

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
24 June 2021

Original: English

**Letter dated 24 June 2021 from the Security Council Facilitator
for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the
President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), my six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 18 December 2020 to 24 June 2021.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Geraldine **Byrne Nason**
Security Council Facilitator for the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)



Eleventh six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) sets out the practical arrangements and procedures for the Council for carrying out tasks related to the implementation of its resolution 2231 (2015), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.
2. According to the note, the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its Facilitator for the functions specified therein. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the note, and after consultations among the members of the Council, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2021 (see S/2021/2).
3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on its work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.
4. The present report covers the period from 18 December 2020 to 24 June 2021.

II. Summary of the activities of the Council in the “2231 format”

5. On 18 December 2020, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran sent a letter addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2020/1262) in which he outlined the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran with regard to the tenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2020/1177), as described further in paragraph 9 of the present report.
6. On 22 December 2020, the Security Council, via an open videoconference,¹ was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the tenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), by the Facilitator at that time (Phillippe Kridelka, Permanent Representative of Belgium) on the work of the Council and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2020/1244), and by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on the procurement channel (S/2020/1164).
7. On 24 June 2021, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) met in the “2231 format” and discussed the findings and recommendations of the eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2021/582).
8. During the reporting period, a total of 35 notes were circulated within the “2231 format”. In addition, I sent 26 official communications to Member States and/or the

¹ See S/2020/1324. In accordance with the procedure set out in the letter dated 7 May 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Council (S/2020/372), which was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, briefings and statements delivered during open video-teleconferences will be issued as an official document of the Council.

Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. I received a total of 26 communications from Member States and the Coordinator.

III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

9. In the above-mentioned letter dated 18 December 2020, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran outlined the views of his country regarding the tenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). In his letter, he noted that the United States' "unilateral sanctions" had "rendered the Iranian benefits from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ... almost completely inaccessible" and stressed that the statement of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), as reflected in the annex to document S/2015/550, and the positions contained therein, remained valid. He stated that "the Islamic Republic of Iran underlines the need for the full and unconditional implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action."

10. In a joint statement after the 21 December 2020 ministerial meeting of the E3/EU+2 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the participants of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action recalled that the Plan, as endorsed by resolution 2231 (2015), remained "a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture" and "a significant achievement of multilateral diplomacy". They underscored the important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); stressed that resolution 2231 (2015) remained "fully in force"; agreed to "continue dialogue to ensure full implementation of the Plan of Action by all sides"; and acknowledged "the prospect of a return of the United States of America to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action", underlining "their readiness to positively address this in a joint effort". They discussed "the need to address ongoing implementation challenges, including on nuclear non-proliferation and sanctions lifting commitments."²

11. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and to report at any time any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments, the Director General submitted to the Agency's Board of Governors and to the Security Council regular reports in February 2021 (S/2021/239) and May 2021 (S/2021/558) on the Agency's verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as updates in January 2021 (S/2021/231 and S/2021/232), February 2021 (S/2021/233, S/2021/234, S/2021/235, S/2021/236, S/2021/237 and S/2021/238), March 2021 (S/2021/547, S/2021/548 and S/2021/549), April 2021 (S/2021/550, S/2021/551, S/2021/552, S/2021/553, S/2021/554 and S/2021/555) and May 2021 (S/2021/556 and S/2021/557), covering activities related to the "production of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to" 5 per cent, 20 per cent and 60 per cent; "research and development on the new type of fuel for the TRR [Tehran Research Reactor]" and related "research and development on uranium metal production"; and the installation of IR2m, IR4 and IR6 "centrifuge machines at the FEP [fuel enrichment plant] in Natanz".

² See https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/90907/Joint%20Ministerial%20Statement%20on%20the%20Joint%20Comprehensive%20Plan%20of%20Action.

12. In its regular report of 23 in February and 31 May 2021, IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had stated that “in implementation of its rights set forth in Paragraph 26 and 36 of the JCPOA ... [it would] stop some of Iran’s measures under the JCPOA”, and had further informed it that it “will stop the implementation of voluntary transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA as of 23 February 2021,” including “Provisions of the Additional Protocol to the CSA” In the light of this, the Islamic Republic of Iran and IAEA had reached a “temporary bilateral technical understanding...whereby the Agency would continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities for up to three months...and to keep the technical understanding under regular review to ensure it continued to achieve its purposes.” Also in its 31 May report, IAEA informed that the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Vice-President Salehi of the Islamic Republic of Iran reached an agreement that the information collected by the IAEA monitoring equipment covered by the technical understanding would continue to be stored for a further period of one month up to 24 June 2021, which would “enable the Agency to recover and re-establish the necessary continuity of knowledge.” It also noted that “the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities in relation to the JCPOA have been affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.”

13. In a letter dated 18 February 2021 (S/2021/158), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the United States’ Mission to the United Nations notified the Security Council that, on behalf of his Government, he withdrew the letters to the Security Council dated 20 August 2020 (S/2020/815), 21 August 2020 (S/2020/822) and 21 September 2020 (S/2020/927), and that it was “the view of the United States that the measures contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of resolution 2231 (2015) remained in effect and that the provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010) that were terminated by resolution 2231 (2015) remain terminated”.

14. In response, in a letter dated 24 February 2021 (S/2021/183), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that “the above-mentioned decision” of the United States was “indeed a welcome acknowledgement”. He further noted that his country “underlines that the United States still [was] not a participant State in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and “continues to be in material breach of its obligations under resolution 2231 (2015)”.

15. In a letter dated 12 April 2021 (A/75/852-S/2021/347), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran transmitted a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding “a dangerous, reckless sabotage” at the “electricity distribution network of the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant” that had taken place on 11 April 2021.

16. In a letter dated 3 June 2021 addressed to the Secretary-General (A/75/914-S/2021/538), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran transmitted a letter from his country’s Foreign Minister regarding his views on the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States and its impact on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ability to transfer their financial contribution to the United Nations.

17. In a letter dated 10 June 2021, addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2021/594), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation outlined the concerns of his country regarding their proposal, circulated on 29 August 2019, of the export of equipment to the Islamic Republic of Iran in accordance with paragraph 4 (a) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). He noted that they “continue to proceed from the understanding that this request has been approved, since no formal objection was made to this proposal by the set deadline,” noting their “detailed position...set out in [their] letter dated 22 October 2019 (S/AC.58/2019/COMM.51).”

He requested that the Facilitator “issue a corrigendum to the [outcome] note.” In the light of this, I recall paragraph 29 of the previous Facilitator’s report³ which reads as follows: “On 22 August, a proposal was submitted by a Council member to the Security Council to participate in and permit the activities set forth in paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). During the no-objection procedure, three Council members requested that the proposal be denied. Subsequently, I sent an outcome note informing Council members that the proposal was deemed disapproved. I also informed the proposing Council member that the proposal had not been approved. The proposing Council member subsequently raised concerns about the outcome.” On 14 June, I circulated a draft response to the request of the Russian Federation, under an expedited no-objection procedure, stating that I, as Facilitator, was not in a position to issue the requested corrigendum. On 16 June, a Council member objected to the draft response.

18. With a focus on addressing developments regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including the possible return by the United States to the Plan, and to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Plan by all sides, the Joint Commission convened on 2 April 2021 – and held further meetings in April, May and June – through expert-level working groups to work out the specific measures needed in terms of sanctions-lifting and implementation of nuclear-related commitments and to look into the possible sequencing of respective measures.

Ballistic missiles and launches

19. In a letter dated 18 February 2021 (S/2021/163), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom noted that they wished to bring to the attention of the Security Council certain “recent actions” undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran that were “inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)”, regarding “multiple ballistic missile launches” conducted on 16 and 17 January 2021 and “a space launch vehicle test” publicly announced on 1 February 2021. The Permanent Representatives noted that such launches “constitute[d] an enduring trend Iran’s continuing to advance its ballistic missile capabilities despite the provisions in Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”.

20. In response, in a letter dated 2 March 2021 (A/75/795-S/2021/216), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation stated that this was an “attempt to spread unsubstantiated claims about Iran’s alleged violation of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)”, and that the Islamic Republic of Iran was “fully entitled to the advantages of space science and technology”. He underscored that “none of the existing international instruments and mechanisms...either directly or implicitly prohibit[ed] Iran from developing missile and space programmes”, and that “attempts to single out Iranian activity and directly place it in a military context were biased and misleading”.

21. In response to the aforementioned letter (S/2021/163), in a letter dated 4 March 2021 (S/2021/222), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that the country’s missile and space programmes, including the launches of ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles, fell outside the purview or competence of resolution 2231 (2015) and its annexes, and categorically rejected all unsubstantiated allegations made in the aforementioned letter.

22. In a letter dated 7 April 2021 (S/2021/338), the Permanent Representative of Israel noted “the ongoing Iranian ballistic missile programme”, including a “wide-scale military exercise” in mid-January 2021 in which “multiple short and medium-range ballistic missiles” had been launched, in “direct violation of paragraph 3 of

³ S/2019/952/Rev.1.

annex B” to resolution 2231 (2015). He furthermore pointed to “the close link between Iran’s space and military programmes”. He urged the Security Council to condemn these ongoing violations of resolution 2231 (2015) by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

23. In response to the above-mentioned letter (S/2021/338), in a letter dated 14 April 2021 (S/2021/361), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) was “self-explanatory” and “need[ed] no interpretation”, and that its launches of ballistic missiles “fall outside the purview or competence of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and its annexes”. He further stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran was “determined to resolutely continue its ballistic missile activities”, and that its space programme was related to “the peaceful uses of outer space”.

24. The abovementioned letters, addressed to the Secretary-General and/or the President of the Security Council, were circulated in the “2231 format” of the Council during the reporting period.

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

25. During the reporting period, one new proposal for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 was submitted to the Security Council.

26. Since Implementation Day, a total of 52 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To date, of the 52 proposals that have been processed, 37 have been approved, 5 not approved and 10 withdrawn. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in 50 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the procurement channel continues to function, and the Joint Commission continues to review proposals.

27. According to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), certain nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. In this regard, during the reporting period, seven notifications were submitted to the Security Council in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment and technology covered by annex B, section 1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1, intended for light water reactors.

28. No notifications were submitted to the Security Council related to the necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, and no notifications were submitted to the Council related to the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design.

29. On 16 June 2021, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to me the Group’s eleventh six-month report of the Joint Commission (S/2021/578), in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

V. Other approval and exemption requests

30. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

31. Exemptions to the assets freeze provisions are contained in paragraph 6 (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). No exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to the 23 individuals and 61 entities currently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).

VI. Transparency, outreach and guidance

32. Having been newly appointed as the Facilitator for 2021–2022, and reflecting upon the work of my predecessors who have worked tirelessly since 2016 to promote the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), I remain committed to and hopeful for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as endorsed by the Council in its resolution 2231 (2015). I will continue to facilitate, strengthen and promote the implementation of the resolution and believe that dialogue, transparency and the utilization of the procurement channel remain critical. I also note and welcome the active efforts by all Member States in promoting, supporting and engaging in dialogue and in acknowledging the importance of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a multilateral agreement in nuclear non-proliferation.

33. Outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated by the note mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present report (S/2016/44), will continue to foster awareness of resolution 2231 (2015). The website on resolution 2231 (2015), also managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, continues to play a significant role in providing relevant information.

34. In my role as Facilitator, I also held several bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). As I continue to advocate for the Council's collective responses to international peace and security issues, I encourage the international community to act in line with paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (2015), which calls upon all Member States, regional and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
