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Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of the United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors (Board) and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council) is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement¹ and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions² in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), as requested by the Board in its resolution GOV/2025/71³ adopted on 20 November 2025.

B. Previous developments

2. The Director General, on 13 June 2025, reported to the Board and to the Security Council that the Agency had been informed of a military operation launched by Israel, which included attacks on several of Iran's nuclear facilities. These attacks took place between 13-24 June 2025. On 22 June 2025, the United States conducted attacks on three of Iran's nuclear facilities. The Agency stopped conducting

¹ The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

² Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010).

³ GOV/2025/71, OPs 1-3.

verification activities in Iran at the commencement of the military attacks and, by the end of June 2025, had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons.

3. In his statement to the Board on 13 June 2025, the Director General, *inter alia*, recalled the relevant General Conference resolutions, in particular GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533, which provided, *inter alia*, that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”. The Director General also reiterated that he had repeatedly stated that nuclear facilities must never be attacked, regardless of the context or circumstances, as it could harm both people and the environment, and that such attacks have serious implications for nuclear safety, security and safeguards, as well as regional and international peace and security.

4. On 2 July 2025, the President of Iran signed into force a law suspending cooperation with the Agency.⁴ The Director General made it clear that it was indispensable and urgent to restart safeguards activities in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and that implementation of the Agreement could not be suspended under any circumstances.

5. On 9 September 2025, the Director General signed an agreement with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr Abbas Araghchi, in Cairo on ‘Practical Steps on Safeguards Implementation in Iran pursuant to the NPT Safeguards Agreement following the armed attacks on its safeguarded nuclear facilities’ (Cairo agreement) that provided an understanding of the procedures for Agency inspections, notifications and safeguards implementation covering all declared nuclear facilities and nuclear material in Iran.⁵ While taking into consideration Iran’s concerns, these procedures were in line with the relevant provisions of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement.

6. On 7 November 2025, the Agency also reminded Iran that the provision by Iran “without delay” of a report for the affected facilities and associated nuclear material is a requirement under its NPT Safeguards Agreement,⁶ and which Iran had agreed to provide under the Cairo agreement.

7. The Board, in its resolution GOV/2025/71 of 20 November 2025, requested the Director General, *inter alia*: to “report before each regular quarterly Board meeting on the implementation of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, and implement and report on the provisions of all relevant [Security Council] resolutions, including 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010), consistent with past practice”; and to ensure that such reports include “information on the verification of Iran’s uranium stockpile, including the locations, quantities, chemical forms, and enrichment levels, and the inventories of centrifuges and related equipment”.⁷

8. On 20 November 2025, Iran informed the Director General that the Cairo agreement was “no longer valid and shall henceforth be regarded as terminated”.

9. The Agency, in a letter to Iran dated 29 January 2026, indicated, *inter alia*, that in the absence of Iran providing declarations, reports on the status of the affected declared nuclear facilities and associated nuclear material and the access required to verify those declarations and reports, the Agency would not be able to conclude that there had been no diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities in Iran.

⁴ <https://president.ir/en/160022>.

⁵ [Statement by IAEA Director General on Iran | IAEA](#).

⁶ INFCIRC/214, Article 68.

⁷ GOV/2025/71, OP 2.

10. Iran, in its reply of 2 February 2026, informed the Agency that “the conditions resulting from acts of aggression and the continuation of threats have created a situation in which the normal implementation of safeguards is legally untenable and materially impracticable” and that “it would be inconsistent with Iran’s essential security considerations”.

11. The Agency, on 6 February 2026, requested Iran to facilitate as soon as possible the conduct of design information examination (DIE) and DIV at IFEP that had been cancelled by the Agency in June 2025.

12. The Agency, on the same date, also informed Iran that it had observed, through the analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, regular vehicular activity around the entrance to the tunnel complex at Isfahan in which UF₆ enriched up to 20% and 60% U-235 was stored. The Agency, in light of this activity, requested Iran to facilitate, as soon as possible, the conduct of a DIV and nuclear material inventory verification at the relevant parts of the tunnel complex at Isfahan.

13. Iran, in its reply dated 6 February 2026, reiterated its previous position and, with regard to IFEP and the tunnel complex at Isfahan, stated that they had both been “subjected to illegal military attacks”.

14. The Agency, in a letter dated 18 February 2026, informed Iran that it was essential that the Agency conduct the long-delayed DIE for IFEP as soon as possible and, if possible, the DIV immediately afterwards in order to confirm Iran’s statement that the facility had been “subjected to” military attacks. The Agency reiterated that it was prepared to conduct the DIE either at the site as originally planned or at another location, such as AEOI Headquarters in Tehran. The Agency requested Iran to facilitate the necessary access.

15. The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva, in which he provided advice on issues relevant to the verification of Iran’s nuclear programme.

C. Recent developments

16. On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran.

17. On 3 March 2026, the Agency, based on its analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, observed that the entrance buildings of the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz were damaged. On 12 and 21 March 2026, Iran informed the Agency of attacks on the Natanz nuclear site. The Agency observed, through the analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, damage to additional non-nuclear-related buildings on the site. On 4, 17 and 24 March 2026 and 27 April 2026, Iran informed the Agency of attacks on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) site. The Agency observed, through the analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, that a structure located approximately 350 metres from the Bushehr NPP reactor had been damaged. On 29 March 2026, the Agency observed, through the analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, that the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP)⁸ at Khondab, which Iran reported had been attacked on 27 March 2026, had sustained severe damage.

⁸ HWPP is not a nuclear facility.

18. During the reporting period the Agency has interacted with Iran regarding the provision of required reports and access by Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement taking into account the prevailing circumstances.

19. On 1–3 June 2026, the Agency, with Iran’s cooperation, conducted an inspection and DIV at BNPP as part of its regular quarterly verification activity at this facility, as well as DIES of recently updated DIQs for BNPP-1, BNPP-2, BNPP-3.

D. Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

D.1. Declared Facilities

20. Under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 22 nuclear facilities and one LOF (see Annex).⁹ According to its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran is required to provide the Agency with nuclear material accounting reports, design information for facilities and the LOF, and access to enable the verification of such reports and information, to ensure that no declared nuclear material has been diverted from peaceful nuclear activities and that there has been no undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at those facilities and the LOF.

21. As mentioned above, on 1–3 June 2026, the Agency conducted an inspection at BNPP. Throughout the reporting period, the Agency has not received information from Iran regarding the status of any of its other declared nuclear facilities or LOF or regarding associated nuclear material. Nor has the Agency had access to any of those other facilities and LOF to conduct in-field verification activities. Therefore, with the exception of BNPP, the Agency has not been able to fulfil its obligations under the NPT Safeguards Agreement in relation to nuclear facilities and the LOF and associated nuclear material. Nor has the Agency been able to verify whether Iran has suspended all enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water related activities as required in the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions.

22. The seven declared facilities that the Agency assesses were affected by the military attacks of June 2025 and which had contained declared nuclear material prior to those attacks are: the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP); the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP); the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP); UCF; FMP; FFPF; and EUPP. The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR), which was under construction and did not contain nuclear material, was also affected by the attacks. In addition, Iran informed the Agency in February 2026 that IFEP had also been “subjected” to military attacks, although it did not indicate whether it contained nuclear material at the time. As mentioned previously, the Agency does not know the precise whereabouts of this facility and, therefore, cannot verify its status for safeguards purposes. Iran has yet to confirm the current status for safeguards purposes of any of these affected facilities and associated nuclear material to the Agency.

23. The 13 declared facilities that the Agency confirms were unaffected by the June 2025 military attacks are: Tehran Research Reactor (TRR); Process Research Facility (PRF); Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility); the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL); Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR); Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR); Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR); Isfahan Research Reactor 10MW (IRR-10); Karaj Waste Storage; BNPP

⁹ The LOF is situated in the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s (AEOI’s) Tehran site.

Units 1, 2 and 3 (BNPP-1, BNPP-2, BNPP-3); and the Karun Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) at Darkhovin. The LOF was also unaffected.

D.2. Enrichment-related activities

24. Pursuant to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is required to suspend all enrichment-related activities – to be verified by the Agency. In addition, pursuant to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran is required, inter alia, to provide the Agency with access to its declared nuclear facilities and LOF in order for the Agency to verify that no declared nuclear material has been diverted from peaceful nuclear activities and that there has been no undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at those facilities and LOF. As indicated earlier, the Board requested in GOV/2025/71¹⁰ that this report include information on the verification of Iran's uranium stockpile, including the locations, quantities, chemical forms, and enrichment levels, and the inventories of centrifuges and related equipment.

25. Based on the information provided by Iran up to 12 June 2025, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities, the Agency's estimate of Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile, as of 13 June 2025, was 9874.9 kg, comprising 9040.5 kg of uranium in the form of UF₆ and 834.4 kg of uranium in other forms. The total enriched uranium stockpile in the form of UF₆ of 9040.5 kg comprised: 2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235; 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235; 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235.¹¹

26. Due to the lack of information about, and access to, any of Iran's four declared enrichment facilities to perform verification activities the Agency cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran or whether Iran has suspended all enrichment related activities, including R&D. In addition, due to the lack of access since February 2021 to Iran's centrifuge component manufacturing, centrifuge assembly and testing workshops for the Agency to perform verification activities, the Agency cannot provide any information on Iran's current inventory of centrifuges or whether it has suspended their manufacture, assembly and testing.

D.3. Reprocessing Activities

27. Pursuant to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is required to suspend all reprocessing-related activities, including R&D – to be verified by the Agency. The Agency has not been able to monitor the use of hot cells at the TRR¹² and the MIX Facility,¹³ and the R&D activities at JHL.¹⁴ Due to the lack of information and access to date, the Agency cannot confirm whether there are any ongoing reprocessing-related activities at TRR, MIX or JHL.

D.4. Heavy Water Related Projects

28. Pursuant to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is required to suspend work on all heavy water related projects – to be verified by the Agency. This includes at Arak,

¹⁰ Operative paragraph 2.

¹¹ The Agency has verified 432.9 kg of this 440.9 kg of uranium in the form of UF₆ enriched up to 60% U-235.

¹² TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.

¹³ The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.

¹⁴ JHL is a multi-purpose research laboratory where Iran conducted plutonium separation experiments in the 1990s (see GOV/2003/75, para. 28).

the construction of the KHRR, and the production of heavy water at HWPP. Both KHRR¹⁵ and HWPP¹⁶ were damaged during the military attacks of June 2025. As mentioned earlier, on 29 March 2026, the Agency observed, through the analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, that HWPP, which Iran reported had been attacked on 27 March 2026, had sustained severe damage. The Agency has not accessed KHRR since 14 May 2025.

D.5. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

29. As indicated above, pursuant to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is required to suspend all enrichment-related activities and heavy-water-related projects – to be verified by the Agency. In the past, UCF, EUPP, FMP and FFPF facilities were involved in enrichment-related activities and heavy-water-related projects. Since the military attacks of June 2025, Iran has not provided the Agency with information about, or access to, any of these facilities and the Agency cannot, therefore, assess either their current status or the status of the associated nuclear material, previously reported as being contained therein, or verify if Iran has suspended related activities.

D.6. Modified Code 3.1

30. Contrary to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.

31. The modified Code 3.1 provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new nuclear facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction, and commissioning phases.¹⁷

32. Iran stopped implementing modified Code 3.1 on 23 February 2021.¹⁸ The Agency has reminded Iran on many occasions that implementation of modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its NPT Safeguards Agreement. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a CSA that is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1.

33. Iran's failure to implement the provisions of modified Code 3.1 has prevented the Agency from receiving early design information for any of the new nuclear reactors¹⁹ which Iran has publicly announced it planned to construct. This significantly obstructs the Agency's ability to conduct DIVs in respect of such new facilities and to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

¹⁵ 'Update on Developments in Iran', dated 19 June 2025.

¹⁶ HWPP is not a nuclear facility.

¹⁷ The initial Code 3.1 only required the submission of design information for a new facility "normally not later than 180 days before the facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time".

¹⁸ GOV/INF/2021/13.

¹⁹ Information published on the AEOI website in June 2023 indicated that Iran had decided the locations for new power reactors and a new research reactor in Iran (GOV/2023/43, footnote 29). In November 2023, Vice-President Eslami made a statement referring to the excavation of the main building of the planned IR-360 reactor "in the coming days" and information available on the AEOI website referred to the "start of the executive operation of the construction of "Iran Hormoz" nuclear power plants by order of the president" (GOV/2024/8, para. 20).

D.7. Additional Protocol

34. Contrary to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol (AP). Iran is called upon to act in strict accordance with the provisions of the AP and promptly to ratify it. The Additional Protocol equips the Agency with important additional tools that provide broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under the AP thus significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in Iran.

35. Iran stopped provisionally applying its AP in February 2021, since which date Iran has not provided updated declarations and the Agency has not been able to conduct complementary access to any sites and other locations in Iran. Unless and until Iran implements its AP, the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.²⁰

E. Unresolved safeguards issues

E.1. Comprehensive Assessment

36. The Director General's report of 31 May 2025²¹ provided a "comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme". The report identified a number of unresolved safeguards issues related, inter alia, to Iran not declaring nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at undeclared locations; the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material in Iran; and Iran's limited cooperation with the Agency to address the outstanding safeguards issues. Unless and until Iran assists the Agency in resolving these issues, the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

E.2. Board Resolution

37. The Board considered the Director General's report and, on 12 June 2025, adopted resolution GOV/2025/38 in which the Board, inter alia:

- found that "Iran's many failures to uphold its obligations since 2019 to provide the Agency with full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran, as detailed in GOV/2025/25 constitutes non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement" (operative paragraph 3);
- found, consistent with Article 19 of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement, that "the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material" (operative paragraph 4);
- reaffirmed its decision that "it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations" (operative paragraph 7);
- called upon Iran to "urgently remedy its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement" (operative paragraph 10); and

²⁰ Iran's Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

²¹ GOV/2025/25.

- decided to remain seized of the matter (operative paragraph 13).

E.3. Recent developments

38. During this reporting period Iran has not engaged the Agency on the unresolved safeguards issues described in the Director General's report, GOV/2025/25.

F. Summary

39. The Agency has neither received information from Iran regarding the status of its declared nuclear material, facilities and LOF for safeguards purposes nor had access to any of those facilities and LOF to conduct in-field verification activities, with the exception of BNPP. Therefore, with the exception of BNPP, the Agency was unable to discharge its safeguards responsibilities under the NPT Safeguards Agreement at declared nuclear facilities in Iran and, consequently, cannot verify the status, for safeguards purposes, of these facilities and associated nuclear material.

40. Specifically, the Agency cannot verify:

- whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related activities, including research and development;
- whether Iran has suspended all reprocessing activities;
- the size of Iran's uranium stockpile;
- whether Iran has suspended work on all heavy water-related projects;
- Iran's inventories of centrifuges and related equipment.

In addition, Iran is not implementing the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, nor is it implementing the Additional Protocol. Moreover, in light of Iran's continued unwillingness to address the unresolved safeguards issues, the Agency has outstanding concerns about the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

41. The Director General has emphasized to Iran that it is indispensable and urgent to implement effectively the NPT Safeguards Agreement, which remains in force, and that its implementation cannot be suspended by Iran under any circumstances.

42. While the Agency acknowledged that the military attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities and sites have created an unprecedented situation, it is critical for the Agency to conduct verification activities in Iran without delay in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and, as required, under the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions. In this regard, the Agency acknowledges Iran's cooperation in facilitating the recent verification activities at BNPP.

43. Iran is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched up to 60% U-235, of which it had accumulated 440.9 kg by the time of the military attacks in June 2025. The Agency's lack of access to verify the previously declared HEU and LEU, for nearly a year – which is long overdue according to standard safeguards practice – is a matter of proliferation concern and of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement. The Agency's loss of continuity of knowledge over all previously declared nuclear material at affected facilities in Iran needs to be addressed with the utmost urgency.

44. The Director General notes that once again Iran has not engaged the Agency during this reporting period on the unresolved safeguards issues.

45. The Director General calls on Iran to engage the Agency constructively in order to facilitate the full and effective implementation of safeguards in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and implement the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions.

46. The Director General reiterates his full support to the negotiations underway aimed at finding a mutually acceptable solution to issues related to Iran's nuclear programme, and his readiness – through the Agency's verification and monitoring capability – to support an eventual agreement. The Director General again expresses his conviction that the long-standing problem and recurrent crises surrounding these issues must be resolved through a long-lasting, verifiable diplomatic agreement.

47. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

Annex

List of Declared Nuclear Facilities and LOF in Iran

Tehran:

1. Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
2. Process Research Facility (PRF)
3. Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility)
4. Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)

Isfahan:

5. Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant (IFEP)
6. Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)
7. Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)
8. Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR)
9. Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
10. Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)
11. Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP)
12. Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant (EUPP)
13. Isfahan Research Reactor 10MW (IRR-10)

Natanz:

14. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
15. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)

Fordow:

16. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)

Arak:

17. Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR)

Karaj:

18. Karaj Waste Storage

Bushehr:

19. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) Unit 1 (BNPP-1)
20. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) Unit 2 (BNPP-2)
21. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) Unit 3 (BNPP-3)

Darkhovin:

22. Karun Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP)

Location outside facilities:

One location outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOF), (situated on the AEOI's Tehran site)