Letter dated 21 June 2019 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), my six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 12 December 2018 to 15 June 2019.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Marc Pecesteen de Buytswerve
Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
Seventh six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) set forth practical arrangements and procedures for the Council for carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.

2. In the note, it was established that the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its Facilitator for the functions specified therein. On 2 January 2019, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2019 (see S/2019/2).

3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on its work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.

4. The present report covers the period from 12 December 2018 to 15 June 2019.

II. Summary of the activities of the Council in the “2231 format”

5. On 11 December 2018, a letter from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General was received by the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1108). The letter transmitted the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the sixth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/1089), as described further in paragraph 19 of the present report.

6. On 12 December 2018 (see S/PV.8418), the Security Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the sixth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/1089), by Karel J. G. van Oosterom, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations, as Facilitator in 2018, on the work of the Council and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/1106) and by the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the procurement channel (S/2018/1070).

7. On 3 April 2019, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) met in the “2231 format” and heard a presentation from the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Coordinator provided an overview on the procurement channel and the work of the Procurement Working Group. The Secretariat, through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, also provided an update on the administrative support provided to the Council for the processing of proposals through the procurement channel.

8. During the reporting period, a total of 30 notes were circulated within the “2231 format”. In addition, I sent 23 official communications to Member States and/or the
Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. I received a total of 25 communications from Member States and the Coordinator.

9. There were no changes to the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), which at present comprises 23 individuals and 61 entities. Since Implementation Day, no travel ban or assets freeze exemption request has been submitted.

III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

10. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution 2231 (2015), the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted in February and May 2019 to the IAEA Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council reports on its verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of the resolution (S/2019/212 and S/2019/496).

11. In its quarterly reports, the Agency affirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran had not pursued construction of the existing Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 reactor) based on its original design, with all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies having remained in storage under continuous Agency monitoring.

12. The Islamic Republic of Iran also continued to inform the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in-country and the production of heavy water at the heavy water production plant. It allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of its heavy water stocks and amount of heavy water produced at the plant. In both reports, it was stated that throughout the reporting period, the Islamic Republic of Iran had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water (reporting 124.8 metric tonnes in February 2019 and 125.2 metric tonnes in May 2019 respectively). In the May report, the Agency stated that following a halt in the production of heavy water at the plant between 15 April and 22 May 2019, the operation of the plant had resumed.

13. Regarding activities related to enrichment and fuel, it was confirmed in the reports that there had been no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges installed in 30 cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, which remain in the configurations in the operating units at the time the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was agreed. In the February report, it noted that no IR-1 centrifuges were withdrawn from those held in storage while in the May report, it was noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran withdrew 52 IR-1 centrifuges from those held in storage for the replacement of damaged or failed IR-1 centrifuges installed at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant.

14. In both reports, the Agency stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had continued the enrichment of UF6 at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and had not enriched uranium above 3.67 per cent U-235. Its total enriched uranium stockpile had not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67 percent U-235 (202.8 kg of uranium) and that the quantity uranium enriched up to 3.67 per cent U-235 in the Islamic Republic of Iran was 163.8 kg (as at 16 February 2019) and 174.1 kg (as at 20 May 2019) respectively, based on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and decisions of the Joint Commission.

15. The Agency stated that, at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges had been maintained in one wing (Unit 2) of the facility and that 1,020 IR-1 centrifuges were installed in six cascades. In the May report, the Agency verified that 10 IR-1 centrifuges were installed in a layout of 16 IR-1 centrifuge positions and 1 IR-1 centrifuge was installed in a single position for conducting “initial research and [research and development] activities related to stable isotope production.” In the reports, it was also stated that the Islamic Republic
of Iran had not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development activities and there had not been any nuclear material at the plant.

16. In both reports, the Agency stated that no enriched uranium had accumulated through enrichment research and development activities, and that the enrichment research and development of the Islamic Republic of Iran with and without uranium had been conducted using centrifuges “within the limits defined in the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]” (February 2019 report) or as “specified in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (May 2019 report), respectively.

17. In both reports, the Agency stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to permit the Agency to use online enrichment monitors and electronic seals. It also issued long-term visas to inspectors, provided proper working space at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites. The Agency also reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, including through the conduct of complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the country which the Agency needed to visit.

18. Both reports stated that “timely and proactive cooperation” by the Islamic Republic of Iran in providing such access would facilitate the implementation of the Additional Protocol and “enhance confidence”. The Agency also reported that its verification and monitoring of the other Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear-related commitments of the Islamic Republic of Iran continued.

19. In its letter dated 11 December 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1108), the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the United States of America “reintroduced and reimposed all its unlawful unilateral sanctions” that had been lifted on 16 January 2016 consistent with resolution 2231 (2015), following its “unwarranted and unlawful decision” to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The letter stated that the Secretary-General’s report “failed to provide an assessment” of how United States sanctions “violate the resolution, including its annexes, or affect its implementation”. It further noted that the United States was also “coercing other States” to violate the resolution, and that its sanctions impaired civil cooperation projects, which “constitute some of the main pillars” of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015).

20. In its letters dated 24 December 2018 and 26 February 2019 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (A/73/691-S/2018/1155 and S/2019/185), the Islamic Republic of Iran noted the continued growing threats and provocative statements made by the United States, which was in clear contradiction with the overall object and purpose as well as the spirit and letter of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The letters stated that the United States should be held accountable for such policies and wrongful acts which were clearly disrespectful of those calls by the Security Council and challenged the will of the international community. The letters also noted that the Security Council called upon all Member States to support the implementation of the Plan by refraining from actions that undermine its implementation.

21. On 3 May 2019, the United States announced that assistance to expand the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant beyond the existing reactor unit would be exposed to

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2 See https://www.state.gov/advancing-the-maximum-pressure-campaign-by-restricting-irans-nuclear-activities/.
sanctions; any involvement in transferring enriched uranium (out of the Islamic Republic of Iran) in exchange for natural uranium would also be exposed to sanctions; the storage of heavy water (produced in excess of current limits) would no longer be permitted; and that any such heavy water must not be made available to the Islamic Republic of Iran “in any fashion”. In addition, the United States stated that certain non-proliferation activities (related to the Arak reactor, the Fordow facility, the existing unit at Bushehr, the Tehran Research Reactor and sensitive material) could continue for a renewable duration of 90 days and that it reserved the right to “modify or revoke” its policy covering such activities “at any time”.

22. On 8 May 2019, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that having had shown “considerable restraint” in the past year and in order to protect the security and national interests of its people as well as in the implementation of its rights set forth in paragraphs 26 and 36 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, it decided to “stop some of Iran’s measures” under the Plan. These measures include not committing Iran to “respecting the limits on the keeping of enriched uranium and heavy water reserves at the current stage” and giving the remaining countries 60 days “to fulfill their obligations, especially in banking and oil fields” since “no operational mechanisms have been set up to compensate” for United States sanctions. It further noted that if these countries failed to meet its demands in the time given, the Islamic Republic of Iran would “suspend compliance with the uranium enrichment limits and measures to modernize the Arak Heavy Water Reactor”. It also stated that when demands are met, it would “resume the same amount of suspended commitments” but otherwise, suspend the implementation of other obligations “step by step.” The Islamic Republic of Iran noted however, that it was “ready to continue its consultations” with the remaining members of the Plan “at all levels” but would show a “strong and immediate response” to any “irresponsible action, including referral to the United Nations Security Council or implementation of further sanctions.”

23. In a letter dated 23 May 2019 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/429), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that the United States “unilateral nuclear as well as economic sanctions” have reached “an unprecedented level” since November 2018 and that its “wrongful conduct” had been extended to “peaceful” nuclear cooperation, nuclear-related activities and the work of the procurement channel as envisaged within the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and annex B of resolution 2231 (2015). In the letter, the Permanent Representative further noted that the latest decision by the United States regarding international nuclear cooperation has “prevented” the implementation of the relevant nuclear-related provisions of the resolution by “impeding” the sale, transfer or exchange of enriched uranium and heavy water produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Permanent Representative also noted that the United States should bear “full responsibility” for the consequences of “those wrongful acts” and that the international community should “uphold its responsibilities”.

24. In his letter dated 11 June 2019 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/482), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the

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4 See resolution 2231 (2015), annex A (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), annex I (Nuclear-related measures), sections C and J. Namely, for 15 years, Iran will maintain a total enriched uranium stockpile of no more than 300 kg of up to 3.67 per cent enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) (or the equivalent in different chemical forms); all enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67 per cent enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold on the international market; and all excess heavy water (beyond the estimated needs of the Islamic Republic of Iran of 130 metric tonnes of nuclear-grade heavy water) made available for export to the international market.
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations stated that “the fully fledged functioning of the ‘procurement channel’ is one of the key elements for the comprehensive implementation of not only the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but also of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”, and that the Russian Federation “considers attempts by the United States to undermine the ‘procurement channel’ and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a whole as absolutely unacceptable”. He also stated that an “overt threat of use of unilateral sanctions against potential exporters and Member States who act in full conformity with a Security Council decision is unprecedented by itself and merits an appropriate response”. Conveying its view that “in order to raise efficiency and ensure the stable work of the ‘procurement channel’ it is imperative to increase international trust in this mechanism”, the Russian Federation stated that it was “necessary to promptly elaborate, within the Procurement Working Group and the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, special security mechanisms in order to negate the effects of unilateral sanctions and thus ensure the continued implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)”. A proposal submitted to this end to the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission was also annexed to the letter to bring to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Ballistic missile launches

25. In their letters dated 18 December 2018 and 22 February 2019 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council respectively (S/2018/1171 and S/2019/177), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stated that recent actions undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran were inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), including the 1 December 2018 test firing of a medium-range ballistic missile, the 15 January 2019 third flight test of the Simorgh satellite launch vehicle and the programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran to develop ballistic missiles. The representatives also noted that these activities were “destabilizing” and increased regional and existing tensions.

26. In response, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, in his letter dated 14 January 2019 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/49), stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran “categorically reject[ed]” any attempt to reinterpret paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) by means of definitions or criteria contained in the Missile Technology Control Regime, as there was “no implicit or explicit reference” to the Regime in that paragraph. The letter further noted that the programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran to develop ballistic missiles had nothing to do with the provisions of paragraph 3 and that its activities fell “outside of the purview of the resolution”, being “defensive” and “exclusively conventional.”

27. In his letters dated 18 January, 20 February, 2 April and 31 May 2019 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/62, S/2019/168, S/2019/288 and S/2019/452), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to violate resolution 2231 (2015) restrictions on its ballistic missile activity, including the following launches: a Simorgh missile satellite launch vehicle on 14 January 2019, the Safir satellite launch vehicle on 6 February 2019 and the 23 February 2019 ballistic missile test of a Shahab-3, noting seven surface-to-surface missile tests from December 2018 to February 2019. The Permanent Representative called for the international community to curb the threat of Iranian missiles and to raise the awareness of all Member States regarding their responsibilities in implementing the said resolution.
28. In a letter dated 7 March 2019 (S/2019/270) from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/216), the United States noted several activities conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran in “defiance” of paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The Acting Permanent Representative referred to the 1 December 2018 launch of a medium-range ballistic missile and the 15 January 2019 and 5 February 2019 attempts to place satellites into orbit using its Simorgh and Safir space launch vehicles, which the Islamic Republic of Iran carried out in “defiance of the expressed will of the Security Council”, and noted that such provocations continued to “destabilize the entire Middle East region”. The Acting Permanent Representative called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to “cease immediately” all activities related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

29. In a letter dated 25 March 2019 (S/2019/270) addressed to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom stated that recent actions undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran were inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and formed “part of a trend of increased activity”. The representatives referred to the launch of the Safir space launch vehicle on 6 February 2019, the unveiling of a new variant of the surface-to-surface ballistic missile Fateh-110 (“Dezfül”) on 7 February 2019 and the public display in the country of a variant of the Khorramshahr ballistic missile on 4 February 2019. The representatives emphasized that these developments and launching of ballistic missiles were not only “inconsistent” with paragraph 3, but also followed “previous inconsistent activity” and remained “a matter of deep concern”.

30. In response to the above-mentioned letters from the Permanent Representatives of Israel (S/2019/62, S/2019/168 and S/2019/288), the United States (S/2019/216) and France, Germany and the United Kingdom (S/2019/270) to the United Nations, in a letter dated 12 April 2019 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/315), the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that it “categorically rejects” all of the “unfounded allegations” and “fabrications”, as well as any attempt to reinterpret paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The letter also stated that “given the fact that none of Iran’s missiles are ‘designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons,’... consequently, its related activities were not inconsistent and were “outside the purview or competence of the Security Council resolution and its annexes”.

31. In a letter dated 18 April 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/339), the Russian Federation stated that none of the multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms prohibited the Islamic Republic of Iran from “developing missile and space programmes”. The Permanent Representative also noted that “as of yet, no viable information to the contrary was ever provided to the Security Council”, and given such lack of evidence, the Russian Federation continued to “proceed from its previous assessment” that the Islamic Republic of Iran was “respecting in good faith the call addressed to it” concerning paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

32. In a letter dated 22 April 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/330), Israel stated that during the annual celebration of the “Fajr Decade”, which took place from 1 to 11 February 2019, the Islamic Republic of Iran used the opportunity to publicly display elements of its ballistic missiles arsenal which was documented by official Iranian news agencies. The following types of missiles were noted: Khorramshahr, Sejil, Emad, Ghadr and Simorgh, all of which
were “designed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads”, as well as the introduction of the Dezful missile production line. The Permanent Representative further noted that such activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran clearly violated resolution 2231 (2015) and its annex B restrictions. In a letter dated 17 May 2019 (S/2019/412) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated that he “categorically reject[ed] all disinformation, fabrications and claims raised” in the above-mentioned letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel.

Ballistic missiles, arms-related and other transfers

33. In a letter dated 4 April 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/292), Israel reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran Quds Force, of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, fired a surface-to-surface missile on 20 January 2019 from the area of Damascus towards the Golan Heights, which carried a “precise warhead” and that the missile was “transported from Iran to Syria after January 2016”. The Permanent Representative further noted that the transfer of this missile and its launch constituted “clear violations” of resolution 2231 (2015) and that the Security Council must take responsibility for “stopping these activities”.

34. In response, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/315), rejected “the allegations and fabrications raised” against it in the above-mentioned letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel.

35. In a letter dated 31 May 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/452), Israel stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran transferred “technological know-how for the Mohajem-92 unmanned aerial vehicle” production to Iraq, which occurred “later than January 2016” and was a violation of the resolution’s arms transfers restrictions. He also noted that the statement by the Al-Quds Brigades’ spokesperson in the Gaza Strip of May 2019, which pointed to “Iranian military support” of the “Bader 3 missile launch to Ashkelon”, was also a violation of the arms transfers restrictions.

36. In response, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, in a letter dated 3 June 2019 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/457), stated that from 20 July 2015 to 31 May 2019, 18 letters had been addressed to the President of the Security Council by Israel on the “so-called violation” of resolution 2231 (2015) by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The letter also noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran was “categorically rejecting” “all claims” contained in the letter as well as “this regular fabrication and disinformation campaign” by Israel who was “violating a large number of Security Council resolutions”.

37. In a letter dated 13 June 2019 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/489), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations stated that, while the type of projectile used in the attack against the Abha International Airport on 12 June 2019 had yet to be determined, the attack proved, inter alia, the “Iran-backed Houthi militia’s […] acquisition of new special weapons” and “the continued violation of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions,” including resolution 2231 (2015). In response, in his letter dated 14 June 2019 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/494), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated that he “categorically reject[ed]” the “unfounded allegation” in the above-mentioned letter.
38. Those letters, as addressed to the Secretary-General and/or the President of the Security Council and noted above, were circulated in the “2231 format” of the Council during the reporting period.

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

39. During the reporting period, two new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council. One was disapproved, and one is currently under review. In addition, one proposal, which was noted as under consideration in the previous Facilitator’s report (S/2018/1106), was subsequently approved by the Council.

40. Since Implementation Day, a total of 44 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), have been submitted to the Security Council by 5 Member States from 3 different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To this date, out of the 44 proposals that have been processed, 29 have been approved, 5 not approved and 9 withdrawn, and 1 is currently under review. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in 48 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the procurement channel continues to function, and the Joint Commission continues to review proposals.

41. According to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), certain nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or both to the Council and the Joint Commission. In this regard, since the most recent report of the Facilitator, four notifications were submitted to the Security Council in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment and technology covered by annex B, section 1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 and section 2 of the annex to INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 intended for light water reactors. Three notifications were submitted to the Council related to the necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, and no notifications were submitted to the Council related to the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design.

42. On 13 June 2019, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) the Group’s seventh six-month report of the Joint Commission (S/2019/488), in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

V. Other approval and exemption requests

43. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council to participate in and permit the activities set forth in paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

44. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

45. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 (b) of resolution 2231 (2015).

46. Exemptions to the assets freeze and travel ban provisions are contained in paragraphs 6 (d) and 6 (e), respectively, of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). No
exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to the 23 individuals and 61 entities currently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).

VI. Transparency, outreach and guidance

47. I recall that in my introductory remarks as Facilitator during the first meeting in the “2231 format” in 2019, I emphasized my role as an “honest broker” and outlined three main areas of priority in order to facilitate and strengthen the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) as well as in achieving the objectives set out therein: facilitating dialogue, transparency and trade, and promoting the use of the procurement channel.

48. Further outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated by the note mentioned in paragraph 1 above (S/2016/44), will continue to foster awareness of resolution 2231 (2015). The website on resolution 2231 (2015), also managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, continues to play a significant role in providing relevant information on the resolution. In this regard, I continue to encourage the Secretariat to regularly maintain, update and improve the website on resolution 2231 (2015), which has been updated in line with the Division’s overall development of its website. I plan to utilize outreach opportunities as they arise to promote further understanding of resolution 2231 (2015) and the procurement channel.

49. In my role as Facilitator, I also held several bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). As I continue to advocate for the Council’s collective responses to international peace and security issues, I encourage the international community to act in line with paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (2015), which calls upon all Member States, regional and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.