for encouraging the spread of democracy in the Middle East region. The Iranian regime will remain unchallenged as long as the MEK remains hamstrung by its designation as an

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1Kempster, Norman, "US Designates 30 Groups as Terrorists." *Los Angeles Times*, 9 October 1997. See also: Agence France Presse, "US Lawmakers Voice Support for Iranian Dissident Group." 17 September 1998.

<sup>15</sup> Vesely, Milan, Neil Barnett, and Adel Darwish, "Iran and the U.S. on Collision Course?" *The Middle East*, October 2004.

FTO. Removal of the MEK from the FTO list is not only legally justified but would materially bolster U.S. national security options with regard to the radical regime in Tehran.

### ***Legal Criteria for FTO Designation***

The Anti-terrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 modifies the Immigration and Nationality Act to form the legal basis for the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. To qualify as an FTO, an organization must meet three criteria laid out in the AEDPA. It must be: a) foreign; b) engaging in, or possessing both intent and capability to engage in, terrorism or terrorist activity, and, c) those activities must threaten U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States. Although the MEK is certainly a foreign organization, its intent to bring democracy to Iran and to depose a regime that itself is recognized as the number one state sponsor of international terrorism clearly place it in the camp of those who are “with us.”

Moreover, the U.S. Government granted “protected persons” status under the Fourth Geneva Convention to the entire MEK population of some 3,800 members living in Camp Ashraf, Iraq in 2004. An exhaustive 16-month interagency investigation by the U.S. government found no basis for charges of wrongdoing by any member.<sup>16</sup> It makes no sense for the U.S. Government to place on its FTO list an organization whose members the U.S. Government also protects. Maintaining this logically untenable position makes it appear that the Government is in the business of protecting terrorists. As a result, these individuals do not belong on a list of “terrorist” organizations.

### ***Allegations against the MEK***

The Department of State, as a legal rationale to justify the FTO designation of the group, levies four main charges against the MEK; these form the basis for its designation as an FTO.

- First, State accuses the MEK of involvement in the killings of several Department of Defense officers and contractors during the 1970s.
- Second, State accuses the MEK of supporting the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran in 1979.
- Third, State alleges that the MEK collaborated with Saddam Hussein to suppress the Kurds in northern Iraq as well as the Shi’ites in the south.
- Fourth, State characterizes the MEK’s attacks on Iranian regime targets as terrorist in nature.

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<sup>16</sup> Jehl, Douglas, “U.S. Sees No Basis to Prosecute Iranian Opposition “Terror” Group Being Held in Iraq.” *New York Times*, 27 July 2004.

After intensive research, an IPC Task Force finds all four accusations to be false. The first three charges refer to events, some of which occurred decades in the past, which are without factual basis. The fourth grossly mischaracterizes the MEK's struggle to depose the brutal regime in Tehran.

### ***Killing of Americans***

Central to assigning blame for the killing of American military and contractor personnel in Iran in the 1970s is an understanding of the many groups that formed in opposition to the Shah, their ideological platforms, and varying fortunes in the face of savage repression by the Shah's notorious secret police, SAVAK.

Among the various groups sometimes identified by the U.S. and international press as "Islamic-Marxist guerrillas" or "anti-government terrorists" or simply "leftists" were the *Fedayeen-e Khalq*, the *Tudeh*, and the *Mujahedeen-e Khalq* (MEK). These groups (not to mention their splinter factions) were distinct and different in their ideology, membership, and *modus operandi*. But neither the Shah's state-run media nor American reporters, nor even U.S. government officials, seemed able to distinguish among them when reporting on events such as the killing of the Americans, or the takeover of the American Embassy.

The State Department's *'Country Reports on Terrorism 2004,'* accuses the MEK of having "killed U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians working on defense projects in Tehran."<sup>17</sup> Specifically, Lt. Colonel Lewis L. Hawkins was murdered on 2 June 1973 in Tehran. Air Force Colonel Paul Shafer and Air Force Lt. Colonel Jack Turner were killed in an ambush as they were driving to work on 21 May 1975. One year later, on 28 August 1976, three Rockwell International employees, Donald G. Smith, Robert R. Krongrad, and William C. Cottrell met the same fate, killed in their car on the way to work.

The Iran Policy Committee conducted an extensive investigation of these killings and the accusations that MEK members were responsible for them. The investigation included an open-source review of recently-declassified U.S. Government documents, newspapers reports from the time of the killings, and books by a variety of American, Iranian, and other authors. These sources were supplemented with in-person interviews with current and former MEK members, input from Iraqi officials and citizens, plus discussions with U.S. military officers who served at Camp Ashraf, Iraq.

Turn the clock back to the 1970s. In early 1972, a massive and well-planned assault by SAVAK succeeded in arresting 69 members of the MEK, which included nearly half of all its membership and almost the entire leadership (including all three founders and eleven of sixteen original Central Committee members).<sup>18</sup> Massoud Rajavi, who spent the next seven years in jail, ultimately was the only one of the original leadership to survive. Additional arrests and killing of MEK members followed in May 1972, which practically "shattered" the organization.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism*, 27 April 2005.

<sup>18</sup> Abrahamian, Ervand, *The Iranian Mojahedin*, Yale University Press, 1989, pp. 128

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, p. 136

In order to avoid a repetition of this disaster, the few survivors of the clampdown not in jail divided the MEK organization into three entirely separate branches, each led by a Central Committee member, one of whom was named Bahram Aram. Bloody infighting among these branches followed, which tore them apart and resulted in a sharp turn away from the philosophy and strategy of the imprisoned MEK leadership and other members. This breakaway by a few individuals really constituted an attempted hijacking of the true MEK's identity and purpose. It unfortunately succeeded in vilifying the overall reputation of the real MEK when those individuals, led by Bahram Aram and Vahid Afrakhteh, took the unilateral decision to kill Americans in order to establish their credentials as the most radical of the elements trying to oust the Shah.<sup>20</sup>

Vahid Afrakhteh, a member who was closely linked to Aram, also played a key role in the internal battles of the breakaway groups, which included internecine assassinations as well as murderous attacks on MEK leaders, such as Majid Sharif-Vaqefi, who remained loyal to the imprisoned leadership.<sup>21</sup>

These names and splits are important because they explain the confusion over who was responsible for the killings of the American military and contractor personnel. As late as 1979, after the Revolution was well-underway, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran still misidentified the leadership of the MEK in official reporting, confusing leaders of splinter factions with the core group.<sup>22</sup>

Vahid Afrakhteh, eventually caught and executed by the Shah's security forces, spoke with a Western journalist who visited him in prison before his death and admitted to "personally [killing] Col. Lewis Hawkins in Tehran in 1973 and [to leading] the cell that gunned down Col. Paul Shaffer and Lt. Col. Jack Turner...in 1975."<sup>23</sup>

Bahram Aram, who, as noted above, had assumed leadership of one of the other surviving MEK branches, was responsible for the killing of the three Rockwell International contractors in 1976. In an article titled: "Three U.S. Civilians Slain by Guerrillas in Tehran," *The New York Times* reported on August 29, 1976 that, "the three civilian victims were killed by members of the same self-styled "Islamic Marxist" anti-Government terrorist group that was officially blamed for the assassination of two American colonels in Teheran last year."

On November 18, 1976, *The Washington Post* quoted Iranian officials who said that security police had shot and killed the man who masterminded the August 1976 slaying of three American civilians. Bahram Aram, according to police, directed the morning

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, p. 136

<sup>21</sup> "Who was Sharif?," an article published 23 September 2004 on the Sharif University of Technology website.

<sup>22</sup> "Iran: A Comment on Terrorism in a Revolutionary Situation," US Embassy Tehran, 28 February 1979. Declassified document, originally classified "Secret."

<sup>23</sup> William Branigin, "Iran Says Guerilla Trained in Cuba" *The Washington Post*, 5-11-76



rush-hour attack on an automobile carrying three U.S. employees of Rockwell International.

It might be noted here that a letter of responsibility later issued for the murders in 1975 and 1976, although it carried an ostensible MEK emblem at the letterhead, can be identified easily as coming from the splinter group rather than the legitimate MEK because the Koranic verse that is intrinsic to the MEK logo was missing in the logo on that letter. Eventually, in the last weeks leading up to the Revolution, this splinter group abandoned the use of the name *Mojahedin* and the MEK's symbols, and adopted a new name, "The Organization for the Struggle on the Path for the Emancipation of the Working Class (aka Peykar)."

As it became known to the core MEK leadership and members inside the Shah's jails that individuals like Aram and Afrakhteh were veering off so radically from the course envisioned by Massoud Rajavi and the other MEK Central Committee members, a serious fracturing of the MEK ensued.

Beginning in 1972, the anti-American radicals, such as Taghi Shahram and Bahram Aram, essentially engineered a *coup d'etat*, taking advantage of the killing and imprisonment of most of the rest of the MEK leadership and members. They attempted to legitimize their splinter group by arrogating to themselves the *Mojahedin* name, the organization's emblem, and thereby, the mantel of leadership of the anti-Shah movement. Their actions aroused stiff resistance from the few remaining Muslim *Mojahedin* who remained loyal to the imprisoned MEK leadership. The bottom line is that a few individuals hijacked the MEK, killed Americans, and it only appears as if the MEK were to blame.

During discussions in Auvers-sur-Oise, France in April 2005, IPC Executive Director Clare Lopez spoke with Mohsen Reza'i, the younger brother of MEK Central Committee leadership figures, Ahmed and Reza Reza'i, (both killed by the Shah's security forces). Mohsen recounted the story of his family, which ultimately lost a total of eight members who were killed by the security services of either the Shah or the clerical regime that followed. The Reza'i brothers and sisters initially opposed the Shah for the lack of democracy under his reign; surviving siblings, including Mohsen, later fought the even-more repressive rule of the successor regime, which later tortured them.

Mohsen's account essentially confirmed the broader research of the IPC Task Force outlined above; in particular, he strongly denied any MEK involvement in the killing of the Americans during the 1970s. He also cited the personal involvement of his own family in the course of events: from the massive crackdown that imprisoned most of the MEK during the period to the splintering apart of the remaining group members who remained on the outside.

As is evident from various sources, the murder of six Americans in the 1970s was entirely the responsibility of individuals who had carried out a bloody coup d'etat in the organization and were rejected by the legitimate members and leadership of the MEK. As

noted in greater detail below, a 2004 U.S. government investigation of all 3,800 MEK members then living in Camp Ashraf, Iraq resulted in a finding that there was “no basis to charge members of [the MEK] with violations of American law, according to senior American officials.” If any of the MEK members present at Ashraf, including those active during the time of the Shah, had any connections with the murder of Americans, then that investigation would have not cleared them.

Additional and separate discussions Lopez held with Mohammad Mohadessin, chairman of the NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee, also corroborated the principal elements of the MEK history as told by Reza’i during the mid-1970s when the Americans were killed. The IPC Task Force validated their interpretation of the MEK history.

Mohadessin admitted that the Mujahedin opposed the U.S. policy of supporting the Shah because they sought an end to non-representational government in Iran. He stated emphatically, however, that this opposition took the form of internal animosity toward SAVAK and the rest of the Shah’s security apparatus rather than any directed attacks against Americans.

### ***Support for the U.S. Embassy Takeover***

The State Department also accuses the MEK of supporting the American Embassy takeover of 1979. Interviews with the NCRI and MEK leadership elicited strong denials of any MEK involvement in either the Embassy takeover or the subsequent hostage crisis. To the contrary, the leaders considered the MEK to be a victim of this regime-engineered episode.

Independent academic research by the IPC Task Force uncovered documents of the period that also cast serious doubt on the likelihood that MEK members supported the U.S. Embassy takeover or subsequent seizure of Americans.

One example of IPC Task Force material is a recently declassified document, originally classified “Secret,” from the Office of Security of the U.S. Department of State, titled, “Threat Assessment: Iran,” dated June 14, 1979. The 22-page report states that when the American Embassy was first attacked on February 14, 1979, it was the forces of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) “that came to the aid of the Americans.” Inexplicably, the report then goes on to note that “at present,” [June 1979] the Embassy continues to be “protected by an element of the [MEK] led by Mashallah Kashani who claims to hold credentials directly from Khomeini.”

In fact, the Khomeini elements ostensibly “protecting” the U.S. Embassy were actually special Komiteh security forces of the Iranian government, led by Mashallah Kashani.<sup>24</sup> These forces were in open conflict with the MEK and brutally attacked MEK members

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<sup>24</sup> The Komiteh was a motley collection of street militia, hastily-formed by Ayatollah Khomeini and his clerical supporters in an effort to take charge of the street in the confused early days of the Revolution. The Komiteh was the forerunner of the more organized militia called *Bassij*, now part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

on the street. The same forces even brought a kidnapped member of the MEK from elsewhere in Tehran to the back of the U.S. Embassy and “used the embassy compound and used the motor-pool office for interrogation purposes,” the report states.

Thus, it is evident from this State Department threat assessment written more than four months after the Iranian Revolution began that the U.S. Embassy in Tehran had developed very little understanding of the political circumstances on the ground. In particular, the Embassy was confused about the identity and role of the MEK during this period of the Iranian Revolution.

In a 1981 interview, Massoud Rajavi asserted that “[students at the Embassy] were linked to the Pasdaran and to [Ayatollah] Musavi Khomeini. This was before the IRP [Islamic Republic Party—the party of the clerics who supported Ayatollah Khomeini] had organized itself and there were many different factions of the petty bourgeoisie who were trying to attach themselves to Khomeini in one way or another... the first students in the embassy, for the initial two to three weeks, were either IRP people or people controlled by Khomeini. Then the IRP took complete control and organized the embassy people [those who took over the Embassy]...”<sup>25</sup>

Mohammad Mohaddessin described the plot to attack the U.S. Embassy in Tehran as a shrewd move by Ayatollah Khomeini to discredit the MEK, which he had begun to view by November 1979 as an impediment to totalitarian clerical rule in Iran.

The Embassy takeover confronted the MEK with an impossible choice: either denounce the Embassy takeover and seizure of American diplomats as hostages and thereby become instantly an enemy of the regime to be obliterated—or express support for the takeover and betray the MEK’s own democratic ideals and platform. Mohaddessin admits and regrets that the MEK waffled for too long, failing to denounce the takeover, in a vain attempt to preserve some ability to influence the course of the Revolution.

Still, the historical record and recollections of those actually involved make clear that the MEK neither supported nor benefited from the American Embassy crisis. The adversarial position in which the MEK found itself vis-à-vis the faction of Ayatollah Khomeini at the time of the takeover was described in very clear terms by Massoumeh Ebtekar, spokesperson for the student group that took over the Embassy and later Vice President for the Department of the Environment in the administration of President Khatami. Her book, *Takeover in Tehran*, provides an eyewitness account of the crisis. She states that, “...we had completely excluded the MKO [MEK] and its members from participation in the embassy takeover.”<sup>26</sup>

The separation between the MEK and the groups that were involved at the Embassy is confirmed by the American scholar, David Farber, in his book *Taken Hostage*. He writes, “All the students involved were members of the Muslim Students Association... none of

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<sup>25</sup> Halliday, Fred, “Mujahidin’s Masud Rajavi: “We are the Only Real Threat to Khomeini.” The Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), March-April 1982 (No. 104).

<sup>26</sup> Ebtekar, Massoumeh, *Takeover in Tehran*, Talon Books 2000, Vancouver CA, p. 106.

the left-wing political groups were allowed to participate, nor were members of any of the other political factions that vied for power on campus. The leaders of the takeover called their group “Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam.”<sup>27</sup>

Perhaps even more important than these now-historical accounts from the past is the fact that for the last 25 years the MEK has demonstrated its commitment to principles of secular liberal democracy and asserted that its only true enemy is the clerical regime in Tehran.

An examination of the official publications of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI, the umbrella Iranian opposition coalition of which the MEK is a member) reveals the explicit commitment of these groups to such key principles of democracy as: separation of mosque and state; abolishment of all discrimination; freedom of expression and belief; guarantees for the freedom of the press and political parties; security for all citizens as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; an electoral process with universal suffrage; and equality for women and minorities.

### ***Suppression of Kurds***

The State Department 2004 *Country Report on Terrorism*, accuses the MEK of collaborating with Saddam Hussein to suppress Kurdish minorities in northern Iraq and the Shi'ites in southern Iraq when they rose up in revolt at the conclusion of the First Gulf War in 1991. This assertion has been widely debunked, however, by neutral third party observers as well as by Kurdish leaders themselves.

The IPC Task Force also conducted its own investigation of charges of MEK collaboration against the Kurds. The IPC collected statements from credible Iraqi sources and American military officers who served at Camp Ashraf, Iraq, in addition to holding direct discussions with current and former MEK members. The IPC findings confirm Iraqi and MEK denials of any such role by the MEK in suppression of the Kurdish people.

In 2002, Reuters obtained a document from a civil suit being conducted in the Netherlands testifying that the MEK had no part in Saddam's brutal operations against the Kurds. The document, signed by a principal Kurdish political official, said that, “(We) can confirm that the Mujahedin [sic] were not involved in suppressing the Kurdish people neither during the uprising nor in its aftermath. We have not come across any evidence to suggest that the Mujahedin have exercised any hostility towards the people of Iraqi Kurdistan.”<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, an independent investigation conducted by the International Educational Development/Humanitarian Law Project (a UN Roster NGO) decisively concluded that allegations about suppressing the Kurds were “false” and that there is “compelling

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<sup>27</sup> Farber, David, *Taken Hostage*, Princeton University Press, 2005, Princeton NJ, p.130.

<sup>28</sup> Jonathan Wright, “US Says Iraq-based Iran opposition Aids Iraq Govt” *Reuters* 5-22-02.

evidence” that they were propagated by agents of the Khamenei regime seeking to discredit the MEK.<sup>29</sup>

On multiple occasions, representative groups of Iraqis have stepped forward to attest to the mutual esteem that characterizes their relationships with the MEK. In August 2005, the Association of Independent Jurists for Defense of Human Rights in Iraq collected signatures from 1,000 Iraqi lawyers, who condemned the abduction on 4 August 2005 of two members of the MEK in Baghdad.

On 10 May 2005, a briefing called “Iraq’s Future: The Iranian Impact” was held in the U.S. Congress at the initiative of the House Iran Human Rights and Democracy Caucus, co-chaired by Congressmen Thomas Tancredo (R-CO) and Bob Filner (D-CA). The panel featured Dr. Sa’d Abdullah Al-Jabouri, the former governor of Iraq’s Diyala province, which borders Iran and is where Camp Ashraf is located. Dr. Al-Jabouri told the briefing session that 2.8 million Iraqis had signed a petition in support of the MEK, which called on the U.S. and European governments to remove the group from their lists of terrorist organizations.

Such a level of support for the MEK, from among Iraqis of all ethnic groups, including Kurds, is hard to imagine if allegations about an MEK role in suppression of the Kurds held any truth.

Also present at the May 2005 panel was Lt. Colonel (USA, ret.) Thomas Cantwell. He served as Battalion Commander with the 324<sup>th</sup> Military Police in Iraq. In 2003, Lt. Col. Cantwell directed the consolidation of the MEK members inside Camp Ashraf; he spoke of his experiences during the briefing, expressing his appreciation of the level of discipline and organization the MEK demonstrated during interactions with U.S. troops under his command. He noted with some amazement that their impressive level of cooperation followed a March 2003 air assault by U.S. and British forces against MEK camps, which killed and injured dozens of their members without a single shot being fired in self defense.

Finally, Saffi Yasseri, an Iraqi journalist who traveled in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, including the cities of Irbil, Kelar, Khaneqin and Suleimaniya, issued a May 2005 statement. It asserted that he personally conducted an opinion poll in various Kurdish villages in order to gauge the reaction of the people to the MEK. These citizens, according to Yasseri, “denied that the Mojahedin had any role in suppressing the Kurdish opposition.”<sup>30</sup>

### ***Cross-Border Attacks and Assassinations***

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<sup>29</sup> International Educational Development, UN Document # E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/NGO/55 “Implications of Humanitarian Activities for the Enjoyment of Human Rights” 8-22-95.

<sup>30</sup> Yasseri, Saffi, “Knowing the truth of Iranian Intelligence Ministry’s fabrication of lies about PMOI’s suppression of Iraqi Kurds during 1991 uprising.” May 27, 2005.

Although the MEK has not been involved in any violence against western targets, it has been involved in a long struggle to free Iran from the rule of its clerics. During that struggle, the record shows that the MEK attacked only regime military and security targets and has no history of attacking innocent civilians or other noncombatants. In fact, even the State Department *Country Reports on Terrorism* notes that the MEK had only targeted members of the clerical regime and its enforcement officers, particularly those who are in charge of interrogations and torture in the Iranian prison system.<sup>31</sup>

Although the MEK denies involvement, it is also accused of organizing the simultaneous protests outside of 13 Iranian embassies on April 5, 1992 that led to some vandalism. During the Iran-Iraq war, MEK forces also conducted traditional attacks against Iranian military forces from its camps in Iraq. Arguably, the MEK attacks against the clerical regime's leadership no more constitute terrorism than American attempts to takeout Saddam and his leadership apparatus at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Furthermore, the MEK's attacks in Iran provide no basis for its designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under the law adopted in the AEDPA. These attacks neither threaten American citizens nor do they threaten U.S. national security. The MEK in the past has attacked Iranian regime targets, not foreign citizens, and the MEK's attempts to bring democracy to Iran and depose the world's largest state sponsor of terror in fact support American national security objectives.

### ***Terrorist Capability and/or Intent***

Since 2001, the MEK has undertaken no violent attacks at all and has shifted its focus to generating publicity against the Iranian regime and in support of democracy for Iran. In a letter dated 24 Apr 2003, General Tommy Franks, U.S. Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, expresses his appreciation for the "cooperation [of the MEK] with Coalition Forces..."<sup>32</sup> Later, in 2004, the members of the MEK also agreed in a written contract with U.S. officials in Iraq to reject "participation in, or support for terrorism" and "violence." They furthermore agreed not to "unlawfully take up arms or engage in any hostile act."<sup>33</sup>

The AEDPA requires Foreign Terrorist Organizations to "engage(s) in" or "retain(s) the capability and intent to engage in terrorism or terrorist activity." But the IPC Task Force was unable to discover any evidence that the MEK targeted civilians or other noncombatants, or engaged in terrorism. Moreover, for the last four years, it has refrained from violent attacks altogether, invalidating the assertion that the MEK "engages in" terrorism or terrorist activity.

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<sup>31</sup> US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism*, 27 April 2005.

<sup>32</sup> Letter from General. Tommy R. Franks, General, USA to Mr. Muhammad Mohaddessin, Chair, Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran in Auvers-sur-Oise, France, 24 Apr 2003.

<sup>33</sup> Agreement for the Individuals of the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI); *see also* "Camp Ashraf," Multi-National Force—Iraq. Available online at *see also* the Letter from Major-General Geoffrey D. Miller (USA) to the "People of Ashraf, Ashraf, Iraq", dated July 21, 2004 in which he congratulates the residents of Camp Ashraf and notes that they "have signed an Agreement rejecting violence and terrorism."

In dealing with accusations of attacks against Americans, the United States Government recognizes that at least since the 1979 Revolution in Iran, the MEK has not been a threat to the United States. “The MEK conducted anti-Western attacks *prior to the Islamic Revolution* [emphasis added].”<sup>34</sup>

The IPC research concludes that the MEK neither engages in terrorism nor intends to do so. Even when Coalition forces attacked MEK camps in Iraq during March 2003, causing dozens of casualties, the members did not fire back. Eric Slater, writing in the *Los Angeles Times* on May 12, 2003, quotes Capt. Josh Felker, a U.S. Army spokesman, who told him that, “The MEK was never fighting Coalition forces.”

The 2004 State Department *Country Reports on Terrorism* also recognizes that, “After Coalition aircraft bombed MEK bases at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the MEK leadership ordered its members not to resist Coalition forces, and a formal cease-fire arrangement was reached in May 2003.”

Moreover, after voluntarily giving up all of its arms to U.S. forces in Iraq, completely renouncing terrorism and the unlawful use of force, and after all of its members have been officially cleared of allegations of terrorism and granted protected persons status, it is illogical to conclude that the MEK retains either the capability or the intent to engage in terrorism.

The MEK activities have not, and do not threaten American citizens, and the MEK opposition to the clerical regime in Tehran and support for democracy reinforce, rather than damage, U.S. national security. On no level does the MEK meet the definition of a “terrorist organization” under the AEDPA.

In any case, events of almost three decades ago are irrelevant to FTO list designation. The AEDPA requires that an organization engage in terrorism or terrorist activity to be included on the FTO list.

The MEK completely ceased all offensive military operations inside Iran by the end of 2001 as conceded in the 2004 State Department *Country Reports on Terrorism*. Since the launching of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 and the subsequent disarming of the MEK by the U.S. military, the MEK has not possessed any weaponry in over two full years.

### ***Accusation of “Cult”***

*“If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.”* Joseph Goebbels

The regime in Tehran deflects negative attention from its own atrocious human rights record by demonizing and caricaturizing the MEK, even going as far as accusing the MEK of being a major violator of human rights.

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<sup>34</sup> US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism*, 27 April 2005.

Reflecting the massive state resources that the Tehran regime devotes to vilifying the MEK, consider a report by the German Security Agency (Bfv), “The 1999 Annual Report of the Office for Protection of the Constitution.” It notes that the activities of the Iranian Intelligence Service (VEVAK) “focused on the political neutralization of opposition groups and their anti-regime activities. The ‘People’s Mujahiddin of Iran’ (MEK) and its political arm which is active worldwide, the...National Resistance Council of Iran, continued to be the focus of the intelligence interest of the Iranian intelligence service.”

Designation as an FTO deprives the MEK of fundraising capacity with which to counter regime accusations, leaving the MEK a victim of a well-funded, state-backed propaganda machine.

By frightening the Iranian population into believing that the MEK alternative is worse than the regime, Tehran attempts to deflect public animosity and guarantee its own survival. Such propaganda also targets liberal democracies, attempting to persuade them to hold off providing support to the MEK, in a typical case of, “Better the devil you know...”

In addition, the cult portrayal prompts western liberal democracies to seek out any regime opponents other than the MEK. As long as the opposition groups appear as “normal,” these governments may consider them as an alternative to the regime. Not easily finding such opposition groups, western governments may conclude that in the absence of viable opposition, it is better to continue their efforts to effect rapprochement with the regime.

As some scholars have documented, the policy of Iranian clerics is to “reverse the human rights situation in Iran by making the militant opposition organizations—especially the Mojahedin and the Kurdish groups,” out to be the principal *violators* of human rights in Iran.<sup>35</sup>

The “cult” accusation elicits particular resonance in the United States, because it conjures up very negative images like Charles Manson, David Koresh, Jim Jones, and the Hari Krishna. In the American lexicon, cults are associated with anti-social, weird, and self-destructive behavior.

A cult by definition is closed, insular, and imposes on its members a singular philosophy or ideology that typically is radically different from the thinking of mainstream society. A cult often forcibly closes members off from the outside world to ensure compliance, and usually involves, too, the enforced and unnatural adulation of the group leader (virtually always a man).

Dr. L.J. West, a foremost specialist on cults and who was Director of the Neuropsychiatric Institute at the University of California in Los Angeles stated that,

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<sup>35</sup> Afshari, Reza. *Human Rights in Iran: the abuse of cultural relativism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. p. 168



A cult is a group or movement exhibiting a great or excessive devotion or dedication to some person, idea or thing and employing unethically manipulative techniques of persuasion...<sup>36</sup>

In addition, West stresses that cults isolate themselves from the mainstream. In contrast to his definition, the MEK and the umbrella coalition of which it is a part consistently, actively, and ceaselessly reach out to the media, the public, and to democratic leadership among all the liberal democracies, but especially in Europe and in the United States. Its members write, travel, speak, and interact widely in an effort to bring the cause of freedom in Iran to public attention.

As documented in the IPC's June 30, 2005 White Paper, accusations like those levied by a May 2005 Human Rights Watch Report about supposed MEK human rights abuses, are without factual basis.

MEK and NCRI members are individuals who often sacrifice careers, a stable family life, and professional advancement in Iran to work together, many times in exile, to bring freedom to their country. If and when anyone decides it is not possible to do any more, or wishes to leave the group, that person is free to go. The organization typically provides substantial financial, logistical, and other assistance to the member and any family to aid departure and resettlement elsewhere.

During the April 2005 visit to NCRI headquarters in the Paris suburb of Auvers-sur-Oise, IPC Executive Director Clare Lopez participated in a luncheon meeting of the NCRI Committee Chairs—who, one and all, believed firmly in the mission of the group. But, men and women alike, did not hesitate to speak their opinions, which were as varied as their own backgrounds. It is worth noting here that around that table sat Jews, Christians, Muslims, Marxists, atheists, and at least one Zoroastrian.

And while NCRI president-elect Maryam Rajavi is highly respected and admired, there is nothing that remotely could be termed “adulation” in the regard the members display for her.

And concerning the canard about immolation supposedly ordered on behalf of Madame Rajavi, the IPC Task Force conducted extensive interviews with surviving family members. This research found no evidence that the NCRI or MEK ordered immolation and no evidence that the motivation was for “adulation.” Rather, their actions were to protest the Government of France decision to detain Madame Rajavi as a part of a deal with Tehran. Indeed, there is evidence that once she discovered the immolations, she was appalled and immediately pleaded for them to cease.

### ***Accusation of “Islamic-Marxism”***

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<sup>36</sup> West, L. J., & Langone, M. D. (1985). *Cultism: A conference for scholars and policy makers. Summary of proceedings of the Wingspread conference on cultism, September*, Weston, MA: American Family Foundation.

Another oft-repeated slur, the “Islamic-Marxist” label, invokes two among the worst *bêtes noires* of Western liberal democracies: *ihadis* on a rampage and totalitarian communism from the Cold War.

Iranian scholar, Afshin Matin-Asgari describes the term “Islamic Marxism” as an “ingenious polemical label” used by the regime in the 1970s to describe its most ardent enemies, e.g., Islamist and Marxist guerrillas and student activists, as well as a minority of clerics and seminarians.<sup>37</sup>

In pointed contrast to this characterization stands a work of philosophical thought, developed by the MEK’s foremost leader in the post-Revolutionary period, Massoud Rajavi. He developed an ideological framework for the MEK. An Iranian scholar, Syracuse University professor Mehrzad Boroujerdi, points to Rajavi’s work as “perhaps the best example of the Mojahedin’s ideological contemporaneity,” which can be found in the pages of *Tabiyn-e Jahan* (“Comprehending the World”), the organization’s foremost work on ideology. This book consists of a long series of lectures delivered in 1979 by Massoud Rajavi.

Organized as a set of pedagogical lectures, *Tabiyn-e Jahan* was intended to present the Mojahedin’s beliefs on the nature of human existence, history, and epistemology (Rajavi 1979, 1:11). The bulk of this three-volume book, however, is devoted to epistemology, as Rajavi presents a critique of the limitations of August Comte’s, Max Planck’s, and Kant’s positivism; William James’s pragmatism; Freudian psychoanalysis; Darwinian evolutionism; along with a host of other Western “isms” such as scholasticism, scientism, empiricism, and rationalism.

Rajavi saves his most extensive critical commentary for Marxist materialistic epistemology. The book’s chief target is the Russian biochemist Aleksander Ivanovich Oparin (1894-1980), whose materialistic theory on the origin of life, was first formulated in 1922. By subjecting the materialistic doctrines of Oparin and those of a host of other orthodox Marxist thinkers to a religious critique, the Mojahedin hoped to challenge the vigorous presence of Marxism within Iranian intellectual circles.

The Mojahedin remained skeptical of Marxism’s philosophical postulates and rejected the latter’s cardinal doctrine of historical materialism. They held firm to their beliefs in the existence of God, revelation, the afterlife, the spirit, expectation of the return of the 12<sup>th</sup> Imam, salvation, destiny, and the people’s commitment to these intangible principles.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Matin-Asgari, Afshin. 2004. *From social democracy to social democracy: the twentieth-century odyssey of the Iranian Left*. In: Cronin, Stephanie, editor. *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left*: London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p 37-64

<sup>38</sup> Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. *Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996. P. 117-119

In short, the Mojahedin not only challenged the materialistic philosophy of Marxism but also distanced themselves from the traditional interpretation of religion by the Islamist clergy.

### ***Conclusions: Legal Allegations***

The open source record relevant to the past history, current status, and future intention of the Iranian opposition group, the *Mujahedeen-e Khalq* (MEK), is rich in material from first-hand and knowledgeable sources. The Iran Policy Committee (IPC) Task Force, charged with researching and addressing the official allegations that have been levied against the MEK, in particular by the Department of State, found plentiful and credible information to guide the analysis.

In summary, the IPC finds that allegations against the MEK charging involvement in the killing of Americans in Iran in the 1970s, support for the Tehran Embassy seizure and hostage crisis, collusion with Saddam Hussein in suppression of the Kurds and Shi'ites, and launching of cross-border terrorist attacks against Iran are unsupported by the facts.

Understandable confusion about the diverse and shifting groups that opposed the Shah may, to some extent, account for official failure to distinguish between those guilty of murdering the American military officers and contractors in Iran and other groups (such as the MEK) that had nothing to do with these crimes.

The swirling chaos that surrounded the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in 1979 also served to confuse analysts and Embassy officials alike about the allegiances and identities of the radical students who actually carried out the assault and hostage-taking.

Disinformation campaigns by the clerical regime in Tehran are more likely to blame for the widespread acceptance of the fallacious charge that the MEK assisted Saddam Hussein to suppress Iraq's Kurdish and Shi'ite minorities in the wake of the First Gulf War.

The failure to discern clearly the nature and targets of MEK cross-border attacks on regime military, security, and intelligence targets inside Iran is less easy to understand but seems to reflect an official bureaucratic and intelligence community tendency to perceive established governments more favorably than their armed opposition, no matter the true characteristics of either.

The IPC's concerted effort to conduct research and analysis on these allegations and success in discovering a plethora of valid open sources that address them in an open-minded way prompts inquiry about why official investigators charged with responsibility for the FTO list have not done likewise.

At issue, finally, is the national security of the United States and how best to ensure its defense. Iran has been identified repeatedly by the Department of State as the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism; its pursuit of nuclear weapons jeopardizes not only

the Middle East peace process and the region but the stability of all of Iran's neighbors and beyond. The Islamist ideology of Tehran's clerical rulers demands violent expansion abroad and brutal repression at home.

In opposition to this regime stands the MEK—an organized, highly-motivated group of Iranian patriots who are committed to establishment of a secular, democratic republic in Iran that respects human rights, eschews nuclear weapons and terrorism, and lives in peaceful cooperation with its neighbors.

Removal of the MEK from the Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list is crucial to its ability to take charge of the effort to bring regime change to Iran so that the Iranian people can decide freely for themselves how best to organize their society. A delisted MEK should lead to an empowered Iranian people and a democratic Iran willing to live in peace with its neighbors.

President Bush made a promise when he spoke to Iranians everywhere during his State of the Union address in January 2005: “And to the Iranian people I say, as you stand for liberty, America stands with you.” It is time to fulfill that promise.

### ***Background on the MEK***

Founded in the 1960s by college students, the MEK participated in the 1979 revolution against the Shah, but later broke with the forces supporting Ayatollah Khomeini, who executed tens of thousands of its members and leaders.

The MEK soon occupied the central position in the opposition while the secular organizations became secondary and marginalized.<sup>39</sup> As one Iranian scholar writes, as a result of the class, cultural, academic, and professional developments, many of Iran's rising intelligentsia were attracted toward an egalitarian, progressive, and scientific interpretation of Islam, such as the one promoted by the Mojahdein. Theirs was an Islam interpreted not by the distant clergy, with their cryptic language, but by the students' and young professionals' own highly-educated and militant cohorts and colleagues.<sup>40</sup>

The Fedayeen-e Khalq and the Tudeh Party were keen to be the “legal Marxists;” their only concern was that the ruling party and Ayatollah Khomeini had rejected their suggestion of the formation of an anti-imperialist popular front.<sup>41</sup>

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39 Mirsepassi, Ali. 2004. The Tragedy of the Iranian Left. In: Cronin, Stephanie, editor. Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left: London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p 229-249.

40 Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996, p. 117-119

41 Mirsepassi, Ali. 2004. The Tragedy of the Iranian Left. In: Cronin, Stephanie, editor. Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left: London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. p 229-249.

Following the start of mass executions in June 1981, the MEK went underground, and many of its leaders fled to France from 1981 to 1986, after which the MEK took refuge in Iraq.

While in Iraq, the group formed an army equipped with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and field guns, and began to implement cross-border attacks against the Iranian regime. The MEK network in Iran also carried out military operations against the Revolutionary Guards and other government targets. The MEK represents a significant security threat to the Iranian regime and could continue to do so, were it released from its circumscribed status in Iraq.

### ***The MEK's Relationship with the U.S. Military in Iraq***

Months before the start of the 2003 War in Iraq, the United States' major concern was Iraq's eastern neighbor, and its perceived involvement in the conflict that might have complicated the situation in the region. Washington, therefore, offered to alleviate Iran's concerns by bombing and destroying the MEK, hoping to reach an accommodation with Iran in a post-Saddam Iraq.

Days after the start of U.S. bombing of Saddam's forces in late March and early April of 2003, Coalition planes heavily bombed nearly a dozen bases belonging to the MEK, killing dozens of fighters and wounding many more.

U.S. Special Forces worked out a ceasefire agreement with the MEK in April 15, 2003, once the MEK consolidated its forces in a few camps north of Baghdad. The United States decided in May 2003 to disarm the group, and confiscated 2,139 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, air defense artillery pieces, and miscellaneous vehicles formerly in the MEK's possession.

In August 2003, in what appeared to be a response to Iranian demands, the State Department acted to close down the offices of MEK associate groups in Washington.

Tehran has been particularly sensitive to the MEK activities inside Iran and abroad, signaling that it takes the dissident group most seriously. European governments and some U.S. administrations have used the MEK as bait to improve relations with Tehran. In a similar vein, the November 2004 European Union nuclear agreement with Iran includes an EU promise to treat the MEK as a terrorist group, which addressed Iran's security concerns.

Although it is difficult if not impossible to gauge accurately the level of support MEK enjoys in Iran, as demonstrated by the IPC research, this organization is indisputably the largest and most organized Iranian opposition group. There are nearly 3,800 of its members in Camp Ashraf, 60 miles north of Baghdad. Females constitute nearly a third of its rank and file.

As of September 2005, the State Department still listed the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization, despite calls for its removal from the list by many members of the U.S. Congress and others.

### ***MEK Relationship with Iraqis***

Since the fall of the Iraqi regime in April of 2003, the MEK has acted as one of the strongest *de facto* allies of the United States in Iraq, helping to improve the relationship between the United States and the Iraqi population. Iraqis have particularly been vulnerable to the Iranian religious, cultural, political, intelligence and military campaign against which the United States has had no serious counter balance.

By promoting a modern, democratic and tolerant view of Islam, the MEK has actively sought to ease tensions between the U.S. and the Iraqis. While many Iraqis, whom the United States helped gain power from the repressive Hussein regime, are now using the Iraqi police structure as a cover to attack the coalition forces and conduct kidnapping and killings, the MEK's role has been quite different: their continued support has been particularly helpful to U.S efforts to stabilize Iraq. According to a May 2003 news release from CENTCOM Headquarters, the MEK "significantly contributes to the Coalition's mission to establish a safe and secure environment for the people of Iraq."<sup>42</sup>

In meetings, seminars, and gatherings held in its main Camp Ashraf since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, thousands of Iraqi citizens, tribal and local leaders have supported the MEK's call for a secular and democratic society and demanded that Iran's influence in Iraq should be halted.

To cite just one example, on 21 June 2004, 50,000 people from across Iraqi society, including representatives of the Shi'a, Sunni, Kurd and Arab communities from 15 provinces came to Camp Ashraf to declare their support for the MEK. Dr. Abdullah Hassan Al-Jabouri, the then-Governor of Diyala Province, addressed the crowd, saying "As an official, I must say that we are united with the Mujahedin in our common goal of achieving democracy and freedom..."<sup>43</sup>

### ***MEK Capabilities***

Mujahedin-e Khalq as an organization and, by extension, its associated larger coalition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, possess major potential that has not been fully appreciated by the United States—much to the benefit of the Iranian regime.

With the rising threat of the Iranian regime, now elevated after the Ahmadinejad ascension to the presidency, the United States cannot afford to ignore the benefits that the MEK may provide once it is delisted.

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<sup>42</sup> CENTCOM News Release, "Coalition and Iraqi Police Work to Make Iraq Secure." May 17, 2003.

<sup>43</sup> "50,000 Iraqis in Ashraf declare support for PMOI's political presence in Iraq," the Iraqi *Ad-Dustour* daily, 21 June 2003. *See also*: "Thousands of Iraqis gather in Ashraf in support of PMOI," *AFP*, June 19, 2003.

The Tehran regime fears MEK capabilities more than those of any other Iranian entity. The MEK's FTO designation has deprived the USG of such benefits. The MEK has a trained, well-disciplined military force, capable of rearming itself, something that no other Iranian opposition group has. Camp Ashraf is a showcase of a vibrant society and cultural scene, a peaceful, self-governing community that functions according to democratic, humane principles, with gender equality, and a diversity of beliefs and ethnicities.

The MEK's ability to access and meet with national-level decision-makers in United States and Europe can help the administration unify the international community in favor of a decisive policy regarding Iran.

MEK is the only organization that has demonstrated the ability to mount large scale operations against the Iranian regime, organize demonstrations, and cause serious problems for the regime of the Iranian clerics. The ability to gather intelligence, otherwise unavailable, is unique to the MEK, which has proven most effective in exposing Iran's major nuclear sites, its missile capabilities, as well as its terror network worldwide.

The ability to recruit new members and cooperate with other dissident groups has been demonstrated in the MEK's contribution to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the largest and longest-lasting political coalition in Iran. A delisted MEK and NCRI would act as a catalyst for action and provide direction to an otherwise leaderless opposition.

The secular platform of the NCRI, as endorsed by the MEK, has provided guidance for the opposition in Iran. The NCRI's president, Maryam Rajavi, a Muslim woman, has led a generation of Iranian women to the most senior positions of responsibility, providing a sharp contrast to the misogynous mentality of the Iranian regime.

The MEK with its secular, tolerant and anti-extremist view of Islam can exert an impact across the Islamic world, but particularly in Iraq, where the Iranian regime has made inroads among Islamists with funding and sponsorship.

The MEK and its associate groups boast urbane, well-spoken, polished representatives who appear in striking contrast to Ahmadinejad's rough band of former security men. The MEK representatives are capable, highly-educated, professional, multi-lingual, persuasive, and personable.

MEK commitment to democratic principles, free and fair elections, equality of opportunity, free press, assembly, secular government, and protection for religion, minorities, and women will provide impetus and encouragement to Iraq, as well as to the surrounding region.

The MEK has extensive support among the bazaar merchants inside Iran. Many well-known bazaaris were murdered by the Iranian regime because of their financial and political support for the MEK.

### ***Delisting the MEK Serves U.S. National Security Interests***

In the final analysis, the IPC supports delisting of the MEK first and foremost because it would serve U.S. national security interests. This paper and earlier IPC white papers have described in extensive detail the nature and urgency of the threats posed by the aggressive clerical regime in Tehran, now in position to deploy its IRGC forces with a renewed mandate to pursue its extremist ideology.

Foremost among these threats is Iran's nuclear weapons program; support for transnational terrorism and the extremist terrorist groups fighting to prevent a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, increasingly brazen support for insurgent forces seeking to prevent stability in Iraq, and an unapologetically-appalling record of human rights abuses at home also contribute to regional instability, stoke popular discontent and pose a direct challenge to U.S. personnel and objectives in the Middle East.

U.S. goals for greater democracy, economic development and equal opportunity for all the people of the Middle East meet a particular focus, and challenge, in Iran. Empowerment of the Iranian people, who long to achieve these goals for themselves, would result in obvious benefits to themselves and provide a symbol of hope to their neighbors. Delisting of the MEK from the FTO list is the first step. That first step will trigger a number of positive outcomes.

- Delisting would reinforce the sincerity of President Bush's promise that America stands with the people of Iran in their struggle to liberate themselves and send a strong message to the Iranian people that America is on their side.
- Delisting would signal the unified resolution of the U.S. administration to support a policy of regime change in Tehran, thereby putting the clerical rulers on notice that a new option is now on the table, and that America is not limited to an infeasible military option or the failed diplomatic option. The Iranian regime would know that it faces an enabled and determined opposition on its borders; this will shift the attitude of the Ahmadinejad presidency from an offensive mode to a defensive one.
- A U.S. delisting of the MEK from the FTO list likely would be followed by a similar move on the part of the European Union (EU). The EU and especially the EU-3, which has been at the forefront of efforts to negotiate with Iran on the subject of its nuclear program, would benefit from the knowledge that a backup plan is now in place should their diplomatic initiatives reach a dead end. In the short term, such knowledge would bolster the negotiating position of the EU-3 with Iran, improving the chances of eliciting better cooperation from Tehran.



- Even more importantly, in the longer term, friends and allies would appreciate that the United States is taking the lead in demanding that Iran honor its obligations to the international community on nuclear issues. The likelihood is that they would follow this lead.
- Delisting likely would improve the ability of the MEK to collect more intelligence about Iran's nuclear program by encouraging more potential intelligence sources inside Iran to provide information. The outcome would certainly inhibit Tehran's efforts to move ahead with its nuclear weapons program.
- Also in the intelligence arena, delisting would serve to support an expansion of the MEK's intelligence network inside Iran on a variety of important collection requirements, including information about Iran's terrorist network throughout the Middle East, its support for terrorist groups in Iraq, and a more detailed understanding of the political situation in Iran, including leadership issues and popular sentiment. By creating doubt in the minds and commitment of lower level regime officials, the likelihood of defections to the camp of regime opponents would rise.
- In terms of the Iranian people themselves, enabling the MEK would help to energize the majority who are either undecided "fence-sitters" or heretofore have been uncommitted in the absence of an active policy in favor of regime change.
- Allowing the MEK to assume a role among leaders of pro-democracy groups in Iran shifts the financial and organizational responsibility for regime change from external entities to the Iranian people themselves and empowers the MEK and other opposition groups to play their rightful role in organizing anti-government demonstrations and other political activity among women, students, merchants and other groups naturally interested in regime change.
- The majority of Iranian clerics, who are not associated with the regime, and who are sympathetic to the MEK's secular Islamic ideas about government, would be encouraged to take a more positive attitude toward the U.S.; many MEK leaders come from families of prominent Ayatollahs. The ability to raise funds would also greatly assist the MEK to mount expanded satellite television and radio broadcasting into Iran and to develop an integrated publication and information program not only inside Iran, but abroad as well.
- The effects of delisting on U.S. and Coalition efforts to bring secure democratic development to Iraq can hardly be overstated. An Iranian government, IRGC, MOIS and other security services suddenly thrown on the defensive would be forced to scale back their current large scale assistance to terrorist and insurgent forces inside Iraq (as well as those perpetrating terrorist attacks against Israel).
- Other pro-Iranian groups, such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its armed militia wing, the Badr Corps, would have to adopt a

lower profile in southern Iraq, permitting the forces of federalism, integration, moderation and democracy to advance there. Iraqi Shi'ites would be encouraged to behave more moderately if their principal sponsor in Tehran were threatened; by the same token, Iraqi Sunnis would be able to join the political process more easily and with enhanced prospects for meaningful participation once the Shi'ites adopt a less entitled attitude.

- Additionally, empowerment of the MEK would allow it to officially operate as a legitimate opposition group in Iraq, thereby providing a cultural, political and religious counter-weight to the rising tide of Islamist extremism there, much of which is funded and sponsored by Tehran. This positive effect would aid the U.S.'s efforts to strengthen the position of moderate forces overall in Iraq, sending a signal to radical Iranian proxy groups in Iraq that their efforts are not welcome.
- Regionally, and especially among the Gulf States, the signal would go out that small, weak neighboring countries do not have to put up with Tehran's bullying pressures and destabilization operations anymore.
- In the United States, delisting would allow the MEK and its associated larger coalition of the NCRI to open offices, organize the American-Iranian community in line with U.S. government efforts to spread democracy in the Middle East and to establish a representative government in Iran.
- Once the MEK is no longer an officially-designated "terrorist organization," the United States could turn to a decision about whether to return the MEK's weapons, confiscated at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which would relieve the American military of its current responsibility for the protection of MEK camps and personnel.

### ***Conclusions: Delisting of the MEK Supports U.S. National Security***

This list of potential benefits to removing the MEK from the FTO list is impressive—and all the more so as it is merely suggestive and hardly comprehensive. It is clear that many of the most important national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States are engaged in the Middle East in general and in Iraq and Iran in particular. It is not often that a single administrative decision can affect so much that is at stake in a region as is the case with delisting the MEK. This is an opportunity the United States cannot afford to miss. The chances for freedom and democracy in Iran as well as U.S. national security are riding on this issue.

# Appendix Documents

## **Appendix A: Methodology and Content Analysis of Iranian Opposition Groups**

### **Appendix B: US-MEK Interaction After the 2003 War in Iraq**

- A) US says Iran opposition in Iraq agrees to disarm, AFP, May 10, 2003
- B) Letter from General Tommy Franks to Mr. Mohammad Mohaddessin, Chair of the National Council of Resistance of Iran Foreign Affairs Committee, April 28, 2003
- C) Statement issued by CENTCOM on May 17, 2003

### **Appendix C: Allegation of the Murder of Americans in Iran**

- A) Iran Says Guerilla Trained in Cuba, Washington Post, May 11, 1976
- B) US Men Killed in Ambush, Washington Post, May 22, 1975
- C) Iran Kills Man Accused in Slaying of Three Americans, Washington Post, November 18, 1976
- D) MEK Logo/Marxist Statements on Killing of Americans

### **Appendix D: MEK and the United States**

- A) Judge criticizes CSIS, Crown over siege trial, Ottawa Citizen, September 10, 1994
- B) Iran US MKO, BBC World, June 5, 1998
- C) U.S. extends restrictions on Iranian opposition, Reuters, October 14, 1999
- D) National Security Archive Document, Threat Analysis Group, June 14, 1979

### **Appendix E: MEK and Iraq**

- A) Excerpts from Congressional Briefing by Iran Human Rights and Democracy Caucus Hon. Tom G. Tancredo (Extensions of Remarks - May 19, 2005)
- B) Iranian Influence, The Washington Times, May 12, 2005

### **Appendix F: MEK Positions**

- A) Middle East Research and Information Project, Interview with Masood Rajavi, March-April 1982
- B) Copy of the NCRI Constitution.

### **Appendix G: MEK and the Kurds**

- A) Saffi Yasseri's Statement, May 27, 2005
- B) United National Economic and Social Council, Implications of Humanitarian Activities for the Enjoyment of Human Rights, August 22, 1995
- C) US says Iraq-based Iran opposition aids Iraq govt., Reuters News, May 23, 2002

## Appendix A: Methodology and Content Analysis of Iranian Opposition Groups

### Quantitative Analysis of Iranian Opposition Groups

10 September 2005

#### Coding Notes: A Measure of Intensity

The project codes intensity from statements. Using the Islamic Republic News Agency archives, the search was done on various opposition groups, including those who favor regime change as well as those working within the system. Various keywords such as “MKO”<sup>1</sup> or IIPF were used in IRNA from 1 January, 2005 – 5 September, 2005. This study rates the statements according to intensity of dislike/disfavor shown by the regime in Tehran towards the MKO on a scale of 1-5.

- **Key Words:** Three coders individually reviewed the statements after agreeing to the basic key phrases and terms that would trigger an automatic score. See the key words and terms below.
- **Exceptions:** Notations were made where there was disagreement on the rating of the statements among the three coders.
- **Context:** In addition each statement was rated in reference to the context in which it was made. Some sentences and situations did not reflect the seriousness and intensity of the actual situation.

#### Key Words

Rating Structure:

Ratings applied when key terms and ideas were used.....

- 1 -- **Highly Favorable:** The quotation presents the organization in a very positive light, using substantial praise for the organization or its actions.
- 2 -- **Somewhat Favorable:** The quotation has a positive connotation but stops short of actual praise for the organization or its actions. (Groups, leaders or activities linked with support for more government reform, accountability, etc..)
- 3 – **Neutral:** The quotation reports the activities of the organization without assigning any value judgment, either out rightly or connotatively.
- 4 -- **Somewhat Negative/Unfavorable:** The quotation implies negative things about the organization, or uses mildly negative terminology. The groups were simply mentioned as “banned” “illegal”, or accused of causing disturbances and other types of unrest. etc.
- 5 -- **Highly Negative/Highly Unfavorable:** The organization is directly condemned in the quotation. Any references or comparisons to “terrorists”, “terror”, “terrorism”, “al-Qaeda”, etc. = 5 (e.g., the “Terrorist MKO”). Using multiple pejoratives (e.g., “notorious”, “dangerous”, “grouplet”). Any references to “kill”, “death”, “destruction”, etc. (e.g., “Death to the Hypocrites”)

The other illegal opposition groups really do not show up on the regime’s radar screen – they are simply not considered serious threats and are not important enough to denigrate in the eyes of the current regime.

#### IRNA Archives Search Parameters:

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<sup>1</sup> Initially the term “MEK” or “Khalq” and/or variants of “Mujahedin” were used to search for statements. These terms yielded few statements by decision-makers in Iran about the MEK. Once the term “MKO” (the favored term used by the Iranian government) was used over 58 stories referencing the MKO were found.

IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency)

[http://www.irna.ir/index.php?option=com\\_newssearch&Itemid=243&lang=en](http://www.irna.ir/index.php?option=com_newssearch&Itemid=243&lang=en)

Time Period: Jan. 1 2005-Sept. 5 2005

- Keyword search: MKO  
Hits: 58
- Keyword search: IIPF  
Hits: 31
- Keyword Search: “ Freedom Movement “  
Hits: 8
- Keyword Search: “ Reza Pahlavi “  
Hits: 0
- Keyword Searches: RWOI; “ Revolutionary Workers Party ”  
Hits: 0
- Keyword Searches: Fedaian Organizaton; “ Fedaian ”  
Hits: 0
- Keyword Searches: National Front; “ National Front ”  
Hits: 0
- Keyword Searches: “Office for the Strengthening Unity”; “ Strengthening Unity ”/ “Tahkim”/ “  
Vahdat”/ “ Consolidation of Unity”  
Hits: 0

These IRNA articles mentioning the terms MKO, IIPF, or FMI were then combed for statements regarding these groups. Each story was broken down into statements while still attempting to keep the idea in context. From 1 January, 2005 through 5 September, 2005, 173 statements were found with mentioning these opposition groups. The MEK had 121 statements (contained in 58 articles) about the MEK that were found in the IRNA database. The IIFP had 44 statements (from 31 articles), the FMI had 8 statements (from 8 articles), while the Monarchists/Reza Pahlavi and the Marxist/Leninist groups as well as others were not mentioned at all.

These statements were then coded using a 1-5 scale of favorability/unfavorability. The averages of each group were taken in order to demonstrate the relative measure of dislike and attention given to various Iranian opposition groups. Only the MEK scores exceedingly high on both the amount of attention it receives and the negativity of that attention. While the IIFP does receive a fair amount of press time it must be mentioned that it is considered a legitimate opposition group operating from within the current political system.

In order to analyze the clerical regime’s attitude towards the MEK and other resistance groups, we conducted a content analysis of all the articles referring to opposition groups in the regime’s global news agency: the Islamic Republic News Agency.

This study gave us insight into how the clerical regime in Tehran views these resistance groups. From the number of times the regime mentions a specific group, we can hypothesize that dealing with that group is on the regime’s agenda. Clearly, if a group is important or troublesome, it will receive more attention than one

who is marginal or unimportant. In this regard, it is remarkable to note that the MEK is the topic of discussion over 230% more than all of the other resistance groups *combined*. But not only is the MEK apparently on the minds of the Iranian regime, the clerics are also clearly worried about the MEK. Across the board, the MEK averages an antipathy score of 4.7 out of a 5 point score, whereas the next closest group scores only a 3.0, which qualifies as neutral.

IPC conducted a companion study using Farsi Language websites of the Iranian regime, Fars News Agency and Baztab website. In the Farsi websites, the MEK and related names appear 136 times. The next closest groups—Islamic Iran Participation Front—headed by the brother of Iran’s former president Khatami, appears only 25 times. The MEK groups average an antipathy score of 4.17 out of a 5 point score, whereas the next closest group scores only a 2.5, which qualifies as marginally favorable.

This demonstrates that the regime is going out of its way to attack the MEK and try to condemn it. Of all of the resistance groups in Iran, the only one that seems to be getting any serious attention and provoking fear and anger in the regime is the MEK.

## Opposition Groups of Iran


The number of references to opposition groups in Iran on the government run Iranian Republic News Agency (IRNA) between 1 January, 2005 and 5 September, 2005. The statements were then ranked according to their intensity: (1) being the *Most Favorable*, (2) being *Favorable*, (3) being *Neutral*, (4) being *Unfavorable* and (5) being *Most Unfavorable*.

### Mojahadin-e-Khalq (MEK/MKO)

Number of References: 121

Average Intensity Rating: 4.736

- 1 = 0
- 2 = 0
- 3 = 3
- 4 = 26
- 5 = 92



### Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF)

Number of References: 44

Average Intensity Rating: 2.363


1 = 7

2 = 15

3 = 21

4 = 1

5 = 0



**Freedom Movement of**

**Iran (FMI)**

Number of References: 8

Average Intensity Rating: 3

1 = 0


2 = 2

3 = 3

4 = 2

5 = 0

**Regime Statements:  
Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI)**



**Marxist/Leninist Groups (including Revolutionary Workers of Iran)**

Number of References: 0

Average Intensity Rating: 0

1 = 0

2 = 0

3 = 0

4 = 0

5 = 0

**Reza Pahlavi (Monarchists)**

Number of References: 0

Intensity Rating: 0

1 = 0

2 = 0

3 = 0

4 = 0

5 = 0



## Appendix B: US-MEK Interaction After the 2003 War in Iraq

Copyright 2003 Agence France Presse  
Agence France Presse -- English  
May 10, 2003 Saturday

SECTION: International News

LENGTH: 624 words

HEADLINE: US says Iran opposition in Iraq agrees to disarm

BYLINE: STEPHEN COATES

DATELINE: NORTHEASTERN IRAQ, May 10

US forces struck a disarmament deal here Saturday with the Iraq-based Iranian armed opposition, a group listed as a terrorist organisation in the United States, a US general told AFP.

The People's Mujahedeen's thousands of guerrilla fighters and heavy weapons are to assemble in camps in Iraq under the control of the US-led coalition, said General Ray Odierno, commander of the US Army's 4th Infantry Division.

"It is not a surrender. It is an agreement to disarm and consolidate," Odierno said after winding up two days of talks with the group, which has been termed a terrorist organisation by the US State Department, the European Union and Iran.

Speaking at a Mujahedeen base near the Iranian border, the general said they appeared to be committed to democracy in Iran and their cooperation with the United States should prompt a review of their "terrorist" status.

"I would say that any organisation that has given up their equipment to the coalition clearly is cooperating with us, and I believe that should lead to a review of whether they are still a terrorist organisation or not," he said.

The Mujahedeen's 4,000 to 5,000 fighters -- many of whom were educated in the United States and Europe -- would gather at one camp in Iraq while their equipment, including scores of tanks, would be collected at another, Odierno said.

Both camps would be guarded by coalition forces and the weapons would not be available to the Mujahedeen "unless we agree to allow them to have access", the general said.

The fighters, including a large number of women, would not be categorised as prisoners of war but they would be under "coalition control." Their status would be decided by Washington at a later date.

They are likely to face brutal retribution if they are repatriated to Iran,

while asylum in the United States could fuel charges of double standards in the US fight against terrorism.

The People's Mujahedeen was supported by Saddam Hussein's regime as a buffer against Iranian influence in Iraq, and could provide US forces with valuable information about the former Iraqi leadership and pro-Iranian militia groups in the region.

Asked what role they could play in the future of Iraq, Odierno said only that they shared similar goals to the United States in "forming democracy and fighting oppression" and that they had been "extremely cooperative."

Mujahedeen officials refused to comment publicly about the agreement, but one officer said the group had no quarrel with the United States and had not fired a shot at coalition forces during the war to topple Saddam's regime.

A "ceasefire" deal was agreed last month after the United States bombed some of the Mujahedeen's camps in Iraq.

US and Mujahedeen troops have mingled cordially during the discussions here over the past two days, although the US military was taking no chances with regular overflights by F-15 bombers and Apache attack helicopters.

Washington's dialogue with the Mujahedeen has infuriated Iran, which has accused the United States of hypocrisy in its "war on terror".

Also known by its Persian name Mujahedeen-e Khalq, the group has mounted major attacks inside Iran and has been fighting to overthrow the clerical regime in Tehran since shortly after it seized power.

Washington and Tehran do not have formal diplomatic relations, and US President George W. Bush labelled Iran as part of an "axis of evil" last year along with Saddam's Iraq and communist North Korea.

US officers are concerned that if the group is rendered powerless, rival guerrillas from the Badr Brigade, the Iran-based military wing of the main Iraqi Shiite faction, will gain influence in the region.

smc/kir/wai

Iraq-US-Iran-opposition-militia

LOAD-DATE: May 11, 2003



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD  
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

28 APR 2003

CCJ5

Mr. Mohammad Mohaddessin  
Chair, Foreign Affairs Committee  
National Council of Resistance of Iran  
17 rue de Gorde  
95430 Auvers-sur-Olas France

Dear Mr. Mohaddessin:

Thank you for writing and expressing your concerns about Iranian actions against the Mojahedin and the Iranian Resistance in Iraqi territory. Factional violence in Iraq must stop and interference in Iraq from neighboring countries, such as Iran, is not welcome. Coalition Forces are doing everything possible to instill a peaceful environment in Iraq for all the people living there.

Your letter of April 18, 2003 has been forwarded to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. Douglas Feith. The issues you have raised will be considered at the national level.

I appreciate your cooperation with Coalition Forces and encourage it to continue during this critical phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Please report any further attacks immediately to the local Coalition Force commander for his adjudication.

Sincerely,

*Tommy R. Pranks*  
TOMMY R. FRANKS  
General, USA



# NEWS RELEASE

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

7115 South Boundary Boulevard

MacDill AFB, Fla. 33621-5101

Phone: (813) 827-5894; FAX: (813) 827-2211; DSN 651-5894

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May 17, 2003

Release Number: 03-05-57

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

COALITION AND IRAQI POLICE WORK TO MAKE IRAQ SECURE (May 17, 2003)

CAMP DOHA, Kuwait -- Coalition Forces continue to aggressively patrol to make Iraq safer for all Iraqis by eliminating smuggling and trade in weapons and explosives. Coalition forces also continue to conduct training and joint security patrols with Iraqi police in efforts to increase the professionalism of the police force and prepare them for their role in a self-governed Iraq.

**Update on the Consolidation of the Mujahedin-E Khalq (MEK):**

Coalition forces have consolidated 2,139 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, air defense artillery pieces and miscellaneous vehicles formerly in the possession of the Mujahedin-E Khalq (MEK) forces. The 4th Infantry Division also reports they have destroyed most of the MEK munitions and caches. The voluntary, peaceful resolution of this process by the MEK and the Coalition significantly contributes to the Coalition's mission to establish a safe and secure environment for the people of Iraq.

## Appendix C: Allegation of the Murder of Americans in Iran

### Iran Says Guerrilla Trained in Cuba

By William Branigin Special to The Washington Post

*The Washington Post* (1974-Current file); May 11, 1976; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Washington Post (1877 pg. A9)

# Iran Says Guerrilla Trained in Cuba

By William Branigin

Special to The Washington Post

TEHRAN — Iranian authorities say that two alleged terrorists killed recently in a gun battle with police were Communists who had received guerrilla training in Cuba and two other unnamed countries.

The "terrorists," identified as Garsivaz Broumand and Khosrow Safaie, were fatally shot May 4 when police raided their hideout in Tehran, according to a government communique.

Their deaths bring to at least 31 the number of alleged terrorists executed or slain in shootouts with police in Iran this year.

The government statement said Broumand had taken a six-month course in Cuba nine years ago and that

Safaie, a member of Iran's outlawed Tudeh Communist Party, had been trained in two foreign countries.

Most of the terrorists killed previously in Iran have been identified by Iranian authorities as belonging to an "Islamic Marxist" organization responsible for killing at least 30 persons, including three American colonels, and wounding more than 70 others in assassinations, gun battles and bombings over the past three years.

According to a confession by a gang member before he was executed recently, the Iranian leaders of the Islamic Marxists received training and instructions from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, led by George Habash.

Iranian authorities say the

latest casualties in the Islamic, Marxist gang includes a man killed by a grenade he tried to throw at police and three persons, including a woman, who were slain in a shootout with security forces last month.

In January, nine terrorists convicted of murdering the three American colonels and five Iranians, including a general, were executed by firing squad.

The leader of the group, Vahid Afrakhten, told a Westerner allowed to see him shortly before his execution that the gang had plotted to kill U.S. Ambassador and former CIA director Richard Helms and the Shah of Iran. Afrakhteh said security surrounding both men was too tight.

Afrakhteh said he person-

ally killed Col. Lewis Hawkins in Tehran in 1973 and led the cell that gunned down Col. Paul Shaffer and Lt. Col. Jack Turner after stopping their chauffeur-driven car in 1975.

He said most of his immediate superiors were Iranians who still at large and who have close links with the Marxist Habash group.

Iranian authorities recently publicized a pamphlet that they said showed the connection between the Habash group and Iranian "subversives." They said it contained pictures of executed Iranian terrorists and an article signed by Habash supporting guerrilla activities in Iran and Oman, where the Shah's troops have been helping local forces fight Marxist rebels.

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## U.S. Men Killed in Ambush

By Andrew Borowiec Special to The Washington Post

*The Washington Post* (1974-Current file); May 22, 1975; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Washington Post (1877 - 1 pg. A1

# U.S. Men Killed in Ambush

## Iran Leftists Gun Down Two A.F. Officers

By Andrew Borowiec

Special to The Washington Post

TEHRAN, May 21—Left-wing opponents of the Iranian government struck at the American military presence in this country today, killing two senior U.S. Air Force officers in a daring ambush.

A clandestine group calling itself the Iranian People's Fighter Organization claimed credit for the attack, which it said was an act of reprisal for the government's execution of "innocent prisoners."

An official government statement charged that the attack was inspired from abroad and promised to track down the culprits. Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda promptly conveyed condolences to the victims' families.

The dead were Col. Paul Shaffer, 45, of Dayton, Ohio, and Lt. Col. Jack Turner, also 45, of Carbondale, Ill. Both officers were married; Shaffer had two children and Turner had three.

According to an embassy statement, the two officers were being driven to work in the northern section of Tehran when the ambush took place. A car blocked the path of their vehicle while another rammed it from behind. Three gunmen surged out, shouted at the Iranian driver of the American car to lie down and opened fire at point-blank range. Then they drove off in a third car, leaving a propaganda leaflet behind with the two dead officers in the bloodstained car.

The leaflet was promptly seized by the investigating authorities. Six hours after the attack, an anonymous woman called reporters with a message she said was from those who arranged the ambush.

"In the presence of the traitor shah the Iranian revolutionaries are being executed," she read over the telephone in a trembling voice. "What we did this morning was in response to the shah's action against innocent prisoners. We are not going to leave the atrocities of the traitor shah without response."

The statement was apparently a reference to the shooting of nine prisoners last month as they were being transferred from one prison to another. An official statement at the time said the nine were mowed down when they tried to escape.

A government statement after the ambush said that the "evil inspiration" for the act came "from outside Iran's borders and serves anti-Iranian interests."

In 1972 U.S. Air Force Gen. Harold L. Price was wounded; the next year U.S. Army Col. Louis Hawkins was fatally shot. Both were members of the U.S. advisory group in Iran.

The United States now has almost a thousand military men assigned in Iran. There are 18,000 Americans living in Iran, a nation of 30 million.

[In Washington, Pentagon sources said Shaffer was the director of the plans and policy section, and that Turner was on the personnel staff of the AID mission, UPI reported. The sources said neither man was involved in intelligence work.

[For the last two years Iran has been the principal foreign buyer of American weapons. Last year the shah ordered \$3.8 billion worth of weapons

See IRAN, A26, Col. 6

# 2 U.S. Officers Killed in Tehran

IRAN, From A1

or 45 per cent of all the arms the United States sold that year.]

The Iranian People's Fighter Organization consists mainly of small terrorists cells. It is believed to be on the fringes of the country's timid opposition, which primarily expresses itself through student protests. Today's ambush is not expected to have wide-ranging repercussions in Iran.

A Marxist-anarchist underground has been active in Iran for several years. About 200 members of the underground have been killed in battles with the police or executed by firing squads. The shah said during his recent visit to Washington that about 3,000 of them are in jail. Iranian students held several protest demonstrations during the shah's visit.



COL. PAUL R. SHAFFER, LT. COL. JACK J. TURNER  
... Air Force officers were victims of terrorists in Tehran.

# Iran Kills Man Accused In Slaying of 3 Americans

TEHRAN, Iran, Nov. 17 (UPI)—Security police have shot and killed the man who masterminded the August slayings of three American civilians on a Tehran street, officials announced today.

The announcement said Bahran Aram was killed in a police shootout on a downtown Tehran street yesterday. Two other guerrillas also were killed in an intensified 10-day campaign to rid Tehran of terrorists, the announcement said. Seven suspected guerrillas were arrested and a large amount of arms and explosives confiscated during the campaign, police said.

According to police, Aram directed

the morning rush-hour attack on an automobile carrying three U.S. employees of Rockwell International.

The three Americans killed — William Cottrell, 43, Robert Krongard, 44, and Donald Smith, 43—were all Californians.

Since the attack, Americans in Iran, particularly those working on sensitive defense contracts, have taken special precautions while traveling in the city.

The three dead Americans had been working on Project Ibex, an electronics system capable of surveillance of neighboring countries, including parts of the Soviet Union.





## اجرای حکم انقلابی اعدام مستشاران امریکائی

### این است پاسخ مابه کشتار وحشیانه فرزندان انقلابی خلق در زندانهای شاه جنایتکار

در ساعت ۱۰ و ۶ دقیقه با اعداد روز چهارشنبه ۲۱ اردیبهشت ۷۵ همزمان با بازگشت شاه جنایتکار از سانر ت  
توسط آمیتر به آمریکا حکم انقلابی اعدام ۲ تن از مستشاران تجارز کار آمریکائی در ایران " سرهنگ شفر " و " سرهنگ  
دوم ترنر " توسط بنه و متحد از روزندگان " سازمان مجاهدین خلق ایران " اجرا گردید . انقلابیون ما سر حالیکه از دو طرف  
راه را بر انحصار حامل سرهنگان بسته بودند . بر روی آنها آتش گشودند . این دو مورد در اثر آشنایی مجاهدین در  
دم گشته شدند . راننده ایرانی دو سرهنگ تجارز کار که دستورات فر ماندهی عملیات جنین بر عهده ملاحظت در ظاهر زندگان  
ما را بطریق اطاعت نموده بود . بدین اینکه کوچکترین آسویی بهینند بر صحنه عملیات سالم بر جای ماند . بدین ترتیب  
ما بار دیگر ثابت کردیم که گلوله های ما تنها صیقل نیروهای اشتراکگر و تجارز کار یعنی دشمنان خلق را نشان خواهد گرفت .  
عده ای از مردم و به خصوص تعدادی از کارگران سلفندان که در آن حدود مشغول کار بودند در صحنه عمل جمع شده و  
آهنگرا از اعدام تجارز کاران آمریکائی بدست پیششاران انقلابی خلق را قی منمودند . رقص ما چهارا اطمینان از جویشت  
عمل و پیش اعلامیه های توضیحی در میان مردم با نراهای " مرگ بر شاه جنایتکار " " مرگ بر امپراتور امریکسا "  
استاد و مدارک کپی دو سرهنگ آمریکائی به نفع انقلاب صادره شد که در فرصت مناسب معتمادات آن اقبلا خواهد شد .

Figure 1. Statement by Marxist opportunists on the assassination of American military attachés in Tehran, 22 May 1975. Quranic verse has been deleted from the Mojahedin emblem.

## چرا صحنه ران نظامی آمریکا را اعدام کردیم ؟

این دو سنسار معدوم از جمله بیست هزار نظامی شجاع آمریکایی بودند که ایستادگی در سپهر ما به کیندن خون مردم زحمتکی ما و حفظ وحدت رژیم دیکتاتوری شاه چنانچه شریفیست . و مملکت سرکوب خونین و خفقان بی حدی را که از طرف دستگاههای پاپیست نظامی شاه بر خلق ما احاطه میدادند ، رهبری می کنند .

اعدام این سرشناسان امریالیست آمریکایی مقصود ما به انتقام خون و فرزند دلاور خلق : شهید معتمد چهره انزلی ، شهید احمد جلیل افشار ، شهید عزیز صریدی ، شهید بهمن جلیلی ، شهید حسن ضیاء طریقی ، شهید کاظم نوری ، شهید مصطفی جوان خوشدل ، شهید شعوفی گلشنی و شهید عباس سوکری صورت گرفت این انقلابی که هر یک از سالها پیش در زندان و در اسارت جلاوران شاه قرار داشتند در روز ۳۰ فروردین ۵۷ بهمت از تعلق شکنجه های وحشیانه در مخیمات ساوان - شهرانی بدستور شاه خونخوار ، این نوکر سرحدود امریالیستهای آمریکایی ، با دستهای پستی - خدای رگبار مسلطهای آمریکایی - اسرائیلی قرار گرفتند و آشکارا پلیس وحشی شاه به شرمناکه اسفا کرد که آنها در حال فرار کشته شدند .

اعدام این دو آمریکایی تجار کار از طرف سازمان ما پاسخ روشن و برگشت ناپذیر بر خلق رنجده بهد و زیر ستم مسلمان است به دیکتاتوری شاه رژیم پهلوی ، پاسخ آشکار است به رژیم مست نشاند و اربابان آمریکایی او ، که دیگر فارتگر چپا و ظلم و ستمی حد آنها تحمل نخواستند . این عملیات نشان داد که خلق ما به هیچ وجه در مقابل فشار و شکنجه های حیوان صفتانه ای که بر هزاران رزقده اسیر در صیاحوانهای سازمان و شهرانی وارد میشود ساکت نخواهند شد .

تصمت خلق ما تحمل نخواستند که بهترین فرزندان مبارز هر ریز به بهانه ای بعد از شکنجه های طولانی و مستمر به رگبار مسلسل بسته شوند تا امریالیستهای آمریکایی و نوکران دریای آنها با خیال راحت به جهانی وفارت ایران بگردانند .

ایستادگی ما در زیر رگبار مسلطهای آمریکایی رژیم ، در زیر ضربات شلاق سازمان اشدت شاه و در زیر ظلم و استعمار بی حسد امریالیستهای آمریکایی و نوکران دشمن آنها ناله نمیکند ، او بهر خونین خویش را بلنه میکند و صلاح بر روش میگرد خلق ما راه پدست آوردن آزادی راهی که خلق کبیر و ستام و کابوچ و لائوس پیروز شده اند ، یعنی راه فرار دادن تهر انقلابی در مقابل تهر ضد انقلابی ، فرار دادن قدرت انقلاب در مقابل قدرت ضد انقلاب و پیش رفتن تا نابودی کامل دشمن را یعنی آخرت است .

## عکس العمل دستگاه تبلیغاتی رژیم شاه چه بود ؟

پس از اعدام این دو سنسار رژیم که از جهات متعدد تحت فشار قرار گرفته بود طریق تبلیغاتی های فراوانی را پیشرو نمودند ، یعنی توطئه حکومت ادا دادند .

تبلیغاتی های شاه یعنی دستگاههایی که خبر اعدام رژیم کینه مشترک ساوان - شهرانی سررتیب زندی بود راه تنها در چند سطر و به شکل تعلیم آموز در صفا حواصت نوشت بودند اخبار تلخ شدند تمام دستگاه سرخ پرانگی تبلیغاتی شان را بکار اندازند تا به خیال خودشان با تعریف جریانات از تاثیرات وسیع این عمل انقلابی بنگاهند .

در مقابل ارباب رژیم خود به لایه و زاری افتاد و دانشا قیل نسکیر کردن انقلابی را میدهند و وانمود میکنند که خطایات اخیر تنها توسط چهار نفر صورت گرفته که صحت آنها نیز شلخته شده و ضمن ریزها دستگیر خواهند شد .

عکس العمل مذکورانه بار دیگر از یک طرف آشکارا خلفان تبلیغاتی رژیم را به نمایش گذارد و از طرف دیگر نشان داد که چگونه شاه که حاضر است به جسد خد نکوگران گامه لبستی چنین سررتیب زندی بود مانند سگ مرده لنگ برتد مجبور است در مقابل اربابان آمریکایی این جنازه سرشناسان را بر سر پیکار و از آنها به خاطر ضد تبلیغاتی فراوانی ! که کرده اند تجلیل به عمل آورد .

## رزم شاه جهانگیر آمریکا را در هند و چین

### بر دوش خلفای منطقه تحویل میگردد

امپریالیستهای جاپانگزار آمریکایی که به دنبال شکست های ضعیفانه و غرور کننده ای در ویتنام ، کامبوج و لائوس از جنوب شرقی آسیا لغزاج شده اند اکنون قصد دارند با تحکیم رزم های ارتجاعی و وابسته در غرب آسیا خصوصاً با تحکیم موقعیت رزم ارتجاعی شاه خائن در ایران موضع سلطه طلبانه و مغزترکانه خود را در خلیج فارس و اقیانوس هند حفظ کنند . از نظر امپریالیستهای منطقه خلیج و اقیانوس هند هم بدلیل اوجگیری مبارزات انقلابی خلقهای آن و انعکاس ضربه سرکوبی ر ضد چین به امپریالیزم در این قسمت از آسیا و هم بدلیل وابستگی ریزانیزی که اقصاء بحرانی رزم سرمایه داری جهانی به دستخاستر عظیم زیر زمینی و سود ناشی از استثمار و استثمار خلقهای این منطقه دارد . هر ریزه پتاز پیش امیت ریزه ای می باید . به بین جهات از هم اکنون و در آینده همه فشار امپریالیستی بر آسیا بر این نقطه حساس وارد خواهد شد . اما فشار نیروهای ضد امپریالیستی در سطح جهانی و غیرانی که امپریالیزم از مبارزات انقلابی خلقهای تحت ستم خصوصاً از غرب و هشتاد و کاری ویتنام و کامبوج دریافت کرده همچنین اوجگیری و تشدید بحرانیهای اقتصادی - سیاسی - اجتماعی در رزم آمریکا ، امپریالیستهای آمریکایی را اینک در وضع بسیار اسفناک و نومید کننده ای قرار داده است . آنها می بینند که در سرانجام مغرورانه افتاده اند و سرزنش صحت بار امپراطوری قدر ارانگستان اینک در انتظار آنهاست . آنها از قسمت پس از آسیای مرکزی و شرقی ( چین و ویتنام ) به شدت لغزاج شده اند در حالیکه در آسیای غربی ، در شمال و جنوب و منطقه اقیانوس هند نیز مقاومت انقلابی خلقها علیه آنها شدت گرفته است . در چنین شرایطی است که امپریالیستها تا حدتیا دیگر جرئت و توانائی یک سخاوت مستقیم نظامی را در این منطقه یعنی آسیای بلختری در خود نمی بینند . مقاومت انقلابی و بیرونی بر شبکه خلق های ویتنام کامبوج و لائوس ناچاراً در سبهای شکننده ای به امپریالیستهای آمریکایی داده است . امپریالیستها ظاهراً فهمیده اند که خلق های ایمنی آسیا کورستان بسیار بزرگتری برای آنها آماده کرده اند از این نظر صحت دارند این بار دست نشانندگان منطقه ای خود را که تا دندان مسلح کرده اند به پیشوا چنین سرزنش می برستند . درین میان رزم مزدور شاه جهانگیر برای سرکوب هر چه خونین تر انقلابات دلفنی و مبارزات مسلحانه اوج گرفته اند خلق ایران و همچنین برای ایفای نقش زاننداری در منطقه و سرکوب جنبش های انقلابی خلق های انقلابی خلیج - عمان - بلوچستان و ... استعداد برای شکرانی از خود بریز می دهد ؛ این استعداد از یک طرف ناشی از تشابلات ماجرا جهانی و سلطه طلبانه سرمایه داران حاکم ایران و خواست درونی او برای ایفای نقش امپریالیستی در منطقه است و از طرف دیگر به شدت تحت تاثیر سر سرکردگی و وابستگی این رزم به امپریالیزم آمریکا قرار دارد . با این توضیح از یک طرف حرمی و آرزوی انزین شاه برای هراج بیشتر نفت و به دست آوردن پول بیشتر و از طرف دیگر شتاب او برای پای بوسی اربابان آمریکائیت و تاکیه روی لغزوم " اداره رهبری آمریکا در جهان " خصوصاً در شرایطی که مغرور سگان هم زنجیرش این تول دوران خود در کامبوج و ویتنام او را به شدت از وضع مشابه در ایران وحشت زده کرده است . سنای ایمنی شورش را پیدا میکند . بدین ترتیب امپریالیستها در وجود شاه خائن سگ وفاداری را می بینند که میتواند بخشی و تا حدتیا مانع آنانرا در منطقه حراست کند . و شاه نیز در وجود امپریالیستهای آمریکایی ، این اربابان قدرتمند قدیمی پیشینیان را می باید که حاضرند او را تا دندان مسلح کنند و به جان خلقهای منطقه بینند از آنجا . ایجاد رهبری سازمان سرکوب پلیس و ارتش در ایران توسط مستشاران و جاسوسان جاپانگزار آمریکایی یعنی همان کسانی که میلیون ها تن از مردم بیگناه هند و چین را زیر کبار مسلسل های خود کار و با بمبارانهای جنبش خود تکه تکه می کردند ، و همچنین فرماندهان و مبارزان مسلح این جاسوس سرد و آدامس بین انطالی در شهر . سابی سازمان جاسوسی آمریکا ( سیا ) بهترین سفیر در ایران جوش از همسین نقطه میزانه یعنی تبدیل رزم ایران به قدرت مسلح منطقه برای پاسداری منافع امپریالیزم آمریکا بشمار می رود . به پس

Figure 1. Continued.

ترتیب مرحله جدیدی در تهاجم امپریالیستی به آمریکا آغاز میشود . در این مرحله قسمتهای افغانی هند و در غرب آنرا  
به کانین تهادهای امپریالیزم و خلفهای منطقه تبدیل میشود . از این قرار بدین جهت نیست که رژیم های ارتجاعی منطقه  
و در رأس آنها رژیم مرزیر شاه ، تحت رهبری مستقیم امپریالیزم آمریکا اکنون به سرعت هر چه بیشتر به سرکوب خونین و جهشت  
در مردم منطقه مشغول شده اند .

طیبات انقلابیین ما در صحنه ۳۱ اردیبهشت به امپریالیستهای آمریکائی و مرزیران ایرانی تیان شاه و طبقات  
حاکمشان داد که در این مرحله جدید چگونگی از آنها و نقشه های مزیراع جدیدشان استقبال میشود ! البته امپریالیستهای  
آمریکائی باید بدانند که خلعن ما مبارز آتش ناپذیر خود را علیه دیکتاتوری و ظلم و استعمار شاه و دیگر مرزیران طبقات حاکم  
در ایران آغاز کرده است . امپریالیستها و بزرگان دغلی آنها باید بدانند که اگر خلق کبیر و ستام ۳۰ سال پیگیرانه جنگید  
تا آزادی و استقلال خود را بدست آورد اکنون ما حاضریم ۱۰۰ سال جنگیم . اگر امپریالیزم تا گردن در مرزهای ستام  
و هند و چین نیروی ما ، ما حاضریم تا قرن سز او را در گردنهای افغانی هند فرو بریم !! آری خلق های غرب آسیا  
گورستان فرقهتاری را برای امپریالیزم و تمام دست نشاندگان محلی آن تدارک دیده اند !

\* \* \* \* \*

ای توده های عظیم خلقی ما ! کارگران - دهقانان - روشنفکران - روحانیین - همیشه جوان - بازاربانان - دانشجوان  
و دانش آموزان زنان و مردان انقلابی :

امپریالیستهای آمریکائی و رژیم شاه جنایتکار بزرگترین دشمنان مردم رنجیده ما و خلفهای تحت ستم منطقه هستند .  
آنها هر روز توطئه های بزرگتری را برای سرکوب جاریات مردم ما و بیخلف منطقه تدارک می بینند . آنها همان کسانی هستند  
که دم اکنون شماره مطبوعی از فرزندان راستین و مبارز شما را در صباهای سازات و شهرهای در حالیکه به نفع تسلط  
بسته شده اند و بدنهایشان با لجان برقی و شبکه الکتریکی سوخته است به بند کشیده اند . آنها کسانی هستند کسه  
دیکتاتوری سپاه شاه جنایتکار را بر پا نگاه داشته اند و به اهلشان و قاتلان سازمان امنیت شاه اجازه داده اند تا ایران را  
به یک زندان بزرگ تبدیل کنند . آنها کسانی هستند که چون زانو بچین شما مردم زمینگر ایران را می کشد و شایع شود  
طبیعی شما را غارت میکند .

توده های مبارز زمینگر ما ! مبارز انقلابی خود را علیه دیکتاتوری شاه جنایتکار و سلطه امپریالیزم آمریکا بر  
صیبهتان شدت بخشید . در حلق سازمانهای صلح بهشتاز متشکل شوید و جاری خود را در تحت زمین تفکلی تا ناپودی  
کامل دشمن ، شاه و اربابان آمریکائین به انجام برسانید .

نابود باد دیکتاتوری شاه جنایتکار صدمه زنجیری آمریکا  
بر نوان تر باد مستان انتقام گیر فرزندان انقلابی خلق  
نابود باد نفوذ سلطه خلفای امپریالیزم آمریکا در منطقه

\* سازمان مجاهدین خلق ایران \*

۰۱ / ۲ / ۱

# اطلاعیه سازمان مجاهدین خلق ایران در باره : عمل ناموفق اعدام دیپلمات امریکائی



پشتیبان جنبش تاکنون که در مدینه این پراکنده که به سوی این انشای تاکتیکی را با هدفی استراتژیک جنبش مسلحانه مطلق نمایند - نام اینها برای باز مسوولان تر شدن همه این ایامات - باز دیگر اتمام میروم که استراتژی جنبش ما بطور کلی بر سه محور خود تکیه میبندیم - خود سرمایه داری وابست (کپرالیزم) و خود سلطنتی فراتر داور پویان زمین نظریه نظریه استراتژیک افسوس که در این مرحله ارگانهای ایرونی که حمایت بر چون و چرایی رژیم ایران را در دستور قرار داده اند - ارگانهای مختلف طبقه حاکمه مزدور ایران - ارگانهای اصنام دیکتاتوری و استعمار و جنبش که در تمام عناصر خائن به ملت - متصرفین خود جنس و استعمارگرانی که مستقیماً در خدمت منافع این طبقه و در خدمت منافع امپریالیسم رژیم دیکتاتوری - پلیسی وابست به آن قرار دارند و عملاً بر تکیه جنبش انقلابی خلق مومنین تمامه اشغال نموده اند مورد حمله ما واقع میشوند - کتب و خطبات نظامی ما نیز تاکنون در رابطه با جنبش معورهای قبایل تبیین شده - مطابق این تمایل به کارنامه ساده در چشمه که کارنامه سفارت امریکا باشد تبیین شده و نیابستی مستفاد عملیات ما قرار گیرد زیرا که بسیاری از کارمندان و عناصر پاتیل رژیم کتانتی فستند که تنه‌های مدیست با رژیم دیکتاتوری دارند و این امکان همیشه وجود دارد که تحت شرایطی به حامیان جنبش خلق تبدیل شوند

۳ - مهمترین پیش راه‌های نظیر که اعلام و توضیح پیروزیها و موفقیت‌های جنبش از طرف سازمانها و گروه‌های عمل کننده ضروری دارد بپایه گرفتن مستوریت خطما و انشایات و حواشی ناشی از آن ضروریست زیرا واقفان به مریض حاکمانه در مقابل خلق که خود تمکات پیروزی ستوان در برین سازمانها و گروه‌های انقلابی است متداول شده ما را بر تکیه خلق افزون ساخته و بدین طریق است که می‌توانیم از تکرار انشایات و حاکمیت ضعیف جلوه‌گری نماییم

مسلماً دره تکرار مسائل فوق و هم برخورد مشخص و جدی با آنها - زمینه را برای بر نشی و مت و مت در میان جنبش انقلابی - از طریق اتمام عملیات خبر ستوانه یوسپله انقلابی ضمای کرست طلب ویا حتی عناصری که تاکنونان مسد به عملیات کرد و انحرافی میزند - اراض مسازده - در چنین صورتی طبیسی خواهد بود که رژیم توطئه گر شاه کرشش خواهد کرد یا استفاده از پیوسن دستارهای به منظور متصرف کردن رابطه اشغال آمویز شغل و انقلاب ضویات پیشروی بر بیکر انقلاب شسقل وارد کرد - در حالیکه بر شروع دستار و ستوانه تهریسای انقلابی و مهارت در چنین مؤثری نه تنها بطور مراز دست نمیتواند مورد سز استفاده رژیم قرار گیرد بلکه با ایجاد به رابطه اشغال آمویز بین شغل و انقلاب - در گونه توطئه رژیم را در میرواقتست

سو انجام پیروزی از آن نیروهای انقلابی است سازمان مجاهدین خلق ایران

در اوضاع عملیات نظامی سازمان و در رابطه با عملیات سیاسی تعیین شده - مطابق خبر روز شنبه ۲۲ خرداد ماه ۵۱ که راجع به ایات کتاسوریت اعدام دیپلمات امریکائی دونالد ریتا - به آنها عمل شده بود - در متعلق اخبارهای فانی و شریعت راه را بر اتومبیل مسوول امریکا بستند و بر روی آن آتش کشیدند

طبق شناسایی های قبلی - دیپلمات مکتور در متعلق طب و دو کتار دو کارمند زن سفارت می نشست - برقیل شوره برین فضای داخل اتومبیل و بر نقش مستر لیشک در شناسایی دیپلمات امریکائی و همچنین اشکالاتی که در سیستم خبر رسائی و افراد مستر آن در شرح وجود داشت کارمند آمریکائی سفارت که آمویز پیشور انشای بهای از نشست بره - متلف گزله قرار گرفت و کشته شد بر همین جریان طبقا بدوکارمند ایرانی زن و راننده اتومبیل - طبق برنامه اصلی شرح دیده‌گره آمویز فرستاد

سازمان مجاهدین خلق ایران به پیش میله شدن ابراز تأسف عمیق خود از این واقعه و ضروری با خاتمه و بستن این فرد ایرانی - مسوولیت این عملیات انشای آمویز در مستقیماً بپایه میگرد - مسلماً پیشین انشای مسوول برمی سبیل و ریشه ای ما قرار خواهد گرفت و رفاقی که با برکت خود در اجهاد چنین حادثه‌ای تأسف انگیز نظر مژدوی داشته اند - با توجه باین اصل که متنا کسی انشای نمیکند که عمل عم نمیکند مورد انتقاد و حتی تنبیہ نظامی واقع خواهند شد

مواضع کلی ما در تکیه شکست ما - ضعف ها و انشایات موجود در سطح جنبش مسلحانه توضیحات ما در این زمینه در موارد زیر خلاصه میشود :

۱ - پذیر ما ضعیفما - شکست ها و انشایات موجود در سطح جنبش مسلحانه نسبتاً آمویز نیز طبیسی و ایسر ممکن باشد - چرا که هر حال در شرایط کنونی - جنبش توپای خلق ما در مریض ضعیفتری نسبت به دشمن کسرات دارد و از طرف دیگر ضیعت تهر آمویز مهارت خودی که هم اکثرین بین خلق ما و رژیم خود تقویر و تا فکتن مسلح شده چنانکه در جریان است بما میگرد که انشایات و تهر کرد که به سانگی میروان به حوادث شوین و تأسف انگیزی بدل شود - هر چند که اینگونه حرارت - مؤثره میبستار مسوول از خسارات و از تهرهای قرارش و تشکیک بپوسد که خلق ما بهر حال در جریان مهارت دست و شراتش برای تهر به آزادی مشمل خواهند شد

اما آنچه که در این میان ضرورت جهانی می باید بود این مسئله است که تنها در جریان پیشبرد حاکمانه ستوانه با همین انشایات - ضعیفما و شکست‌ها است که جنبش ضعیفترانه پایه مانع‌شکست پیروزیهای درخشان آمویز را بر میوزی نماید

۲ - پس از آن عمل انشای آمویز - ایستار نظرها - ستوانه و ضعیف سیاسی گوناگونی در مسازده این مسئله و مستأ بر جهت تهریبه آن متروک شده - حتی عدای از متاسر

Figure 2. Statement by Marxist opportunists on murdering an Iranian national instead of the intended target, 3 July 1975. Note that the Quranic verse is missing from the Mojahedin emblem.

استشارگر ، امپریالیست ها و دست نشاندهان مردم در آنها در صحنه‌ها  
ایران ، شاه خونخوار و دارو دسته‌ی خائن اشیرانشانه خواهد گرفت .  
رفقای ما پس از اطمینان از انجام موفقیت آمیز عمل با فریادهای " سرک  
بر شاه جنایتکار " ، " سرک بر امپریالیزم جهانی " و " زند بهاد انقلاب  
مسلحانه ی خلق " صحنه‌ی عملیات را ترک کردند و سالم به پایگاههای خویش  
بازگشتند .  
در این عملیات اسناد و مدارک محتملی کیف این سه آمریکایی مسز در  
به نفع انقلاب مصادره شد .

## **Appendix D: MEK and the United States**

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The Ottawa Citizen

September 10, 1994, Saturday, FINAL EDITION

SECTION: CITYLIFE; Pg. C1

LENGTH: 583 words

HEADLINE: Judge criticizes CSIS, Crown over seige trial; Only two of 21 Iranian Embassy protesters jailed

BYLINE: MIKE BLANCHFIELD; CITIZEN

BODY:

An Ottawa judge has criticized Canada's spy agency, CSIS, and the local Crown attorney's office for their handling of the April 1992 Iranian Embassy seige and the subsequent trial.

Justice Pierre Mercier made the comments Friday after sentencing 21 people convicted in the attack on the Metcalfe Street mission. Nineteen received suspended sentences for theft, possession and break-and-entry; one received a six-month jail term and one was jailed for a year.

In his ruling, Mercier asked why CSIS, which had the embassy under surveillance at the time, was watching the diplomatic mission. Why did it do nothing to stop the attack by an armed and angry mob? Why did it not alert the RCMP?

A CSIS spokesman would not comment on the judge's remarks until he saw a transcript of the proceedings. But he pointed to a federal government review of the matter that found CSIS had not delayed in notifying police.

The same report says CSIS videotaped the attack, but did not intervene.

Mercier also said he was "flabbergasted" at the stiff penalties being sought by the Crown, in one case a 10-year prison term for one of the assaults.

Senior assistant Crown attorney Mac Lindsay called for stiff sentences, saying Canada has a duty to keep embassies safe.

Defence lawyer Ron Guertin, whose client, Behroz Saneie, received six months for assault, said the same sentences could have been arrived at two years ago through plea bargains, sparing taxpayers millions of dollars spent for the lengthy trial.

Guertin accused Lindsay, who led the case, of having a hidden agenda. "It's obviously been our feeling Mr. Lindsay wasn't making the decisions here," said Guertin.

He suggested Foreign Affairs or other federal government departments with a vested interest in protecting foreign missions in Canada might have pressured the Ottawa Crown Attorney's office.

Neither Lindsay nor Ottawa's chief Crown attorney, Andrejs Berzins, were available for comment Friday.

The attack on the Metcalfe Street embassy was one of several simultaneous sieges at Iranian diplomatic missions worldwide. They came one day after the Iranian government bombed a camp filled with fleeing Iranian refugees.

In his ruling, Mercier said there was no evidence the 21 accused belonged to the dissident Iranian group Mujahedeen Khalq, or -- as the Crown had alleged -- any terrorist group. Saying they were neither heroes nor terrorists, he condemned their use of violence. He said the protesters had reason to be angry given the atrocities many endured under the regime of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, but that it didn't justify what they did.

Nezanalddin Afraz was sentenced to one year for assaulting the Iranian ambassador. Saneie got six months for his role in the beating of an embassy visitor.

Moments after he was sentenced, Afraz tried to approach Mercier, three red roses in his right hand. He was stopped by police and his own lawyer. The public gallery, filled with co-accused and supporters, erupted in applause after Saneie joined him, shouting with his hands raised in the air. Both were immediately taken into custody.

Update The issue: The sentencing of 21 people convicted of attacking the Iranian Embassy in April 1992. What's new: During a sentencing hearing Friday, a judge criticized Canadian's spy agency for videotaping the embassy attack but not intervening. What's next: Two of the 21 accused are to begin jail sentences; 19 others received suspended sentences.

LOAD-DATE: September 14, 1994



## **BBC World: Americas**

### **Iran US MKO**

The authorities in Iran have appealed to the United States and Europe to stop the activities of the armed opposition group, Mujahedin Khalq, which has several offices overseas.

The group has said it was behind a string of bomb attacks that killed three people and injured others in Teheran this week.

The former President of Iran, Akbar Rafsanjani, welcomed a statement from the US, condemning what it called terrorist acts.

But, he said, if Washington was serious, it should close down Mujahedin Khalq offices.

The Mujahedin Khalq is based in Iraq but emigres in other countries run a support network.

*From the newsroom of the BBC World Service*

**U.S. extends restrictions on Iranian opposition.**

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By Jonathan Wright

652 Words

14 October 1999

19:56 GMT

Reuters News

English

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WASHINGTON, Oct 14 (Reuters) - The United States, in response to Iranian government inquiries, has imposed new restrictions on the activities of the main Iranian opposition group in exile, a senior U.S. official said on Thursday.

Martin Indyk, assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, said the State Department had added the National Council of Resistance (NCR) as an alias for the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), a group which has assassinated Iranian officials.

The NCR, which has offices in downtown Washington, has acted as the civilian front for the Mujahedin and was not previously subject to restrictions imposed on the Mujahedin.

"Just last week we redesignated the MEK as a foreign terrorist organisation and for the first time listed the National Council of Resistance, the NCR, as an alias of the MEK," Indyk told a lunch hosted by the Asia Society.

"Such designations have the effect of making it illegal to provide financial support to these organisations. This will further reduce the Mujahedin-e Khalq's ability to generate support in this country," he added.

He told Reuters later that the NCR would also be subject to the other restrictions imposed on "terrorist" groups, such as a ban on U.S. visas for NCR officials and a requirement that U.S. financial institutions block the organisation's assets.

Asked why the State Department has chosen now to act, he said: "The Iranian government had brought this to our attention. We looked into it and saw that there were good reasons for designating the NCR as an alias for the MEK."

"When the original list was drawn up (two years ago), we were focused on the MEK. I don't think adequate homework had been done on the NCR," he added.

According to the designations released last week, the State Department listed several other organisations as aliases for the MEK, though Indyk did not mention these.

They include the National Liberation Army of Iran, the Iraqi-based military wing of the movement, and the Moslem Iranian Students' Society, which the State Department described as a front organisation used to gather financial support.

A crackdown on the Mujahedin will antagonize many members of Congress, who have criticised the designation and favour overt U.S. support for the Iranian opposition.

The Administration, on the other hand, has been trying to persuade the Iranian government to take part

in an official dialogue on the differences between them.

On Thursday two senators, New Jersey Democrat Robert Torricelli and Missouri Republican Christopher Bond, said they and 26 other senators had asked the State Department to take a fresh look at "the possibilities that exist within Iran's democratic opposition, including the People's Mujahedin".

But Indyk said the Mujahedin was clearly a "terrorist" organisation, even if it attacked members of a government which Washington calls a state sponsor of "terrorism".

"In 1998 several high-ranking members of the Iranian government were attacked and at least two were killed in attacks claimed by the terrorist group the Mujahedin-e Khalq. More recently that same group claimed responsibility for the assassination of Iran's deputy chief of staff. We condemn these acts as we condemn all acts of terrorism," he said.

A spokesman for the National Council of Resistance noted that in August 1998, after NCR-led demonstrations at a soccer match between Iran and the United States in France, the State Department distinguished between the NCR and the MEK.

"A careful review of the evidence concerning the National Council of Resistance, which is associated with the MEK, has shown that it does not meet the criteria in the law for the designation of the NCR as a foreign terrorist organisation," State Department spokesman James Rubin said at the time.

The NCR spokesman had no immediate comment on the extension of the U.S. restrictions.

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SECRET

THREAT ASSESSMENT: IRAN

Prepared by:  
Stefanie C. Stauffer  
632-1864

Approved by:  
Bowman H. Miller  
Sid T. Telford  
632-2412

June 14, 1979

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RDS-1,2,4 5/29/2009 (Multiple Sources)

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has been engaged in training activities, it could also act as a spearhead for an assault on the Embassy or U.S. personnel off the compound. Such a force, trained and disciplined, would pose a more serious threat than the elements that attacked the Embassy on February 14. (GDS--5/2/85)

(U) The Chariks and the Mujahidin operated clandestinely until the demise of the Peacock throne. Both groups continue to be viable terrorist groups; however, both have, to some extent, changed their directions of interest in recent months.

(LOU) On February 14, 1979 the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was attacked and overrun by the Chariks, an organization which had previously not focused on American targets because they felt such incidents would bring too strong a response from the Iranian security agencies. However, with the Iranian government in internal chaos, they struck and were quite successful, taking control of the Embassy compound and nearly one hundred Americans including then Ambassador Sullivan. To add an even more disconcerting note, the forces that came to the aid of the Americans and were at the time acting as the

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Provisional police, were members of the Mujahidin. The Mujahidin since 1972 have assassinated six Americans (three military personnel and three Rockwell International employees). They also attempted the bombing assassination of a U.S. Air Force brigadier general, the kidnapping of the American Ambassador, and mistakenly assassinated an Iranian employee of the U.S. Embassy (the actual target was a U.S. consular official). At the present time, an element of the Mujahidin protects the Embassy compound (see section titled "Security of the Compound" for a more detailed explanation).

(U) Among the gravest problems for the Khomeini government is the capability of restive tribes and regional groups demanding autonomy to harass the beleaguered central authorities. The government is trying to rebuild the armed forces to a capability similar to that which they attained under the Shah. Iran's guerrilla groups are resisting this, trying instead to create a "people's army" run by soldier committees and elected officers. Several government attempts to dissolve these groups and seize their arsenals of weapons have failed. The guerrillas'

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Americans. Private vehicles were set on fire, firebombs tossed through private residence windows, and a number of restaurants in Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz which catered to foreigners were attacked, bombed, and set afire.

(S) Anti-U.S. feelings, which appeared to have abated several months ago following the evacuation of most Americans are on the increase. The fractionalization of the Islamic movement and the many political groups competing for public favor may once again find the U.S. an attractive target for propaganda and aggression. Recent demonstrations protesting Senator Jacob Javits' resolution on Iran point out the fact that any political decision which Iranians in general consider disadvantageous to them could trigger anti-U.S. demonstrations and/or incidents. In this regard, a decision to allow the deposed Shah and/or family members to visit or settle in the United States could have serious consequences. The Iranian reaction would probably be immediate and possibly violent. Such a decision would probably be the one cohesive and unifying factor in the entire Iranian political spectrum. (GDS--5/2/85)

Security of the Compound

(S) At present the compound is protected by an element of the Mujahidin led by Mahallah Kashani who

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claims to hold credentials directly from Khomeini. His forces, which supposedly number approximately 40 with a reserve located in two mosques in the area, are untrained, lack discipline, and are armed with a variety of weapons (some stolen from the U.S. Embassy) as well as radio equipment removed from the Chancery on February 14, 1979. Foreign Service personnel report that only five to ten of these guards are on the compound during daylight hours. During evening hours the forces increase to fifteen or twenty. Periodic checks at night usually find most, if not all, the troops asleep.

(GDS--5/2/85)

(S) Of definite concern is the Embassy's lack of control over the after-hour activities of Mashallah and his troops. He has used the Embassy compound to run his own revolutionary and intelligence operations. He has brought SAVAK agents on the compound and used the motor-pool office for interrogation purposes. Upon learning of the possibility that Mashallah may have tortured a prisoner on the compound, the Charge ordered these activities stopped. It is believed that this activity ceased; however, Mashallah has found other ways to amuse himself.

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He has run an operation against the Soviets and also some Iranians from the compound. An Embassy vehicle was used in the seizure of three Soviets, and the safehouse was located off the rear of the compound. Indiscriminate shooting at each other and at unknown persons firing at the compound during darkness is another inherent problem with Mashallah and his Mujahidin. Lastly, Mashallah and his forces control access to the compound. They threaten, abuse, and generally obstruct normal access to the compound. Attempts are being made for police forces to gradually take over some of the security responsibilities of the Mujahidin. (GDS--5/2/85)

Tribal Unrest in the Provinces

(C) Nationalist groups, who were active underground until the downfall of the Shah, are now openly demanding full autonomy for their ethnic groups. This includes the Kurds in the west, the Baluchis in the southwest, and the Azeris in the northwest. The most recent open expression of hostility occurred in Khorramshar on May 30, 1979 following an incident in which a revolutionary guardsmen killed two Arabs in the course of a labor dispute at the port. The Arab community attacked the port and public

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## Appendix E: MEK and Iraq

### EXCERPTS FROM CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING BY IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY CAUCUS -- HON. TOM G. TANCREDO (Extensions of Remarks - May 19, 2005)

[Page: E1014] [GPO's PDF](#)

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**HON. TOM G. TANCREDO**  
OF COLORADO  
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 2005

- Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Speaker, last month, leaders and representatives of 65 Iraqi political parties and groups unveiled a petition signed by 2.8 million Iraqis, sharply criticizing neighboring Iran's interference in Iraq and warning of the specter of "Islamic fundamentalism's stealthy domination" of their country. Iraqi signatories included ethnic Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen, from different religious backgrounds, including Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, Christians, and people of other faiths.
- The petition offered strong support to the main Iranian opposition group, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). The Iraqi statement said that the PMOI was fighting a "legitimate struggle against an unjust dictatorship", adding Iran's meddling was the biggest cause of instability in present-day Iraq. They also said the PMOI should be recognized in Iraq as "a legitimate political movement" and the rights of its members, under Iraqi and international law, fully respected. A Congressional Briefing was convened by Iran Human Rights and Democracy Caucus on May 10, 2005 to discuss these developments. I ask that the following excerpts of the witnesses' speeches, as follows, be entered into the **RECORD**. Furthermore, I ask that it be noted that the remarks of those witnesses connected to the US military are not to be attributed to the U.S. Department of Defense, but taken as personal observations offered by each witness.
- Dr. Abdullah Rasheed Al-Jabouri, Former Governor of the Iraqi Province of Diyala: "I must emphasize that among the 2.8 million Iraqis who signed the petition of support, there are many Kurds, Turkomans, Shiites and Christians. Last June, 50,000 Iraqis attended a major gathering at Ashraf, which I addressed, and in May, 500,000 Iraqis signed a petition calling for the continued presence of the group in Iraq as a legitimate political force. The fact is that by virtue of espousing an anti-fundamentalist Islam, the Mojahedin has emerged as a major bulwark against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Iraq, and especially the Iranian meddling. They have developed strong ties with the local people and the many tribes in the province. The sheer presence of the Mojahedin (MEK) was providing security to the region because the people in the province have complete trust in them. It is my hope that as we and the U.S. grapple with the problem of insurgency in Iraq, the United States would realize that the Mojahedin are friend of the Iraqi people and a source stability and calm in Iraq and move to remove them from the terrorist list, which would in turn lead to the removal of the restrictions placed on them."
- Lt. Colonel Thomas Cantwell: "When I moved up into northern Diyala province [in Iraq], the relationship with the Mojahedin with the local community helped me in that regard, I think because most of the local sheiks, understanding as part of the Sunni triangle, weren't exactly trusting of coalition forces but they seemed to have some level of trust with the Mojahedin, and so what I sought to get them to come in to get to speak to them and to understand what their issues were, was their security issues, their infrastructure repair issues, they lack of support issues, and to try and help them understand what our operations were doing and to ensure that they understood why we were under

taking our operations. It certainly helped to have that friendly relationship that they had with the Mojahedin because it helped me to break the ice with the local sheiks which I think was important. My mission had several different aspects to it. On the one hand, we had a Geneva Convention responsibility to safeguard the Mojahedin, and this was a real possibility since there was evidence at the camp that the camp had been previously attacked by the Iranian government."

- Captain Vivian Gembara: ``As a soldier and a lawyer I believe it's time to change their (MEK) classification as a terrorist organization. Two years ago we could say clearly or argue that it was in all of our best interest to maintain this label, even despite Special Forces recommendations out of natural weariness. Now two years have passed and I think it's crucial that we acknowledge that the situation has changed, and we need to reassess. The potential benefits of working together definitely overshadow previous concerns or hesitations that we had. Next of course is identifying your allies, and over two years have passed now since I met with the MEK but my question is still the same and hasn't changed at all. It's basically why we can't take maximum use of the assets and potentials of this ally here? "
- Dr. Kenneth Katzman: ``The broader regional effects of the pro-Iranian tilt of the new Iraqi government are hard to discern. It is likely that the new Iraqi government might support Iran against international criticism of Iran's growing nuclear program. Iraq might move closer to Iranian positions on the Arab-Israeli peace process. It is also likely that the Shiite-dominated new government of Iraq will support other Shiite movements in the region, such as in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Some commentators say Iraq's new leaders are likely to remain wary of Iran exercising substantial influence in Iraq. They note that most Iraqi Shiites generally stayed loyal to the Sunni-dominated Iraqi regime during the Iran-Iraq war. Most Iraqi Shiites appear not to want a cleric-run Islamic regime."

# The Washington Times

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## Embassy Row

By James Morrison

Published May 12, 2005

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### **Iranian influence**

He survived 14 assassination attempts as governor of Iraq's Diyala province and is ready to risk his life again as a candidate in the parliamentary elections expected in December.

**Dr. Abdullah Rasheed al-Jabouri**, a dentist by profession, also learned about dirty politics when his opponents on the provincial election commission blocked him from running in the January elections by leaving his name off the ballot. Dr. al-Jabouri, who made enemies among Islamic extremists by governing as a secular leader, only learned about the stunt on election day when the ballots were made public.

"There was cheating and deception. It was not a fair election," he said over lunch yesterday at The Washington Times.

His one-year term ended in March, and he returned to England to resume his dental practice. However, he is already planning his political comeback, and he plans to travel to Iraq soon to open his campaign.

Dr. al-Jabouri was in Washington to talk about the threat facing Iraq from its old enemy, Iran, which shares a border with Diyala province, and to urge the United States to remove the Iranian resistance from a blacklist of terrorist groups on which they were included during the Clinton administration.

"There's question today that Iran is behind many terrorist attacks, especially against civilians and anti-fundamentalist politicians," he told a congressional hearing this week.

"In Diyala province ... we managed to capture many Iranian agents or Iraqi and foreign nationals who were on Iran's payroll and had received training in terrorist activities."

Dr. al-Jabouri told the Iran Human Rights and Democracy Caucus in the House that the United States made a mistake in 2003 when U.S. forces bombed the camps of the military wing of the resistance, the People's Mojahedin, which had operated from Diyala since 1986. He said they provided security against Iranian infiltration.

"I believe the bombing of the Mojahedin camps at the outset of the war was a major blunder, even more so was the U.S. decision to disarm them," he said. "This left the entire province wide open to Iranian meddling and interference."

Also at the Tuesday hearing, two Army officers who dealt with the Mojahedin testified about their cooperation and professionalism. The officers pointed out they were offering their personal opinions.

**Lt. Col. Thomas Cantwell**, who commanded a military police battalion, guarded the Mojahedin at Camp Ashraf, where all of the resistance fighters were consolidated. He called them "cooperative" and "very disciplined, as a paramilitary force should be."

**Capt. Vivian Gembara**, the Army lawyer who negotiated the Mojahedin disarmament agreement, said the United States should make "maximum use of the assets and potentials of this ally."

"As a soldier and a lawyer," she said, "I believe it's time to change their classification as a terrorist organization."

### **Trade and security**

**Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld** yesterday welcomed six Latin American presidents and called the pending Central American Free Trade Agreement another weapon in the war on terrorism.

"Economic progress and security are interdependent," he said. "Today the threat to Central American and Caribbean security comes from an anti-social combination of gangs, drug traffickers, smugglers, hostage

takers and terrorists. It is increasingly clear that they can be effectively combated and are being combated only by close cooperation among nations."

Presidents **Oscar Berger** of Guatemala, **Enrique Bolanos** of Nicaragua, **Leonel Fernandez** of the Dominican Republic, **Ricardo Maduro** of Honduras, **Abel Pacheco** of Costa Rica and **Antonio Saca** of El Salvador are in Washington to campaign for congressional passage of the trade agreement.

•Call Embassy Row at 202/636-3297, fax 202/832-7278 or e-mail [jmorrison@washingtontimes.com](mailto:jmorrison@washingtontimes.com)

## Appendix F: MEK Positions

tion. Insofar as one believes in such a relationship of force, solutions to problems will not be found in a liberating spirit. Liberalism is based on such an individualistic conception of the relationship of forces, Marxism on the relationship of forces between groups and classes. Everyone tries to realize his social project by affecting the balance of forces.

I have developed a critique of these principles, and in the Quran I have

found another set of relationships without force, derived from the relation between man and God. This latter relation must be without force, since it would make no sense for God and man to relate through force. This principle enables us to develop a new system of planning and action; it has led to something as marvelous as the Iranian revolution. When Khomeini was talking in Paris, he derived all he said from these basic principles. We formulated these ideas and

Khomeini voiced them. The mouth was Khomeini's but the pen was that of those who had accepted these principles. Everyone was convinced. Even the Marxists said: "If this is Islam, we accept it." The principles produced a real unity. The same thing was evident when I was elected president. I was not elected by any party. When I sat on the Revolutionary Council, I sat alone. It was in this way that I won the confidence of the people. They knew that I would not compromise. ■



Masud Rajavi in France.

Masud Rajavi was the only one of the original leadership of the Mujahidin-i Khalq to escape execution by the Shah. Imprisoned from 1971 until December 1978, he emerged to reorganize the Mujahidin. He ran for president in the elections of January 1980 but Khomeini declared him ineligible. He escaped from Iran with former president Bani-Sadr on July 28, 1971. He is the prime minister in Bani-Sadr's government in exile, and is active in the Council of National Resistance. Fred Halliday interviewed him outside Paris in August 1981.

**You have predicted the imminent fall of Khomeini's government, and you have stated that the Mujahidin constitutes the only force that can overthrow the Ayatollah. What leads you to make these assertions?**

We are the only real threat to Khomeini. First of all, we are Muslims. Communists and similar groups fail in Iran because they cannot understand the people, but Islam is a special characteristic of our country. Secondly, we do not need Khomeini and we never did. We accepted him as a leader in the final period of the struggle against the Shah, but we were founded quite independently of him and we knew, quite early on, what his true dictatorial and reactionary character was. A group of *Mujahidin* hijacked an Iranian plane to Iraq in 1970

Mujahidin's  
Masud Rajavi:  
**"We are the  
only real  
threat to  
Khomeini."**

and met with Khomeini. They saw that he had a traditional petty bourgeois and rightwing approach to Islam. Other political groups have had to hide under Khomeini's protection: we have never had to do this. The third reason why we pose a threat to him is that from the beginning we have been the main competitor to Khomeini. One of the main reasons he organized the hostage affair was to attract progressive young people away from our organization.

Other politicians are not even as strong as Khomeini's finger. Khomeini has often said that people should not be concerned about Kurdistan: while it is important, the main danger is under the government's nose, in Tehran itself. Just look at the three main slogans of the regime, which they repeat endlessly at

Friday prayers and meetings: *Allahu Akbar* [God is great], *Khomeini Rahbar* [Khomeini is the leader], and death to the *munafiqin*—the "hypocrites," a Quranic term used to describe us. These slogans specify ideology, leadership, and the main enemy—the *Mujahidin*.

**You have compared the situation in Iran now to that which existed during the Iranian revolution of 1978. Although your organization is much stronger, there are important differences between Khomeini's regime and that of the Shah. Khomeini still has some popular following, and his repressive units are still active and have shown themselves to be quite ruthless: thousands of your members have been killed since June 1981. No one doubts your heroism, but aren't you underestimating the resources of the regime?**

Khomeini is not as strong as he pretends. At the beginning he had the support of 90 percent of the population. But now he has the support of at most 15 percent. He was leading a broad front of national, popular and religious forces. When he tried to monopolize power, he lost support: from the national bourgeoisie, from the peasants, from the working class, the different political groups, the other *ayatollahs*, the national minorities. Since breaking with Bani-Sadr, he has become almost totally isolated. That is why he had to expel all foreign journalists and why he is executing over 30 people a day. There are five million unemployed, two million refugees from the war. Damage from the war runs at \$100 billion, inflation is running at over 100 percent, and more than one million Kurdish people are living under siege. Khomeini needs to continue the war with Iraq to cover up these economic

and social problems. This was clear from the elections in July, when Raja'i became president. They lowered the voting age to 15 years, which made over 23 million eligible to vote. But we know, from a secret Ministry of Interior report, that not more than 2.7 million people voted—at most 15 percent. Even the Shah should get out a vote like that, for his *Rastakhiz* Party.

Don't make the mistake of thinking that Khomeini's forces are well organized. Khomeini does not have the power of the Shah's army and of SAVAK. The *pasdaran* and *komitehs* are not well organized, especially when compared to the *Mujahidin*, who have 15 years of experience. At first these elements were like fascist phalanges—they at least believed in Khomeini. But now they are just lumpen elements who work for money, not ideas. In recent weeks more than 40 percent of them have left because they are afraid. The total number is not high . . .

#### **People say they total 80,000.**

No, much less. Bear in mind, too, that the army is away on the frontiers. If Khomeini could use the army against us, he would. But if Khomeini sent the army into the streets, it would side with us. He is always complaining that the police are not working properly, and that its personnel are cooperating with us.

Khomeini cannot organize anything: this is his basic problem. His regime is from the middle ages. This is why forms of mobilization are so important—marches, demonstrations, the Friday prayers. If he is going to defeat us and establish a stable dictatorship, he has to solve some of the country's problems. Even Hitler could do that. This was something Beheshti understood. But with the bombings against IRP leaders, more than 60 percent of their top personnel have been removed. A medieval regime cannot survive, using the hostages affair and the war with Iraq to cover up its weaknesses.

#### **Who were the "students" in the US Embassy?**

They were linked to the *pasdaran* and to Musavi Khomeiniha. This was before the IRP had organized itself and there were many different factions of the petty bourgeoisie who were trying to attach themselves to Khomeini in one way or another, through Khomeiniha or through

Ahmed Khomeini, his son. There were many contradictions among them, and the first students in the embassy, for the initial two to three weeks, were either IRP people or people controlled by Khomeiniha. Then the IRP took complete control and organized the embassy people. But don't think the IRP was like a Western party even then: it is a pool with all sorts of fish in it.

#### **It has been claimed that you were planning to seize the embassy and that the Islamic right preempted you in order to prevent compromising documents from falling into your hands.**

No. We were not planning to seize the embassy. We did infiltrate the students and we got hold of documents showing that Ayatollah Beheshti had been collaborating with the Americans.

#### **If Khomeini is so medieval and incapable, why was it that he was able to lead the revolution against the Shah?**

Khomeini's success derived from several factors. There was a political vacuum in the country, but the Shah did not destroy the religious institutions. He compromised with them, and they with him. Khomeini's success was to convert these religious institutions into political ones, and to link them to the liberal camp of people like Mehdi Bazargan. Other factors were Khomeini's personal record as someone who had opposed the Shah, his anti-communism, and the interviews he gave while in exile in Paris. But Khomeini's movement always had a petty bourgeois and reactionary character.

#### **Yet the *Mujahidin* supported Khomeini, and you must in some measure be held responsible for his regime. You even voted for the Islamic Constitution in November 1980.**

No. We boycotted that referendum.

#### **But you did vote for the Islamic Republic in March 1979.**

Yes, but with reservations.

#### **And you yourself then stood for election to the Council of Experts in August 1979.**

Yes, but I was not elected.

#### **Why did you not criticize Khomeini earlier than you did? Why has it taken over two and a half years for the *Mujahidin* to come into open opposition to Khomeini?**

We never accepted Khomeini as our leader or as *faqih*.\* We only agreed to work with him against the Shah. From the day of his return to Tehran, in February 1979, we were in increasing contradiction with him. But it is important to remember that our movement was not very strong at that time. Within a few weeks of Khomeini's return, I began to speak out openly against some of his policies: in a country like Iran, where someone may still enjoy the confidence of the people, it is a mistake to attack his person. I criticized the system of secret revolutionary courts, the arrogation of power to Khomeini as *faqih* and the buildup of the Islamic Guards.

From February 1979 until June 1980 we opposed Khomeini indirectly: it was like a dance, but everyone knew what was going on. Then we went into open opposition, until June 20 of this year when clashes in the streets of Tehran began. We had to prove that although we had fought the Shah's regime with the gun we were not just people of the gun. The Middle East is full of people who are all too quick to resort to arms. It was in this period that I came to understand what Jesus Christ meant by saying one should turn the other cheek—we were attacked and insulted. Our offices were burned and one of our leaders, Muhammad Saadati, was arrested and held as a hostage: he was later killed in prison. We wrote to Khomeini many times, saying that the killing had to stop, that we were prepared to accept his leadership and hand in our arms provided people's rights were guaranteed. But we got no reply.

#### **Khomeini's first open attacks on you were in June 1980. He began saying that you were the main enemy, attached to America and so forth. Why then?**

We exposed the regime at that time. We gave Bani-Sadr a cassette tape of the then-IRP leader Ayat, showing how he planned to seize power. Overall it can be said that the conflict with Khomeini began when he arrived in Tehran, but his anti-popular orientation took time to develop. There was a first period of indirect attack up to June 1980. Then a second period of direct attack when he mentioned us by name. Our evolution was the opposite of the so-called Majority *Fedayi*: they began by attacking Khomeini in the April 1979 clashes in the Turkoman Sahra region, and ended up

\*Interpreter of divine law.

praying behind him. Throughout this period we were never allowed to sell our paper without hindrance—it first came out six months after the revolution. They were always looking for a reason to attack us, throughout those two and a half years.

**On one occasion you had a meeting with Khomeini.**

Yes. Khomeini spent a quarter of an hour saying how much he appreciated the *Mujahidin*. Then, without waiting for a reply, he got up to leave. I told him that I had some important matters to discuss and he asked me to submit them in writing. I think Khomeini is an extremely shrewd person: he is better informed about world affairs than might appear—he listens to the radio news every night—and he always alters what he says to suit the person he is talking with.

**How do you distinguish your Islam from that of Khomeini? You say you want an Islamic regime in Iran, but have not the Iranian people had enough of Islamic politics?**

We should not confuse the problem of reactionary politics with that of the clergy as such. People can be against reactionaries, but not against Taleqani, who was the father of the *Mujahidin*. The key question is one of class, not of clothing. Just as some people confuse Judaism with Zionism, so they may be tempted to mix the problem of Islam with that of some reactionary *akhunds*:\* but these matters must be kept separate.

We do not consider Khomeini to be a true Muslim or an *Imam*. He is a murderer, and *moshrek*—a polytheist. How could any true Muslim allow nine-year-old girls to be killed? The battle between ourselves and Khomeini goes right back to the beginnings of Islam. His is static, traditional and anti-scientific. The Islam we want is nationalist, democratic, progressive, and not opposed to science or civilization. We believe that there is no contradiction between modern science and true Islam, and we believe that in Islam there must be no compulsion or dictatorship. We certainly believe that Muslims should lead but not that they should compel.

**But surely any political movement that derives its policies from a supposedly divine book is bound to be authoritarian, to preclude independent and democratic thought.**

In Islam, as in Marxism, there are always different interpretations. Marxism has only been around since 1848, yet it has many differences within it. Islam has been in existence for over 14 centuries. These different interpretations depend upon specific social and historical situations.

You get the same thing in Christianity: there are different social bases, and different political conditions. There are feudalist Christians, capitalist ones and socialist ones. There is one way of seeing whether something is truly Islamic or not—practice. Study the life of Jesus Christ, or the principles which derive from Muhammad, 'Ali and Hussein. We reject a classbound and traditional Islam, and our quarrel with Khomeini is about two kinds of Islam. We do not believe that in true Islam there is room for oppression: you cannot oblige someone to believe something else, or to drink or wear what they do not want to. There is a problem of leadership, but this must not involve dictatorship. We therefore distinguish between reactionary dictatorship and democratic centralism. No prophet could kill people without giving them defense lawyers—a Muslim can even have a lawyer who is a *kafir*.\*\*

We stress the concept of *touhid*—unity—and we invoke the traditions and religious dramas of Shi'i Islam which point forward to a society without exploitation, without cruelty and without money. God does not provide all the answers to our problems: He provides only the framework. Khomeini's interpretation of the Quran is mechanical and deterministic. But we are not talking nonsense like Khomeini. We do not consider that we have discovered any Islamic "third way." We do not believe in a "third way." We consider ourselves to be followers of the "first way," in the line of Muhammed, 'Ali and Hussein. If you ask me who the symbols of my Islam are, I would never say the Umayyads or the Abbasids, or interpreters such as Shaikh Muhammad 'Abdu or Maxime Rodinson. We have a social program derived from 'Ali.

**But even in the seventh and eighth centuries, the doctrines of 'Ali were a failure.**

Not at all. All societies need socio-economic analysis and something more general, ideology. Islam provides an ideological framework. It is up to us to provide concrete applications, so that we can come nearer to the ideal of a classless order.

**What about your position on women? The Quran insists that men have superiority over women, and women mem-**



A shack in south Tehran, 1980.

Meriphoto

\* *Akhund*: preacher.

\*\* *Kafir*: unbeliever.



**bers of the *Mujahidin* have to wear Islamic clothing.**

Khomeini accused me of having left Iran disguised as a woman: it is not true, but if it had been true I would not have been ashamed of it. In our Islam men and women are equal: those passages of the Quran you mention are not obligatory—they are *mutashabe* not *muhkam*. We do not force women to wear the *hejab*, or Muslim clothing. But the *hejab* is not, in any case, a symbol of inequality. Rather it reflects the Quranic injunction not to consider women as mere objects. In times of revolution, clothing acquires particular significance: remember that in the Chinese revolution women's clothes changed too.

**Why do you think there is so much hostility in Iran to the Baha'i?**

This has a political background. When the Baha'i began in the 19th century, the leadership of the movement was a political tendency, deriving its influence from Britain and Czarist Russia. Lower down, there were many people who believed in the religion without knowing about these political connections. There are therefore two questions: the political background and the mass of unconscious members. Khomeini confuses

these two—because he is a murderer. But I do not believe in the Baha'i, and I condemn them ideologically and philosophically.

**But do you condemn Christians?**

No. Jesus was a real prophet, like Muhammad.

**But would you deny Baha'i equal rights in the Islamic Republic?**

No. We want a democratic republic. In Islam no one can kill or harass someone for their religion or their thinking. We must respect people.

**You are accused by your opponents of being "Islamic Marxists." What is your relation to Marxism?**

There are two things which I would like to make absolutely clear. The first is that we are not Marxists: we reject the materialism of Marxism. But we are willing to discuss with Marxists. The sixth *Imam* sat in the *kaaba* at Mecca and debated with the materialists. Secondly, we are not allied to the Soviet Union. We are an independent organization. Those in Iran who are allied to the USSR are the *Tudeh* Party and the so-called Majority *Fedayi*: these groups have no social base and

have had to seek protection under Khomeini. We condemn their policies.

**Are you seeking support outside Iran?**

One of the reasons why I left Iran is to inform the world about what is really happening in Iran, particularly the non-aligned movement. The non-aligned movement should not support a blood-thirsty old man who is murdering people every day and who is buying arms from Israel.

**A central issue in Iran's relation to the non-aligned movement is the war with Iraq. If you were in power, how would you end it?**

If we had been in power, it would never have started. We always opposed Khomeini's attempt to export the revolution. Khomeini must therefore bear some responsibility for the material and human cost of this war. But we also condemn Iraq for aggression, and many of our members have been killed on the front. We are prepared for peace on the basis of non-interference in the affairs of Iraq and respect for existing frontiers. I hope Iraq is ready for this too, but I am not sure. ■

# The Constitution of the National Council of Resistance of Iran

Monday, 13 June 2005

The following is the text of the Constitution of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, adopted unanimously by NCRI in 1982 and updated afterwards.



## **Constitution of the National Council of Resistance of Iran**

**Article 1:** *The National Council of Resistance has been formed to overthrow the Khomeini regime and to establish the Provisional Government. >*

**Article 2:** Until the formation of the National Legislative and Constituent Assembly and declaration of its readiness to assume its responsibilities, this Council will undertake temporary duties of the state's legislation and supervision of the administration of the country's affairs.

**Article 3:** Every personality or political current (whose membership of the Council is accepted), is entitled to one vote.

**Article 4:** The Council's decisions are reached through a simple majority of members present during the session.

**Article 5:** Acceptance to the Council of any member requires the applicant's undertaking of the program of the Council and the Provisional Government, of the Provisional Government's urgent tasks, and of other ratification's by the Council. It must be accompanied by the written application for membership of the applicant and be presented to the president of the NCRI. This application will be set forth in the earliest sitting of the Council and provided its acceptance is approved (in accordance with article 4 laid above) the applicant will be considered as a Member of the Council' thereafter.

**Article 6:** All members of the Council and the Provisional Government must comply with the decisions made by the Council.

**Article 7:** The responsibilities to form the Provisional Government and to appoint the cabinet ministers is entrusted upon Mr. Massoud Rajavi who is representative of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran. This government will act in accordance with the program and the immediate tasks assigned to the Provisional Government and in accordance with the Council's future ratification.

**Article 8:** Within the framework of the Council's ratification, the right to question and to interpolate the Provisional Government, or any of its members, is reserved for every member of the Council.

**Article 9:** Personality-members of the Council attend the Council's session in person. They may not send representatives or deputies instead.

**Article 10:** The expenses of the Council are met by means of membership fees and voluntary donations made by those who wish to see a free and independent Iran. With the agreement of each member, the President of the NCRI will determine the amount of financial contribution each member undertake to provide. He will submit fiscal reports to the Council.

**Saffi Yasseri**  
Writer / Journalist  
Baghdad-Iraq  
May 27, 2005

**Knowing the truth of Iranian Intelligence Ministry's fabrication of lies about PMOI's suppression of Iraqi Kurds during 1991 uprising**

After the Iraqi Army disintegrated in March 1991 and the army personnel catastrophically retreated, a tank from one of the Iraqi Army battalions turned around in the main square at the entrance of Basra, aimed its gun towards a giant poster of the former President Saddam Hossein and fired. The poster was completely demolished and this sparked the uprising the United States had called for with all its might.

The uprising engulfed Iraq from south to north. Some areas like Baghdad, Ramadi, Tikrit and Mosoul did not join the uprising. Iraqi soldiers generally retreated to their homes. What was inside the garrisons, also in government offices and the archives of some of them, particularly the Department of ID Registration, were looted. The objective was to destroy all evidence against bringing a large number of Iranians into Iraq and disguise them as Iraqis. The departments working on this issue were set on fire. Of course, the central government was more clever and had preserved the files in special slides.

This was the first step in Iran's attempt to infiltrate southern Iraq and destroy the country's infrastructure and national economy.

However, with the power and prowess of the Republican Guard preserved including its forces and weapons, in addition to the US Forces' withdrawal following an agreement known as "tent", in which the US gave an open hand to Saddam in the southern region, the Republican Guard could infiltrate the south and indulge in the blood of its inhabitants. The situation was no different in the north.

At this point, fabricated allegations against the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran were propagated indicating clashes with and massacre of Kurdish dissidents. The source of these fabrications was the Iranian Intelligence Ministry.

The PMOI had a number of garrisons in northern Iraq which served as a jump board into Iran (while their policy was based on armed struggle as a

tool to topple Iran's dictatorial religious regime that is imposing its power upon the Iranian people). The PMOI had abandoned those bases before the war. Pishmarga forces of Jalal Talebani, leader of P.U.K. destroyed those camps. Talebani resorted to the Iranian regime and praised it. He served the policies of the Iranian regime by conducting its assignments. He shamelessly proposed to confront the People's Mojahedin in return for financial and military support. The letters exchanged between Talebani and Iranian authorities were later revealed when Massoud Barezani's organization occupied Talebani's offices and got hold of some documents showing Talebani's paid services for the Iranian regime.

In light of this background, a group of Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards accompanied by a number of Talebani's Pishmarga entered Jalawla, the town where PMOI's base and hospital were located with a number of patients, disabled individuals and a few physicians and nurses; they purged the places and left no survivor. Subsequently, they went to Kelar. This is where the Iranian regime and its Intelligence claimed, before the Kurds do, that the Mojahedin had attacked the town with tanks.

Actually, what happened in this city was what I investigated for my journalistic work and published the results in my book, entitled, "The People's Mojahedin and Iraq."

To avoid confrontation with the Kurdish dissidents, a number of PMOI tanks and armored vehicles were retreating according to the order of their commanders. Their wireless communication had failed due to long distance from the central control.

The tanks lost their way and stopped at the entrance to the city of Kelar. The dissident Kurds and Iranians thought the tanks and armored vehicles belonged to the Iraqi army and fled. When the PMOI found out that they had come to the wrong place, they turned around to go back. At this point, the Iranians and the Kurds came back and attacked them from behind.

The Mojahedin did not have any order to clash with the Kurds or react to the sources of fire. So they abandoned their tanks and armored vehicles and walked out, holding their hands behind their heads. They were trying to prove that they are not seeking trouble and do not wish to fight. They were surrendering, but the assailants took them one by one and fired into their heads at point blank range, abandoning their bodies by the side of the road. A number of them were handed over to Iran. The number of martyrs amounted to 17. Their bodies had been mutilated.

A number of residents of this city told me about the manner of killing of the PMOI by the Kurds. I have written this in my book. I also informed the

Mojahedin of what I had learned. They transferred the bodies of their martyrs to the City of Ashraf and buried them in the cemetery.

The incumbent Iraqi foreign minister Hoshiyar Zibari who at the time was in charge of the Kurdistan Democratic Party's external affairs, wrote a formal letter to a court in The Netherlands, denying PMOI's involvement in the suppression of Kurdish dissidents.

In an opinion poll, I personally conducted in some villages in Solaimaniya, Kelar, Jalawla, Khaneqeen, Mandalee, Dahouk and Erbil, Kurdish citizens denied that the Mojahedin had any role in suppressing the Kurdish opposition. A number of Pishmargas of Kurdistan Democrat Party even emphasized that when they confronted the Mojahedin who headed for Iran or were returning from there, there was not any hostile engagement from either side. They stressed that a number of Iran's Revolutionary Guards were dressed in Kurdish clothes and when a number of them were killed by the Mojahedin fire who were trying to defend their positions, the Iranian Intelligence filmed the area and pretended that the Mojahedin had killed the dissident Kurds.

I would like to emphasize that the Iranian Intelligence Ministry's fabrication of lies in this regard has surpassed all limits. They take advantage of the media they have at their disposal and their power to pay money and of their relations with Kurdish leaders, to surpass any boundary.

In this way, I have a verified testimony. I am prepared to help any one who wishes to have any field investigation about what I just proved, in any manner that they deem suitable.

May 27, 2005

Iraqi writer and journalist  
Saffi Yasseri



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Sub-Commission on Prevention of  
Discrimination and Protection  
of Minorities  
Forty-seventh session  
Agenda item 19

IMPLICATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES FOR  
THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Written statement submitted by International Educational Development,  
a non-governmental organization on the Roster

The Secretary-General has received the following communication, which is circulated in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1296 (XLIV).

[21 August 1995]

1. International Educational Development/Humanitarian Law Project has been concerned about the armed conflict in Iran between the military forces of the Khomeini regime and the National Liberation Army (NLA) of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. We have also been keenly aware of the situation of the Kurdish people in the area and have raised our concerns, based on our own investigations, in the United Nations human rights forums.

2. We have been distressed because of certain misrepresentations of events in the area, in particular allegations made that the NLA has collaborated with the armed forces of the Government of Iraq, inter alia by participating in attacks against Kurdish people in Kirkuk, Qara Hanjeer, Kifri and Altun Kopir in April 1991. There are also allegations that NLA troops took part in the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish villages, and that they even collaborated earlier with the then Shah against the Kurdish peoples.

3. From our independent investigation and discussion with parties involved, we find these allegations false. Accordingly, we wish to set out the facts as we believe them to be.

4. During the Gulf war, the NLA evacuated the military bases they had in Kurdish areas along the Iran-Iraq border - some in the north and some in the south. They relocated to the middle border area away from Kurdish settlements. The key reason for this costly relocation was to remove themselves from Iraq's internal affairs.

5. After the defeat of the Iraqi forces in the Gulf war, the Iranian regime began a two-pronged initiative to annihilate the NLA and to establish an Iranian-controlled Islamic government in Iraq. In March 1991, Iran sent seven Guard Corps divisions and brigades to attack NLA base camps on the border. However, these were heavily defeated by NLA fighters. Six of the Iranian soldiers captured by the NLA wore Kurdish dress. At the same time, the Iranian regime sought to hire Iraqi Kurds to fight against the NLA, and in the Kurdish areas demolished the abandoned NLA camps.

6. The "Kurdish" prisoners of war (who were in fact Iranians) held by the NLA were subsequently presented to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and they conceded that the Iranian regime was trying to recruit Kurds to fight the NLA. The prisoners were released by order of M. Rajavi, Commander-in-Chief of the NLA and extensive documentation as well as film footage and photographs were also made available to the public about these events.

7. The NLA and the National Resistance Council of Iran sent messages to Kurdish groups in Iraq indicating that they had no interest whatsoever in interfering with them or in their own struggles. They reiterated that their only objective was directed at the Khomeini regime and stressed that they had relocated to central border areas away from the Kurds.

8. This communication follows a pattern of good relations between the NLA, the National Resistance Council of Iran and Kurdish people and their leaders in Iraq. Resistance leaders have met with leaders of the Iraq Kurdish Democratic Party (led by Mr. Barzani) and freely associates with other Kurdish groups in Iraq, Europe, the United States and at United Nations sessions.

9. Most of the allegations made against the NLA regarding the Kurdish people come from a man named Jamshid Tafrishi-Engineer, who was cited by people at this session of the Sub-Commission as a former leader of the Iranian resistance. Our investigation indicates that Mr. Tafrishi-Engineer joined the resistance in 1988, but left after 19 months with a low rank. In his letter of resignation, handwritten and dated 23 September 1990, he cites personal problems and requests leave to transfer to a refugee camp. He then travelled to Europe where he began to campaign publicly against the NLA. There is compelling evidence that he is in fact an agent of the Khomeini regime's Ministry of Intelligence.

10. IED/HLP has first-hand experience that the Khomeini regime seeks to draw attention away from the civil war in Iran - in fact the regime has fought diligently to keep all mention of the war and application of humanitarian law out of United Nations reports and resolutions on the situation in Iran. The regime attempts to make the international community believe the NLA is really fighting the Kurdish people in Iraq and as such is a pawn of the Iraq regime. We present this assessment of these events because in our view, misinformation must be challenged and true facts presented in the interest of sound and honest evaluation of events in Iran and of the civil war raging there.

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**US says Iraq-based Iran opposition aids Iraq govt.**

Iba0000020020523dy5n00e7b

By Jonathan Wright

636 Words

23 May 2002

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Reuters News

English

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WASHINGTON, May 22 (Reuters) - The Bush administration has alleged the Iraqi-based opposition to the Iranian government performs internal security functions for the Iraqi government, adding a new allegation against a group which the United States has called a foreign terrorist organization since 1997.

The opposition Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), also known as the People's Mujahideen, dismissed the allegation as Iranian government propaganda. A document obtained separately also appeared to challenge a U.S. claim that the group helped the Iraqi government against a Kurdish uprising after the Gulf War in 1991.

The allegations appear in the "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001" report released by the State Department this week and did not appear in the same report in previous years.

"In 1991, it assisted the government of Iraq in suppressing the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in northern and southern Iraq. Since then, the MEK has continued to perform internal security services for the Government of Iraq," the 2001 report said.

"In the 1980s the MEK's leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. Since resettling in Iraq in 1987, the group has conducted internal security operations in support of the Government of Iraq," a separate passage said.

A U.S. State Department official said the United States had suspicions in the past and had been able to confirm the facts in the course of the last year. "It's now in the realm of certitude," added the official, who asked not to be named.

In a written response, the Mujahideen said: "The new allegation and lies are another gift and 'goodwill gesture' to the religious fascism ruling Iran."

"Astonishingly it has taken eleven years for those who are making these allegations to reach 'the realm of certitude' about the lies that the mullahs' regime has repeated a thousand times," the statement added.

**LEGAL DOCUMENT**

Reuters separately obtained a copy of a 1999 legal document signed by a senior official of a major Iraqi Kurdish group that said there was no evidence the Mujahideen took part in the Iraqi government's 1991 campaign against the Kurds.

The document, which was part of a lawsuit in the Netherlands, was received on condition that the author and the original recipient remain anonymous. The Iraqi Kurds have regular contacts with the Iranian

government.

"(We) can confirm that the Mujahedin (sic) were not involved in suppressing the Kurdish people neither during the uprising nor in its aftermath. We have not come across any evidence to suggest that the Mujahedin have exercised any hostility towards the people of Iraqi Kurdistan," it said.

The State Department lists the Mujahideen as a "foreign terrorist organization" but, alone of such groups, it runs an office in Washington and enjoys widespread support among members of Congress hostile towards the Iranian government.

The office has stayed open since the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States. The State Department and the Justice Department each say the other is responsible for any sanctions the authorities should take against the organization.

The Mujahideen has a large and well-equipped military force on the Iraqi side of the Iranian border. It receives much of its money from the Iranian community in the United States.

Members of Congress sympathetic to the Mujahideen were unavailable to comment on the new allegation, which would tend to discredit the organization in the eyes of many Americans.

The Mujahideen challenged its designation as a "foreign terrorist organization" in the U.S. courts and won a partial victory last June when a federal appeals court ruled that the State Department should give such organizations a chance to answer the allegations against them.

The Mujahideen statement said the organization would challenge the new allegations in the U.S. courts.

For assistance, access [Factiva's Membership Circle](#).

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## **Iran Policy Committee (IPC) Co-Chair Biographies**

**James Akins, Ambassador (ret.):** James Akins was U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the Nixon administration. An internationally respected expert on Middle East and energy issues, Akins has been an active and outspoken proponent for a just resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a prescient analyst of the Middle East peace process and Arab politics in general. Author Jean-Jacques Servan Schreiber has called Akins “the westerner who knows the most about the Middle East and has the closest relationship of trust with its leaders.”

**Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, USMC (ret.), co-founder of wvc3, inc.:** Bill Cowan is an internationally acknowledged expert in areas of terrorism, homeland security, intelligence, and military special operations. A retired Marine Corps officer, Cowan spent three-and-a-half years on combat assignments in Vietnam. From 1989 through 1994, Cowan was involved in numerous operations in the Middle East in response to terrorist incidents and the holding of Western hostages in Beirut and Kuwait. He was directly involved in every facet of the Beirut hostages drama, including international negotiations leading to their release in 1991.

In 1990, on behalf of a major New York law firm and working with former CIA Director Bill Colby, he organized and successfully conducted a series of operations resulting in the repatriation of a number of Western hostages from Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. Cowan is a FOX News Channel contributor and a co-founder of the WVC3 Group, a company providing homeland security services, support and technologies to government and commercial clients.

**Paul Leventhal, Founder and President, Nuclear Control Institute:** Paul Leventhal founded the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) in 1981 and served as its President for 22 years prior to becoming Senior Advisor and Founding President in June 2002. He prepared four books for the Institute and lectured in a number of countries on nuclear issues, including as Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Cambridge University’s Global Security Programme. Prior to establishing NCI, Leventhal held senior staff positions in the United States Senate on nuclear power and proliferation issues.

Leventhal was Special Counsel to the Senate Government Operations Committee and Staff Director of the Senate Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee; Leventhal was responsible for the investigations and legislation that resulted in enactment of two landmark nuclear laws—the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. He also served as co-director of the Senate Special Investigation of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident and Assistant Administrator for Policy and Planning at the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Leventhal holds a bachelor’s degree from Franklin and Marshall College and a master’s degree from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism.

**Clare M. Lopez, Executive Director IPC:** Clare Lopez is a strategic policy and intelligence analyst with a focus on Middle East, national security and counterterrorism issues. Based in the private sector environment of the Washington metro area, Lopez began her career as an

operations officer with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), serving domestically and abroad for 20 years in a variety of assignments. Lopez joined the staff of the Battelle Memorial Institute in July 2005 as a Senior Scientific Researcher and is a Visiting Researcher and occasional guest lecturer at Georgetown University. Previously, Lopez worked at the high-tech consulting firm, HawkEye Systems, LLC. Earlier, Lopez produced Technical Threat Assessments for U.S. Embassies at the Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security. During Lopez's CIA career, she served around the world, acquiring regional expertise on the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. She has served in or visited over two dozen nations worldwide and speaks several languages, including Spanish, Bulgarian, French, German, and Russian. Currently, Lopez is studying Farsi with a private tutor and at the Comprehensive Language Institute in Arlington, Virginia.

**R. Bruce McColm, President Institute for Democratic Strategies and Former President, International Republican Institute:** McColm is the President of Democratic Strategies, a non-profit organization committed to strengthening democratic processes abroad. For the past 25 years, he has been actively involved in the global movement toward democracy and has written extensively on political transitions in Latin America, Africa, and Central Europe. He has served on numerous boards of directors and acts as a trustee for various private foundations and advocacy groups. McColm served as president of the International Republican Institute, where he extended the organization's capacity to provide technical assistance on economic and political reform around the world, introducing the use of information technologies to democracy programs. Previously, McColm worked in a variety of capacities at Freedom House, a New York-based human rights organization and also was elected a member of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS). McColm was educated at William College, Harvard University, and the University of Chicago.

**Lt. General Thomas McInerney USAF, (Ret.):** General McInerney established his own consulting firm, GRRT (Government Reform Through Technology) in January 2000. Working with high-tech companies that do business with federal, state, city, and local governments, GRRT helps them introduce advanced technology into the private sector. From 1996-1999, Gen. McInerney was Chief Executive Officer and President of Business Executives for National Security (BENS), a national, nonpartisan organization of business and professional leaders, with headquarters in Washington. Prior to joining BENS, Gen. McInerney was Vice President of Command and Control for Loral Defense Systems-Eagan. He joined Loral (then Unisys Electronic Systems Division) in 1994, following 35 years as a pilot, commander, and Joint Force Commander in the United States Air Force. Gen. McInerney retired from military service as Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and as Director of the Defense Performance Review (DPR), reporting to the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity, he led the Pentagon's "reinventing government" effort, visiting more than 100 leading-edge commercial companies to assimilate their ideas about business re-engineering.

Gen. McInerney earned a Bachelor of Science degree at the U.S. Military Academy in 1959 and a master's degree in international relations from George Washington University in 1972.

He completed Armed Forces Staff College in 1970 and the National War College in 1973. Gen. McInerney is a member of several Boards of Directors.

**Captain Charles T. “Chuck” Nash, USN (ret.)** is the founder and President of Emerging Technologies International, Inc. (ETII). The company’s focus is to understand military requirements and then actively search out and identify high leverage, emerging technologies that can be inserted quickly and inexpensively into tools for the U.S. military. Clients include government laboratories and commercial technology companies. Previously, Capt. Nash served as Vice President, Emerging Technologies Group, Santa Barbara Applied Research, Inc. For 25 years before that, Capt. Nash served as an officer in the U.S. Navy, accumulating over 4,300 hours of flight time and 965 carrier landings on nine different aircraft carriers as a Naval Aviator. He served in a variety of command positions with Naval Operations at the Pentagon and U.S. Naval Forces Europe and has filled billets with U.S. and foreign special operations forces in Turkey, Northern Iraq and elsewhere. Capt. Nash previously served on the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and on the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Expert Panel for the Supersonic Cruise Missile Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. He was a sponsor and co-chairman of the OPNAV High Speed Strike Information Day, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (JHAPL). Currently, he serves on a number of Boards of Directors and is an advisor to the Chairman of the Board of Isothermal Systems Research, Inc. and to the President and CEO of Vision Technologies International, Inc. Capt. Nash earned his B.S. in Aeronautics from Parks College of Aeronautical Technology, St. Louis University and attended the National War College at Fort L. J. McNair in Washington. Currently a Fox News Channel Military Analyst, Capt. Nash frequently appears on the network to discuss military, terrorism and aviation issues.

**Lt. General Edward Rowny, USA (ret.):** General Rowny began his military career following graduation from the Johns Hopkins University and the U.S. Military Academy, two Masters Degrees from Yale University and a Ph.D. from American University. He fought in WW II, Korea, and Vietnam, commanding units from platoon to Corps size. Later, he served in the 1970s and 1980s as an advisor to the SALT II talks and as the chief negotiator of the START negotiations, with the rank of ambassador. From 1985 to 1990, he was Special Advisor for Arms Control to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. In 1989, President Reagan awarded him the Presidential Citizens Medal. The citation reads that Gen. Rowny is “one of the principal architects of America’s policy of peace through strength. As an arms negotiator and as a presidential advisor, he has served mightily, courageously, and nobly in the cause of peace and freedom.” In 1991, Ambassador Rowny retired from government and currently consults on international affairs.

**Professor Raymond Tanter, Former Senior Staff Member, National Security Council:** Raymond Tanter is an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University, where he teaches courses on International Relations and Terrorism. Tanter is an adjunct scholar at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and was scholar-in-residence at the Middle East Institute in Washington. He researched U.S. policy options regarding Iran at both think tanks. After receiving a Ph.D. from Indiana University in 1964, Prof. Tanter taught at Northwestern, Stanford, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Tanter was a fellow at the Hoover

Institution at Stanford and the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington and a Fulbright scholar, University of Amsterdam. In 1975, Tanter spent a month as scholar-in-residence at the American Embassy, Tokyo, lecturing on petroleum interruption scenarios, with special reference to the Middle East. In 1967, Tanter was deputy director of behavioral sciences at the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense and a member of the Civilian Executive Panel, Chief of Naval Operations, 1980-1981. He served at the White House on the National Security Council staff, 1981-1982. In 1983-1984, he was personal representative of the Secretary of Defense to arms control talks in Madrid, Helsinki, Stockholm, and Vienna. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Among Tanter's publications is *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. Tanter is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Committee on the Present Danger, American Political Science Association, and the Iran Policy Committee.

**Major General Paul E. Valley, USA (Ret.):** General Valley retired in 1991 from the U.S. Army as Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific in Honolulu, Hawaii. Gen. Valley graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and was commissioned in the Army in 1961, serving a distinguished career of 32 years in the Army. He served in many overseas theaters, including Europe and the Pacific Rim countries, as well as two combat tours in Vietnam. He has served on U.S. security assistance missions on civilian military relations in locales around the world. Gen. Valley is a graduate of the Infantry School, Ranger and Airborne Schools, Jumpmaster School, the Command and General Staff School, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the Army War College. His combat service in Vietnam included positions as infantry company commander, intelligence officer, operations officer, military advisor and aide-de-camp. He has over 15 years experience in Special Operations, Psychological and Civil-Military Operations. Gen. Valley was one of the first nominees for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations under President Reagan and commanded the 351st Civil Affairs Command during the 1980s. He has served as a consultant to the Commanding General of the Special Operations Command as well as the Department of Defense Anti-Drug and Counter-Terrorist Task Forces. Gen. Valley is a military analyst for Fox News Channel and is a guest on many nationally-syndicated radio talk shows. He also is a guest lecturer on the War on Terror and has just co-authored a book entitled *The Endgame, Winning the War on Terror*.