Excerpts from previous status reports, by subject
Removed on March 6, 2009
- Working with spent nuclear fuel?
- More Treasury sanctions
- Increased uranium production rate
- Limiting IAEA inspections
Working with spent nuclear fuel?
There have been allegations that Iran is exploring the possibility of extracting enriched uranium from spent reactor fuel. Reportedly, according to an intelligence report provided to the IAEA by a member country, Iran conducted covert experiments aimed at recovering highly enriched uranium from irradiated reactor fuel used at a research reactor at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. Such work would contravene binding Security Council resolutions and would give Iran an additional means of growing its enriched uranium stockpile. These allegations were reported in late October 2008.
More Treasury sanctions
The U.S. Department of the Treasury pursued unilateral measures aimed at isolating Iran from the commercial and financial system. On December 17, 2008, Treasury froze the assets of Assa Corp and Assa Co. Ltd., front companies set up by Iran’s Bank Melli in order to “funnel money from the United States to Iran” in defiance of sanctions, according to Treasury.
Earlier, on September 17, 2008, the United States froze the assets of six Iranian military entities linked to missile and nuclear work, including several electronics firms controlled by the Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics. And on September 10, the United States took the extraordinary step of blacklisting Iran's national shipping line, eighteen of its affiliates and some 120 individual ships, all for supporting Tehran's nuclear and missile development. The U.S. hoped that its move to sanction the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) would prompt other countries and firms, including maritime insurers, to see business with IRISL as dangerous. IRISL and its affiliates were specifically accused of providing logistical services to Iran's Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics, by facilitating transport to U.N. designated proliferators and falsifying documents to disguise this assistance. The U.S. action prohibits transactions between U.S. persons and the designated entities and freezes their assets under U.S. jurisdiction. It also reinforces U.N. Security Council resolution 1803, passed in March 2008, which called on countries to inspect suspicious IRISL cargo to and from Iran.
Increased uranium production rate
The rate at which Iran fed uranium hexafluoride gas into its centrifuges at Natanz increased in late 2008. In an eight month period between December 2007 and August 2008, Iran processed some 6,000 kg of UF6, as compared to 2,150 kg in a two month period from September to early November 2008. The production rate of low-enriched uranium during this period increased as well. From mid-December 2007 through late August 2008, Iran produced 405 kg of this material enriched up to four percent U-235, as compared to 150 kg during the more recent period.
Limiting IAEA inspections
In response to Security Council resolution 1747, an Iranian government spokesman announced that instead of notifying the International Atomic Energy Agency of new building and renovating plans for nuclear facilities as soon as they are decided, Iran would revert to providing such information 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material into such facilities. The change, contested by the IAEA, further limits the Agency’s ability to understand Iran’s nuclear status and its future plans – a task already limited by Iran’s February 2006 decision to end application of the Additional Protocol. Under the basic inspection agreement now in place in Iran, the IAEA must still be allowed to observe any enrichment activity that takes place. However, Agency inspectors cannot inspect Iran’s progress in manufacturing or assembling centrifuges and related equipment.