Iranian Entity: Jaber ibn Hayan Research Department (JIHRD)

On August 12, 2008, added to the Specially Designated National (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; listed in an annex to U.N. Security Council resolution 1803 of March 3, 2008, because of links to Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, the designation requires states to freeze financial assets on their territories which are owned or controlled by the entity, by its agents, by entities it owns or controls, or by entities determined by the Security Council to have assisted the designated entity in evading sanctions; the designation also requires states to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the listed entity; listed by the British government in 2008 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement; listed by the Japanese government in 2008 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to nuclear weapons; listed by the European Union on April 23, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, and within their jurisdiction, European Union member states must freeze all funds and economic resources owned, held or controlled by the listed entity, and must also ensure that funds or economic resources are not made available to or for the benefit of the listed entity; listed as an entity of concern for military procurement activities in an early warning document distributed by the German government to industry in July 2005; the German government urged caution when initiating commercial dealings with this entity, and suggested that because this entity is involved with both military and civilian projects, civilian use must be shown by specific and verifiable evidence; intended recipient of a nitrogen production plant, the procurement of which was denied on April 30, 2002, by a member state of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

A department of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI - see separate entity record); created in 1990 as a center for nuclear technology training; existence of the facility was declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in March 2003; placed under IAEA inspection as of June 2003; located at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC - see separate entity record); functions as a backup complex for research and development for the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle, and produces 99Mo, 131I and 133Xe radioisotopes; provides a wide range of laboratory services for the Nuclear Fuel Production Division of AEOI (now NFPC - see separate entity record); equipped with a gamma-ray spectrometry system, an Alpha-Particle spectrometry system, neutron activation analysis facilities, and a radiocarbon dating laboratory; consists of several rooms where conversion activities took place using nuclear material imported in 1991.

In February 2003, Iran acknowledged the undeclared 1991 import of natural uranium in the form of UF6 (1,000kg), UF4 (400kg) and UO2 (400kg), allegedly from China; according to Iran, 376.6 kg of the imported UF4 were converted to uranium metal in 113 experiments carried out at JHL between 1995 and 2000; the equipment used in uranium metal conversion experiments was dismantled and Iran is now refurbishing part of JHL as a uranium metal processing laboratory; in October 2003, Iran admitted that uranium metal production capabilities had been intended for use in its laser enrichment program; according to Iran, 44 kg of the imported UO2 were used to test pulse columns and pellet production at JHL; Iran also tested uranium conversion and purification processes for potential use at its Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF); 2.7 kg of the UO2 were used to produce UF4; in addition, gram quantities of UO2 were irradiated at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and then processed at JHL; the IAEA noted in March 2003 that one of the three cylinders containing the imported UF6, then being stored at JHL, was lighter than declared; at the time, Iranian officials explained that 1.9 kg of UF6 had escaped due to leaking valves, but later admitted that the missing UF6 was used in centrifuge tests at Kalaye Electric Company.

According to Iran, a small amount of separated plutonium was stored in a laboratory at JHL and 4 kg of unprocessed irradiated UO2 targets were stored in containers at TNRC; both materials were presented to the IAEA on November 8, 2003, and the containers of UO2 targets were sealed by the IAEA at that time.

From January 10-28, 2004, the IAEA carried out "complementary access" at a number of hot cells located in JHL; also in January 2004, waste from reprocessing experiments at TNRC that had first been moved to Anarak was transferred to JHL; JHL is also the storage location of uranium metal secretly imported in 1993, some of which was used in laser enrichment experiments at TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad.

Between April 24 and May 5, 2004, the IAEA carried out inspections at JHL, during which inspectors received information on what Iran said was all nuclear material at JHL from the facility's operator and were able to take samples of the uranium metal stored there; inspectors were also able to discuss Iran's production of uranium metal for its atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) experiments, a technique used for laser enrichment of uranium.

According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), produces beryllium oxide; according to the NCRI, cooperates with Mr. Dahstizadeh, director of the Center for Research at Iran's Scientific and Industrial Organization.