Home

WMD Programs

Iran's Suspect Entities

Iran's Suppliers

Our Publications

Iran Watch Library

International Organization Documents

Government Documents

Private Viewpoints

Reactions to Iran's WMD Efforts

Useful Links

Search

Excerpts from previous status reports, by subject

Removed on June 27, 2008

 

 

Iran makes progress on advanced centrifuges
A February 2008 International Atomic Energy Agency report confirmed Iran’s pursuit of more advanced centrifuges. According to this report, Iran had installed a single IR-2 centrifuge and a 10-machine cascade at the Natanz pilot plant and was testing the single machine with small quantities of uranium gas. The IR-2 is one of four new centrifuge designs Iran has researched in a Tehran workshop and it is estimated to enrich uranium two to three times more efficiently than the problem-prone P-1 machines operating at the Natanz commercial-scale plant. According to the IAEA, between February 2007 and February 2008, Iran introduced 1,670 kg of uranium gas into the nearly 3,000 P-1 machines operating at Natanz. This activity yielded only 75 kg of low-enriched uranium – a result the Agency called “well below” the design capacity of the P-1.

Iran’s advanced centrifuge research and development efforts were on display in early April 2008, when Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad toured the Natanz enrichment complex in honor of the country’s nuclear day. At the time of his visit, Ahmadinejad announced that work had begun on the installation of 6,000 additional centrifuges at the Natanz commercial-scale facility, located underground. Ahmadinejad also boasted that Iran was testing a new centrifuge – perhaps the IR-2 – capable of enriching uranium “more than five times” as efficiently as the P-1 machines spinning at Natanz. Photographs of Ahmadinejad’s with advanced components during a visit to the Natanz enrichment complex confirmed that some new machines were installed, and that they appeared to be more advanced than the P-1 machines.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1803
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1803 was adopted on March 3, 2008 by a vote of fourteen in favor and one abstention (Indonesia). The Resolution increased restrictions on Iran’s nuclear and missile work, but it did not require countries to impose broader economic penalties sought by the United States. The Resolution also called on countries to inspect suspect cargoes to and from Iran, to reduce public financial support for business with Iran, and to cut back on transactions involving Iranian banks, particularly Bank Saderat and Bank Melli. However, the Resolution’s language left plenty of room for countries uninterested in enforcing such measures to opt out. Resolution 1803 also extended travel restrictions and asset freezes – and in some cases instituted a travel ban – to additional Iranian entities, and it barred Iran from buying almost all dual-use nuclear and missile-related technology. Iran was given ninety days, (up from sixty in the previous two resolutions) to comply or face further sanctions.

IAEA work plan
Iran and the IAEA agreed to a “work plan” in August 2007 that set out a staged process through which seven unresolved issues about Iran’s nuclear past were to be addressed. The plan was originally structured to broach each issue in turn; an issue would be “closed,” or resolved, by the IAEA before the next issue was addressed. IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei had insisted that the timeline embedded in the plan would only run through the end of 2007 – a deadline which was repeatedly extended. Critics of the plan, including the United States, Britain and France, argued that it bought Iran more time to pursue enrichment, and provided cover for countries eager to avoid imposing further sanctions on Iran.

Despite the work plan, Iran continued to withhold information from the IAEA on some past work. However, on other issues, Iran was more forthcoming. It provided the Agency with an avalanche of documentation related to the production of polonium-210, which, in conjunction with beryllium, can be used to initiate a nuclear chain reaction. Iran claimed that the research project was undertaken in 1988 without a specific aim, and that it was abandoned when the project leader left Iran. The IAEA concluded that Iran’s explanation for this work was “consistent” with the Agency’s findings, and the issue is now considered resolved.

Questions about the history of Iran’s work at the Gchine uranium mine and mill were also resolved through the work plan. Iran explained that financial concerns, preference for a more promising uranium mine and problems with a company contracted to construct the mill, were behind the fitful progress at Gchine over nearly 20 years. New documentation supporting this claim led the IAEA to conclude that Iran’s explanation was “consistent” with the Agency’s findings.

Iran tests Shahab-3
On February 4, 2008, Iran test-launched a rocket that it said was part of a nascent space program; in fact, the rocket looked very much like Iran’s nuclear-capable Shahab-3 ballistic missile. Even Russia, a reticent member of the coalition seeking to roll back Iran’s nuclear progress, criticized the test. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov complained about “Iran's permanent demonstration of its intentions to develop its rocket sector and continue to enrich uranium,” and said Iran should “refrain from actions that raise tensions and create the impression Iran is ignoring the international community.”

International pressure increases
In response to U.S. pressure, a number of banks have reduced business with Iran. In August 2007, Commerzbank AG, Deutsche Bank AG and Dresdner Bank, all of Germany, announced plans to limit or end business with Iran. And since early 2007, a number of other banks have done the same, including: ABN Amro Holding NV, Credit Suisse Group and UBS AG of Switzerland, Credit Lyonnais and Societe Generale SA of France, and Standard Chartered PLC, Barclays PLC and HSBC Holdings PLC of the United Kingdom. These restrictions have made it more costly and difficult for Iran to move hard currency around the world, and have raised the cost of doing business for the Iranian government and Iranian companies. According to media reports, even banks in the United Arab Emirates are issuing fewer letters of credit for trade finance involving Iran. And some cargos destined for Iran have been inspected, and in some cases seized, by UAE customs officials.

The impact of U.S. bi-lateral sanctions against Iran was questioned in a report by the nonpartisan U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released in mid-January 2008. According to the report, Iran has continued to sign energy development contracts with foreign firms, to procure U.S. goods through third countries, and to increase its global trade ties – all despite U.S. sanctions. As a result, the GAO report recommends an overall impact assessment of U.S. sanctions policy in order to ascertain whether the policy is furthering U.S. objectives.

In March 2008, in response to concerns that Iranian ports lack effective anti-terrorism measures, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with other U.S. government agencies, placed Iran on port security advisory list. Vessels wishing to enter U.S. waters that have visited Iran in one of their last five ports of call will now be boarded offshore to determine if required anti-terrorism measures have been taken.