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Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran's) implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and on matters related to verification and monitoring in Iran in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). It covers the period since the issuance of the Director General's previous report.¹

2. The estimated cost to the Agency for the implementation of Iran's Additional Protocol and for verifying and monitoring Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA is €10.4 million per annum, of which €4.6 million is funded by extrabudgetary contributions.² As of 29 August 2025, extrabudgetary funding had been pledged sufficient to meet the cost of JCPOA-related activities until the end of January 2026.

¹ GOV/2025/24.

² These figures have been adjusted to reflect current costs and the latest 2025 budget update.

B. Background

3. On 14 July 2015, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (E3/EU+3) and Iran agreed on the JCPOA. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), in which, inter alia, it requested the Director General to “undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA” and “[r]eport to the Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council, at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern directly affecting fulfilment of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA” (GOV/2015/53 and Corr.1, para. 8). In August 2015, the Board of Governors authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, and report accordingly, for the full duration of those commitments in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency’s standard safeguards practices.³

4. On 8 May 2018, the President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, announced the withdrawal of the United States from the “Iran nuclear deal”.⁴

C. JCPOA Verification and Monitoring Activities

C.1. Previously reported

5. Between 16 January 2016 (JCPOA Implementation Day) and 8 May 2019, the Agency verified and monitored Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments in accordance with the modalities set out in the JCPOA,⁵ consistent with the Agency’s standard safeguards practices.^{6,7}

6. From 8 May 2019 onwards, however, Iran stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA on a step-by-step basis until, on 23 February 2021, it stopped implementing them altogether, including the Additional Protocol. As a result, Iran no longer allowed the Agency to conduct many verification and monitoring activities in relation to the JCPOA.⁸

7. This has seriously affected the Agency’s JCPOA-related verification and monitoring activities. The situation was exacerbated in June 2022 by Iran’s decision to remove all of the Agency’s JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment, as a result of which, the Agency lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate (UOC), which it will not be possible to restore.

³ More background information to the matters outlined in this report can be found in previous quarterly reports of the Director General (most recently in GOV/2021/39).

⁴ ‘Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’, at: <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/>.

⁵ Including the clarifications referred to in para. 3 of GOV/2021/39.

⁶ GOV/2016/8, para. 6.

⁷ Note by the Secretariat, 2016/Note 5.

⁸ For a full list of these activities see, most recently, GOV/2025/24, para. 6.

C.2. Recent developments

8. The Director General, on 13 June 2025, reported to the Board of Governors and to the Security Council that the Agency had been informed of a military operation launched by Israel, which included attacks on several of Iran's nuclear facilities.⁹ These attacks took place between 13-24 June 2025. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran. By the end of June 2025, the Agency had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons. On 2 July 2025, Iran enacted a law suspending cooperation with the Agency.¹⁰ Since 13 June 2025, the Agency has not received nuclear material accountancy reports and updated design information questionnaires (DIQs) and has not had access to any safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iran, with the exception of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP). The Agency, through the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery and open sources, continues to monitor developments at Iran's nuclear facilities.

Chronology

9. The Director General, in his statement to the Board of Governors on 13 June 2025, recalled the relevant General Conference resolutions on the subject of military attacks against nuclear facilities, which provided, inter alia, that "any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency".¹¹ The Director General also reiterated that he had repeatedly stated that nuclear facilities must never be attacked, regardless of the context or circumstances, as it could harm both people and the environment, and that such attacks have serious implications for nuclear safety, security and safeguards, as well as regional and international peace and security.

10. Following the commencement of the military attacks on several of Iran's nuclear facilities, the Agency stopped all in-field verification and monitoring activities in Iran for safety reasons, to which Iran agreed.

11. The military attacks, in which the United States of America also later participated, lasted until 24 June 2025. During this period the Director General provided updates on the status of Iran's nuclear and nuclear-related facilities, based on the Agency's assessments of commercially available satellite imagery, to the Board and the Security Council (details of which are reported below under relevant headings).

12. The facilities known to have contained nuclear material affected by the military attacks were: the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP); the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP); the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP); the Uranium Conversion facility (UCF); the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP); the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP); and the Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant (EUPP). In addition, the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR), which was under construction and did not contain nuclear material, was also affected.

13. In a letter to the Director General dated 13 June 2025, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, HE Mr Abbas Araghchi, indicated that Iran would "adopt special measures to protect our nuclear equipment and materials". The Director General, in his letter of reply of the same day, indicated that any transfers of nuclear material from a safeguarded facility to another location in Iran must be declared to the Agency, as required under Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement and expressed his readiness to work with Iran on the matter.

⁹ See Director General's 'Statement on the situation in Iran' of 13 June 2025 and [Director General Grossi's Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran | IAEA](#), of 13 June 2025.

¹⁰ <https://president.ir/en/160022>.

¹¹ In particular, GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533.

14. As noted above, by the end of June 2025, taking into account safety considerations arising from the military attacks, the Agency had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran.

15. On 2 July 2025, President Masoud Pezeshkian reportedly signed a law adopted by the Parliament of Iran to suspend cooperation with the Agency. According to this law, such cooperation must be suspended pending determination by Iran's Supreme National Security Council that certain conditions have been met.

16. The Agency and Iran have conducted a number of high-level consultations aimed at agreeing practical steps to address Iran's concerns following the military attacks and to enable the resumption of Agency verification activities in Iran, pursuant to the NPT Safeguards Agreement (see GOV/2025/53, Section B, for details).

17. The Agency has not been able to access any facilities in Iran since the military attacks began on 13 June 2025, with the exception of BNPP. Since that time, the Agency has monitored developments at Iran's nuclear facilities through the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery and open sources.

C.2.1. Verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments

18. The status of the Agency's verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA is as follows:

JCPOA Section	Commitment	Most recently verified
B	Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor ¹²	14 May 2025
C	Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP)	February 2021*
D	Other Reactors	Unavailable since February 2021
E	Spent Fuel Reprocessing Activities	TRR: 18 May 2025 MIX Facility: 20 May 2025 JHL: 19 May 2025 Shielded cells: February 2021*
F	Enrichment Capacity	FFEP: 10 June 2025 FEP: 27 May 2025 PFEP: 11 June 2025
G	Centrifuge Research and Development	11 June 2025
H	Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)	10 June 2025
I	Other Aspects of Enrichment	See Sections F, G and H above
J	Uranium Stocks and Fuels	17 May 2025
K	Centrifuge Manufacturing	February 2021*
L	Additional Protocol (AP) & Modified Code 3.1	February 2021*
N	Modern Technologies and Long-term Presence of IAEA	OLEM: June 2022 122 inspectors currently designated
O	Transparency related to UOC	February 2021*
P	Transparency related to enrichment	February 2021*
Q	Access	Unavailable since February 2021

¹² Subsequently referred to as the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR).

R	Centrifuge Component Manufacturing Transparency	February 2021*
S	Other Uranium Isotope Separation Activities	February 2021*
T	Activities Which Could Contribute to the Design and Development of a Nuclear Explosive Device	February 2021*

* Verification and monitoring not allowed by Iran since February 2021.

C.2.2. Activities related to Heavy Water and Reprocessing

19. The Director General, based on the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery by the Agency, has reported¹³ that key buildings at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) were damaged during the military attacks of 13-24 June 2025. The Agency assessed that prior to the attacks HWPP was operating but that it has not been operating thereafter.

20. The Agency last accessed KHRR on 14 May 2025.¹⁴ The Director General, based on the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery by the Agency, has reported that KHRR was hit during the military attacks of 13-24 June 2025.¹⁵

C.2.3. Activities related to Enrichment

21. As previously reported, prior to the military attacks of 13-24 June 2025, there were 125 full-sized cascades installed in Iran's three previously declared enrichment facilities, containing a total of over 20 000 centrifuges (of types IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4 and IR-6).

FFEP

22. In a letter dated 12 June 2025, Iran informed the Agency that, in line with its previous declaration of November 2022,¹⁶ it intended to replace the IR-1 centrifuges installed in six cascades in Unit 2 at FFEP with IR-6 centrifuges. In the same letter, Iran also informed the Agency that it intended to feed uranium enriched up to 5% U-235 in Unit 1 in order to produce uranium enriched up to 20% U-235, using a previously declared operational mode.¹⁷

23. In its reply dated 12 June 2025, the Agency requested Iran to provide further information on the intended changes in order to ensure that the necessary safeguards measures were in place before the activities began.

24. The Agency last accessed FFEP on 10 June 2025 when the facility was operating the same number of cascades as previously reported, to produce UF₆ enriched up to 5%, 20% and 60% U-235.¹⁸ Since then, the operating conditions at the facility and the status of the nuclear material, previously reported as being contained therein, are not known to the Agency. The Director General, however, based on the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery by the Agency, has reported that FFEP is expected to have suffered very significant damage as a result of the military attacks on 13-24 June 2025.¹⁹

¹³ 'Update on Developments in Iran', dated 19 June 2025.

¹⁴ GOV/2025/24, para.9.

¹⁵ 'Update on Developments in Iran', dated 19 June 2025.

¹⁶ GOV/INF/2022/24, para. 8.

¹⁷ Iran had previously only fed Unit 1 with natural UF₆ into up to 870 IR-6 centrifuges in five cascades to enrich UF₆ up to 5% U-235 (GOV/2025/24, para. 11).

¹⁸ GOV/2025/24, paras 10 to 12.

¹⁹ Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, dated 23 June 2025.

FEP

25. The Agency last accessed FEP on 27 May 2025 when the facility was operating the same number of cascades as previously reported, to produce UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235.²⁰ Since then, the operating conditions at the facility and the status of the nuclear material, previously reported as being contained therein, are not known to the Agency. The Director General, however, based on the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery by the Agency, has reported that FEP has been extensively damaged, including indications of direct impacts on the underground enrichment halls, as a result of the military attacks on 13-24 June 2025.²¹

PFEP

26. The Agency last accessed PFEP on 11 June 2025 when the facility was operating with the same number of cascades as previously reported, to produce UF₆ enriched up to 5% and 60% U-235.²² Since then, the operating conditions at the facility and the status of the nuclear material, previously reported as being contained therein, are not known to the Agency. The Director General, however, based on the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery by the Agency, has reported²³ that the underground part of PFEP has been extensively damaged, including indications of direct impacts, while the above-ground part was destroyed, as a result of the military attacks on 13-24 June 2025.²⁴

IFEP

27. In a letter dated 12 June 2025, Iran informed the Agency that it “intends to establish a new enrichment facility named as Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant (IFEP) at NRFC [Nuclear Reactors Fuel Company] site” and that the related DIQ was available for examination by the Agency at the facility.

28. In its reply dated 12 June 2025, the Agency notified Iran of its plan to conduct a design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) on 13 June 2025, but these planned activities were subsequently cancelled due to the commencement of the military attacks on that day.

Centrifuge component manufacture

29. Under paragraph 80.2 of Annex I to the JCPOA, the Agency implemented continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance on locations and equipment used for the production of centrifuge rotor tubes or bellows, to verify that this equipment is being used to manufacture centrifuge rotor tubes or bellows only for the activities specified in the JCPOA. The Director General, based on the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery by the Agency, has reported that at the Tehran Research Center,²⁵ where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, one building was hit; at the Karaj workshop, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, two buildings were destroyed;²⁶ and at Isfahan a centrifuge manufacturing workshop was hit.²⁷

²⁰ GOV/2025/24, paras 14 and 15.

²¹ ‘Update on Developments in Iran’, dated 19 June 2025 and 24 June 2025.

²² GOV/2025/24, Section C.

²³ ‘Update on Developments in Iran’, dated 19 June 2025.

²⁴ ‘Update on Developments in Iran’, dated 19 June 2025.

²⁵ JCPOA Annex I, para. 40.

²⁶ ‘Update on Developments in Iran’, dated 19 June 2025.

²⁷ ‘Update on Developments in Iran’, dated 21 June 2025.

C.2.4. Activities related to Fuel

30. **FPFP:** The Agency last accessed FPFP on 9 June 2025. Since then, the operating conditions at the facility and the status of the nuclear material, previously reported as being contained therein, are not known to the Agency. The Director General, however, based on the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery by the Agency, has reported²⁸ that FPFP was damaged in the military attacks on 13-24 June 2025.

31. **UCF:** The Agency last accessed UCF on 21 May 2025. Since then, the operating conditions at the facility and the status of the nuclear material, previously reported as being contained therein, are not known to the Agency. The Director General, however, based on the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery by the Agency, has reported²⁹ that the facility was damaged in the military attacks on 13-24 June 2025, including the uranium metal production area.³⁰

32. **EUPP and FMP:** As the Agency has not had access to either EUPP or FMP since the military attacks of 13-24 June 2025, the operating conditions at the facilities and the status of the nuclear material, previously reported as being contained therein, are not known to the Agency. The Director General, however, based on the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery by the Agency, has reported³¹ that EUPP and FMP were damaged in the military attacks on 13-24 June 2025.

33. **Tehran Research Reactor (TRR):** The Agency last accessed the TRR on 18 May 2025, as already reported.³² Since then, the operating conditions at the facility, and the status of the fuel assemblies and elements previously reported as being contained therein, are not known to the Agency. However, the Agency has calculated³³ that all previously irradiated TRR fuel elements in Iran continue to have a dose rate of no less than 1 rem/hour (at one metre in air), except one control fuel assembly and one test fuel assembly. There is no indication, based on the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery by the Agency, that TRR was subjected to military attack.

C.2.5. Enriched Uranium Stockpile

34. Since 13 June 2025, the Agency has not been able to conduct the in-field activities required to collect and verify Iran's declarations used to estimate the changes to the previously reported stockpile.³⁴ Until the Agency is able to resume its in-field verification activities, it is not in a position to quantify Iran's enriched uranium stockpile with the same confidence and accuracy as before or to determine its whereabouts.

35. However, based on the information provided by Iran, Agency verification activities between 17 May 2025 and 12 June 2025 (the day preceding the start of the military attacks), and estimates based on the past operation of the relevant facilities, the Agency has estimated that, as of 13 June 2025, Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile was 9874.9 kg. This figure represents an increase of 627.3 kg since the previous quarterly report. The estimated stockpile comprised: 9040.5 kg of uranium in the form of UF₆ and 834.4 kg of uranium in other forms.

²⁸ 'Update on Developments in Iran', dated 19 June 2025, 21 June 2025 and 22 June 2025.

²⁹ 'Update on Developments in Iran', dated 21 June 2025.

³⁰ GOV/2023/24, para. 49.

³¹ 'Update on Developments in Iran', dated 21 June 2025.

³² GOV/2025/24, para. 21.

³³ Based on measurements and conservative calculations.

³⁴ GOV/2025/24, paras 23 to 29.

36. As of 13 June 2025, the Agency has estimated that the total enriched uranium stockpile in the form of UF₆ of 9040.5 kg comprised:

- 2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235 (+169.7 kg since the previous report);
- 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235 (+515.6 kg);
- 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235 (–90.4 kg); and
- 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235³⁵ (+32.3 kg).

37. As of 13 June 2025, the Agency was not aware of any UF₆ having been converted to other chemical forms or of changes in the quantities of enriched uranium in fuel items and targets. The Agency, therefore, considers that the previously reported enriched uranium stockpile of uranium in forms other than UF₆ remains unchanged at 834.4 kg.

D. Summary

38. The withdrawal of all Agency inspectors from Iran because of safety concerns arising from the military attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities was necessary given the overall security situation. Iran's subsequent decision to suspend cooperation with the Agency is deeply regrettable. Despite this development, the Agency has repeatedly reached out to Iran. The Director General, in letters to Iran's Foreign Minister, has reiterated his own and the Agency's disposition to take into consideration Iran's security concerns, bearing in mind the law adopted by Iran.

39. During this reporting period, the Agency lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the current inventories of nuclear material in Iran, including low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU), which urgently needs to be addressed. The Agency had already lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and UOC, which it will not be able to restore.

40. While acknowledging the need to agree on technical, practical steps to enable the resumption of safeguards implementation, it must be recalled that Iran's inventory of HEU, the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced such nuclear material, is a matter of serious concern. The Agency has not had access to verify this specific nuclear material in Iran for over two and a half months, which means that its verification – according to standard safeguards practice – is overdue.

41. It has been four and a half years since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol. Therefore, throughout this period, Iran has not provided updated declarations and the Agency has not been able to conduct complementary access to any sites and other locations in Iran.

42. Technical modalities to enable the full resumption of Agency inspections should be concluded without delay. The Director General expresses his conviction that agreement on such modalities is possible.

43. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

³⁵ The Agency has verified 432.9 kg of this 440.9 kg of uranium in the form of UF₆ enriched up to 60% U-235.

Annex I

List of acronyms

AEOI	Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
DIQ	Design Information Questionnaire
DIV	Design Information Verification
EUPP	Enriched UO ₂ Powder Plant
FEP	Fuel Enrichment Plant
FLUM	Flow-rate Unattended Monitoring
FMP	Fuel Manufacturing Plant
FPFP	Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant
FFEP	Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
HWPP	Heavy Water Production Plant
IFEP	Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JHL	Jaber Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratory
KHRR	Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor
MIX facility	Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production facility
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OLEM	On-Line Enrichment Monitor
PFEP	Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant
PIV	Physical Inventory Verification
TRR	Tehran Research Reactor
UCF	Uranium Conversion Facility
UOC	Uranium Ore Concentrate