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Excerpts from previous status reports, by subject

Removed on October 3, 2007

 

Nuclear and political developments
During the summer of 2007, talks over a third round of U.N. Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran stalled. Instead, Iranian officials again took up negotiations with E.U. foreign policy chief Javier Solana, reportedly over a “time out” proposal in which Iran would stop expanding its uranium enrichment work in return for a halt to new sanctions. At the same time, Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency worked out yet another plan of action to help Agency inspectors resolve outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The plan itself took several months to hammer out—to say nothing of its implementation.

Meanwhile, inspectors in Iran in early May found that the pace of expansion at Iran’s Natanz enrichment plant had slowed, but not stopped.  According to a June 12, 2007 report in the New York Times, Mohamed ElBaradei estimated that Iran could have 8,000 centrifuges installed at Natanz by the end of the year. Iran’s determination to pursue enrichment and work on a heavy water reactor violates two binding U.N. Security Council Resolutions—and should trigger a third. Russian and China, however, have been unwilling to support further sanctions as long as IAEA and E.U. initiatives aimed at diffusing the nuclear crisis remain active. But at a meeting in Germany from June 6-8, leaders of the Group of Eight leading industrial countries reached a political agreement to pursue “further measures”—meaning more sanctions—against Iran.

Measures put forward at the time, however, were too controversial to win quick acceptance.In June 2007, Britain and the United States reportedly suggested further restrictions on Iranian banks, a mandatory travel ban on senior Iranian defense and intelligence officials, a ban on all weapon sales to and from Iran, and a requirement to check Iranian cargo flights and maritime shipments to ensure that they are not carrying banned goods or arms.

There were also reports that the United States might sanction Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps for its links to terrorism. The Washington Post reported on August 15 that the designation would be made under Executive Order 13224. This move would allow the United States to freeze the group’s assets. Also on August 15, the New York Times reported that the United States might instead list the IRGC as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization.” This designation would require U.S. financial institutions to block IRGC funds and would prohibit all material support to the IRGC by U.S. persons or those subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Whether designated under E.O. 13224 or listed as a FTO by the United States, international reaction to the proposed action indicated that other countries would follow in targeting the IRGC, which is a branch of Iran’s military, for its links to terrorism.

The United States has continued to impose unilateral sanctions against Iran, notably by targeting Iran’s banking sector, while encouraging like-minded countries to do the same.  The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department amended the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR) to block Bank Saderat and Bank Sepah, both Iranian government-owned banks, from the U.S. financial system. The amendments block all “U-turn” payments, and allow for a grace period after which all other payment and financing transactions previously exempt or allowed after obtaining a license must be stopped. Three Japanese banks with branches in the United States (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Mizuho Corporate Bank and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp) have decided to refrain from doing business with Bank Saderat as well. These banks have also reportedly decided not to embark on any new business with Iran. And in November 2006, the Japanese government announced an end to new project financing in Iran, and the freezing of $10 billion in existing loans.

 

U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747
Iran’s refusal to suspend enrichment led the U.N. Security Council to ratchet up sanctions on March 24, 2007, with the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1747. The resolution called on states to freeze the assets of 28 more Iranian entities—in addition to the nearly two dozen frozen earlier. The 28 include seven officials in the Revolutionary Guard Corps, several scientists at the Ministry of Defense, and a number of subsidiaries of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Aerospace Industries Organization and Defense Industries Organization. Also included in the list—at the insistence of the United States—was Bank Sepah, one of Iran’s oldest and largest state-owned banks, which is accused of supporting Iran’s missile effort.

Resolution 1747 and its predecessor, Resolution 1737, call on Iran to suspend all enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water-related activities, to ratify the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, and to implement transparency measures so that IAEA inspectors may resolve questions about Iran’s past nuclear work. Both resolutions were written under Article 41, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which makes compliance mandatory and allows the United Nations to use economic and diplomatic measures—but not military force—to compel compliance.

 

Reduced cooperation with the IAEA
Iran reduced cooperation with the IAEA in response to U.N. Security Council sanctions. In an April 13, 2007 letter to the IAEA, Iran announced that it had decided to unilaterally block inspectors’ access to the heavy water reactor under construction at Arak, a decision the IAEA contested. During a March 2005 visit to this site, IAEA inspectors confirmed that construction work on the reactor had begun. Inspectors re-visited the reactor in February 2006, and again in April, and estimated that the reactor’s commissioning would likely be postponed until 2011, though Iran has claimed it will be completed by 2009, even without IAEA assistance. During more recent visits, in July and August 2006, and in January 2007, inspectors noted that construction work was continuing. Verification since then of ongoing construction has been limited to the analysis of satellite imagery.  IAEA inspectors were allowed to make a one-off visit to the reactor in July 2007.

Further, in early 2007, Iran rejected 48 IAEA inspectors designated for work in Iran, which the Agency noted would lead to “diminished operational flexibility.” And, according to media reports in early 2007, Iran denied inspectors access to some rooms at Natanz containing centrifuges, in the first test of a negotiated agreement to allow no-notice inspections.

 

Nuclear questions
In its November 2006 report, the IAEA noted that its inspectors had discovered traces of plutonium on containers stored at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility. Particles of high-enriched uranium had already been discovered there and reported by the IAEA in August 2006. Iran explained that the containers were used to store spent fuel from the Tehran Research Reactor. The enriched uranium found at Karaj marked the second time in 2006 that IAEA tests uncovered high-enriched uranium contamination. In January, particles of natural and high-enriched uranium were found on equipment at a technical university. According to the IAEA’s August 2007 “work plan,” only contamination found on this remains unexplained.

The first issue to be resolved by the work plan was Iran’s past plutonium separation experiments.  The IAEA had uncovered inconsistencies in Iran’s declarations regarding the date and the scope of these experiments. The IAEA’s tests found that Iran had separated more plutonium than it originally admitted—and that the work had been done more recently.  In August 2007, Iran provided new information on the neutron flux distribution for the core of the Tehran Research Reactor, where irradiation took place, and additional information on irradiation conditions.  The IAEA’s revised calculations using this information remained consistent with previous results.  However, taking into account all available information, the IAEA concluded that Iran’s statements regarding the date, quantity, and type of material were “consistent” with the Agency’s findings, and called the issue “resolved.”