Excerpts from previous status reports, by subject
Removed on September 19, 2005
Iran resumes uranium conversion
Iran made good on its threat to resume nuclear work at its Uranium
Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan on August 8, effectively thumbing
its nose at Europe and the negotiation process led by Britain, France
and Germany for the past two years. On the same day, and after only
cursory consideration, Iran also officially rejected Europe’s
package of economic, security and energy incentives, offered in exchange
for Iran’s agreement to permanently abandon its uranium enrichment
program. Iran’s move is a clear violation of the November 2004
deal it struck with Europe, in which Tehran promised to suspend “all
enrichment related and reprocessing activities,” including “all
tests or production at any uranium conversion installation.”
Iran resumed work at the UCF before IAEA inspectors could properly test monitoring equipment installed at key points in the facility. Such testing would only have taken an additional 24 hours, according to the IAEA. The facility had been frozen for several months and Iran’s civilian nuclear energy program—for which Iran claims it needs to operate the facility—would not have been set back by the additional delay.
Europe’s reaction to Iran’s announcement was swift: the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany fired off a letter warning Iran that by taking such a step, “our negotiations would be brought to an end, and we would have no option but to pursue other courses of action.” In veiled diplomatic language, this means Iran would be sent to the U.N. Security Council. The Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, called on Iran “to continue the negotiation process” with Europe and “not to take any action that might prejudice that process.”
This impasse is almost identical to the crisis between Iran and Europe that erupted in April, when Iran threatened to resume uranium conversion work in the coming days. Then too, the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany replied that such a move “would bring the negotiating process to an end.” They threatened to join the United States in an effort to punish Iran in the U.N. Security Council. Iran then backed away from its threat and both sides met in Geneva, in May, in an attempt to salvage the talks. The meeting, however, seems barely to have papered over the differences. Europe promised to offer Iran a more complete package of incentives—including access to nuclear technology—by early August. And Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator said that Iran would continue its suspension until then, a decision confirmed by officials in Tehran.
The source of enriched uranium traces
One of the IAEA’s most worrisome findings has been the traces
of high-enriched uranium discovered at several locations in Iran. In
its August 2003 report, the Agency first revealed that it had found
highly enriched uranium particles on chemical traps at the pilot enrichment
plant at Natanz. According to later reports, these particles were enriched
to about 54% U-235. Fifty-four percent enriched uranium particles were
also at Kalaye Electric Company, a centrifuge workshop in Tehran, on
components imported by Iran, and on centrifuge rotors assembled using
these components. The IAEA has also found traces of 70% enriched uranium
on centrifuge components and in samples taken at Kalaye, and particles
of 36% enriched uranium predominantly in one room at Kalaye.
Iran has claimed that the contamination came from centrifuge components
purchased from “foreign intermediaries.” Tehran claims
not to have enriched uranium beyond 1.2% U-235 using centrifuges and
explains that the high enriched uranium must have arrived on imported
equipment. In its September 2004 report, the IAEA termed Iran’s
claim “plausible.” According to a report in Jane’s
Defense Weekly quoting sources close to the IAEA, the 54% enriched
uranium probably came from equipment Iran imported through the network
run by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan and the 36% enriched uranium
was from Russian equipment that had been supplied to China, then passed
on to Pakistan, after which Khan sold the equipment to Iran. In May
2005, the Agency confirmed that it had received and was testing nuclear
equipment and material from Pakistan, in an effort to uncover whether
the traces of enriched uranium discovered at several sites in Iran
match the uranium on centrifuges used by Pakistan in its nuclear weapon
program.