Excerpts from previous status reports, by subject
Removed on February 27, 2005
Missile progress
Iran’s ballistic missile program has made strides in recent months as
well, which suggests that international pressure has not done much to cow Iran’s
ambitions. In August, September and October 2004, Iran appears to have tested
an upgraded version of the Shahab-3 medium range missile. According to news
reports, the new missile is longer than its predecessors and can travel further.
In early October, Iran’s former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani claimed
that the country now has missiles capable of traveling 2,000 km.
European carrots
and American sticks
Much of the diplomatic maneuvering at the IAEA since February 2003 has been
guided by hard-line pressure from the United States on the one hand, and
by a commitment to “constructive engagement” with Iran by Britain,
France and Germany on the other. The United States firmly believes that Iran’s
civilian nuclear program masks a bomb effort. On September 2, U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell said that the United States “still believes that
the Iranians are not fessing up to everything. They still have a program
that, in our judgment, is a nuclear program designed to develop, ultimately,
a nuclear
weapon.” Europe has been hesitant to embrace the hard-line U.S. strategy—fearful
that Iran might stop all cooperation with the IAEA.
However, Iran’s actions in recent months have failed to provide much assurance of peaceful intentions. Though it allowed the IAEA to seal centrifuges and material at Natanz, its main enrichment site, after concluding a deal with Britain, France and Germany in October 2003, it continued to manufacture and assemble centrifuges at a series of workshops. When this activity was criticized, Iran waited until February 2004, just before the release of the IAEA’s quarterly report, to concede a halt to these activities. But the manufacturing and assembling of centrifuges was only partially suspended in by April, and in the same month Iran announced its intention to begin testing the UF6 production line at its conversion plant. This move came despite the IAEA’s request that Iran reconsider its decision to test UF6 production, which the Agency said “would technically amount to the production of feed material for enrichment processes.”
In addition, Iran’s attitude towards its negotiating partners has not been encouraging. During a meeting with officials from Britain, France and Germany in early August 2004, Iran reportedly issued a series of demands as a condition for continuing to cooperate. The demands apparently included access to nuclear technology, the removal of sales restrictions on Iran imposed by the nuclear supplier nations, assurances that the Europeans would support Iran in the U.N. Security Council, sales of conventional weapons, a commitment to push for a non-nuclear Middle East and a commitment to provide Iran with security assurances against a nuclear attack. The breadth of Iran’s requests, along with its apparent unwillingness to continue confidence-building measures like the enrichment freeze, have made the Europeans more skeptical of Iran’s intentions.
Yet the IAEA’s September 2004 report failed to provide the “smoking gun” that would automatically have sent Iran’s nuclear file to the U.N. Security Council. Instead, it reiterated many of the questions that appear again in the November 2004 report and that the Agency continues to investigate. These open issues include Iran’s plutonium separation experiments, the history of Iran’s centrifuge programs, and the origin of enriched uranium contamination found at several sites in Iran. The September report also concluded that on a number of other key issues, including Iran’s laser enrichment effort and its past uranium conversion experiments, Iran’s stories have largely checked out.
In the weeks following the September IAEA report, Europe and Iran negotiated a second deal, which was finally concluded in November 2004. This agreement goes further than the 2003 deal and complies with many of the demands made in the IAEA’s September 18, 2004 resolution. The resolution called on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities, to renounce its plans to build a heavy water research reactor, and to provide the IAEA with access to and information on nuclear equipment and sites. Given Iran’s incomplete adherence to past pledges to freeze uranium enrichment activities, the resolution has specifically defined such activities as including “the manufacture or import of centrifuge components, the assembly and testing of centrifuges, and the production of feed material, including through tests or production at the UCF.” Though the resolution did not say so explicitly, if Iran had failed to abide by the terms of the resolution, it risked getting referred to the U.N. Security Council at the November 25 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. The same fate would apparently befall Iran if it should violate the November 2004 deal struck with Europe.
The deal Iran struck with the Europeans nearly fell apart before it got off the ground. Iran pushed to continue producing uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), a key precursor in the production of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), which is the feedstock for centrifuges. Iran also argued for a time limit on the length of its nuclear suspension, and for the exemption of a handful of centrifuges from the freeze. Though the Europeans did not give ground on the last two points, Iran has proceeded with the production of UF4. Iran also managed to negotiate a delay in its implementation of the freeze, until November 22, 2004, and therefore the ability produce a reserve of 3.5 tons of UF6.
Not surprisingly,
the United States has expressed deep skepticism about any deal with Iran.
On the margins of a conference in Chile in November
2004,
U.S. President George W. Bush said that while he “appreciate[s]
the efforts of the governments of France, Germany and Great Britain to
convince the Iranians
to give up any nuclear ambitions,” the United States remains “concerned
about their desires.” Earlier in the week, U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell accused Iran of actively working on designs that could be
used to deliver
a nuclear warhead using a missile. Though the intelligence information
behind this allegation has since been questioned in the media, its timing,
just after
the conclusion of the deal between Iran and Europe, suggests that the
Bush administration wants to make sure the world is not lulled into complacency
by Iran’s latest promise.