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Excerpts from previous status reports, by subject

Removed on May 10, 2007

 

Implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737
In early February 2007, the IAEA agreed to end or limit four of eleven national projects in Iran, and 18 of 40 regional or interregional projects involving Iran. Since mid-February, Australia, Canada, India and Japan have approved measures to implement 1737. And on February 12, European Union countries agreed on measures to sanction Iran that go beyond the requirements of 1737 in three important ways. First, they bar Iran from importing all items on international missile and nuclear control lists, whereas the Security Council carved out major exceptions for light-water reactor related technology and for dual-use goods. Second, individuals named by the Council for their involvement in Iran’s missile and nuclear programs are banned from traveling or transiting through the European Union, while the Council merely asked countries to “exercise vigilance” regarding their movements. And third, additional Iranian entities may in the future be singled out for economic penalties by the E.U. independently of the Council, where unanimity among permanent members is difficult to achieve.

Iran resumes enrichment work
In January 2006, after announcing the end of its voluntary freeze, Iran removed IAEA seals from “P-1” centrifuge components, maraging steel, high-strength aluminum, centrifuge manufacturing and quality control equipment, and cylinders containing uranium hexafluoride (UF6)—a gas that can be enriched in centrifuges to make fuel for reactors or bombs. This resulted in re-activation of its main centrifuge enrichment plant at Natanz, and workshops at Farayand Technique and Pars Trash, which are subsidiaries of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization. Iran then renovated the gas handling system at its pilot plant at Natanz, and began testing cascades of 164 centrifuges, along with several smaller cascades. In April 2006, Iran ran uranium gas through the first cascade and for the first time used these machines to produce about five percent enriched uranium—a concentration high enough to fuel a reactor. In June, Iran began a new campaign to produce UF6 at its Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Isfahan using 110 tons of “yellowcake,” which had yielded some 55 tons of UF6 as of November 7. These moves bring Iran closer to its goal of operating six 164 machine cascades at its pilot centrifuge plant at Natanz and of operating some 54,000 machines at its commercial-scale facility, also at Natanz. Beginning in early 2007, Iran stepped up work at this larger facility, located underground, with the installation of piping, wiring and control panels, and the installation and linkage of centrifuges in a cascade.

Iran’s nuclear intentions
Iran’s nuclear efforts leaped into the headlines in August 2002, when an exiled Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), revealed the existence of two undeclared nuclear sites in Iran: a centrifuge enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak. Suspicions about Iran’s intentions came to a head in November 2003, when the IAEA reported that Iran had successfully produced both enriched uranium and plutonium—fissile materials that can be used to fuel a nuclear weapon.

Suspicion of Iran’s intentions has been further fueled by evidence that it may have a secret “weaponization” program aimed at developing a workable nuclear warhead. In 2004, the United States reportedly obtained one thousand pages of Persian-language documents—including computer simulations and accounts of experiments—from an Iranian laptop computer. According to media reports, the documents describe Iran’s efforts to develop a re-entry vehicle for its Shahab missile that could carry a compact nuclear warhead as well as plans for a deep tunnel, perhaps to conduct underground nuclear tests. The documents also point to administrative interconnections between Iran’s nuclear and military work. Iran flatly denies allegations that it undertook a study, known as the “Green Salt Project,” that combined work on uranium conversion, high explosives and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle.

In addition, the IAEA has documented Iran’s past production of Polonium-210, which could be used as a neutron initiator in a bomb. There have also been reports that Iran has shopped for deuterium gas (which can boost the power of a nuclear explosion), for equipment used in nuclear testing, for dual-use machine tools, for maraging steel, for high strength aluminum, for titanium, for specialty oils, and for high precision switches that can be used to trigger a nuclear explosion. In July 2005, the NCRI accused Tehran of trying to import maraging steel from Malaysia, through the United Arab Emirates, for its missile and nuclear programs. According to the NCRI, Iran wants to use the durable material for centrifuge construction and for missile casings.

Unraveling uranium traces
The IAEA’s February 2007 report confirms that it has not yet been able to establish the origin of all the traces of high and low-enriched uranium found in Iran. After analyzing samples taken at a location in a country where Iran claims its imported centrifuge components had been stored, and samples taken from centrifuge components from a country (believed to be Pakistan) where Iran’s centrifuges originated, the IAEA concluded that most of the highly enriched uranium contamination probably came from imported equipment. This had long been Iran’s explanation. However, other more recent samples taken at sites where nuclear equipment was stored before arrival in Iran did not reveal traces of enriched uranium. Therefore, the Agency is not yet ready to end its investigation into the origin of uranium contamination, and is particularly interested in learning more about the source of low-enriched uranium traces.

Iran has thwarted the IAEA’s attempts to unravel the uranium enrichment related work done at the Physics Research Center (PHRC), which had been located at Lavisan-Shian in northeastern Tehran and controlled by the Ministry of Defense. Analysis of IAEA samples taken in early 2006 from vacuum pumps acquired by the PHRC revealed traces of natural and high-enriched uranium. Iran claims that all dual-use equipment the PHRC attempted to procure—including electric drive, power supply and laser equipment, as well as balancing machines, mass spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment—was in fact destined for a technical university. In February 2006, inspectors were able to interview the former head of the PHRC, who is also a professor at the university. However, the IAEA’s requests to interview another former head of the PHRC were refused. The official, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, was designated in Security Council Resolution 1747 for his role in Iran’s proliferation activities and is therefore subject to international sanctions.

In November 2004, the National Council of Resistance of Iran held a press conference in which it accused Iran of relocating nuclear activities from Lavisan-Shian to the nearby Modern Defensive Readiness and Technology Center, also controlled by the Ministry of Defense. The new site is sometimes referred to as “Lavizan II.” After the move, the buildings and area around the original Lavizan site were razed. Iran claimed that Lavizan was turned over to the municipality of Tehran, which undertook the razing. The NCRI believes the intent was to destroy evidence of secret nuclear work. Iran has since provided the IAEA with documents supporting its claim, which the Agency has judged “coherent and consistent with its [Iran’s] intentions.” Regardless of why the site was razed, the IAEA acknowledged in its November 2004 report that “the detection of nuclear material in soil samples would be very difficult in light of the razing of the site.”

Iran’s aggressive posturing
On March 23, 2007 15 British sailors and marines were held by Iranian authorities, and later released, on charges of having entered Iranian territorial waters in the Persian Gulf. In mid-March, Iran's regular navy undertook war games in the Persian Gulf involving small vessels carrying missile launchers and tactical submarines. And its Revolutionary Guards carried out three days of ground maneuvers beginning on February 19, during which weapons in possession of the Guards' ground forces were tested, including the Fajr-3, Fajr-5 and Zelzal missiles. On February 7, Iran successfully tested the TOR-M1 air defense missile system supplied by Russia. In January 2007, the Guards conducted short-range missile tests, and in November 2006 reportedly tested the Shahab-3 missile, which has an estimated range of 1,300 km, the Shahab-2, and a number of other solid and liquid fuel short-range rockets.

China supplies Iran
For at least the last decade, Chinese organizations have sold Iran the ingredients and equipment needed to make poison gas. According to TK CIA report, Iran has continued to seek “production technology, training, and expertise” from Chinese entities. In 1996, the press reported that China was sending entire factories for making poison gas to Iran, including special glass-lined vessels for mixing precursor chemicals and hundreds of tons of chemicals useful for making nerve agents. In 1997, a Chinese company was caught sending Iran special alloy piping useful for chemical weapon manufacture through Hong Kong. These transfers have made China the greatest contributor to Iran’s chemical weapon capability.