Excerpts from previous status reports, by subject
Removed on March 15, 2006
Lead-up to the Security Council and the Russian offer
On February 4, 2006 the International Atomic Energy Agency took the
fateful step of reporting Iran to the U.N. Security Council. The
outcome was widely expected, after the five permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council, along with Germany and the European Union,
agreed to take such action on January 30. This show of unity among
the world’s major powers was prompted by Iran’s decision,
on January 10, to remove international seals from uranium enrichment
equipment at three sites and to resume “nuclear research” at
its pilot centrifuge plant at Natanz. According to the IAEA, Iran
announced plans to manufacture centrifuge components, install additional
centrifuge cascades at the pilot plant, and run uranium gas through
those centrifuges in order to enrich it.
The February vote was a victory for the United States—which has long advocated such action—as Russia, China and India supported the resolution. Only Cuba, Syria and Venezuela voted against it, with Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South Africa abstaining. In a concession to Russia and China, however, the Security Council waited one month before debating what to do about Iran’s nuclear violations.
During this time, the IAEA called on Iran to resume its freeze of uranium enrichment, to reconsider plans to build a heavy water research reactor, to stick with the IAEA’s Additional Protocol allowing for enhanced inspections, and to allow the Agency access to individuals, documents and workshops linked to suspicious nuclear work. In addition, Russia used the one month delay to pursue negotiations with Iran over a proposal that would have moved Iran’s commercial enrichment work to Russia—a proposal which Iran ultimately rejected on March 12.
The Agency had already ruled in September that Iran had broken its nuclear obligations and voted to send Iran to the U.N. Security Council—without, however, specifying a date. At the time of the September vote, the Agency cited “Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations.” It also urged Iran to stop preparing uranium for enrichment, urged it to reconsider the construction of a heavy water reactor and urged it to ratify the IAEA’s Additional Protocol allowing for enhanced inspections. Iran was also asked to clear up questions about its procurement of centrifuge equipment and the history of its nuclear work.
Following the Agency’s September ruling, Iran made a series of concessions in an effort to fend off Security Council referral. First, Iran allowed the Agency’s inspectors to visit the Parchin site on November 1 so they could take environmental samples; it gave the Agency some documents on its purchases of uranium enrichment equipment in the 1980s; and it allowed the Agency to interview two Iranian officials who were involved in the purchases. Iran did not budge, however, on the key point: it would not promise to give up uranium enrichment.
Uranium enrichment suspension?
Iran agreed to suspend most of its nuclear work in November 2004, as
part of an agreement reached with Britain, France, Germany and the
European Union. However, its adherence to this pledge was far from
perfect. During a visit to Iran in December 2004, IAEA inspectors
discovered that Iran was digging tunnels at its Uranium Conversion
Facility (UCF) in Isfahan. The work should have been declared to
the IAEA before it began in September. Iran said the tunnels—which
according to media reports were to be made of hardened concrete and
to run as deep as half a mile—were intended to “increase
capacity, safety and security of nuclear material.” Within
the UCF, Iran finished converting all 37 tons of natural uranium,
or “yellowcake,” into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) in
February 2004, well after its deal with Europe to cease “all
tests or production at any uranium conversion installation.” Prior
to the freeze, Iran processed some of the UF4, producing 3.5 tons
of uranium hexafluoride (UF6). This quantity is in addition to the
UF6 Iran had produced previously—estimated at several tens
of kilograms—and since, as well as to the material imported
by Tehran in the past.
Between December 2004 and January 2005, the IAEA also discovered that Iran was running quality control tests on centrifuge parts housed at Farayand Technique, a site linked with Iran’s secret uranium enrichment work. It only stopped the work in February, after the IAEA asked about the nature and purpose of the tests.
From August 8, 2005, when the UCF resumed operation, until early September, Iran produced 6,800 kg of UF6. As of August 29, Iran had introduced a further 4,000 kg of uranium concentrate into process lines at the plant, which could eventually yield additional UF6. And on November 16, Iran introduced 150 drums of natural uranium, or “yellowcake” into the plant. Iran could produce enough fuel for several nuclear weapons if it enriched its existing stock of UF6 to weapon-grade. According to the latest IAEA report, all UF6 produced at the plant has been contained and is under surveillance by the Agency. However, Iran removed seals from two cylinders of UF6 on January 10, 2006 in order to conduct uranium enrichment “research.”
Lack of cooperation with the IAEA
The IAEA has been troubled by Iran’s effort to delay and inhibit
the work of the Agency’s inspectors. In 2004, Iran postponed
a visit by the IAEA aimed at verifying Iran’s pledge not to manufacture
or assemble centrifuges. The visit—initially planned for mid-March—did
not take place until mid-April, and even then the inspectors were either
delayed or prevented from visiting several centrifuge workshops. And
the Agency was not granted access to the Parchin military complex south
of Tehran until January 2005, some eight months after its initial request.
During the visit, inspectors were only allowed into certain parts of
the sprawling site, and were limited in where they could take environmental
samples. It then took nine months and repeated IAEA requests for Iran
to allow inspectors to make a follow-up visit. This visit was conducted
on November 1, 2005.
And earlier, after receiving what was expected to be a full accounting of Iran’s nuclear program in October 2003, the Agency discovered that Iran had failed to include any information about its work with the more advanced P-2 centrifuge. Then in early 2004, after Iran admitted to a small-scale P-2 program, the IAEA concluded that based on Iran’s procurement attempts, its P-2 program was far more extensive than previously admitted. Earlier still, when IAEA inspectors were finally allowed to take environmental samples from the workshop at Kalaye in August 2003—after asking to do so for several months—they reported that there had been “considerable modification of the premises” since their visit earlier that year.
On the missile front
General Ahmad Vahid, a member of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps,
announced that the range of the Shahab-3 missile had been increased
from about 1,300 km to 2,000 km, and that it was accurate within
a meter of its target. This announcement followed a statement in
July 2005 by Iranian defense minister Ali Shamkhani, in which Shamkhani
claimed that Iran had made an “important step forward,” and
would now use solid fuel in its medium-range Shahab-3. Solid-fuel
missile technology is more advanced than liquid fuel technology.
Iran announced the successful test of a solid fuel missile motor
for the Shahab-3 in June.