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Amidst violence, Iran’s centrifuges are still spinning

By Valerie Lincy
Updated June 26, 2009

(Click here to access status report archive)

 

Political turmoil in Iran surrounding the results of a June 12 presidential election has derailed the Obama administration’s policy of seeking to engage Iran in negotiations over its nuclear program. Stalled nuclear diplomacy will give Iran more time to build up its nuclear infrastructure, rendering an Iranian nuclear weapon capability a fait accompli.

Conservative candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s current president, was quickly declared the winner by an overwhelming margin. However, the election was marred by a number of irregularities and those contesting Ahmadinejad’s victory then took to the streets in a series of massive demonstrations. The regime’s decision to silence demonstrators with a bloody crackdown has now sparked international outrage, including from U.S. President Barack Obama. On June 23, President Obama strongly condemned the crackdown, saying he was “appalled and outraged by the threats, the beatings, and imprisonments of the last few days.” This climate has eliminated the prospect of any fruitful nuclear talks involving Iran in the coming months. The United States and its European partners are unlikely to sit down with a regime whose legitimacy has been so severely challenged at home – and whose response to that challenge has been violence and repression.

Iran’s nuclear program progresses despite this upheaval, and is likely to continue apace irrespective of the political outcome in Iran. So, while western leaders put nuclear diplomacy on hold, Iran will continue to increase its ability to enrich uranium using centrifuges. These machines produce fuel for nuclear reactors, but are also capable of producing fuel for nuclear weapons. As of early June, Iran had nearly 5,000 centrifuges enriching uranium, and over 2,000 more machines ready for operation – out of a planned total of over 50,000. The 1,339 kg of low-enriched uranium Iran now has stockpiled would be more than sufficient to fuel one nuclear weapon, though the material would need to be further enriched by re-circulating it through the centrifuges. (For more detail on these estimates, see Iran’s Nuclear Timetable.)

Updates on the status of Iran’s nuclear work are provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, the Agency’s inspection ability has been repeatedly hindered by Iran: inspectors have been unable to return to a heavy water reactor complex under construction at Arak, which will give Iran a ready source of plutonium; they were not allowed to complete an unannounced inspection of the Natanz enrichment plant last month; and a recent request to install additional cameras at Natanz was rejected.

Meanwhile, the IAEA’s investigation of alleged military dimensions to Iran's nuclear work has come to a grinding halt. Open issues of "serious concern" include reports that Iran acquired from the Khan network designs for a more sophisticated nuclear warhead, small enough to fit atop Iran’s medium-range Shahab-3 missile. The IAEA has described additional activities that, if true, would confirm that Iran, at least at some point, sought to develop nuclear weapons. These activities include:

Iran’s missile work has also surged ahead in recent months. In May, Iran tested the Sejil-2, a two-stage, solid fueled rocket, with an estimated range of 2,000 km. While it appears to have the same size, range and propellant as the Sejil-1, tested last November, Iran’s defense minister claimed that the Sejil-2 was fitted with an improved navigation and guidance system. This latest test confirms Iran’s progress in its mastery of staging, which will allow Iran to extend the range of its missiles, and in its use of solid fuel, which makes missiles easier to maintain, to store, and to launch quickly. This test follows Iran’s successful launch, in February, of a powerful two-stage, liquid-fueled rocket, the Safir-2. The launch, which managed to place a satellite in orbit, marks a milestone in Iran’s quest to field long-range missiles: a rocket that can propel a satellite into orbit can also carry a warhead over great distances.

The status of sanctions

Countries that are leading diplomacy with Iran have pursued a two-track strategy: Penalties – such as U.N., E.U. and U.S. sanctions – are coupled with offers of incentives and engagement. To implement U.N. Security Council resolutions and to further tighten the noose around Iran’s nuclear and missile developers, the United States has largely relied on Executive Order 13382. Of the 76 entities listed in Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803, the United States has designated 48 under this Executive Order, which freezes the bank accounts and financial assets of these entities, and prohibits U.S. persons from doing business with them. U.S. action against a number of entities not yet designated by the Council have probably had more impact, notably sanctions imposed against almost all major Iranian banks, along with their affiliates and subsidiaries.

In addition, pressure has continued to build in the U.S. Congress for more Iran sanctions. One measure under consideration would authorize sanctions against foreign oil and shipping firms that export gasoline and other refined petroleum products to Iran. The foreign firms – including Total, BP and India’s Reliance – could be barred from doing business in the United States and could have their assets under U.S. jurisdiction frozen. Another measure would authorize U.S. states to divest from companies involved in Iran’s energy sector. Congress has also sought to close loopholes in sanctions laws that allow foreign-based subsidiaries of U.S. companies to trade with Iran, that allow countries like the United Arab Emirates to serve as a platform for the transshipment of U.S. origin goods to Iran, and that allow the administration to balk at imposing penalties on foreign energy companies willing to invest in Iran.

The United States has also invoked banking laws to encourage major financial institutions in Europe, the United States and the Middle East to limit or cut ties with Iran. Last November, Treasury revoked Iran’s license for “U-turn” bank transfers, which had allowed certain dollar-based transactions involving Iranian entities to briefly enter the United States before being sent to offshore banks. And last March, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network warned U.S. banks that Iran is resorting to "an array of deceptive practices" in order to avoid sanctions. According to Treasury, Iran's central bank, also known as Bank Markazi, may be facilitating transactions for sanctioned Iranian banks. Bank Markazi and other Iranian banks have also requested that their names be removed from global transactions in order to mask the parties in the transaction. A number of banks have limited or ended business with Iran because of these risks, which has made it more costly and difficult for Iran to move hard currency around the world, and has raised the cost of doing business for the Iranian government and Iranian companies.

U.S. allies have also adopted measures to punish Iran. Britain announced on June 18 that it had frozen $1.6 worth of Iranian assets, pursuant to U.N. and E.U. sanctions. And last October, the Australian government announced new travel and trade restrictions against nearly 40 individuals and organizations for their contribution to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. The sanctions target 20 Iranian individuals and 18 organizations, including Iran’s bank Melli and Saderat. In addition, Australia said it would no longer provide new financial support for trade with Iran under trade promotion and finance programs.

For its part, beginning in early 2007, the European Union has pursued sanctions beyond the Security Council. However, such action has been tentative and infrequent. In August 2008, the E.U. strengthened financial sanctions against Iran by requiring member states to “exercise restraint” in using public money to support trade with Iran, to inspect suspicious air and sea cargo to and from Iran, and placing additional due diligence requirements on E.U.-based financial institutions in their activities with Iranian banks. In late June 2008, 26 additional Iranian entities linked to missile and nuclear work were targeted – including Iran’s Bank Melli and officials from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Defense. The move requires all E.U. member states to freeze the assets of listed entities and to institute a travel ban on listed individuals. Earlier, in April 2007, the E.U. acted outside the Council in hitting 23 Iranian entities with such penalties.

Iran’s refusal to suspend enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water work has led the U.N. Security Council to vote three rounds of sanctions: Resolution 1803 of March 3, 2008, resolution 1747 of March 24, 2007, and resolution 1737 of December 23, 2006. These resolutions bar Iran from importing or exporting most items related to uranium enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water and nuclear weapon delivery systems, and bar states from providing Iran with financial or technical assistance aimed at acquiring these items. Resolution 1803 also bars Iran from purchasing dual-use nuclear and missile items, requests that countries inspect suspect cargoes to and from Iran, reduce public financial support for business with Iran, and cut back on transactions involving Iranian banks, particularly Bank Saderat and Bank Melli. However, the resolution’s language leaves plenty of room for countries uninterested in enforcing such measures to opt out. Combined, the resolutions call for a freeze on the assets of some 75 Iranian entities linked to missile and nuclear work. Resolution 1747 also bars Iran from exporting conventional arms and related materials and asks states to “exercise vigilance and restraint” in transferring arms to Iran. States must also “exercise vigilance” in providing Iranian nationals with specialized nuclear and missile-related training and are called upon, but not required, to cut off “grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans” to the Iranian government. In addition, countries must report whether a person sanctioned by the Council has entered into or transited through their territory. Resolution 1803 puts five additional individuals under an international travel ban.

In order to oversee implementation, the Security Council created a Committee composed of Council members, responsible for investigating alleged violations of the resolutions, for expanding the asset freeze and travel surveillance to additional entities, and for considering exemption requests. The Committee reported in June 2009 that Iran had sought to export conventional arms to Syria in violation of resolution 1747 -- the illicit cargo has been detained in Cyprus. As of June 15, 2009, out of 192 countries, the Committee had received reports on the implementation of resolution 1737 from only 91, reports on the implementation of resolution 1747 from 78, and reports on the implementation of resolution 1803 from 66.

Nuclear progress

After an intermittent freeze on uranium enrichment that lasted several years, Iran resumed enrichment work in January 2006. Since early 2007, Iran has stepped up efforts at its underground commercial-scale enrichment plant at Natanz, with the installation of piping, wiring and control panels, and the installation and linkage of IR-1 (P-1) centrifuges in cascades. Iran has completed the installation of two “units” at Natanz, with roughly 3,000 centrifuges each. As of the IAEA’s last report, published in June, thirty cascades of 164 machines are operating there, or about 4,920 centrifuges. All these centrifuges have been fed with UF6. A further 2,132 machines have been installed and placed under vacuum; 164 are being installed. According to an IAEA inventory in November 2008, Iran has produced 839 kg of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride at the plant since February 2007. This is about a third more than Iran had estimated in its operating records. Since last November, Iran estimates that it has produced a further 500 kg of the material, brining its total stockpile to 1,339 kg. Based on these figures, Iran appears to be producing about 2.75 kg of low-enriched UF6 each day.

Work at the Natanz pilot plant has shifted away from the first-generation IR-1 centrifuges towards the development of more advanced machines, including the IR-2, IR-3 and IR-4. All of these machines have been tested with UF6. The IR-2 is a sub-critical machine with a single carbon fiber rotor and no bellows, according to a report by the Institute for Science and International Security. However, Iran is also testing a modified version of the IR-2, according to the IAEA’s latest report. This modified IR-2, or one of the other, more advanced centrifuge models, is likely made with higher strength metals, like maraging steel. It is not clear whether Iran is able to manufacture, assemble and install any of these advanced machines in large quantities, as Iran may rely on foreign suppliers for some of the machine’s key materials and parts. However, Iran is working to make centrifuge operations entirely indigenous; at its Kalaye Electric research and development laboratory, Iran is developing not only centrifuge components, but also measuring equipment and vacuum pumps.

Iran has also continued to produce large quantities of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) – a gas that can be enriched to make fuel for reactors or bombs – at its Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Isfahan. From March 2004 through early November 2008, Iran had produced some 357 tons of this material. The IAEA is now in the process of verifying Iran’s estimated inventory of UF6, which is likely to decrease and more of the material is shifted to Natanz for enrichment.

At the same time, other parts of Iran’s nuclear program have progressed. Despite calls by the U.N. Security Council, the IAEA and Europe to abandon the project, Iran has pushed forward with its heavy water production plant at Arak, and with its 40-megawatt heavy water reactor nearby. The heavy water plant was inaugurated in August 2006, and, using satellite imagery, the IAEA assesses the plant to be operational. The IAEA board indefinitely blocked Iran’s request for technical assistance for this project at a meeting in November 2007, over concerns that the reactor could be used to produce plutonium for weapons. IAEA inspectors have been denied access to the reactor since August 2008, thus limiting the Agency’s ability to report on construction progress there; newly-installed roofing over many of the buildings on the site, including over the reactor building, has prevented the Agency from tracking process using satellite imagery.. Inspectors’ access to the heavy water production plant is also blocked, as long as Iran fails to implement the Agency’s Additional Protocol allowing for enhanced inspections. On May 23, 2009, Agency inspectors were able to visit the Fuel Manufacturing Plant and confirmed that it is operating and producing natural uranium pellets to fuel the heavy water reactor.

After years of delay, the light water power reactor at Bushehr, which is being built by Russia for over $1 billion, is nearing completion. Tests using virtual nuclear fuel rods began in late February 2009 and start-up is expected before the end of 2009. Delivery of the reactor fuel needed for start-up, some 82 tons, was completed in January 2008. The billion dollar reactor is expected to supply 1,000 megawatts of energy to the national power grid. Each year, the reactor will also generate spent fuel containing some 250 kg of weapon-useable plutonium – enough to fuel several dozen nuclear weapons after further processing. The spent fuel will be returned to Russia, in accordance with a protocol signed in February 2005.

Grounds for suspicion

Doubts about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear work have grown in response to Iran’s decision to limit its cooperation with the IAEA. In early February 2008, the IAEA presented member states, including Iran, with specific evidence that Iran had pursued work related to nuclear weapons. In its May 2008 report, the Agency listed eighteen documents supporting these allegations. Iran has called the documents “forged” or “fabricated,” but still refuses to help the Agency investigate their validity by providing access to individuals, records and sites. For instance, it has barred IAEA inspectors from interviewing Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, former head of the Physics Research Center who was reportedly described by the IAEA as the Iranian military official in charge of Iran's nuclear effort. Since May, the IAEA has made a number of proposals aimed at breaking this impasse – none of which Iran has accepted.

The IAEA has also presented specific information showing that a company in Iran involved in uranium conversion was in touch with a team designing the inner cone of a missile re-entry vehicle that could, according to the Agency, “quite likely accommodate” a nuclear warhead. The IAEA wants Iran to explain documents and technical information that link Iran to the testing of high voltage detonator firing equipment, the development of exploding bridge wire detonators and an arrangement for underground, remote explosive testing. The Agency considers these activities to be “relevant to nuclear weapon R&D.”

The IAEA also wants clarification on Iran’s efforts to procure such potentially nuclear weapon-related items as spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron sources, corrosion resistant steel parts and radiation measurement equipment. These items might have been intended for use in interrelated studies on uranium conversion, high explosives testing and the design of a nuclear-capable missile re-entry vehicle.

The IAEA is still reviewing elements of Iran’s undeclared nuclear program, including the illicit import of centrifuge equipment in the late 1980s and 1990s. In November 2007, Iran finally turned over a one-page document containing a 1987 offer from the network run by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. According to Iran, this is the only remaining evidence of the offer, which included supplying a disassembled P-1 centrifuge, centrifuge manufacturing specifications, blueprints for a “complete plant,” and materials to make 2,000 centrifuges. The offer also included auxiliary vacuum and electrical drive equipment, mechanical, electrical and electronic support equipment for the centrifuge plant, and a document on how to reduce UF6 to metal, and how to cast and machine enriched, natural and depleted uranium into “hemispherical forms.” Iran insists that it only received some components for two disassembled centrifuges along with supporting drawings and specifications.

After reviewing what the Agency described as “the limited documentation provided by Iran,” the IAEA concluded that its findings matched Iran’s statements about the 1987 acquisition of P-1 centrifuge technology. However, several questions about Iran’s early research and development work following this offer remain open, including the genesis of a 1993 offer of P-1 enrichment technology from the Khan network and the conditions under which Iran received a document on how to make hemispheres of uranium metal—an activity uniquely useful for bomb making.

As for the development of its more advanced centrifuge program, Iran is sticking to its unlikely story that after receiving a full set of drawings for Pakistan’s P-2 from the Khan network in 1996, during a meeting in Dubai, it conducted no work at all on the P-2 until 2002, and that it never received P-2 components. Iran has also insisted that it procured only a small number of magnets for the P-2. The IAEA was unable to substantiate evidence that Iran received 900 magnets from a foreign supplier during the period between 1996 and 2002 when Iran says it undertook no work on the P-2. As a result, the Agency has concluded its findings about Iran’s P-2 activities match Iran’s statements. Yet, Iran’s current pursuit of the IR-2 makes uncertainties about the program’s early development troubling.

Foreign assistance

Imports of nuclear-, chemical- and missile-related equipment have been indispensable to Iran’s weapon efforts. The latest report by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence on transfers of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapon technology, which covers 2008, repeats claims made many times in the past that Iran has continued to seek foreign assistance from entities in Russia, China, and North Korea. According to the report, China supplies “a variety of missile-related items” to Iran; and Russia provides assistance to Iran’s missile and “civilian nuclear program.”

The nuclear smuggling network run by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan is believed to have been the main supplier to Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program. Speculation as to exactly what equipment and material Iran received has been the subject of numerous media reports since Libya renounced its mass destruction weapons and the Khan network was revealed as Libya’s primary supplier. The IAEA has already confirmed that the enrichment programs in Iran and Libya relied on the same technology obtained from the same foreign sources. And Iran’s P-2 centrifuge design is the same as the one found by the Agency in Libya. The P-1 centrifuges Iran has installed at Natanz are of an early European design, similar to the machines that have been under the control of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in Pakistan. If Iran indeed received the same package of nuclear goods as did Libya, then it is possible that Iran received the same Chinese-origin bomb design. Iran may also have received more sophisticated nuclear weapon designs from the Khan network. Such designs were found on computers seized from Swiss nationals Friedrich, Marco and Urs Tinner. The Tinners were a known part of the Khan smuggling network and the designs found on their computers would reportedly require only 15 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and would be small enough to fit atop Iran’s medium-range Shahab-3 missile.

China has also provided key assistance to Iran’s nuclear effort. Chinese entities have helped Iran prospect for uranium, have sold UF6 ready for enrichment and have provided Iran with blueprints, equipment test reports, and equipment design information for its uranium conversion plant at Isfahan.

Russia’s main contribution is the 1,000 MW light-water power reactor it has been building at Bushehr. As of December 2005, 700 Iranian experts had completed training at Russia's Novovoronezh training center, which is run by the Russian nuclear power agency Rosenergoatom. The training included a theory course, work on a nuclear power unit simulator, and work at Russian nuclear power plants similar to the Bushehr reactor. The Iranian experts will continue their training at the Bushehr reactor itself. In addition to the reactor, Russian entities are alleged to have supplied laser equipment for uranium enrichment, know-how for heavy water reactors, and help with heavy water and nuclear-grade graphite production.

Iran has also sought dual-use nuclear technology from some members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an organization of 45 nuclear supplier countries.  According to the New York Times, seven NSG countries have denied Iran the purchase of nuclear-related materials at least 75 times, mostly since 2002. Iranian end users involved in these denied sales, according to the Times, include the government of Iran, the atomic energy organization, energy, engineering, aircraft and petrochemical companies, schools and universities, a plasma physics center, a helicopter support company and mineral research centers. Denied sales involved nickel powder, petrochemical plant components, compressors, furnaces, steel flanges and fittings, electron microscopes, radiometric ore-sorting machines, valves and tubing, lasers, a rotary drilling rig, a mass spectrometer and a nitrogen production plant.

China, Russia and North Korea have combined to supply Iran’s missiles. Iran’s 1,300 kilometer Shahab-3 missile is essentially an imported North Korean Nodong missile enhanced by Russian technology. It was distributed to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in June 2003 and has since been tested several times. And it is widely assumed that if Iran fields a Shahab-4 missile, it will be a copy of Russia’s SS-4 missile. Both the Nodong and the SS-4 can carry a nuclear warhead. In January 2007, Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov confirmed that Russia had delivered Tor-M1 air defense missile systems to Iran. Iran has already tested the missiles and will use them to defend key nuclear sites. North Korea, in addition to selling the Nodong missile, has furnished Iran a fleet of SCUD-B and SCUD-C short-range missiles, plus the factories to make them. Both the SCUD-B and SCUD-C have a diameter sufficient to accommodate a compact nuclear warhead.

From China, Iran has imported the 150 kilometer CSS-8 ballistic missile and a series of land-, sea-, and air-launched short-range cruise missiles. Many of these latter are anti-ship weapons.

In addition, Grigory Omelchenko, a member of Ukraine’s parliament, revealed in early February 2005 that a former officer in Ukraine’s secret police sold six unarmed Soviet-era cruise missiles to Iran between 1999 and 2001. The nuclear-capable missile, known as the KH-55 or the AS-15, has a range of up to 3,000 km and travels near the ground in order to avoid air defenses.