

European Union

EU Statement on

Agenda item 6: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

IAEA Board of Governors

Vienna, 1-5 March 2021

Madam Chair,

- 1. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: The Republic of North Macedonia* Montenegro*, Iceland*, Serbia*, Albania*, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Liechtenstein, Norway, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and San Marino.
- 2. The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report, and Deputy Director General Aparo for the technical briefing on 25 February 2021.
- 3. The EU reaffirms its resolute commitment to and continued support for the JCPOA at this critical point in time. We are determined to continue working with the international community to preserve this agreement of strategic importance and a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture. The EU calls on all countries to support its implementation in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).
- 4. The EU acknowledges the issues connected to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions by it. We welcome the prospect of a US return to the JCPOA and Iran's return to full JCPOA implementation. The verified full implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments remains essential. The lifting of nuclear-related sanctions is an essential part of the agreement. The EU has fully upheld its commitments, including sanctions lifting as foreseen under the JCPOA. The EU supports the ongoing intensive diplomatic efforts and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners. We acknowledge that all JCPOA participants reiterated their commitment to the agreement in the Joint Ministerial Statement of 21 December 2020.
- 5. In this context, the EU strongly expresses its increasing concern at Iran's continued actions that are inconsistent with its nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA. The EU deeply regrets Iran's announcement of 5 January 2020 that its nuclear programme would no longer be subject to any restrictions in the operational sphere, and the enactment of the law passed by Iran's Parliament on 2 December 2020.
- 6. The EU reiterates its clear and grave concern, at Iran's following actions, which are inconsistent with the JCPOA and have severe and, in the case of R&D activities, irreversible proliferation implications:
 - continued accumulation of enriched uranium in excess of the JCPOA threshold and that its maximum enrichment level remains above the limit set by the agreement; the total enriched uranium stockpile of almost 3 tons – more than fourteen times the maximum quantity of 202,8 kg uranium allowed by the JCPOA;
 - accumulation, since 4 January 2021, of 17.6kg of up to 20% enriched uranium at the underground Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP);

^{*} Candidate Countries the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania as well as potential Candidate Country Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

^{*} Iceland and Norway are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.

- continued installation, testing and accumulating uranium with advanced centrifuges, which significantly increases its enrichment capacity; installation of additional cascades of advanced centrifuges at the FEP, with two IR-2m cascades already being fed;
- ongoing transfer of centrifuge research and development activities from the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) to the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), in Natanz and completed installation of sub-headers for 18 cascades in that regard;
- start of R&D activities on the production of uranium metal using natural uranium, before moving to producing uranium metal enriched to up to 20% U-235 for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR);
- exceeding of the heavy water threshold set by the JCPOA;
- start of mechanical testing of centrifuges at a new location, beyond those specified in the JCPOA.
- 7. The EU is deeply concerned at Iran's decision to suspend, as of 23 February 2021, the implementation of transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol. This action significantly reduces the IAEA's access and oversight regarding sites, activities and relevant information. The IAEA will be deprived of an essential part of its knowledge of Iran's activities on the entirety of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle, including R&D with advanced centrifuges. Unless promptly reversed, this decision will substantially restrict the IAEA's ability to verify that nuclear material and activities in Iran remain for exclusively peaceful purposes. We stress that implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to Iran's Safeguards Agreement is a legally binding agreement between Iran and the IAEA Secretariat that cannot be modified unilaterally, as recalled in the report of the Director General on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement.
- 8. The EU wholly supports IAEA DG Grossi's efforts to maintain necessary verification and monitoring activities of Iran's nuclear commitments under the JCPOA. The EU acknowledges the reference, in the 21 February 2021 Joint Statement issued further to DG Grossi's visit to Tehran, to an agreement between AEOI and the IAEA, on a temporary bilateral technical understanding for up to three months.
- 9. Moreover, the EU strongly supports DG Grossi's tireless efforts in the pursuit of a constructive engagement with Iran, including as announced during the ongoing Board session.
- 10. We strongly urge Iran to reverse all activities inconsistent with the JCPOA and return, without delay, to its full implementation, including of all transparency measures, and support the efforts of the JCPOA participants in addressing all relevant issues within the JCPOA framework.
- 11. This, together with full implementation of the CSA, the Broader Conclusion and early ratification of the Additional Protocol is essential to help building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. In this regard, timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains crucial.
- 12. The EU commends the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, objective and impartial work and fully supports the IAEA's long-term mission of continued verification and monitoring in Iran, even during the COVID-19 pandemic.
- 13. The EU takes note that, as of 19 February 2021, € 4,1 million of extra budgetary funding had been pledged to date. We welcome the support of all States in mitigating the impact of the pandemic on budget and travel arrangements.

Madam Chair,

14. The EU takes note of the Director General's report and requests that it be made public.

Thank you, Madam Chair.