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2019 G7 Statement on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

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1. The members of the G7 are committed to working together and with our partners to promote international peace and security and to create the conditions for a more secure, stable, and safer world. It is essential that we, together with the broader international community, do our utmost to prevent the use and spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.

2. We underline the essential role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses. As we prepare to mark the Treaty's 50th anniversary, we recall its undeniable success in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in advancing disarmament, while facilitating the widespread sharing of the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear technologies, and we reaffirm our commitment to work toward a successful outcome at the 2020 Review Conference. We underline the enduring value of all the commitments States have undertaken in the NPT. Notwithstanding the constraints of the current international security environment, we remain strongly committed to the goal of ultimately achieving a world without nuclear weapons, to be pursued through practical and concrete steps, notably under the NPT, including its Article VI, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security for all. We advocate for the implementation of the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards in order to ensure the sustainability of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the NPT.

I. Regional Proliferation Concerns

North Korea

3. Meeting the threats presented by the DPRK's unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs, as well as its proliferation of these technologies, is at the top of our security agenda.

4. We are disappointed by the DPRK's failure to make significant progress on denuclearization during the February 27-28th, 2019, US-DPRK Summit in Vietnam, and we call for the DPRK to continue discussions with the United States on denuclearization. We regret that the DPRK has not taken concrete actions towards denuclearization, and we urge the DPRK to comply with its international obligations, fulfil its commitments, and undertake those actions. We welcome the readiness of the United States to continue its efforts in that regard and stand ready to support these efforts. We remain committed to the goal of achieving the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of all of the DPRK's WMD, including biological and chemical weapons, ballistic missiles of all ranges, and other delivery systems, as well as related programs and facilities in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). We call on the DPRK to comply with its international obligations, to return to the NPT and to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, to conclude an Additional Protocol, and not to conduct any further nuclear tests and launches that use ballistic missiles technology, and avoid any other provocation, which includes maintaining a moratorium on nuclear testing and launches of any ballistic missiles. We are committed to maintaining maximum pressure and we continue to fully support the current sanctions regime until the DPRK's denuclearization. We further commit to countering the DPRK's sanctions-evasion tactics, particularly through its illicit maritime activities, including prohibited ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum products, and exports of coal and other items, commodities, or products prohibited by the UNSCRs, as well as its malicious cyber activities. To this end, we call on all states to fully implement all relevant UNSCRs, and note with urgent concern that some countries still fail to fully implement these resolutions, as documented in the latest report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSCR 1874. We also welcome ongoing international efforts including deployment of assets for the surveillance of suspicious maritime activities such as illicit ship-to-ship transfers involving the DPRK-flagged vessels in order to fully implement and enforce relevant UNSCRs. We intend to continue our coordination on sanctions implementation, capacity building, counter-proliferation, and proliferation financing.

5. We reiterate that the DPRK will never be accepted as a nuclear power.

Iran

6. We are committed to permanently denying Iran all pathways to a nuclear weapon and to ensuring Iran upholds its obligations and international

commitments, including under the NPT, and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in particular the Additional Protocol.

7. We strongly support the IAEA in its crucial monitoring and verification work to help ensure Iran's compliance with NPT-related safeguards obligations, as well as its other commitments. We call on UN Member States to make voluntary contributions to the IAEA to ensure it has the resources necessary to fulfil this vital role.

8. We are deeply concerned by the continued development of Iran's missile programme. Iran possesses the largest missile arsenal in the region and is actively increasing the sophistication, accuracy, and lethality of its missile systems. Iran's activities related to ballistic missiles contribute to increased tensions and instability in the region, and raise the risk of a regional arms race. We call on Iran to immediately cease activities related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology. We further call on Iran to immediately cease its transfers of missile technology, including production technology, to states and non-state actors. We will continue our work to counter Iran's regional proliferation of ballistic missiles and its unlawful and destabilising arms transfers. We commit to seek to ensure that international restrictions on Iranian missiles do not expire if Iran does not engage constructively on the issue. We call on all nations to take all necessary steps to halt the sale or transfer of controlled and non-controlled items, materials and technologies that could help Iran develop ballistic missiles, and to prevent brokers from operating from their national territory in support of Iranian missile-related procurement efforts.

9. We are also troubled by Iran's compliance record with the Chemical Weapons Convention and call on Iran to abide by its obligations under the CWC.

Syria

10. We are appalled by the repeated and morally reprehensible use of chemical weapons in Syria by the Assad regime and by ISIS, as documented by successive reports of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)/UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). We are united in condemning, in the strongest possible terms, any use of chemical weapons, including the use of chlorine in the April 7, 2018, attack in Douma, Eastern Ghouta, Syria, as confirmed by the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission. The use of chemical weapons by a State Party is a breach of CWC and constitutes a threat to international peace and security; it directly undermines the international norms and standards against such use. There can be no impunity for perpetrators of such crimes; those responsible must be held accountable. To that end, we welcome the June 2018 Decision of the Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC which directed the OPCW to establish attribution arrangements to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks in Syria. We call on all States to support the OPCW in the successful implementation of this mechanism. We encourage the UNSC to recognize the findings of the 7th JIM report published

on October 26, 2017, and take steps to ensure that the perpetrators of chemical weapons attack are held accountable. We urge Syria to adhere to its obligations under the CWC, to finally provide a complete declaration to the OPCW, to desist from further use of chemical weapons, to hand over all such weapons and their precursors to the OPCW for destruction, and to cooperate fully with OPCW investigation mechanisms. We call on all States Party to the CWC to ensure that they do not contribute to the proliferation of chemical weapons in Syria or elsewhere.

11. We also call upon Syria to cooperate without delay with the IAEA to remedy its longstanding NPT safeguards noncompliance and to provide the IAEA with access to all information, sites, material, and persons necessary to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

II. Multilateral Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Continued Pursuit of Arms Control and Disarmament

12. We reaffirm our support for measures that promote further verifiable and enforceable nuclear arms control and disarmament, which is an important part of the rules-based international order and security. Effective measures to promote further arms control, when adhered to and enforced, help reduce the risk of conflict, forestall destructive arms races, and promote international peace and security. In particular, we advocate measures to build trust and confidence, to promote dialogue and cooperation, and to enhance transparency and verification.

13. We are committed to a progressive and incremental approach to nuclear disarmament, which takes into account and seeks to resolve problems in the international security environment that make disarmament progress more difficult. We support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. We are committed to working to make the international environment more conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential implications of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on the NPT. We call on all Parties to the NPT to ensure that the NPT, existing nuclear safeguards, or other efforts to preserve international security or advance disarmament, are not undermined by the TPNW. We encourage all states interested in advancing nuclear disarmament to participate in constructive multiparty dialogue on actionable measures to help ease tensions and strengthen trust among states and to facilitate such disarmament.

2019 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting

14. The NPT remains an essential instrument for the preservation of international security and stability. We are committed to maintaining and strengthening the NPT in all its aspects and to promoting dialogue and cooperation among NPT

Parties. We continue to subscribe to the important objective of the Treaty's universalization. We call on all NPT Parties to take concrete steps in the review cycle, including at the 2019 Preparatory Committee, to help ensure a successful outcome at the 2020 Review Conference.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

15. We reiterate the fundamental role of the IAEA in supporting the implementation of nuclear non-proliferation, safety, and security worldwide — and in facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies in a safe, secure, and sustainable manner. We call for the universalization of IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol as the international verification standard. Finally, we urge all states to ensure that the IAEA has the resources it needs to effectively carry out its monitoring and verification functions and urge all states to support the vigorous, thorough, and professional work performed by the IAEA in exercising its authorities.

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)

16. The G7 remains committed to and underlines the importance of early negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, on the basis of the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein. We support the final consensus report of the high-level FMCT expert preparatory group and note its significant contribution for future treaty negotiations. An effective FMCT is a necessary requirement for a world without nuclear weapons and for eliminating permanently the prospects of a nuclear arms race. We deplore the lack of progress in starting formal negotiations of such an FMCT and will continue to seek ways to overcome the deadlock. The conclusion of an FMCT is important to the NPT and would constitute a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It is imperative that all stakeholders engage in the necessary diplomacy to resolve the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament and start treaty negotiations.

17. Pending negotiation of an FMCT, we continue to support a halt on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We call on China to join the rest of the Nuclear-Weapon States in implementing a moratorium on fissile material production for use in nuclear weapons, and call on all States that have not yet done so to declare and maintain moratoria on such production.

Nuclear Disarmament Verification Initiatives

18. Verification and compliance are essential to the success of arms control and contribute to building trust and confidence among nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States. We support the Nuclear Disarmament Verification Group of Governmental Experts, which will again convene in 2019, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), as well as other ongoing efforts, such as the "Quad" initiative involving Norway, Sweden,

the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the Franco-German “NuDiVe” exercise.

Reductions in Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles

19. Reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles remain important for international security. We welcome the substantial reductions that have been accomplished to date by the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and France, and the continuing implementation of existing unilateral commitments and Treaties, such as New START. While the current international environment is challenging, and some states are today increasing their nuclear arsenals, we remain committed to seeking a security environment more conducive to future nuclear reductions and encourage all states to join us in developing constructive multiparty dialogue in support of this objective.

III. Arms Control and Risk Reduction

20. Adherence to, compliance with, and implementation of relevant existing non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control treaties by all Parties is essential for strengthening mutual trust and improving international stability and security.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

21. We share the concerns which led the U.S. to judge that Russia is in material breach of the Treaty for having tested and fielded the intermediate-range SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile, to decide to suspend its obligations under the INF Treaty, and to provide the requisite six-month written notice to Treaty Parties of its intent to withdraw under Article XV of the Treaty. We urge Russia to return to full and verifiable compliance with its obligations under the Treaty, prior to the U.S. withdrawal taking effect, in order to preserve the Treaty. We recognize that Russia’s failure to do so will result in the end of the treaty. We agree that we need to remain vigilant to the security implications of Russia’s development and deployment of INF-noncompliant missiles and respond accordingly.

22. At the same time, we reaffirm the positive role of effective arms control in promoting and supporting a rules-based order and for international security. Looking ahead, fresh thinking and collective efforts are needed to effectively pursue, strengthen and adapt arms control to the current international security environment. Accordingly, we encourage states with WMD and delivery system technology capabilities to further increase transparency and information sharing with regard to international arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation mechanisms, and call on all states to promote a dialogue to enhance trust and confidence for risk reduction and stability.

Strategic Risk Reduction

23. Efforts towards strategic risk reduction constitute important contributions to regional and international security. In particular, transparency and dialogue on

nuclear doctrines and postures, military-to-military dialogues, hotline agreements among nuclear weapon possessors, “accident measure” agreements, transparency, and notification exercises, as well as missile launch notification and other data exchange agreements, can constitute important elements of strategic risk reduction and can help avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation. The G7 NPDG will continue to seek ways to improve and spread the understanding of strategic risk reduction measures, including in view of the 2020 NPT Review Conference.

Nuclear Weapons Testing

24. We fully support the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, in particular the establishment of the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

25. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones can make an important contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and to regional security.

26. We remain committed to the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD and their means of delivery in the Middle East on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by all States in the region, and call for renewed inclusive regional dialogue to achieve this goal. We note the UN General Assembly’s adoption of a decision calling for the UN Secretary General to convene a conference in 2019 on the establishment of such a zone based on arrangements that do not have consensus support among all the regional states. We urge states committed to resolving the security challenges of the Middle East to join together in inclusive, constructive dialogue to this end.

IV. Promoting Nuclear Safety and Security, Countering the Threat of Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

Nuclear Conventions

27. The threat of nuclear terrorism remains a grave and constant concern of the G7 NPDG, and we thus aim to ensure strong and sustainable nuclear security worldwide. We encourage universalization and implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment (CPPNM/A), and call on states that have not yet done so to become parties to these key nuclear security instruments. In promoting safe nuclear practices, we also encourage all states engaged in nuclear activities to adhere to all relevant nuclear safety conventions, including the Convention on Nuclear Safety in particular, and to work toward their effective and sustainable implementation.

Multilateral Efforts

28. We remain vigilant in ensuring that terrorists and other malicious actors do not obtain materials for committing acts of nuclear or radiological terrorism. In this context, we welcome and support the efforts of the Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to help ensure that we continue to coordinate efforts in implementing our shared commitments to enhancing nuclear security worldwide. We remain committed to contribute to the success of the IAEA's International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS): Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts to be held from 10 to 14 February 2020, which will be a significant opportunity to raise awareness on the importance of ensuring nuclear security.

V. Illicit and/or Destabilising Missile Activities

29. We note with concern destabilising trends in the field of missile technology and proliferation.

30. We have witnessed a dangerous acceleration of the spread of sophisticated missile technologies. In 2016 and 2017, the DPRK developed and repeatedly tested missiles with short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ranges, in violation of UNSCRs, further threatening regional and international security. The DPRK also has continued to assist third countries in developing missile technologies. Iran has continued to advance its own missile capabilities and took the deeply destabilising step of transferring to non-state actors in the Middle East missiles and related technologies, including those necessary for the development of missile production facilities.

31. Conscious of our specific responsibilities and of the necessity to lead by example, the NPDG has adopted the Declaration on Countering Illicit and/or Destabilising Missile Activities.

32. We reaffirm our commitment to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which is at the heart of the international architecture against the proliferation of delivery systems (other than manned aircraft). We are committed to further increasing the effectiveness of the regime.

33. In the interests of international peace and security, we encourage all countries to put in place export controls consistent with MTCR standards and non-member states to adhere voluntarily to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex. We welcome opportunities to conduct a broader dialogue on proliferation issues with non-MTCR member states.

34. We express our support for the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), which is an essential transparency and confidence-building instrument in that field, and call for its universalization, inviting those who have not yet subscribed to do so. We will work towards strengthening its effectiveness.

35. We commit to strictly implementing all relevant UNSCRs, including resolutions 1540, 1701, 2216, 2231 and 2397 and call on all UN Member States to fully implement relevant UNSCRs.

36. We recognise that, regardless of intent, "ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons" as referred in UNSCR 2231, include MTCR Category I systems. By definition, MTCR Category I systems, which are those capable of delivering at least a 500 kilogram payload to a range of at least 300 kilometres, are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

37. We are determined that the transfer of missiles, missile components, and related material and technologies, including those capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, to non-State actors, is deeply destabilizing and will be met with a vigorous effort to stop and roll back such transfers and hold those responsible to account.

38. We affirm our willingness to establish, among ourselves and with other interested partners, a dialogue dedicated to reviewing progress of the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions on missiles, including missile launches and illicit transfers, and to reviewing progress on the implementation by States of UNSCRs in the area of the non-proliferation of missiles, including intangible technology transfer, to continue to urge all states to vigorously implement these resolutions (G7 NPDG Declaration on Countering Illicit and/or Destabilising Missile Activities).

VI. Chemical and Biological Weapons

Chemical Weapons

39. Recalling that we are facing a critical situation because of the recent re-emergence of the use of chemical weapons by state and non-state actors, we remain concerned by chemical weapons use, and note in particular the horrific incidents especially attacks in Syria, Iraq, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom. We are determined to combat this common threat to our security. We emphasize that any use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, under any circumstances is unacceptable. We express the strong conviction that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons should be held accountable. Impunity for the use of chemical weapons can never be tolerated. To this end, we strongly support the work of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons launched in January 2018.

40. The now 40 participating States have jointly published on the Partnership's website 321 names of individuals and entities that have been sanctioned for their involvement in the proliferation or use of chemical weapons.

41. We strongly support measures adopted during the special session of the Conference of the States Party to the CWC, in June 2018, aimed at strengthening and reinforcing the implementation of the CWC, including through work on

attributing responsibility for chemical weapons attacks in Syria and upon the request of States Party more widely. The decision provided the OPCW with additional tools to respond to chemical weapons use, including the direction to establish arrangements to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks in Syria. We reaffirm our utmost support for the new Investigation and Identification Team and look forward to it becoming fully operational. We encourage the OPCW to further engage with all States Party in building capacities to prevent chemical weapons use or proliferation, and protect themselves against chemical threats. We welcome the OPCW Executive Council's decision recommending adoption of the proposal jointly submitted by the United States of America, Canada, and the Netherlands to add two families of toxic chemicals, including the substance used in Salisbury, to Schedule I of the CWC Annex on Chemicals. We call on all States Party to protect and strengthen implementation of the CWC, which constitutes a core pillar of the international peace and security architecture.

42. We are committed to achieving consensus wherever possible in multilateral organizations relating to these issues. We will continue to engage in developing the capabilities of the OPCW and in making use of the range of instruments at our disposal to deter further chemical weapons use.

Biological Weapons

43. Although biological weapons have seldom been used, we nevertheless remain concerned by the threat of their use. This challenge is to be addressed, inter alia, by reinforcing capacities in biosecurity, biosafety, and preparedness for outbreaks of infectious disease. To these ends, we reaffirm the need for universal adherence to, and effective implementation of, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which is a pillar of the international security and non-proliferation architecture. We demand the prompt declaration and elimination of all clandestine biological weapons programs worldwide. We encourage States Party to fulfil these and other obligations of the Convention. We emphasize the need to strengthen the BTWC, with more effective exchanges on biological weapons issues. We are strongly committed to protecting the Convention's credibility, as it is the principal legal international instrument specifically focused on building an effective international response to prevent the development, proliferation, and use of biological weapons. We also call upon all States Party to submit the agreed-upon annual confidence-building measures reports and encourage them to participate in voluntary initiatives, such as peer reviews. To ensure the continuation of efforts to address the existing challenges in the field of biological weapons, States Party must pay their assessed contributions to enable planned meetings to take place. We also emphasise that any use of biological weapons must be met with a swift and effective response. We support efforts to build up and sustain effective operational capabilities for the UN Secretary General's Mechanism for the Investigation of Alleged Use of chemical and biological weapons. The focus of these efforts is on biological weapons as

there is no other international capability to respond to the deliberate use of biological agents.

VII. Cross-Cutting Non-Proliferation Initiatives

44. We reaffirm our commitment to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) as a proven and effective mechanism for addressing WMD proliferation threats worldwide. We recognize the ongoing need for the G7-led GP, which now includes 30 active member countries plus the European Union, and underscore the importance of continuing to deliver coordinated activities and programming to combat chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear proliferation and terrorism. We welcome the GP's Programming Annex for 2018, which included a total of 295 Projects implemented by GP Partners in dozens of countries in every region of the world.

45. UNSCR 1540 and its successor resolutions enjoy the unconditional support of the G7 as critical components of the global non-proliferation architecture dedicated to combating the acquisition by non-state actors of WMD and their means of delivery. We continue to encourage the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including through the submission of national reporting. We also recognize the importance of improving assistance and coordination mechanisms— both through the GP and with the private sector, civil society, and academia. We applaud the Wiesbaden Process as an example of how dialogue and cooperation between States and private sector actors can advance the objectives of UNSCR 1540 and UNSCR 2325.

46. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) plays an important role in ensuring that States are prepared for and capable of interdicting shipments of WMD, their means of delivery, and related materials to and from state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI represents a practical application of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. We encourage further participation in PSI and, to this end, we encourage states which have yet to endorse the "Statement of Interdiction principles" to do so. We welcome the recent endorsements of PSI by the Republic of Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, bringing the total number of participating states to 107.

47. We underline the importance of considering gender equality in all non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament work. It is important to recognize that both women and men play a variety of roles in conflicts, including as victims, community protectors, combatants, arms dealers, smugglers, and providers of support to armed actors. To capture these varied experiences and perspectives, women need to be fully included in preventing, managing, and resolving violent conflict, and in post-conflict peace processes, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Women must be afforded the opportunity to be full partners in security, disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control discussions and organizations.

VIII. Conventional Weapons

48. We recognize the role of the Ottawa Convention and its upcoming Fourth Review Conference in banning for its States Party the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines. In the last two decades, 53 million stockpiled mines have been destroyed and the number of new mine victims has also significantly decreased. However, we remain concerned about the continued use of antipersonnel mines in Myanmar, and the high number of casualties caused by antipersonnel mines, including improvised devices, in countries affected by armed conflicts. We also note with concern the challenging situation Ukraine faces with the identification of newly mined areas under its jurisdiction but outside of its control, following entry into force of the Ottawa Convention for Ukraine. We remain committed to comprehensive mine action and the upcoming Review Conference is an opportunity to reinforce collective efforts addressing mines and explosive remnants of war. We recall that in many parts of the world, the remediation of post-conflict landscapes through mine action makes an important contribution to development and to meeting the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. We commend the work being done through mine action programs to empower women and girls as agents of change in their communities, in order to address the impacts of mines and explosive remnants of war.

49. We recognize that most conflicts are fought with conventional weapons, including with small arms and light weapons (SALW). The illicit trade in SALW fuels and prolongs conflict, leads to regional instability, contributes to violations of international humanitarian law and sexual and gender-based violence, impedes development, and exacerbates the threats posed by terrorist groups and organized crime. We note the outcome of the Third Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which called for the further strengthening of international cooperation and assistance. We recognize the International Tracing Instrument, and we urge all states to implement their commitments under the relevant instruments. We call upon all States to report their international transfers of SALW to the UN Register of Conventional Arms to assist in identifying excessive and destabilizing accumulations of SALW. We note the important role that the Arms Trade Treaty can play in assisting efforts to address the challenges posed by irresponsible international transfer of conventional arms. We acknowledge the importance of the Fifth Conference of State Parties of the Arms Trade Treaty. We also encourage all states to consider joining the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components, and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

50. The Sahel and North Africa remain a priority for the G7. In particular, we are committed to combating the illicit dissemination of small arms and light

weapons, which present a significant threat to regional peace and security. We will continue working closely with the African Union (AU) through the open G7-AU Donor Coordination Platform to significantly enhance the control of SALW in the Greater Sahel and the whole of Africa.

IX. Export Controls

51. We continue to promote effective systems of national controls for exports and imports of conventional arms, such as those called for in the Arms Trade Treaty, in order to prevent illicit trade and promote responsible trade by states and to contribute to international and regional peace, security, and stability. The effective implementation of the international non-proliferation regime demands that all states strengthen national export controls on sensitive goods and technologies including dual-use goods. We urge all states to act in accordance with the guidelines and control lists of the multilateral export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group, and we support efforts including through the GP to provide support to countries requiring export control capacity building assistance. We encourage all states to be particularly mindful of exports of emerging dual-use goods and technologies that may not yet be included in the export control regimes' control lists. We welcome in particular India's participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group, and look forward to its constructive engagement with the Nuclear Suppliers Group to strengthen global non-proliferation efforts.

X. Space Security

52. Outer space activities play an indispensable role in the social, economic, scientific, and technological development of states, as well as in maintaining international peace and security. Access to, and use of, outer space has become a key component of international security, the verification of arms control agreements and commitments, and the security and prosperity of our countries. At the same time, the space domain is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive, and some states are developing capabilities that can threaten our access to, and use of, space capabilities. We reiterate the need to advance and develop norms of behaviour in outer space and best practices for space operations, as well as to cooperate to prevent the creation and proliferation of long-lived orbital debris, in order to strengthen safety, stability, and sustainability of outer space and help all countries benefit from the peaceful use and exploration of space. We call on all states to advance cooperative frameworks that promote responsible uses and exploration of outer space, including through the implementation of the measures contained in the

recommendations of the 2013 UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures (TCBMs) in Outer Space Activities report.

53. We are committed to preventing conflicts from extending into outer space through effective, voluntary, pragmatic TCBMs and guidelines defining responsible behaviour in outer space. In this regard, we are open to considering potential future legally binding commitments that are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance our security. We regret that undue focus has been given on the draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). Its authors are actively engaged in activities that undermine the very objective they say they seek.

54. We support implementation of the 21 Guidelines for Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities and the Preamble, which were agreed in the Working Group by consensus in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

55. Conscious of the need to address the growing challenges to space security and of the need for common approaches among G7 members and committed to implementing the tasking made by G7 Foreign Ministers in Toronto, the G7 is engaged in developing a set of shared positions on the responsible use and exploration of outer space.