



Security Council

Distr.: General

21 June 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 21 June 2018 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), my six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 15 December 2017 to 15 June 2018.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Karel J.G. van Oosterom
Security Council Facilitator for the implementation
of resolution 2231 (2015)



Fifth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) set forth practical arrangements and procedures for the Council for carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.
2. In the note, it was established that the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its facilitator for the functions specified therein. On 2 January 2018, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2018 (see S/2018/2/Rev.1).
3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on his or her work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.
4. The present report covers the period from 15 December 2017 to 15 June 2018.

II. Summary of the activities of the Security Council in the “2231 format”

5. On 19 December 2017 (see S/PV.8143), the Security Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs on the fourth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/1030); by my predecessor on the work of the Council and the implementation of the resolution (see S/2017/1058); and by the Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on the procurement channel (see S/2017/1009).
6. On the same day, a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General was received by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/1075). The letter transmitted the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the fourth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).
7. The representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) met in the “2231 format” on 27 April 2018. During the meeting, the Security Council heard a presentation from the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Coordinator provided an overview on the procurement channel and the work of the Procurement Working Group. The Secretariat, through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs, also provided an update on the administrative support provided to the Council for the processing of proposals through the procurement channel.
8. During the reporting period, a total of 81 notes were circulated in the “2231 format”. In addition, I sent 81 official communications to Member States and the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group. I received a total of 67 communications from Member States and the Coordinator.

9. During the reporting period, there were no changes to the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which at present, comprises 23 individuals and 61 entities. Since Implementation Day (16 January 2016), no travel or asset freeze exemption request has been submitted.

III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

10. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), in February and May 2018, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, reports on its verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) (see [S/2018/205](#) and [S/2018/540](#)).

11. In both quarterly reports, the Agency affirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran had not pursued construction of the existing Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 reactor) based on its original design; that it had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water; that it had no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges that remained installed in 30 cascades at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant; that it had not enriched uranium above 3.67 per cent U-235; and that it had not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development activities at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and that there had not been any nuclear material at the plant.

12. The Agency further reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had continued to permit the Agency to use online enrichment monitors and electronic seals, which communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices; that it had issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors designated for the Islamic Republic of Iran as requested by the Agency; and that it had provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

13. The Agency also reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement and that the Agency continued its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through the conduct of complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit. The Agency also reported that it was continuing to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material had been customarily used, as declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran under its Safeguards Agreement.

14. On 8 May 2018, the President of the United States of America announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the re-imposition of all United States sanctions that had been lifted or waived in connection with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

15. The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed a letter to the Secretary-General on 11 May 2018 ([S/2018/453](#)), conveying a letter dated 10 May 2018 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javad Zarif. In that letter, Minister Zarif described the decision by the United States to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a “material breach of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)”, and the announced re-imposition of all United States sanctions as “significant non-performance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and in clear non-compliance with Security Council

resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)". The letter further stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran would resort to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action mechanism to determine how the full benefits for the country under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action could be ensured, and urged the United Nations "to keep the United States accountable".

Ballistic missile launches

16. On 23 May 2018, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed identical letters to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General ([S/2018/495](#)), informing them of the launch of two ballistic missile launches, a Shahab 3 variant and a Scud variant, by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 2 and 5 January, respectively. The letter noted that these activities were in violation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In response, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General ([S/2018/511](#)), in which he rejected the "baseless allegations" against the Islamic Republic of Iran and stated that "none" of its ballistic missiles were capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

Ballistic missiles, arms-related transfers and other transfers

17. On 11 January 2018, the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council in response to a note verbale sent by the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, as reported in paragraph 28 of the previous Facilitator's report ([S/2017/1058](#)).

18. The Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed several letters to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council. In those letters, the Permanent Representative referred to the launches of ballistic missiles from Yemeni territory towards Saudi Arabia on 19 December 2017, and on 5, 16 and 20 January, 5 February, 25 March, 11, 12 and 28 April and 9 May 2018 (see [S/2017/1133](#), [S/2018/19](#), [S/2018/52](#), [S/2018/55](#), [S/2018/93](#), [S/2018/266](#), [S/2018/337](#), [S/2018/350](#), [S/2018/422](#) and [S/2018/448](#)). He described the missiles to be of Iranian origin, indicated that "Iran's proliferation of ballistic missiles to the Houthi rebel militias is widely evident" and called upon the Security Council to insist on the full and immediate implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and to support all measures "to stop the continuous supply of weapons and materials to the Houthis by Iran".

19. In response, in identical letters addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/123](#), [S/2018/278](#), [S/2018/424](#) and [S/2018/533](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that it "has never transferred or smuggled missiles, arms or military equipment to Yemen in violation of Security Council resolutions [2216 \(2015\)](#) and [2231 \(2015\)](#)".

20. On 10 February and 13 April 2018, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed letters to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/111](#) and [S/2018/349](#)). In those letters, the Permanent Representative referred to an "Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)", which was described as having been launched into Israeli airspace to attack Israeli territory and intercepted by the Israel Defense Forces. He called upon the Security Council to condemn the act as a breach of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

21. In response, on 20 February and 9 May 2018, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed letters to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/142](#) and [S/2018/445](#)). In the former letter, the Permanent Representative stated that the information and accusations contained in the letters of Israel were misleading and that the reference therein to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) was an attempt to weaken the Joint Comprehensive

Plan of Action. In the latter letter, he noted that, according to the information conveyed to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the UAV had been flying inside the Syrian Arab Republic “for the purpose of monitoring and surveillance of ISIL and other terrorist groups”.

22. All the above-mentioned letters addressed to the President of the Security Council and/or the Secretary-General were circulated in the “2231 format” of the Council during the reporting period.

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

23. During the reporting period, 13 new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council. Eight of those proposals have been approved, two have been withdrawn and three are currently under review.

24. Since Implementation Day, a total of 37 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To date, of the 34 proposals that have been processed, 24 have been approved, 3 have been disapproved, and 7 have been withdrawn. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in less than 51 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including the Procurement Working Group, the procurement channel has continued to function and the Joint Commission has continued to review proposals.

25. According to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), certain nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both the Security Council and the Joint Commission. In this regard, since my last report, eight notifications were submitted to the Security Council in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment and technology covered by annex B, section 1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 intended for light water reactors. In addition, two notifications were submitted to the Council for an activity related to the necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, and two notifications were submitted for an activity related to the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design.

26. On 12 June 2018, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) the fifth six-month report of the Joint Commission ([S/2018/601](#)), in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

V. Other approval and exemption requests

27. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council to participate in and permit the activities set forth in paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

28. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

29. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

30. Exemptions to the assets freeze provisions and travel ban provisions are contained in paragraphs 6 (d) and 6 (e), respectively, of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). No exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to the 23 individuals and 61 entities currently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

VI. Transparency, outreach and guidance

31. During the first meeting in the “2231 format” in 2018 and in my introductory remarks as Facilitator, I outlined three areas that the Facilitator’s role could actively promote: talks, transparency and trade. This includes facilitating discussion in the “2231 format” related to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#); facilitating transparency in the work of the Security Council; and encouraging the submission of proposals through the procurement channel, which would contribute to the implementation of the resolution.

32. Further outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated in the note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 ([S/2016/44](#)), will continue to foster awareness of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). I also plan to utilize all opportunities as Facilitator to actively promote understanding and knowledge of the resolution and its measures.

33. The website on resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat, through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs, continues to play a significant role in providing relevant information on the resolution. During the reporting period, the number of unique page views in all official languages of the United Nations was more than 67,000, for a total of more than 193,000 since the creation of the website. I welcome and encourage the Secretariat to regularly maintain, update and improve the website on resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to promote better awareness and information-sharing.

34. In my role as Facilitator, I also held several bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). I am confident that the international community will continue to act in line with paragraph 2 of the resolution, in which the Security Council called upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
