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Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of the United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors (Board) and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council) is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement¹ and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions² in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), as requested by the Board in its resolution GOV/2025/71³ adopted on 20 November 2025.

B. Previous developments

2. The Director General, on 13 June 2025, reported to the Board and to the Security Council that the Agency had been informed of a military operation launched by Israel, which included attacks on several of Iran's nuclear facilities. These attacks took place between 13–24 June 2025. On 22 June 2025, the United States conducted attacks on three of Iran's nuclear facilities. The Agency stopped conducting

¹ The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

² Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010).

³ GOV/2025/71, OPs 1-3.

verification activities in Iran at the commencement of the military attacks and, by the end of June 2025, had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons.

3. In his statement to the Board on 13 June 2025, the Director General, *inter alia*, recalled the relevant General Conference resolutions, in particular GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533, which provided, *inter alia*, that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”.⁴ The Director General also reiterated that he had repeatedly stated that nuclear facilities must never be attacked, regardless of the context or circumstances, as it could harm both people and the environment, and that such attacks have serious implications for nuclear safety, security and safeguards, as well as regional and international peace and security.

4. On 2 July 2025, the President of Iran signed into force a law suspending cooperation with the Agency.⁵ The Director General made it clear that implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement could not be suspended under any circumstances.

5. On 9 September 2025, the Director General signed an agreement with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr Abbas Araghchi, in Cairo – referred to as the ‘Cairo agreement’ – that provided an understanding of the procedures for Agency inspections, notifications and safeguards implementation covering all declared nuclear facilities and nuclear material in Iran.⁶ These procedures were in line with the relevant provisions of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement.

6. The Board, in its resolution GOV/2025/71 of 20 November 2025, requested the Director General, *inter alia*, to “report before each regular quarterly Board meeting on the implementation of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, and implement and report on the provisions of all relevant [Security Council] resolutions, including 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010), consistent with past practice”; and to ensure that such reports include “information on the verification of Iran’s uranium stockpile, including the locations, quantities, chemical forms, and enrichment levels, and the inventories of centrifuges and related equipment”.⁷

7. Iran, in a letter of 20 November 2025, informed the Director General that the Cairo agreement was “no longer valid and shall henceforth be regarded as terminated”.

8. The Agency, in a letter to Iran dated 29 January 2026, indicated, *inter alia*, that in the absence of Iran providing declarations, reports on the status of the affected declared nuclear facilities and associated nuclear material and the access required to verify those declarations and reports, the Agency would not be able to conclude that there had been no diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities in Iran.

9. Iran, in its reply of 2 February 2026, informed the Agency that “the conditions resulting from acts of aggression and the continuation of threats have created a situation in which the normal implementation of safeguards is legally untenable and materially impracticable” and that “it would be inconsistent with Iran’s essential security considerations”.

10. The Agency, on 6 February 2026, requested Iran to facilitate as soon as possible the conduct of design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) at the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant (IFEP) that had been cancelled by the Agency in June 2025.

⁴ GC(XXIX)/RES/444, OP 2; GC(XXXIV)/RES/533, OP 3.

⁵ <https://president.ir/en/160022>.

⁶ [Statement by IAEA Director General on Iran | IAEA](#).

⁷ GOV/2025/71, OP 2.

11. The Agency, on the same date, also informed Iran that it had observed, through the analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, regular vehicular activity around the entrance to the tunnel complex at Isfahan in which UF₆ enriched up to 20% and 60% U-235 was stored. The Agency, in light of this activity, requested Iran to facilitate, as soon as possible, the conduct of a DIV and nuclear material inventory verification at IFEP and at the relevant parts of the tunnel complex at Isfahan where uranium enriched up to 20% and 60% U-235 was stored.⁸ Iran did not provide access at IFEP as requested by the Agency and reiterated its previously stated position that IFEP and the tunnel complex at Isfahan had both been “subjected to illegal military attacks”.

12. The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva, in which he provided advice on issues relevant to the verification of Iran’s nuclear programme.

13. On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran.

14. In March and April 2026, the Agency, based on its analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, observed that a number of nuclear sites were struck by military attacks, although no nuclear facilities located on such sites were struck.⁹ On 29 March 2026, the Agency observed, through the analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, that the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP)¹⁰ at Khondab had sustained severe damage.

15. On 1–3 June 2026, the Agency conducted an inspection and DIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) as part of its regular quarterly verification activity at this facility, as well as DIES of recently updated DIQs for BNPP-1, BNPP-2, BNPP-3.

C. Board resolution

16. On 10 June 2026, the Board adopted resolution GOV/2026/40 in which, inter alia, it:

- recalled that “Iran’s many failures to provide the Agency with full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran, as detailed in GOV/2025/25, constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute” (operative paragraph 2);
- deeply regretted “Iran’s continued failure to remedy its non-compliance over the past 12 months, including its failure to provide the IAEA with requested information and access needed to verify previously declared nuclear material that the Agency has been unable to verify for one year” (operative paragraph 3);
- further reiterated that “consistent with Article 19 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (operative paragraph 4);

⁸ GOV/2026/33, para. 12.

⁹ GOV/2026/33, para. 17.

¹⁰ HWPP is not a nuclear facility.

- affirmed that “it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and take the following actions without delay:
 - i. provide the Agency with complete information on nuclear material inventories and design information for facilities and
 - ii. grant the Agency all access it requires to verify this information” (operative paragraph 5);
- reiterated its call upon Iran “to urgently remedy its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement by taking all steps deemed necessary by the Agency and the Board, so that the Director General can provide the necessary assurances regarding the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement” (operative paragraph 8);
- requested the Director General “to report on the implementation of this and previous resolutions in his report to the next regular session of the Board, for its consideration” (operative paragraph 9); and
- reiterated that the Board “will stand ready to take further action, including to address the timing and content of the report required under Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute for consideration by the United Nations Security Council as provided for by the Board’s resolution of 12 June 2025 contained in GOV/2025/38” (operative paragraph 11).

D. Recent Developments

17. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States of America and Iran was signed by President Trump and President Pezeshkian on 17 June 2026. According to this MOU, the initial duration of which was 60 days, both parties agreed, inter alia, as part of a final deal, to “resolve the disposition of stockpiled enriched material... with the minimum methodology to be down-blended on site under the supervision of the IAEA”.¹¹ The parties also agreed “to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to [Iran's] nuclear needs, based on a satisfactory framework being agreed upon in the final deal”. Pending the “final deal”, Iran will “maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program”. In light of this development, the Agency conducted contingency planning for possible verification activities in relation to such matters, if requested by the parties and approved by the Board.

18. On 21 June 2026, the Director General travelled to Bürgenstock, Switzerland where high-level negotiations between the United States and Iran were taking place. He met Swiss Foreign Minister, Ignazio Cassis to take stock of recent developments concerning Iran.

19. According to public sources, on 8 July 2026, President Trump told reporters at the NATO summit in Ankara that the MOU was “over”.¹² On 19 July 2026, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Gharibabadi told reporters that the United States had suspended all its commitments under the MOU, and that Iran was taking reciprocal measures.¹³ The 60-day period set out in the MOU expired on 17

¹¹ The full text of the MOU can be found at: [Read the US account of unreleased 14-point Iran ceasefire memorandum | Donald Trump News | Al Jazeera](#).

¹² [Trump says MoU with Iran is 'over' and it's a 'waste of time' dealing with Tehran](#).

¹³ [Iran says commitments to MOU suspended, US reports two service members killed | NHK WORLD-JAPAN News](#).

August 2026. President Trump was reported as saying that the United States would not extend it and the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Esmail Baghaei, was reported as saying that “gross US violations” had rendered the MOU’s 60-day deadline “entirely moot”.¹⁴

20. In a letter dated 19 July 2026, Vice President Eslami informed the Director General that on that day “a number of missiles were launched against the Karoon (Darkhovin) Nuclear Power Plant construction site”. Based on its analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, the Agency could not identify any indication of damage to, or attack on, the site of the declared Karun Nuclear Power Plant, although it cannot exclude the possibility that a missile strike landed in the vicinity of that site.

21. Throughout the reporting period, although the Agency continued to notify Iran on several occasions of its planned inspections and DIV activities at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL), Iran did not provide confirmation that it would provide access to these facilities and facilitate the Agency’s planned verification activities that are overdue. Following contacts with Iran, the Agency notified Iran that it planned to conduct two inspections at BNPP-1 and DIVs at BNPP-1, BNPP-2 and BNPP-3 in mid-September 2026 as part of its regular verification activity at these facilities. Iran confirmed that it would provide access and facilitate the Agency’s planned verification activities.

E. Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

E.1. Declared Facilities

22. Under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 22 nuclear facilities and one LOF (see Annex).¹⁵ According to its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran is required to provide the Agency with nuclear material accounting reports, design information for facilities and the LOF, and access to enable the verification of such reports and information, to ensure that no declared nuclear material has been diverted from peaceful nuclear activities and that there has been no undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at those facilities and the LOF.

23. Throughout the reporting period, the Agency has not received information from Iran regarding the status for safeguards purposes of any of its declared nuclear facilities or LOF or regarding associated nuclear material. Nor has the Agency had access to any of those facilities and LOF to conduct in-field verification activities. Therefore, the Agency has not been able to fulfil its obligations under the NPT Safeguards Agreement in relation to Iran’s declared nuclear facilities and the LOF, or the associated nuclear material. Nor has the Agency been able to verify whether Iran has suspended all enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water related activities, as required in the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions.

24. The seven declared facilities that the Agency assesses were affected by the military attacks of June 2025 and which had contained declared nuclear material prior to those attacks are: the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP); the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP); the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP); UCF; FMP; FPPF; and the Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant (EUPP). The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR), which was under construction and did not contain nuclear material, was also affected by the attacks. In addition, Iran informed the Agency in February 2026 that IFEP had also been “subjected” to military attacks, although it did not indicate whether it contained nuclear material at the time. As mentioned previously, the Agency does not know the precise whereabouts of this facility and,

¹⁴ ‘Trump says US will not extend MoU with Iran, claims control of Hormuz’, The New Arab, 18 August 2026.

¹⁵ The LOF is situated in the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s (AEOI’s) Tehran site.

therefore, cannot verify its status for safeguards purposes. Iran has yet to confirm the current status for safeguards purposes of any of these affected facilities and associated nuclear material to the Agency.

25. The 13 declared facilities that the Agency confirms were unaffected by either the military attacks of June 2025 or those in 2026 are: Tehran Research Reactor (TRR); Process Research Facility (PRF); Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility); the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL); Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR); Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR); Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR); Isfahan Research Reactor 10MW (IRR-10); Karaj Waste Storage; BNPP Units 1, 2 and 3 (BNPP-1, BNPP-2, BNPP-3); and the Karun Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) at Darkhovin. The LOF was also unaffected.

E.2. Enrichment-related activities

26. Pursuant to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is required to suspend all enrichment-related activities – to be verified by the Agency. In addition, pursuant to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran is required, inter alia, to provide the Agency with access to its declared nuclear facilities and LOF in order for the Agency to verify that no declared nuclear material has been diverted from peaceful nuclear activities and that there has been no undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at those facilities and LOF. As indicated earlier, the Board requested in resolution GOV/2025/71¹⁶ that the Director General's reports include information on the verification of Iran's uranium stockpile, including the locations, quantities, chemical forms, and enrichment levels, and the inventories of centrifuges and related equipment.

27. Based on the information provided by Iran up to 12 June 2025, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities, the Agency's estimate of Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile, as of 13 June 2025, was 9874.9 kg, comprising 9040.5 kg of uranium in the form of UF₆ and 834.4 kg of uranium in other forms. The total enriched uranium stockpile of 9040.5 kg in the form of UF₆ comprised: 8599.6 kg of LEU – 2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235, 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235, and 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of HEU – uranium enriched up to 60% U-235.¹⁷

28. Due to the lack of information about, and access to, any of Iran's four declared enrichment facilities to perform verification activities the Agency cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran or whether Iran has suspended all enrichment related activities, including R&D. In addition, due to the lack of access since February 2021 to Iran's centrifuge component manufacturing, centrifuge assembly and testing workshops for the Agency to perform verification activities, the Agency cannot provide any information on Iran's current inventory of centrifuges or whether it has suspended their manufacture, assembly and testing.

E.3. Reprocessing Activities

29. Pursuant to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is required to suspend all reprocessing-related activities, including R&D – to be verified by the Agency. The Agency has not been able to monitor the use of hot cells at the TRR¹⁸ and the MIX Facility,¹⁹ and the R&D

¹⁶ OP 2.

¹⁷ The Agency has verified 432.9 kg of this 440.9 kg of uranium in the form of UF₆ enriched up to 60% U-235.

¹⁸ TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.

¹⁹ The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR.

activities at JHL.²⁰ Due to the lack of information and access to date, the Agency cannot confirm whether there are any ongoing reprocessing-related activities at TRR, the MIX Facility or JHL.

E.4. Heavy Water Related Projects

30. Pursuant to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is required to suspend work on all heavy water related projects – to be verified by the Agency. This includes at Arak, the construction of the KHRR, and the production of heavy water at HWPP. Both KHRR²¹ and HWPP²² were damaged during the military attacks of June 2025. As mentioned earlier, on 29 March 2026, the Agency observed, through the analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, that HWPP, which Iran reported had been attacked on 27 March 2026, had sustained severe damage. The Agency has not accessed KHRR since 14 May 2025.

E.5. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

31. As indicated above, pursuant to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is required to suspend all enrichment-related activities and heavy-water-related projects – to be verified by the Agency. In the past, UCF, EUPP, FMP and FPFP facilities were involved in enrichment-related activities and heavy-water-related projects. Since the military attacks of June 2025, Iran has not provided the Agency with information about, or access to, any of these facilities and the Agency cannot, therefore, assess either their current status or the status of the associated nuclear material, previously reported as being contained therein, or verify if Iran has suspended related activities.

E.6. Modified Code 3.1

32. Contrary to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.

33. The modified Code 3.1 provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new nuclear facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction, and commissioning phases.²³

34. Iran stopped implementing modified Code 3.1 on 23 February 2021.²⁴ The Agency has reminded Iran on many occasions that implementation of modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its NPT Safeguards Agreement. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a CSA that is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1.

35. Iran's failure to implement the provisions of modified Code 3.1 has prevented the Agency from

²⁰ JHL is a multi-purpose research laboratory where Iran conducted plutonium separation experiments in the 1990s (see GOV/2003/75, para. 28).

²¹ 'Update on Developments in Iran', dated 19 June 2025.

²² HWPP is not a nuclear facility.

²³ The initial Code 3.1 only required the submission of design information for a new facility "normally not later than 180 days before the facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time".

²⁴ GOV/INF/2021/13.

receiving early design information for any of the new nuclear reactors²⁵ which Iran has publicly announced it planned to construct. This significantly obstructs the Agency's ability to conduct DIVs in respect of such new facilities and to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

E.7. Additional Protocol

36. Contrary to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol (AP). Iran is called upon to act in strict accordance with the provisions of the AP and promptly to ratify it. The Additional Protocol equips the Agency with important additional tools that provide broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under the AP thus significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in Iran.

37. Iran stopped provisionally applying its AP in February 2021, since which date Iran has not provided updated declarations and the Agency has not been able to conduct complementary access to any sites and other locations in Iran. Unless and until Iran implements its AP, the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.²⁶

F. Unresolved safeguards issues

F.1. Comprehensive Assessment

38. The Director General's report of 31 May 2025 (GOV/2025/25), provided a "comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme". The report concluded that Iran did not declare nuclear material and nuclear related activities at three undeclared locations in Iran and that the Agency was not in a position to determine whether this nuclear material had been consumed, mixed with other declared material, or was still outside of safeguards.²⁷ The report also found that Iran's cooperation with the Agency to address the outstanding safeguards issues had been less than satisfactory.²⁸ Unless and until Iran assists the Agency in resolving these issues, the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.²⁹

F.2. Board Resolution

39. The Board considered the Director General's report and, on 12 June 2025, adopted resolution GOV/2025/38 in which the Board, inter alia:

²⁵ Information published on the AEOI website in June 2023 indicated that Iran had decided the locations for new power reactors and a new research reactor in Iran (GOV/2023/43, footnote 29). In November 2023, Vice-President Eslami made a statement referring to the excavation of the main building of the planned IR-360 reactor "in the coming days" and information available on the AEOI website referred to the "start of the executive operation of the construction of "Iran Hormoz" nuclear power plants by order of the president" (GOV/2024/8, para. 20).

²⁶ Iran's Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

²⁷ GOV/2025/25, para. 83.

²⁸ GOV/2025/25, para. 81.

²⁹ GOV/2025/25, para. 86.

- found that “Iran’s many failures to uphold its obligations since 2019 to provide the Agency with full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran, as detailed in GOV/2025/25 constitutes non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement” (operative paragraph 3);
- found, consistent with Article 19 of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, that “the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material” (operative paragraph 4);
- reaffirmed its decision that “it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations” (operative paragraph 7);
- called upon Iran to “urgently remedy its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement” (operative paragraph 10); and
- decided to remain seized of the matter (operative paragraph 13).

40. As referred to above (Section C), on 10 June 2026, the Board adopted resolution GOV/2026/40 in which it reiterated its previous calls to Iran made in its resolution of June 2025.

F.3. Recent developments

41. During this reporting period Iran has not engaged the Agency on the unresolved safeguards issues described in the Director General’s report (GOV/2025/25).

G. Summary

42. During this reporting period, the Agency has neither received information from Iran regarding the status of its declared nuclear material, facilities and LOF for safeguards purposes nor had access to any of those facilities and LOF to conduct in-field verification activities. Therefore, the Agency was unable to discharge its safeguards responsibilities under the NPT Safeguards Agreement at declared nuclear facilities in Iran and, consequently, could not verify the status, for safeguards purposes, of these facilities and associated nuclear material.

43. It is more than a year since the Agency lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the previously declared inventories of LEU and HEU enriched up to 60% U-235 at the declared nuclear facilities affected by the attacks of June 2025. The Agency’s lack of information about this nuclear material and access to facilities to verify it is a matter of proliferation concern and compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and needs to be addressed with the utmost urgency.

44. The Agency is also concerned that Iran has not provided the Agency with access to its fourth declared enrichment facility (IFEP) since it was first declared by Iran in June 2025. Consequently, the Agency does not know its status for safeguards purposes or whether IFEP contains nuclear material.

45. Since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol in February 2021, the Agency has not been able, inter alia, to conduct complementary access to any sites or other locations in Iran.

46. Due to the lack of access to Iran’s declared nuclear facilities, the Agency cannot verify:

- whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related activities, including research and development;
- whether Iran has suspended all reprocessing activities;

- the size of Iran's uranium stockpile;
- whether Iran has suspended work on all heavy water-related projects; and
- Iran's inventories of centrifuges and related equipment.

In addition, contrary to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is not implementing its AP and the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its NPT Safeguards Agreement.

47. The Director General notes Iran's continued refusal to engage the Agency in seeking to address the unresolved safeguards issues during this reporting period.

48. While the Agency acknowledged that the military attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities and sites created an unprecedented situation, it is critical for the Agency to conduct verification activities in Iran without further delay in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and, as required, under the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions. The Director General, therefore, calls on Iran to engage the Agency constructively in order to facilitate the full and effective implementation of safeguards in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement, implement the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, and resolve the outstanding safeguards issues.

49. The Director General reiterates his full support to negotiations aimed at finding a mutually acceptable solution to issues related to Iran's nuclear programme, and his readiness – through the Agency's verification and monitoring capability – to support the implementation of verification measures in relation to an eventual agreement if requested by the parties and approved by the Board. The Director General again expresses his conviction that the long-standing problems and recurrent crises surrounding these issues must be resolved through a long-lasting, verifiable diplomatic agreement.

50. The Agency is fully prepared to resume its safeguards activities in Iran at short notice under the NPT Safeguards Agreement, and conduct other verification activities in relation to an agreed arrangement, if requested by the parties and approved by the Board.

51. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

Annex

List of Declared Nuclear Facilities and LOF in Iran

Tehran:

1. Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
2. Process Research Facility (PRF)
3. Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility)
4. Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)

Isfahan:

5. Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant (IFEP)
6. Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)
7. Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)
8. Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR)
9. Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
10. Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)
11. Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP)
12. Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant (EUPP)
13. Isfahan Research Reactor 10MW (IRR-10)

Natanz:

14. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
15. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)

Fordow:

16. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)

Arak:

17. Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR)

Karaj:

18. Karaj Waste Storage

Bushehr:

19. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) Unit 1 (BNPP-1)
20. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) Unit 2 (BNPP-2)
21. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) Unit 3 (BNPP-3)

Darkhovin:

22. Karun Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP)

Location outside facilities:

One location outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOF), (situated on the AEOI's Tehran site)