



Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Security

**IAEA Safeguards Agreements
and Additional Protocols**





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FOREWORD:

IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei



One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto.


IAEA safeguards are generally acknowledged to be a credible means by which the international community can be assured that nuclear material and facilities are being used exclusively for peaceful purposes. An effective safeguards system functions as a confidence-building measure, an early warning mechanism, and the trigger that sets in motion other responses by the international community. It does not prevent States from acquiring nuclear material, facilities or technology. In fact, adhering to the Agency's safeguards system is a responsibility to be assumed by all States wishing to benefit from applications of nuclear techniques and technology for such diverse purposes as treating cancer, optimizing the use of scarce water resources, developing high-yield varieties of crops, eradicating insect pests and boosting industrial performance.



Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour.



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1. The Important Role of IAEA Safeguards

Ever since the Agency was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has provided an indispensable instrument for nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear co-operation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus put all of their nuclear material under safeguards. Article III of the NPT provides that all NNWS must *“accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under [the NPT]...”*. Such negotiations are to be initiated no later than on the day that the State deposits its instrument of ratification to the NPT, and concluded within 18 months.

In the context of the NPT, the IAEA is thus charged with providing the international community with credible assurance that any nuclear material in peaceful use is not being diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This task can only be realized in States that have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements. Moreover, for the Agency to ensure the absence of possible undeclared material and activities, States should have in force an additional protocol to their safeguards agreements, based on the model approved in 1997.

Calls for wider adherence to safeguards agreements and additional protocols have been made in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, by States parties to the NPT in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and by Member States of the Agency in resolutions of the IAEA General Conference. In addition, the Agency, through its safeguards system, verifies compliance in the context of the different regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties.

The events of 11 September 2001 focused States' attention on the importance of preventing terrorist or other criminal misuse of nuclear material or other radioactive material, as used in hospitals, research facilities or industry. The system of IAEA safeguards and related domestic measures constitutes a firewall against such threats. Of course, IAEA safeguards alone cannot ensure the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material, or of nuclear facilities, from terrorists with malevolent intent. It is the responsibility of States to undertake all the necessary safety and security measures, and to ensure adequate control of such material and facilities. But there is no doubt that bringing into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with an additional protocol is a fundamental measure in this regard.



2. Strengthening the Safeguards System



Although safeguards have developed progressively since their inception, until recently the IAEA system focused mainly on nuclear material and activities declared by the State. However, the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme (despite an existing comprehensive safeguards agreement between Iraq and the IAEA), as well as subsequent events in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, demonstrated that an effective verification regime must also focus on possible undeclared material and activities. A number of measures to strengthen the safeguards system could be applied within the framework of existing comprehensive safeguards agreements. For others, the IAEA required additional legal authority.

In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(corr.)) which contained a number of provisions conferring upon the Agency the legal authority to implement further strengthening measures. The additional protocol is integral to the strengthened system. Its principal aim is to enable the system to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Model Additional Protocol, States are required to provide the Agency with an expanded declaration that contains information covering all aspects of their nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle activities. The States must also grant the Agency broader rights of access and enable it to use the most advanced technologies.

Previously, routine access was generally limited to specific "strategic points" in declared facilities. An additional protocol requires a State to provide access to any place on a nuclear site and to other locations where nuclear material is, or may be, present. The State is required to provide access to all locations that are, or could be, engaged in activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle and, in cases where such access may not be possible, to make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements without delay through other means. The Model Additional Protocol also provides for certain improved administrative procedures including streamlined procedures for designating inspectors and providing them with visas, and improved means by which inspectors may communicate with Agency Headquarters.



The strengthened system is based on a political commitment to support an "intelligent" verification system – one where qualitative assessment takes place alongside quantitative accounting measures. States have recognised and committed themselves to a common, societal objective; bound themselves to certain material obligations; and granted an impartial inspectorate the necessary authority to verify compliance with the commitments.

INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS

In States that have both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force, the Agency will, in due course, be able to implement an optimal combination of all safeguards measures. Towards that end, the Agency is giving priority to the development of “integrated safeguards”, which will result from integrating “traditional” safeguards measures, based on nuclear material accountancy, with the new safeguards strengthening measures, so as to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency within available resources. The process of defining the optimum combination of measures will be developed on a non-discriminatory basis for all States that have comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force.



SOUTH AFRICA REJECTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Following its historical decision to voluntarily abandon its nuclear weapons programme and dismantle its existing nuclear weapons, South Africa adhered to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State on 10 July 1991. It promptly concluded an NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA on 16 September the same year. The IAEA performed the task of verifying South Africa’s dismantlement activities, and was tasked by the 1992 General Conference to report on the correctness and completeness of South Africa’s initial NPT declarations. The South Africa experience gave the Agency important operational experience, and contributed positively to the development of strengthened safeguards.

Consistent with its strong commitment to global disarmament and non-proliferation, South Africa took the decision, in 2002, that it would adhere to the additional protocol, making it one of the first African countries with a protocol in force. In June 2002, South Africa hosted a regional IAEA seminar on the importance of safeguards agreements and additional protocols for nuclear non-proliferation, attended by nearly 100 participants, including from 36 African countries. In her opening address to that meeting, the South African Minister Susan Shabango said, *“If the Agency is to be able to perform its responsibilities it must be given the corresponding authority. We believe all African states should embrace the safeguards agreements and additional protocols.”*



Nelson Mandela addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations

3. Rationale for Participating in the Safeguards System



Fulfillment of international obligations: All non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT are required under international law to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Moreover, only through the widest possible adherence to the strengthened safeguards system based on safeguards agreements and additional protocols will the full potential of the IAEA safeguards system be realized.

International security: With its verification role under the NPT, the IAEA's safeguards system is an indispensable part of the international nuclear regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly, the NPT Review Conference and the IAEA General Conference have made repeated calls for its universal application. Strengthened safeguards also play an important role in the efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, and it is generally agreed that the Agency has an important role to play in this regard. By bringing into force a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, each State strengthens its credibility and thereby its ability to contribute to multilateral efforts towards the accomplishment of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Such a climate is also conducive to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to a more robust nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Regional and national security: The importance of safeguards to regional security is demonstrated by the fact that all the existing regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties¹ require State parties to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Safeguards contribute to greater nuclear transparency, and fulfil the role of a confidence building measure in the context of regional and international security. The implementation of strengthened safeguards will enable the Agency to provide greater assurance with regard to the absence of any undeclared nuclear material and activities. This will help build trust in and between States, thereby contributing to greater stability and security. Members in the safeguards system may also be eligible to receive technical assistance from the Agency in order to develop a national system for better control of nuclear and other radioactive material. This will decrease the risk of such material becoming a health hazard or falling into the hands of individuals with malevolent intent.

Pursuit of development: Practically all States benefit in one way or another from the use of nuclear energy for development purposes. Isotopes and radiation are used in, for instance, health services, water resource management and agricultural production. Nuclear applications also improve industrial competitiveness in many sectors of development. Member States of the IAEA are eligible to receive assistance, through the Agency's technical co-operation programme, in developing national capacity to adapt these techniques to priority development needs, with the possibility for non-members to take part in some regional projects. Effective implementation of IAEA safeguards is vitally important for facilitating co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, it is generally agreed that such a pursuit carries with it certain responsibilities in terms of safety, security and effective oversight. Bringing into force a safeguards agreement with an additional protocol is a fundamental measure in order to achieve those objectives.



¹ Tlatelolco Treaty (Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga Treaty (South Pacific), Bangkok Treaty (Southeast Asia), Pelindaba Treaty (Africa)



“Bringing into force a safeguards agreement with an additional protocol is a fundamental measure in order to achieve safety, security and effective oversight.”




4. Reporting and Access Requirements



For States with facilities under routine safeguards inspection (70 States and Taiwan, China), the Agency has prepared a document providing guidance on their required declarations under Article 2 and 3 of the additional protocol. Similar guidelines have been prepared for the more than 120 States that have little or no nuclear material, and thus fulfil the requirements for a “Small Quantities Protocol” (see page 12). For SQP States, most of the reporting and other requirements under the NPT are suspended, and declarations submitted under an additional protocol are expected to be short and simple. With such limited reporting requirements, SQP States are assured that the effort spent on fulfilling the requirements of a safeguards agreement is kept to a minimum.

INSPECTIONS AND COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS

Under NPT safeguards agreements, the purpose of inspection activities is to verify information on reported nuclear material. They are therefore generally focused on declared nuclear facilities containing nuclear material. Consequently, on-site inspections are generally very limited or non-existent in SQP States. Regarding the additional protocol, the Agency’s governing bodies have underlined that it should be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner and that implementation should be neither mechanistic nor systematic. Guided by such principles, complementary access by IAEA inspectors may be carried out in all States with additional protocols in force. It is foreseen that the measures in the Model Additional Protocol will enable safeguards to be implemented more effectively and allow the Agency’s resources to be used more efficiently.



5. Drawing Conclusions

For all States with safeguards agreements, the Agency draws an annual conclusion on the non-diversion of nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards. For States with additional protocols, the Agency aims to provide more comprehensive assurances regarding not only non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards, but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities. Such assurances are based on the Agency's evaluations, taking into account all information on a State available to it, including analyses of samples collected in nuclear or nuclear-related facilities during complementary access. With regard to 2001, the Agency was able to draw such a conclusion for nine States with additional protocols in force.



6. IAEA Co-operation and Assistance

The Office of External Relations and Policy Co-ordination is the focal point for the Agency's efforts to achieve the conclusion and entry into force of more safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Once a State has decided to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency, the IAEA is able to help the country with the implementation of related legal and technical requirements. Legislative assistance can be provided by the Office of Legal Affairs, for instance, in response to requests within the framework of the national and regional Technical Co-operation Programmes. The Safeguards Department may help States carry out some of the necessary steps for national implementation of safeguards agreements (preparing initial declarations etc.).

7. Status of NPT Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

As of 10 September 2002, 133 out of the 182 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have in force NPT safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Forty-nine (49) States have yet to fulfil their legal obligations to bring such an agreement into force. Sixty-four (64) States have signed additional protocols to their safeguards agreements with the IAEA. For 27 of those States, the protocols have either entered into force, or are being applied provisionally. The status of comprehensive safeguards agreements is summarized in Annex 1 and the status of additional protocols can be found in Annex 2.



APPENDIX

How to Conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with an Additional Protocol

(based on INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) and INFCIRC/540 (Corr.))

Concluding safeguards agreements with the IAEA generally requires three discrete steps:

1. The State notifies the Agency of its intention to conclude a safeguards agreement and/or an additional protocol, and asks the Agency to submit the draft text(s) to the Board of Governors for the Board to authorize the Director General to sign and implement it. The notification should contain information on the entry into force procedure and, if applicable, confirmation that the requirements for a Small Quantities Protocol are met (see below). The text(s) will then be submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval. The Board meets 5 times per year, generally in March, June, September (twice) and December. After this, the documents are open for signature. Model letters are provided in Annex 3 and 4.
2. A representative of the State and the Director General sign the text(s). This may be done by the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs or by any other Government official – such as the Permanent Representative to the Agency – with full powers to sign on behalf of the Government.
3. The State has two options for entry into force. The agreement/protocol(s) may enter into force either upon signature or on the date the Agency receives from the State written confirmation that its domestic requirements for entry into force have been met. If the latter option is applied, the third step required is for the State to provide such a notification to the Agency. A model letter is provided in Annex 5.

SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL (SQP)

States with no nuclear facilities containing nuclear material and with amounts of nuclear material below certain threshold quantities have the option to conclude a protocol to the safeguards agreement which has the effect of holding in abeyance some of the detailed provisions of the safeguards agreement as long as this situation continues to apply (Reporting required under Part II of the comprehensive safeguards agreement is kept to a minimum and the Agency generally does not carry out any inspection activities). The SQP naturally does not hold in abeyance the implementation of the basic undertaking of the State to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities, and exports and imports of nuclear material must be reported. States wishing to conclude an SQP should indicate to the Agency “that the amount of nuclear material present in (the State), or under its jurisdiction or control, is less than the amount given in Article [36] of the draft agreement, and that there is currently no nuclear material in (the State) or under its jurisdiction or control in a ‘facility’ as defined in the draft agreement.”

The draft SQP is generally submitted to the Board of Governors for approval together with the safeguards agreement.

ANNEX 1

Non-Nuclear Weapon States without an NPT Safeguards Agreement in Force

Current Situation as of: 10 September 2002

There are 47 States party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without any comprehensive safeguards agreements in force:

12 Comprehensive safeguards agreements are signed but not yet in force:

Andorra	Moldova
Cameroon	Niger
Gabon	Oman
Georgia	Sierra Leone
Haiti	Togo
Kyrgyzstan	U.R. Tanzania

2 Comprehensive safeguards agreements are approved by the Board of Governors but not yet signed:

Equatorial Guinea	Tajikistan
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33 Comprehensive safeguards agreements have yet to be concluded:

Angola	Mali
Bahrain	Marshall Islands
Benin	Mauritania
Botswana	Micronesia
Burkina Faso	Mozambique
Burundi	Palau
Cape Verde	Qatar
Central African Republic	Rwanda
Chad	Sao Tome & Principe
Comoros	Saudi Arabia
Congo	Seychelles
Djibouti	Somalia
Eritrea	Turkmenistan
Guinea	Uganda
Guinea Bissau	United Arab Emirates
Kenya	Vanuatu
Liberia	

Additionally Albania, party to the NPT, has a sui generis comprehensive safeguards agreement that was not concluded pursuant to the NPT, and Panama still needs to have its comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco confirmed in terms of validity under the NPT either through an Exchange of Letters with the Agency or by concluding a new safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty.

ANNEX 2

Status of the Conclusion of Additional Protocols

Status as of
10 September 2002

	STATE	BOG APPROVAL	SIGNED	IN FORCE
1	Andorra	7/Dec/00	9/Jan/01	
2	Armenia	23/Sep/97	29/Sep/97	
3	Australia	23/Sep/97	23/Sep/97	12/Dec/97
4	Austria ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	*
5	Azerbaijan	7/Jun/00	5/Jun/00	29/Nov/00
6	Bangladesh	25/Sep/00	30/Mar/01	30/Mar/01
7	Belgium ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	
8	Bulgaria	14/Sep/98	24/Sep/98	10/Oct/00
9	Canada	11/Jun/98	24/Sep/98	8/Sep/00
10	China	25/Nov/98	31/Dec/98	28/Mar/02
11	Costa Rica	29/Nov/01	12/Dec/01	
12	Croatia	14/Sep/98	22/Sep/98	6/Jul/00
13	Cuba	20/Sep/99	15/Oct/99	
14	Cyprus	25/Nov/98	29/Jun/99	
15	Czech Republic	20/Sep/99	28/Sep/99	1/Jul/02
16	Denmark ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	
17	Ecuador	20/Sep/99	1/Oct/99	24/Oct/01
18	Estonia	21/Mar/00	13/Apr/00	
19	Finland ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	*
20	France ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	
21	Georgia	23/Sep/97	29/Sep/97	
22	Germany ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	*
23	Ghana	11/Jun/98	12/Jun/98	provisional
24	Greece ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	*
25	Guatemala	29/Nov/01	14/Dec/01	
26	Haiti	20/Mar/02	10/Jul/02	
27	Holy See	14/Sep/98	24/Sep/98	24/Sep/98
28	Hungary	25/Nov/98	26/Nov/98	4/Apr/00
29	Indonesia	20/Sep/99	29/Sep/99	29/Sep/99
30	Ireland ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	
31	Italy ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	
32	Jamaica	12/Jun/02		
33	Japan	25/Nov/98	4/Dec/98	16/Dec/99
34	Jordan	18/Mar/98	28/Jul/98	28/Jul/98
35	Kuwait	12/Jun/02	19/Jun/02	
36	Latvia	7/Dec/00	12/Jul/01	12/Jul/01
37	Lithuania	8/Dec/97	11/Mar/98	5/Jul/00
38	Luxembourg ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	
39	Monaco	25/Nov/98	30/Sep/99	30/Sep/99
40	Mongolia	11/Sep/01	5/Dec/01	
41	Namibia	21/Mar/00	22/Mar/00	
42	Netherlands ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	*
43	New Zealand	14/Sep/98	24/Sep/98	24/Sep/98
44	Nicaragua	12/Jun/02	18/Jul/02	
45	Nigeria	7/Jun/00	20/Sep/01	
46	Norway	24/Mar/99	29/Sep/99	16/May/00
47	Panama	29/Nov/01	11/Dec/01	11/Dec/01
48	Paraguay	12/Jun/02		
49	Peru	10/Dec/99	22/Mar/00	23/Jul/01
50	Philippines	23/Sep/97	30/Sep/97	
51	Poland	23/Sep/97	30/Sep/97	5/May/00
52	Portugal ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	*
53	ROK	24/Mar/99	21/Jun/99	
54	Romania	9/Jun/99	11/Jun/99	7/Jul/00
55	Russia	21/Mar/00	22/Mar/00	
56	Slovakia	14/Sep/98	27/Sep/99	
57	Slovenia	25/Nov/98	26/Nov/98	22/Aug/00
58	South Africa	12/Jun/02		
59	Spain ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	*
60	Sweden ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	*
61	Switzerland	7/Jun/00	16/Jun/00	
62	Tajikistan	12/Jun/02		
63	Turkey	7/Jun/00	6/Jul/00	17/Jul/01
64	Ukraine	7/Jun/00	15/Aug/00	
65	UK ¹	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	*
66	US	11/Jun/98	12/Jun/98	
67	Uruguay	23/Sep/97	29/Sep/97	
68	Uzbekistan	14/Sep/98	22/Sep/98	21/Dec/98
	TOTAL	68	64	26

1) All 15 EU States have signed one of three APs with Euratom and the Agency: one for France, one for the UK and one for all non-nuclear weapon States.

* The Agency has received notification from these States that they have fulfilled their own internal requirements for entry into force. The AP will enter into force on the date when the Agency receives written notification from the EU States and EURATOM that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met.

	OTHER PARTIES	BOG APPROVAL	SIGNED	IN FORCE
1	Euratom	11/Jun/98	22/Sep/98	
	TOTAL	1	1	0

ANNEX 3

Model Notification Letter

Conclusion of a Safeguards Agreement, an Additional Protocol and a Small Quantities Protocol

(date)

Sir,

I refer to your letter of (date), and have the honour to inform you that the Government of (State) has decided to conclude a safeguards agreement between (State) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for to the application of safeguards in connection with the NPT, a "small quantities protocol", and an additional protocol on the basis of the model approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997.

Accordingly, I would request that the Secretariat submit the drafts, as contained in your letter of (date), to the Board of Governors for its consideration [at its (mm, yy) session].

I confirm that the amount of nuclear material present in (State), or under its jurisdiction or control, is less than the amount given in Article [36] of the draft agreement, and that there is currently no nuclear material in (State) or under its jurisdiction or control in a "facility" as defined in the draft agreement.

Entry into force will take place [on the date on which the Agency receives from (State) written notification that (State)'s statutory and/or constitutions requirements for entry into force have been met] [upon signature by the representatives of (State) and the Agency].

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed)

Government Representative

ANNEX 4

Model Notification Letter

Conclusion of an Additional Protocol to an Existing Safeguards Agreement

(date)

Sir,

I refer to your letter of (date), and have the honour to inform you that the Government of (State) has decided to conclude an additional protocol to the safeguards agreement between (State) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for to the application of safeguards in connection with the NPT [and the Tlatelolco Treaty], on the basis of the model approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May, 1997.

Accordingly, I would request that the Secretariat submit the draft, as contained in your letter of (date), to the Board of Governors for its consideration [at its (mm, yy) session].

Entry into force will take place [on the date on which the Agency receives from (State) written notification that (State)'s statutory and/or constitutions requirements for entry into force have been met] [upon signature by the representatives of (State) and the Agency].

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed)

Government Representative

ANNEX 5

Model Notification Letter

Entry-into-force of a Safeguards Agreement and/or an Additional Protocol

The [Permanent Mission][Ministry for Foreign Affairs] of (State) presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has the honour to notify it that the constitutional and statutory requirements for entry into force of the [additional protocol to the] comprehensive safeguards agreement between (State) and the International Atomic Energy Agency [and the small quantities protocol] [as well as the protocol additional thereto] have been met.

The Permanent Mission of (State) avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency the assurances of its highest consideration."



IAEA, September 2002

Written by Jan Lodding, EXPO

Edited by David Kinley III, MTP1

The IAEA contact point for information on the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols is the Office for External Relations and Policy Co-ordination. Queries may be addressed to:

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More information can also be obtained on the Agency's Home Page: www.iaea.org/worldatom

