



Federal Ministry
of the Interior

2015 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution

Facts and Trends



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Politically motivated crime¹

In 2015, the BKA registered 38,981 offences in the category of politically motivated crime, an increase of 19.2% over the previous year (2014: 32,700). This figure includes 13,687 propaganda offences (35.1%; 2014: 12,543, 38.4%). The total number of politically motivated crimes includes violent offences, the number of which rose from 3,368 in 2014 to 4,402 in 2015. Of the total, 29,681 criminal offences (76.1%) were found to have an extremist background (2014: 23,909 or 73.1%). Of these, 604 (2014: 912) could not be assigned to any specific category.

The following aspects should be noted:

- dramatic rise in the number of violent right-wing extremist crimes with a xenophobic background; the percentage of violent criminal offences against accommodation centres for asylum applicants more than quintupled,
- enormous increase in the number of violent criminal offences with a left-wing extremist background.

In detail:

In the area of **right-wing politically motivated crime**, 21,933 (2014: 16,559) criminal offences with an extremist background were recorded. With 1,408 (2014: 990) registered cases, the number of violent criminal offences with a right-wing extremist background increased by 42.2%. At 918, the number of violent crimes directed at foreigners (2014: 512) was the highest since the current definition of politically motivated crime was introduced in 2001. Also, the number of violent crimes against actual or supposed left-wing extremists increased to 252 (2014: 139), while the number of crimes directed at other political opponents rose to 82 (2014: 60). In 2015, there were eight attempted homicides motivated by right-wing extremism (2014: one).

In the area of **left-wing politically motivated crime**, 5,620 (2014: 4,424) criminal offences with an extremist background were recorded; out of those, 1,608 (2014: 995) were violent criminal offences. The number of violent criminal offences with a left-wing extremist background that were directed against the police and security authorities increased dramatical-

ly to 1,032 (2014: 623). The number of violent criminal offences against actual or supposed right-wing extremists also increased to 833 (2014: 367). In the category "Violent criminal offences against the State, its institutions and symbols" the trend is the same with a total of 572 (2014: 326) registered offences in 2015. In 2015, there were eight attempted homicides motivated by left-wing extremism (2014: seven).

In the category of **politically motivated crime by foreigners**, 1,524 (2014: 2,014) criminal offences were classified as having an extremist background, including 235 (2014: 259) violent offences. The total number of criminal offences in this category thus decreased by 24.3%, while the number of violent crimes declined by only 9.3%. In 2015, there were three (2014: six) attempted homicides by foreigners with an extremist background.

Right-wing extremism

By the end of 2015, the number of right-wing extremist sympathizers totalled 22,600, after subtracting multiple memberships (2014: 21,000). For the first time in years, this number had risen. More than one-quarter of all right-wing extremists are neo-Nazis; the size of the neo-Nazi scene rose slightly compared to last year, to about 5,800 persons (2014: 5,600). The number of subculture-oriented right-wing extremists also grew considerably in 2015, to 8,200 (2014: 7,200). This means that subculture-oriented right-wing extremists continue to make up the largest share of right-wing extremist sympathizers, at more than 35%.

Right-wing extremist following¹		
	2014	2015
Subculture-oriented right-wing extremists	7,200	8,200
Neo-Nazis	5,600	5,800
Political party membership	6,850	6,650
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany)	5,200	5,200
DIE RECHTE (The Right)	500	650
Bürgerbewegung pro NRW ² (pro NRW, Civic Movement for North Rhine-Westphalia)	950	500
Der III. Weg (The Third Way)	200	300
Other right-wing extremist organizations	2,500	3,200
Total	22,150	23,850
after subtracting multiple memberships	21,000	22,600
Violence-oriented right-wing extremists	10,500	11,800
¹ Some of these figures are estimated and rounded off. ² In late 2015, pro Köln, the Civic Movement for Cologne, seceded from pro NRW. Its members are included in the number of members of other right-wing extremist organizations.		

At 1,408, the number of violent offences motivated by right-wing extremism rose significantly in 2015 compared to the previous year (990). Together with the increasing number of violence-oriented right-wing

extremists (2014: 10,500; 2015: 11,800), this clearly illustrates the threat posed by this spectrum. More than half of all right-wing extremists can now be considered violence-oriented.

In spring 2015, it became obvious how intense right-wing extremist militancy had become. This intensity then continued to rise: Politicians and journalists were threatened, arson attacks were carried out against accommodation centres for refugees, and there were even cases of attempted homicide.

The enormous rise in right-wing extremist violence and the increasing acceptance of right-wing extremism had a particular influence during the reporting year. The increasing number of refugees led to anti-asylum agitation which became the dominant topic of 2015. This agitation is characterized by its right-wing extremist nature and the acceptance of violence and militancy among parts of the population.

However, a large number of right-wing extremist violent offences related to the refugee issue were not committed by organized right-wing extremists. So far, no indications have been found that violent offences are coordinated at central, regional or supraregional level by right-wing extremists. The majority of offenders had not committed right-wing extremist offences before. About two-thirds of all identified suspects had not yet attracted attention by committing politically motivated criminal offences or being part of the right-wing extremist scene.

Social networks play an important role in agitation and radicalization processes. Uninhibited hate speech on the Internet can lead to individual or collective radicalization. Groups that are purely virtual in the beginning consolidate and become radicalized on the Internet, and then carry out actions in the real world. By taking executive measures against members of the Oldschool Society, the security authorities managed to dismantle a group that was suspected of pursuing right-wing terrorist goals. However, given the charged atmosphere and the anti-refugee mood, there is a continued risk that similar groups may form or that radicalized individuals may commit serious acts of violence.

A vast amount of hate speech can be found on relevant websites or in comments and posts on social networks, ranging from racist and humiliating

comments about migrants to fantasies of violence. The words that are used, especially on the Internet, demonstrate that the debate is getting more and more heated. In some cases, people even openly promote violence. There are, for example, many websites that contain fantasies of violence and comments that dehumanize foreigners and political opponents. The Internet platform "Altermedia Deutschland" played a key role in spreading right-wing extremist propaganda. The Federal Minister of the Interior therefore banned this platform on 27 January 2016 because it was used to spread racist, xenophobic, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic contents. The Office of the Federal Public Prosecutor initiated proceedings against the platform's five operators on suspicion of forming a criminal organization.

Hate speech creates the pressure to take immediate action. Right-wing extremists aggravate the situation by spreading their ideology and warning of alienation and the threat of "race extinction". This provides fertile soil for militancy and violence. This becomes particularly obvious when it comes to the numbers of criminal and violent offences committed against accommodation centres for asylum applicants and motivated by right-wing extremism. While 170 criminal offences (including 25 violent offences) were committed in 2014, more than five times as many (894 criminal offences, including 153 violent offences) were registered in 2015. In 2015, the number of right-wing extremist arson attacks against collective accommodation centres for asylum applicants also increased to 75 (2014: 5). This means that more than half of all arson attacks motivated by right-wing extremism were directed against housing for asylum seekers. While a preliminary assessment has revealed that the vast majority of criminal offences was committed spontaneously by persons living in the immediate vicinity, some violent offences demonstrate a high level of preparation and planning.

Another focus of right-wing extremist violence is attacks on political opponents, left-wing extremists, representatives of the state, journalists and those helping refugees. It is not because of their ethnic origin, but because of their political attitude that persons vilified as "enemies of the people" become the target of aggressive right-wing extremist agitation and violence.

Increased self-confidence among right-wing extremists, which is the result of anti-asylum agitation, raises the potential for violence between right-wing and left-wing extremists. When planning their activities, right-wing extremists already make provisions for clashes with left-wing counter-demonstrators. They clearly accept the risk of escalating violence, and sometimes even do their utmost to make sure that the situation actually does escalate.

Jihadist attacks in Europe repeatedly prompt right-wing extremists to spread their propaganda and try to dramatize the threat situation by portraying it as an ethnic-cultural conflict. Even though no immediate action by violence-oriented right-wing extremists against Salafists was registered in the reporting year, there is a considerable potential for conflict and radicalization.

As a result of the current asylum debate, the right-wing extremist scene managed to mobilize a much larger number of supporters and sympathizers for their rallies than in previous years. In 2015, 95,200 persons attended right-wing extremist demonstrations or those mainly coordinated by right-wing extremists (2014: 20,610). However, not all of these participants can be considered members of the right-wing extremist scene. About 80% of all right-wing extremist demonstrations focused on immigration, asylum and refugees.

The right-wing extremist scene currently seems to be on the rise. It is mobilizing more and more people and addresses issues that are also discussed by the wider public. It provides protests with infrastructure and, where desired, is willing to adopt a different rhetoric or to step up its agitation efforts. Right-wing extremists portray themselves as being part of a popular movement that they want to radicalize and that is meant to oppose the political system.

In 2015, the consolidation efforts of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) bore fruit. Under its new national chairman Frank Franz, the NPD settled a protracted dispute among its leaders about the party's goals and objectives, improved its internal and external communication and enhanced its ability to mobilize followers.

Last year, the NPD took advantage of the refugee issue as the central and predominant topic of agitation to attack the political order. The party combines the refugee issue with its theoretical principles: In its view, the admission of migrants violates its idea of an ethnically homogeneous community. When protesting against asylum applicants and accommodation centres, the NPD demonstrated tactical flexibility: On the one hand, it pretended to care about the worries of local residents. Yet on the other hand, it stirred up hatred against immigrants, especially in social networks. If the NPD were banned, its neo-Nazi members could turn to Die Rechte and Der III. Weg. Both parties succeeded in expanding their structures in the reporting year. Last but not least, they hope to gain importance and recruit new activists on the basis of anti-asylum agitation. Increasing membership of these two parties shows that persons belonging to the neo-Nazi spectrum accept the party's organizational form and are willing to become more involved.

In the reporting year, Die Rechte focused its activities on the asylum problem. In North Rhine-Westphalia, it regularly held vigils and set up information stalls to agitate, sometimes in a highly aggressive manner, against existing and planned refugee housing. During rallies, party officials made slanderous comments about politicians, refugees and their supporters.

The right-wing extremist party Der III. Weg is active mainly in Rhineland-Palatinate and Bavaria. Furthermore, it tried to expand its structures, particularly in Saxony and Brandenburg, in the reporting year. The party's propaganda focuses on anti-asylum agitation.

In 2015, the development of pro NRW was largely characterized by internal disputes, which led to the secession of the pro Köln and the departure of numerous high-ranking party officials. The loss of this regional stronghold limited the viability of pro NRW at district and state level.

With their xenophobic agitation and their sometimes aggressive rhetoric, right-wing extremist parties aggravate an already heated and highly emotional debate. Individuals may therefore get the impression that a much larger number of persons welcome or at least approve more radical or violent action.

Left-wing extremism

At the end of 2015 the number of active left-wing extremists totalled 26,700 (after subtracting multiple memberships) and had thus decreased slightly compared to 2014 (27,200).

As in previous years, there was a slight decline in membership of Marxist-Leninist and other legalist left-wing extremist groups (2015: 20,300; 2014: 21,100).

The number of violence-oriented left-wing extremists rose slightly, by contrast, and totalled 7,700 at the end of 2015 (2014: 7,600), of whom 6,300 were autonomists (2014: 6,100).

Left-wing extremist following¹		
	2014	2015
Autonomists	6,100	6,300
Anarchists	800	800
Marxist-Leninists and other left-wing extremists	21,100	20,300
Total	28,000	27,400
after subtracting multiple member-ships	27,200	26,700
of which violence-oriented left-wing extremists	7,600	7,700
1 Some of these figures are estimated and rounded off.		

The number of left-wing extremist motivated acts of violence rose by nearly two-thirds in 2015 to a total of 1,608 (2014: 995). This increase can essentially be attributed to the following:

The number of violence-oriented autonomists has increased. Moreover, there was a marked escalation in both their activities and level of aggression; in particular there was a sharp increase in the number of attacks against the police as well as violent confrontations between left-wing and right-wing or purported right-wing extremists. There were riots at major events, some of them quite serious, for instance on the day of the official opening of the new European Central Bank (ECB) building in

Frankfurt am Main on 18 March 2015. Of the eight attempted homicides recorded in 2015 (2014: seven), four were directed against police officers during the protests against the ECB.

These examples illustrate the readiness to use violence on the part of those in the left-wing extremist scene, which can range from damaging property to committing bodily injury and attempted homicide.

Violent left-wing extremism is primarily an urban phenomenon, with activists mainly operating in metropolitan areas. Violence-oriented left-wing extremists are concentrated in the city-states of Berlin and Hamburg as well as in Leipzig, where the majority of the left-wing extremist sympathisers live. This is where a large proportion of offences by violent left-wing extremists is committed, including serious violent crimes. It is in urban areas that the left-wing extremist scene is able to mobilise a great many followers and where there is a great capacity for action and readiness to use violence. That applies in particular to those city districts in which left-wing extremists have their own shops and occupy houses, which they regard as their very own domain.

The drastic increase in left-wing extremist acts of violence to the highest level since the system of defining politically motivated crime was introduced in 2001 has gone hand in hand with a rise in the level of aggression and intensity of the violence in recent years.

Again and again it is especially police officers (as representatives of the hated “apparatus of repression”) who come under attack. The readiness to injure police officers has increased. Perpetrators are willing to take the risk not only of inflicting serious physical injuries but also of someone being killed. These attacks are usually carried out during demonstrations. Attacks against the police and against actual or purported right-wing extremists are widely accepted in the violent left-wing extremist scene.

Autonomist militancy, i.e. street rioting during demonstrations or largescale events, seeks direct confrontation with the police and political opponents. One important goal of action-oriented left-wing extremists continues to be the prevention of right-wing extremist events, including by means of direct confrontation. Participants are attacked while en route to demonstrations or their access routes are obstructed, for example.

The number of “mass militant” activities dropped in 2014, though the same cannot be said for 2015. Particular mention should be made of the violence which occurred during the opening of the new ECB building in Frankfurt am Main and during a right-wing demonstration in Leipzig.

While mobilising sympathisers to protest against the ECB in Frankfurt am Main on 18 March 2015 the Blockupy-Bündnis (Blockupy alliance), on the whole a largely non-extremist movement, called on supporters to carry out “multifarious protests”, ranging from organising a demonstration to symbolic actions to obstructing access roads. The goal was to prevent or at least obstruct for a long time, the festivities to mark the opening of the new ECB building. The authorised rally on the evening of 18 March 2015 attended by 17,000 demonstrators was largely peaceful, but autonomists had already vandalised Frankfurt city centre in the early hours of that morning, burning barricades and damaging numerous shops and other buildings. At the height of the rioting a police station in Frankfurt city centre was attacked and four police cars were set on fire. More than 150 police officers were injured during the riots.

The right-wing extremist scene had announced a demonstration which was to be held in the Connewitz district of Leipzig on 12 December 2015; left-wing extremists called on their followers to carry out counteractions. Violent left-wing extremists started a street riot, threw stones, bottles and fireworks at the police and injured 69 officers. What is noteworthy about these attacks is that they were primarily directed against the police. The right-wing extremists’ rally was, on the other hand, only of secondary importance.

A key feature of the left-wing extremist agenda is forging alliances and campaign work (notably in the context of large-scale events), particularly in light of the current lack of sympathisers and organisational structures in the scene. The objective is often to establish as broad a social alliance as possible which reaches beyond the extremist spectrum and is firmly rooted in regional and local structures. A key element is networking at international level.

Three big campaigns dominated the left-wing extremist scene in 2015: One against the festivities to mark the opening of the new ECB building

in March, another against the G7 Summit in Elmau in Bavaria in June, and the “End of the Road” campaign against lignite opencast mining in Garzweiler in North Rhine-Westphalia and in the Lausitz region of Brandenburg. The last is yet another example of the left-wing extremist scene’s successful attempts to take up current affairs in the context of action alliances and to establish them as a focus of agitation within the extremist scene.

While the events during the opening of the new ECB building and the “End of the Road” campaign against lignite opencast mining were broadly discussed in some parts of the scene and deemed an overall success, there was hardly any response to any of the activities directed against the G7 Summit in Elmau.

All in all, these three campaigns show that the left-wing extremist scene’s strategy of building alliances is in fact quite successful. Those organising protests fall back on a broad spectrum of left-wing extremist fields of activity, and “civil disobedience” (the form of action typically chosen by violence-oriented left-wing extremists) is regarded as providing legitimisation for violent riots. Activities to mobilise followers from diverse spectrums is thus used both to propagate own political goals as well as to engage in militancy.

Nonetheless, the ongoing loss of significance of left-wing extremist positions, which manifests itself in social marginalisation and the inability to interconnect, has triggered a debate about the ideological and strategic foundations of left-wing extremism. This debate continued in 2015. Although no one in the left-wing extremist scene calls its basic orientation and premises into question, the debate has nevertheless led to strategic changes and a reassessment of the ideological basis.

As part of a process of restructuring, violence-oriented left-wing extremists are attempting to overcome the fragmentation in the scene and to achieve both social and political relevance by establishing structures throughout Germany. These efforts to adopt new organisational structures while at the same time retaining militant strategies and how they are communicated (“no militancy for militancy’s sake”) have gained momentum since 2014.

The “... ums Ganze!” (uG, “... all or nothing!”) alliance and the Interventionistische Linke (IL, Interventionalist Left) are currently the most successful players in this restructuring of the left-wing extremist scene.

The uG alliance, a network of independent local autonomist groups, has around 250 sympathisers. The individual groups are independent at local level but act in concert in the context of action alliances and at large-scale events, at which they all go by the label of “...all or nothing!”. The alliance is committed to militancy as a strategic element of an organised movement. Its aim is to be able to combine those forces inherent in the individual local groups in order to be capable of acting together at regional level. The alliance was able to increase the degree of its organisation in the period under review.

The IL, formally established in 2005, is ideologically undogmatic. It aims to combine a mass base (with the corresponding opportunities for intervention) with militancy. The controlled process of developing from a network into an organisation, which was publicised in an “interim paper” in 2014, continued in 2015.

While left-wing extremist political parties such as the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) and the Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist–Leninist Party of Germany) are of no relevance whatsoever for violent left-wing extremism, violent Marxist, Leninist and anti-imperialist groups are undertaking increasing efforts to network their structures at national level.

The [3A]*Revolutionäres Bündnis ([3A]*Revolutionary Alliance) explicitly allies itself with Communism and was one of the key players in the “Stop G7” action alliance which protested against the G7 Summit in Elmau in June 2015. The Alliance was also involved in protests at the opening of the new ECB building in Frankfurt am Main on 18 March 2015.

The more Trotskyist-oriented Neue antikapitalistische Organisation (NaO, New Anti-Capitalist Organisation) has since 2014 been stepping up efforts to also network with autonomist groups, though with little success to date. In contrast to the IL and the uG alliance, the NaO seeks to “breathe new life into Marxism and the workers’ movement”. Neverthe-

less, these groups are all in agreement that a revolution is imperative, though impossible in the near term.

The Marxist–Leninist Perspektive Kommunismus (Communist Perspective) was established in 2014 by six organisations from the violent left-wing extremist spectrum. It aims to “establish socialism to create a free, a Communist, classless society”. They claim that this can only be achieved by means of the revolutionary destruction of the existing state and social order.

Islamism/Islamist terrorism

For lack of confirmed information on the number of adherents of several Islamist organisations and groups acting on a nationwide level, a reliable statement about the total number of Islamists in Germany cannot be given.

Islamist following¹		
Organisations²	2014	2015
Core al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Al-Shabab Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS)	no hard numbers	no hard numbers
Islamic State (IS)	no hard numbers	no hard numbers
Salafist Movements	7,000	8,350
Hezbollah	950	950
Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (HAMAS)	300	300
North Caucasus Separatist Movement (NCSM)	220	200
Turkish Hezbollah (TH)	360	360
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT)	300	320
Muslim Brotherhood (MB)/Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e.V. (IGD)	1,000	1,040
Tablighi Jama'at (TJ)	700	650
Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg e.V. (IZH)	no hard numbers	no hard numbers
Millî Görüş movement and affiliated associations	no hard numbers	no hard numbers
Others ³	2,060	1,950

- 1 The figures refer to Germany and are partly estimated and rounded off.
- 2 The list includes – in a systematic order – terrorist organisations and those which refrain from violence.
- 3 Other organisations whose membership/adherent figures are relevant to the Islamist following.

Particularly the following of associations regarded as belonging to the Millî Görüş movement – including the Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş e.V. (IGMG) – can only be roughly estimated. Altogether, the Millî Görüş movement has several tens of thousands of followers. The number of extremist followers is estimated to amount to up to 10,000 individuals.

The term "Islamism" refers to a form of political extremism. Invoking Islam, Islamism aims at the partial or complete abolition of the free democratic basic order of the Federal Republic of Germany. Islamism is based on the conviction that religion, in this case Islam, is not only a personal and private affair but rules social life and the political order or regulates at least part of it. Islamism postulates the existence of a divinely ordained – and therefore "true" and absolute – order which is above all orders made by man. With their interpretation of Islam, Islamists are in conflict with principles established in Germany's Basic Law, in particular the sovereignty of the people, the separation of state and religion, the freedom of speech, and equal rights in general. Anti-Semitism is also an essential ideological element of Islamism.

The generic term "Islamism" comprises several tendencies and movements which differ as to their ideological premises, their geographic orientation, and their strategies and means.

Jihadist groups like the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda, for example, consider terrorist violence used against "nonbelievers" and so-called corrupt regimes to be indispensable in their fight for a "theocracy". Their terrorist agenda is a global one and poses a threat to the international community of states.

Especially the attacks in Paris (France) in late 2015, which IS claimed responsibility for, have faced Europe with a **new dimension of terror**. It has to be assumed that IS is planning further attacks in Europe, including Germany. The German military involvement in Syria and Iraq is reason enough for IS to justify the use of violence against German interests.

Besides IS – and those declaring their allegiance to IS – as the currently most serious threat to the West, Al-Qaeda, too, continues to propagate the fight against the West as its top priority and is still in a position to follow up its hateful words with deadly actions, as was illustrated by the attack against the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris on 7 January 2015.

Threats of attacks mainly emanate from

- self-radicalising lone perpetrators and very small groups
- returnees from jihad areas
- individuals prevented from leaving Germany and
- long-term sleepers placed by terrorist organisations.

Given the continuous immigration into Germany, it also has to be assumed that active or former members, supporters, and sympathisers of terrorist organisations as well as individuals with an extremist orientation and/or Islamistically motivated war criminals may be among the refugees.

By the end of 2015, intelligence was available on more than 780 individuals having travelled towards Syria/Iraq in order to participate in combat there on behalf of the IS and other terrorist groups, or in order to support such groups in other ways. Despite the continuing IS propaganda aimed at making adherents emigrate to the Caliphate and selectively addressing sympathisers in Western countries, the number of departures declined in 2015 in comparison with the previous year. The reasons for this decline are unclear: Besides the growing number of Islamists from Germany losing their lives in Syria and Iraq, the deteriorating military situation there together with the disastrous humanitarian situation might have influenced this development. The decline in departures, however, does not mean that the risk posed by Jihadists has diminished.

This is clearly illustrated by the **jihadist propaganda** which, disregarding borders, makes Jihadism grow also in the West. This propaganda still substantially contributes to the radicalisation especially of young people. Since the period of radicalisation before an active involvement in the militant fight is becoming ever shorter, both the fight against terrorism/jihadism and the early prevention of Islamism continue to be an urgent task. The IS dominates the jihadist propaganda. Texts, photo se-

ries, and video or audio messages are published on a daily basis. The publications, all of them lavish productions, are aimed at a young and media-oriented audience. The IS is also omnipresent in social networks.

Islamism in Germany enjoys undiminished popularity. A particularly strong increase in followers can be observed with **Salafism**, the tendency within Islamism which – unlike the Islamist organisations that have been established in Germany for many years – does not have to respect the traditions and structures brought along from (former) countries of origin. In late 2015, the number of adherents amounted to 8,350 (7,000 in the previous year).

The **Koran distribution campaign LIES! (READ!)** run by the Salafist association Die Wahre Religion (DWR, The True Religion) has been – from a Salafist point of view – a success. Under the cover of proselytising efforts, the activities were continued with unbroken vigour in 2015. Meanwhile, c. 3 millions of Koran copies have been distributed. The campaign which is steadily expanding in Germany and abroad has met with an increased public awareness and is particularly attractive to young people. Among those who participate in the actions of the LIES! campaign are i.a. individuals who belong to the jihadist spectrum or have been in contact with the jihadist scene and, in some cases, are intent right from the beginning on radicalising and recruiting others for a jihadist purpose. There is a growing number of indications regarding individuals who participated in the Koran distribution first and participated in combat in Syria afterwards.

Islamist organisations in Germany see the tide of refugees from Syria and Iraq as a chance to gain new followers by winning refugees over to their extremist ideology under the cover of humanitarian aid. Such activities are likely to increase in future. The contacts Salafists or Islamists make with refugees will remain relevant to Germany's domestic intelligence services. It has to be found out to what extent Islamist organisations or individuals restrict their activities to humanitarian aid or exploit them for spreading an Islamist ideology. Particular attention has to be paid to so-called unaccompanied young refugees since, due to their situation, they are likely to be particularly susceptible to Islamist promises.

A starting point for Salafists/Islamists trying to make contact with refugees, might be **anti-Semitism**, which is not only an integral part of all

manifestations of Islamism but is generally likely to reinforce latent anti-Semitic resentments with many Muslims, particularly in Middle Eastern countries. There is a wide range of anti-Semitism within Islamism. It includes theories about Jewish world conspiracies (e.g. in the Millî Gazete magazine ascribed to circles regarded as belonging to the Millî-Görüş movement) as well as propaganda for and support of the fight against Israel (e.g. by HAMAS and Hizb Allah) and even attacks against (supposed) Jews and Jewish institutions all over the world, called for by jihadist groups (e.g. the attack against a Jewish supermarket in Paris on 9 January 2015 considered to have been committed by an IS follower).

The followers of Islamist-terrorist groups like HAMAS and Hizb Allah striving for the abolition of the Jewish state of Israel are focussed on their regions of origin which is where they commit most of their terrorist acts of violence.

Legalist tendencies like the Millî Görüş movement try to impose an order they consider to be in conformity with Islam by exerting political and social influence.

Extremist efforts of foreigners posing a threat to security (excluding Islamism)

The number of members and adherents of non-Islamist extremist organisations of foreigners has changed only slightly compared to the previous year and amounts to 29,050 individuals (2014: 29,330 individuals). The largest part, i.e. 17,550 individuals, belongs to left-wing extremist groups of foreigners, while 10,000 individuals are affiliated to right-wing extremist groups of foreigners, and 1,500 individuals have to be considered members or adherents of violence-oriented separatist groups of foreigners.

Members and adherents of extremist organisations of foreigners^{1,2} (excluding Islamism)		
	2014	2015
Left-wing extremists	17,550	17,550
including:		
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	14,000	14,000
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C)	650	650
Turkish Communist Party / Marxists-Leninists (TKP/ML)	1,300	1,300
Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP)	600	600
Others	1,000	1,000
Separatists	1,780	1,500
including:		
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	1,000	1,000
Extremist Sikhs	780	500
Right-wing extremists	10,000	10,000
Total	29,330	29,050
¹ Figures refer to Germany; they are partly estimated and rounded. ² Figures also include members / sympathisers of the groups which have been banned.		

For the very most part, the political agitation of the extremist organisations of foreigners as well as their respective level of militancy depend on the political developments in their home countries. It is therefore not easy to make any predictions about a group's tendencies and relevance for Germany's internal security. As a rule, the adherents living in Germany are given politico-strategical guidelines by the organisations in their respective home countries, and they are ready to consistently implement them.

As in the previous years, the **Kurdistan Workers' Party PKK** (which has by far the greatest potential for action and campaigning among the secular extremist organisations of foreigners), the **Revolutionary People's Liberation Party – Front DHKP-C** (due to its overt commitment to armed struggle), and the **Ülkücü movement** (due to its militant denial of the principle of equality) continue to be of particular relevance to Germany's internal security. The essential aspects of their ideological and political orientations remain unchanged.

Although the Kurds are among those suffering from the civil war in Syria as well as from the unstable situation in Iraq, the PKK in particular might benefit from that situation in political terms. At least since the advance of the terrorist militia Islamic State (IS) in 2014, the world has felt deep sympathy for the Kurdish fate. The founding of the Democratic Autonomy in Rojava (part of North Syria with Kurdish population) is a significant step on PKK's way towards a democratic confederation of autonomous entities across national borders.

Indeed, this might even result in separatist efforts. The Syrian border city of Kobanê has become a synonym for the determination of Kurds and other groups threatened by the IS to defend themselves. This ensures increasing support and approval for the PKK, which is considered the defender of the Kurds' lives (quite often, no attention is paid to the fact that other Kurdish militias participate in the conflict, too). The PKK exploits its improved reputation to call even more vehemently than before for the ban imposed on its activities in Germany to be lifted. The organisation wants to free itself from the stigma of a banned organisation, and in doing so, meets with support from the left-wing extremist spectrum.

The PKK's clinging to the armed struggle in Turkey, its indifference concerning militancy and violence in Europe, in particular its continuous recruitment activities for the guerrilla, as well as its opaque decision-making processes and lacking democratic structures are pushed into the background, though. The end of the peace process in Turkey and the massive armed clashes between the PKK guerrilla and Turkish national forces have caused uncertainty also with regard to the PKK's future orientation in Europe: a return to militant forms of action is possible at any time.

The PKK continues to be the largest extremist organisation of foreigners in Germany in terms of members and efficiency. The current situation in Turkey and the other Kurdish settlement areas may well trigger proxy fights between PKK adherents and right-wing extremist Turks or Islamists. This is a permanent threat to Germany's internal security. The aggressive atmosphere can result in spontaneous acts of violence at any moment. The severe bodily harm inflicted on a Kurd in Hanover on 12 September 2015 substantiates a threat dimension not even ruling out fatal victims.

Despite its display of "democratisation efforts", the PKK's party line and activities are not determined by the apparently legal organisational structures, like in particular, the umbrella organisation of PKK-oriented associations in Germany, NAV-DEM, but rather by the PKK's leadership.

PKK continues to be able and prepared, if necessary, to use violence in Germany at least in isolated cases or to tolerate acts of violence carried out by its young adherents. Though peaceful events prevailed in Europe also in 2015, violence remains an option of the PKK ideology. Against the background of the escalating violence in Turkey, a return of the PKK to militant forms of action cannot be ruled out.

The DHKP-C still propagates the necessity of terrorist violence in Turkey and has continued its series of attacks against the Turkish state and US imperialism in 2015. In Germany, the DHKP-C operates via its cover organisation Anatolian Federation especially regarding prisoners' care and the political field of anti-racism. Although the DHKP-C considers Germany a safe haven, its death cult events, staged in commemoration of the so-called martyrs (members who died in terrorist acts in Turkey), show

that also in Germany its organisational units support the party line, including the terrorist option.

The attacks mounted by DHKP-C activists in Turkey throughout 2015 show the high intensity and relentlessness of the organisation's violent pursuit of its aims. To implement such attacks, the safe haven and logistical supply base provided by DHKP-C structures in Western Europe, particularly in Germany, are indispensable. The DHKP-C is not likely to jeopardise this by carrying out militant activities in our country.

The nationalist and racist – and thus right-wing extremist – **Ülkücü** ideology based on an idealisation of Turkey and Turkishness by simultaneously denigrating other ethnic groups is mainly represented in Germany by the umbrella organisation Föderation der Türkisch-Demokratischen Idealistenvereine in Deutschland e.V. (Federation of Associations of Turkish Democratic Idealists in Germany regd. assoc.) and its mostly non-organised young followers. While the umbrella organisation tries to act in compliance with the law on the surface, its young followers offensively propagate their racism via the Internet and do not only call for violence in a radical way but occasionally even carry out acts of violence against other ethnic groups.

In Turkish migrant circles, the **Ülkücü** ideology encourages the development of a nationalist and racist youth movement. Conflicts in Turkey, particularly in connection with its Kurdish policy, are brought into Germany. The young followers of the **Ülkücü** movement bring along the potential for armed clashes.

The often warlike clashes in their home countries provoke an understandably high level of emotionality with many migrants. Extremists try to exploit this for their purposes and instrumentalise rallies. They stir up an aggressive mood that often results in militancy and violence against rival groups or the police, particularly between PKK followers and right-wing extremist Turks as well as individuals the PKK followers consider to be members of the Salafist spectrum.

On the whole, clashes between rival extremist groups at demonstrations and rallies pose a permanent threat to internal security.

Espionage and other intelligence activities

Foreign intelligence services invest a lot of organisational and financial effort to engage in espionage activities against Germany. Germany is of interest in its role as a geopolitical player, as a member of NATO and the EU and on account of its economic strength and innovative businesses. Oppositional groups from foreign intelligence services' home countries are another target of espionage activities in Germany.

Now as before the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran are the major players behind espionage activities directed against Germany. Apart from that, however, intelligence activities of other countries (also from the West) are increasingly in the focus of our counterintelligence efforts.

States which strive to gain an edge in military (particularly strategic) or economic and technological contexts do not hesitate to procure the necessary information secretly and illegally by violating applicable law. The consequences for our country range from a weakening of our negotiating positions to high material and economic damage and a potential impairment of Germany's national sovereignty.

The priority areas of the intelligence services' activities are dictated by their governments' political agendas.

Russian espionage continues to be essentially influenced by the conflict between the West and Russia in regard to Ukraine. Not least, the Russian services are also attempting to present their point of view to the public and to use their contacts to exert influence.

The interest of the Russian intelligence services continues to be focused on the traditional target areas: politics, industry, science, the energy industry, technology and the military. The Ukraine conflict has, however, resulted in a clear shift of their priorities: This issue with all its political, economic and military ramifications is increasingly in the focus of their intelligence activities. Russia's primary interest is to obtain early information on the stance taken on the Ukraine crisis by the Federal Government, the political parties and institutions, on the way they intend to handle it and on their future policy towards Russia.

Apart from intelligence gathering the services also attempt to influence decision-makers and public opinion in Germany according to their interests. In this context it is of particular interest for them to get an insight into decision-making processes and to find out to what extent it is (still) possible to influence them.

Also, Russia increasingly disseminates pro-Russian propaganda through various public media (TV and radio stations, the Internet, high-profile events, etc.). For example, in their German-language broadcasts, Russian international broadcasting stations which are close to the Russian government present facts in a way which reflects a pro-Russian view. In most of these cases it is, however, hardly possible to prove a direct involvement of the Russian intelligence services.

The **Chinese services** have an important role to play when it comes to implementing the Chinese government's policy guidelines, which are aimed at ensuring territorial integrity and protecting the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) hegemony, at expanding China's geopolitical and military power positions and at modernizing China's national economy. For this reason the intelligence services' activities abroad are primarily focused on gathering intelligence about the opposition to the system, political decision-making processes and on obtaining technological know-how.

A substantial part of the spying activities in Germany is directed against efforts that – in the eyes of the Chinese government – jeopardise the Communist Party's monopoly on power and China's national unity. This includes the ethnic minorities of the Uighurs and Tibetans, the Falun Gong movement, the democracy movement and proponents of sovereignty for Taiwan. These groups and organisations are defamed by the Chinese authorities as the "Five Poisons."

The activities of the Chinese intelligence services are also focused on German interests: politics, the military, industry, science and technology. The intelligence services are involved in the ambitious longterm programme to modernise the Chinese economy; in this context, their intelligence activities are aimed at gathering sensitive industrial intelligence for example concerning product innovations and current research findings.

The Chinese services have recently increased their efforts to recruit individuals from Western countries as informers or agents. In addition, intelligence officers from China travel to Germany and its neighbouring countries to carry out their activities. Also political think-tanks are increasingly being used for intelligence purposes. Furthermore, there are indications of combined HUMINT- and SIGINT activities on the part of Chinese intelligence services.

Now as before, the activities of the **Iranian intelligence services** are focused on spying out and suppressing opposition movements at home and abroad. In addition, the services gather political, industrial and scientific intelligence in Western countries.

The negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme agreed between the international community and Iran in November 2013 were concluded on 14 July 2015 with the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action whereby Iran accepted the imposition of substantial restrictions and controls on its nuclear programme. In return, the Comprehensive Plan of Action provides for the progressive lifting of the sanctions that had been imposed on Iran because of its nuclear programme.

Nevertheless, the illegal proliferation-sensitive procurement activities in Germany registered by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution persisted in 2015 at what is, even by international standards, a quantitatively high level. This holds true in particular with regard to items which can be used in the field of nuclear technology. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution also registered a further increase in the already considerable procurement efforts in connection with Iran's ambitious missile technology program which could among other things potentially serve to deliver nuclear weapons. Against this backdrop it is safe to expect that Iran will continue its intensive procurement activities in Germany using clandestine methods to achieve its objectives.

Owing to the development of information and communication technologies, **espionage methods** are also constantly evolving. "Electronic attacks" in particular have become an important method used by foreign intelligence services. Furthermore, the intensity of espionage has multiplied ever since cyberspace is being used for espionage activities.

The attackers identified by the German authorities come primarily from China and Russia, although there are also other countries whose intelligence services have the necessary resources and capabilities to carry out "electronic attacks". In 2015 for example, the German authorities were able for the first time to attribute a number of "electronic attacks" to what were thought to be Iranian sources.

However, "electronic attacks" may be used not only for espionage but also for sabotage purposes. This is a threat in particular with regard to what are known as critical infrastructures. The increasing effectiveness of digital espionage has not, however, led to any loss in the importance of human sources. Instead, both forms of espionage complement each other thus producing an increased threat potential. The potential targets of espionage activities therefore need to safeguard their protected property both against attempted attacks from outside and against disloyal employees in their own organisations ("insider attacks") who are recruited, blackmailed or even specifically infiltrated into the organisation by foreign intelligence services.

Numerous agencies cooperate at the national and at the international levels to counter the threats emanating from "electronic attacks". The National Cyber Response Centre, in which the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution plays a key role, was set up to improve the cooperation between the competent agencies. The National Cyber Response Centre aims to optimise operational cooperation and to improve the coordination of protective and defensive measures against potential IT incidents.

In the past, however, it was often difficult to achieve intensified and permanent cooperation with national organisations in industry and research that are potential targets of espionage activities. In order to improve this situation, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in 2014 established a regular exchange of information with central contact persons in industry and the research community; this exchange is organised on the basis of working groups, associations or information platforms, each of which involves a host of businesses or institutions from a specific sector or field. This makes it possible for example to swift-

ly disseminate information to improve the self-protection of potential target organisations in a targeted fashion to a specific target group. Innovative and technology-driven medium-sized businesses are a core target group of the economic security policies of the authorities for the protection of the Constitution.

To **effectively protect the economy** the government, associations and businesses need to work together. A milestone on the way towards cooperation is the "Economic Security Initiative" coordinated and supported by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Expert groups with the participation of government and industry have developed action targets and projects to achieve them. The aim is primarily to improve networking, intensify the information exchange between government authorities and industry and to strengthen the business community's sense of responsibility for protecting its know-how.

The Scientology Organisation (SO)

The Scientology Organisation (SO) continues to push for expansion but as in previous years, these efforts were largely unsuccessful in 2015, too. As in 2014, membership currently stands at between 3,000 and 4,000 members. Now as before, the SO branches in Berlin and Hamburg are the only ones that have the status of an "ideal org".

The SO adheres to its fundamental ideological orientation and strategy and to its familiar forms of agitation and continues to be guided by the writings of its founder L. Ron Hubbard, who died in 1986. The Scientologist ideology violates the free democratic basic order in that it restricts essential fundamental and human rights.

The SO relies increasingly on Internet services and social networks such as Twitter, YouTube and Facebook to disseminate its ideology, to polish its image and to recruit new members. Furthermore, the organization runs various campaigns to attract new prospective members and reduce reservations about the SO. An example in this context is the SO's drug prevention activities that are implemented by the association "*Sag NEIN zu Drogen - Sag JA zum Leben*" (Say NO to drugs - say YES to life). The association organised a promotional tour from 20 to 27 June 2015 ("drug prevention tour") from Munich to Berlin, setting up information stands in various cities.

Notes

Publication data

Published by

Federal Ministry of the Interior
Alt-Moabit 140
10557 Berlin

Editorial team

Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
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English translation

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Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz

Design and printing

Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
Print and Media Centre

The brief summary of the 2015 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution: Facts and Trends is also available on the Internet at **www.verfassungsschutz.de**

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