



Security Council

Distr.: General

12 June 2018

Original: English

Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Fifth report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. Almost three years ago, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, marking the culmination of 12 years of intense diplomatic efforts to reach a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The Plan, which was unanimously endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2231 (2015), laid out reciprocal commitments.

2. Since 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported 11 times to the Security Council that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In its most recent quarterly reports (see [S/2018/205](#) and [S/2018/540](#)), the Agency again reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran remained ongoing. The Agency also reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and to apply the transparency measures set out in the Plan. In its latest report, the Agency further indicated that it had conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit.

3. Notwithstanding the continued adherence by the Islamic Republic of Iran to its nuclear-related commitments, the agreement is unfortunately at a crossroads. On 8 May 2018, the United States of America announced its withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the re-imposition of all national sanctions that had been lifted or waived pursuant to the Plan. I deeply regret this setback to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation that has contributed to regional and international peace and security. I believe that issues not directly related to the Plan should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.

4. I take note of the letter dated 11 May 2018 addressed to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (see [A/72/869-S/2018/453](#)), in which he indicated that the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue to abide by the



agreement as long as the full benefits that the Iranian people were entitled to were guaranteed. I welcome the reaffirmation by the remaining participants, on 25 May 2018 in Vienna, of their commitment to the continued, full and effective implementation of the Plan.

5. It is important to recall that the Security Council, in its resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), urged the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the timetable established in the Plan. The Council further called upon all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to support its implementation and to refrain from actions that undermine the implementation of commitments under the Plan. In this regard, it is important that the withdrawal of one country not impede the ability of others to fully implement their commitments under the Plan or to engage in activities consistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and the provisions and objectives of the Plan.

6. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is only one part of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). A number of Member States that support the Plan have expressed concerns about Iranian activities allegedly undertaken contrary to the restrictive measures set out in annex B to the resolution. Therefore, I again encourage the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider those concerns.

7. The present report, the fifth on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings and recommendations, since the issuance of the fourth report of the Secretary-General ([S/2017/1030](#)), on 8 December 2017. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.

II. Key findings and recommendations

8. Since 8 December 2017, 13 additional proposals to participate in or permit activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran for nuclear or non-nuclear civilian end-uses have been submitted to the Security Council for approval through the procurement channel. Meanwhile, the Secretariat received information from two Member States on the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods and technology allegedly undertaken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Secretariat has sought clarification on that information from all relevant Member States, and I intend to report back to the Security Council accordingly.

9. In relation to the above, and on the basis of feedback received by the Secretariat during its outreach activities, I call upon all Member States to continue their efforts to promote awareness and understanding of the procurement channel, the procedures for submission of proposals and the process for their review. The Secretariat stands ready to further assist Member States in such efforts, in line with the arrangements and procedures outlined in the note by the President of the Security Council dated 16 January 2016 ([S/2016/44](#)).

10. The Secretariat has carefully reviewed all information and material available regarding the allegations of the transfer of ballistic missiles, parts thereof or related technology by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Houthis in Yemen that may have been used in ballistic missile launches aimed at the territory of Saudi Arabia. On the basis of the information and material analysed, it is the assessment of the Secretariat that the debris of five missiles launched at Yanbu' and Riyadh since July 2017 share

key design features with a known type of missile manufactured by the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is also the assessment of the Secretariat that some component parts of the debris were manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the Secretariat has not yet been able to determine when such missiles, parts thereof or related technology may have been transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in particular whether the transfer(s) occurred after 16 January 2016, the day the restrictions set out in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) came into force.¹

11. In February 2018, Israel brought to my attention information regarding the possible presence of an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the Syrian Arab Republic, which Israel stated had been intercepted and shot down after entering Israeli airspace. While the Secretariat has not yet had the opportunity to examine the debris, Iranian media outlets have reported that various Iranian UAVs have been deployed in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat has no information regarding the owner or operator of that UAV.

12. The Secretariat was invited to examine arms and related materiel seized by Bahrain after 16 January 2016. The Secretariat also concluded its review of the unmanned surface vessel laden with explosives recovered by the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates. In both instances, the Secretariat is confident that some of the arms and related materiel it examined are of Iranian manufacture. However, it has found no indications of whether those items were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.²

13. On 21 May 2018, the political leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, stated in a televised interview that the Islamic Republic of Iran had provided the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and other armed groups in Gaza with “money, [military] equipment and expertise”, including after the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. Any Iranian arms transfers after 16 January 2016 would have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

14. Iranian entities continue to participate in foreign arms exhibitions, including the Defence Industries Organization, an entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Since the issuance of my previous report, Major General Qasem Soleimani appears to have continued to travel to Iraq despite the travel ban provisions of the resolution and previous reporting on this issue. I reiterate my call upon all Member States in the region to take the steps necessary to fully implement their obligations in relation to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), including those regarding the travel ban and asset freeze with respect to individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

15. In its resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council endorsed the establishment of a dedicated procurement channel, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to review proposals by States seeking to engage in certain transfers of nuclear or dual-use goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Through that channel, the Council reviews and decides on recommendations from the Joint

¹ Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of Security Council resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 7 of that resolution. The provisions of resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#) and those of other previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue were terminated on 16 January 2016.

² Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of Security Council resolution [1747 \(2007\)](#) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 5 of that resolution.

Commission established under the Plan, regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

16. Since 8 December 2017, 13 new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the Security Council, bringing to 37 the total number of proposals submitted since Implementation Day (16 January 2016) for approval through the procurement channel. At the time of reporting, 24 proposals had been approved by the Council, 3 had been disapproved, 7 had been withdrawn by the proposing States and 3 were currently under review.

17. In addition, the Security Council received 13 new notifications pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities that do not require approval, but do require a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission.

18. Since my previous report, the Secretariat received information on the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that may have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In a letter dated 19 April 2018, the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates brought to the attention of the Secretariat information and documents related to four shipments of dual-use items. Those shipments were seized by the authorities of the United Arab Emirates while in transit to the Islamic Republic of Iran in May 2016 and in April, July and December 2017. The authorities of the United Arab Emirates assessed, on the basis of the declared technical specifications or specialized tests, that the items involved (40 cylindrical segments of tungsten, 1 inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer, 10 capacitors, and 1 titanium rod) met the criteria set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 and that their transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran would have required prior approval from the Security Council.

19. In addition, on 27 April 2018, the authorities of the United States informed the Secretariat that, in their assessment, two commodities (carbon fibre and aluminium alloys) that had been transferred to the Islamic Republic of Iran over the past year without prior approval from the Security Council met the criteria set out in the above-mentioned information circular.

20. In response to requests for clarification on the above-mentioned information, several Member States informed the Secretariat that they had initiated internal reviews and would provide additional information as soon as those reviews were concluded. In a letter dated 1 June 2018, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated, inter alia, that it was “the responsibility of the exporting State to seek approval through the procurement channel” and encouraged the Secretariat to undertake more outreach activities to address the lack of awareness among some Member States. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course as more information becomes available.

IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions

A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran

21. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.

22. In identical letters dated 23 May 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/495), the Permanent Representative of Israel brought to my attention information regarding two flight tests of ballistic missiles by the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to the information provided, a Shahab-3 variant and a Scud variant were flight tested on 2 and 5 January 2018, respectively. The Permanent Representative of Israel considered that those two ballistic missiles were both category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime “capable of delivering a nuclear payload of 500 kg with a range of over 300 km,” and that their test-firing was in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). In a letter dated 29 May 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/511), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that there was no reference to the criteria of the Missile Technology Control Regime in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and underscored that “none of the ballistic missiles of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”.

B. Restrictions on ballistic missile related-transfers or activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran

23. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States, provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546,³ the provision of various services or assistance, and the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain commercial ballistic missile activities. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.

24. In my previous report, I informed the Council of the possible transfer of ballistic missiles, parts thereof or related technology by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Houthis in Yemen that may have been used in the ballistic missile launches aimed at the territory of Saudi Arabia on 22 July and 4 November 2017 (see S/2017/1030, paras. 28 and 29). Since then, Saudi authorities have brought to the attention of the Secretariat nine additional launches of ballistic missiles by the Houthis, which, in their assessment, were Iranian Qiam-1 ballistic missiles (see S/2017/1133, S/2018/266, S/2018/337 and S/2018/448).⁴

25. In letters addressed to me and the Security Council (see S/2018/123, S/2018/145, S/2018/278, S/2018/424 and S/2018/533), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that, inter alia, the Islamic Republic of Iran “neither has a policy nor seeks to transfer arms or military equipment in Yemen or manufacture them therein”. In addition, he noted that the Yemeni Government had “notable stockpiles of short-range ballistic missiles that could have been utilized by its local expertise as technical bases for further upgrades”. In this regard, the Secretariat notes that, in an interview with France 24 on 31 March 2018, the head of the Houthi revolutionary committee, Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, stated that the Houthis were developing and manufacturing their own missiles based on missiles provided by the former Soviet Union and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea prior to the outbreak of the current conflict.

³ The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime list (S/2015/546, annex) and any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

⁴ The nine additional launches reportedly occurred on 19 December 2017 (1), and on 5 January (1), 30 January (1), 25 March (3), 11 April (1) and 9 May 2018 (2).

26. During the reporting period, Saudi authorities invited the Secretariat to examine the debris which they stated were of three ballistic missiles launched at its territory on 19 December 2017 and on 5 and 30 January 2018. The Secretariat also had the opportunity to re-examine the debris of the two missiles launched at the territory of Saudi Arabia on 22 July and 4 November 2017. It is the assessment of the Secretariat that the debris of the five missiles share key design features with a known type of missile manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is also the assessment of the Secretariat that some component parts in the debris had been manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the Secretariat has not yet been able to determine when such missiles, parts thereof or related technology may have been transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular whether the transfer(s) occurred after 16 January 2016.

27. The Secretariat conducted first-hand and in-depth examinations of debris recovered by Saudi authorities and collected all other information and material available, including photographs and videos of the debris in situ. The Secretariat visited several locations in and around Riyadh to confirm impact sites and that the debris seen in images and videos provided by the Saudi authorities or available on social media corresponded to the debris presented to the Secretariat. Whenever possible, the Secretariat carried out a visual comparison to determine whether the features of the debris of the missiles examined were consistent with those of the missiles seen in the videos of the launches released by the Houthis.

28. The Secretariat observed that the debris of the missiles airframes were made of aluminium, painted a tan colour and bore similar markings in English script and in white lettering. Other than the debris of the missile launched on 22 July 2017, the Secretariat observed that the airframes had been painted over in blue. The Secretariat further observed that the debris of the five missiles examined had identical internal and external design characteristics, with the following features that are consistent with those of the Scud-B missile and all its variants:

- (a) They were all single stage and liquid-fuelled missiles;
- (b) They had a diameter of 880 mm;
- (c) They were powered by a single-chamber rocket engine fed by a turbopump;
- (d) The steering mechanism consisted of four graphite vanes in the motor exhaust section.

29. The Secretariat also determined from its observations of the debris that the missiles had the following specific features:

- (a) The fuel and oxidizer tanks were longer than those of the Scud-B missile, while the guidance section was shorter;
- (b) The oxidizer tank was split in two sections and located above the fuel tank;
- (c) The fuel tanks had three external valves, while the oxidizer tanks had six (due to the split sections), bringing the total number of external valves per missile to nine (the positioning pattern was consistent across all five missiles);
- (d) They were finless and had no observable features suggesting that the fins had been removed post-factory production;⁵

⁵ On four of the missiles examined, small stabilizers had been affixed to the jet vane housings. Paint and markings observed underneath the stabilizers indicate that they had been added after the tan paint and white markings were applied.

(e) Retrieved guidance components had been built with modern digital subcomponents;

(f) They had a separable re-entry vehicle.⁶

30. On the basis of all available information and material at its disposal, including information and photographs published by Iranian media outlets, it is the understanding of the Secretariat that the above-mentioned features are consistent with those of the Iranian Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missile. In addition, it is the understanding of the Secretariat that the Qiam-1 is the only known Scud variant with nine external valves and without fins.

31. In addition, all examined jet vane actuators bore the casting of a logo and the abbreviation “S.B.I”. The logo matches that of an Iranian entity, Shahid Bagheri Industries.⁷ The abbreviation is consistent with the name of that entity. The Secretariat also observed partly burned yellow safety labels with the words “quality assurance” in Farsi and the number “6000” on some actuators parts. Burn marks consistent with the dimensions of those safety labels were observed on the other actuators parts. The Secretariat observed similar yellow safety labels with the number “6000” on other retrieved guidance components. The Secretariat further observed that one printed circuit board in another guidance component was marked “SHIG 6081”. As indicated in the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), “SHIG” is a known abbreviation for the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, which is reportedly responsible for the liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

32. Moreover, according to the information provided to the Secretariat by foreign manufacturing companies, most of the retrieved guidance subcomponents had been produced between 2002 and 2010.⁸ This production date range is incompatible with that of the Scud missiles provided by the former Soviet Union and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Yemen and that were known to be in Yemeni stockpiles prior to the outbreak of the current conflict in early 2015. The latest delivery of Scud missiles to Yemen by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reportedly occurred in late 2002.⁹

33. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), since 16 January 2016, prior approval of the Security Council is also required for, inter alia, the supply, sale or transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran of complete UAV systems (including target drones and reconnaissance drones) capable of a range equal to or greater than 300 km.¹⁰ In identical letters dated 10 February 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/111), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the UAV intercepted and downed that same day after entering Israeli airspace was an Iranian UAV launched from a site in eastern Homs, Syrian Arab Republic. In follow-up identical letters dated 13 April 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/349), the Permanent Representative of Israel indicated that further analysis of its flight path and debris had led Israeli authorities to conclude that the UAV “was armed with explosives and was intended to attack Israeli territory”. In letters dated 20 February and 9 May 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/142 and S/2018/445), the

⁶ According to videos of the launches released by the Houthis, the separable re-entry vehicle had a triconic shape.

⁷ As seen on the website www.shahidbagheri.ir/, accessed through the website of Wayback Machine (<https://web.archive.org/>).

⁸ Some subcomponents had been produced in the 1990s. None appears to have been produced after July 2010.

⁹ See “Yemeni rebels enhance ballistic missile campaign”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 10 July 2017.

¹⁰ See S/2015/546, item 19.A.2.

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the aforementioned letters from the Permanent Representative of Israel contained “misleading information and accusations”. The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran further stated that “operational details that were provided to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran illustrate that the unmanned aerial vehicle was flying inside Syria near the border with Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territories for the purpose of monitoring and surveillance of ISIL and other terrorist groups there”, and that it had been unarmed and not intended to engage in an attack anywhere.

34. Images of the debris of the UAV downed on 10 February 2018 provided to the Secretariat by Israeli authorities showed that its wing configuration appeared to be consistent with that of the Iranian Sae’qeh (Thunder) UAV, which, according to Iranian media outlets, had been unveiled in October 2016.¹¹ According to information provided by Israeli authorities, the UAV flew at a range that meets the specified criteria before its interception. No information is available to the Secretariat as to the owner or operator of that UAV. The Secretariat notes that, according to Iranian media outlets, other UAVs, including the Shahed-129, had been previously deployed by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Syrian Arab Republic.¹² It is also the understanding of the Secretariat that the Shahed-129 meets the specified range criteria. One Shahed-129 was reportedly shot down in southern Syrian Arab Republic on 20 June 2017.¹³

V. Implementation of arms-related provisions

A. Restrictions on arms-related transfers to the Islamic Republic of Iran

35. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), all States, provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts. Prior approval from the Council is also required for the provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of those arms and related materiel. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been approved by the Council pursuant to that paragraph.

36. In a letter dated 15 May 2018, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine indicated to the Secretariat that the Security Service of Ukraine had prevented an attempt by two Iranian nationals to procure and transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran component parts of the “Kh-31” (AS-17 “Krypton”) air-to-surface missile and

¹¹ For example, see Mehr News Agency, “IRGC inaugurates its latest drone ‘Thunder’”, 1 October 2016. Available from <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/120176/IRGC-inaugurates-its-latest-drone-Thunder>.

¹² See Fars News Agency, “Iran’s Shahed-129 drone in combat operations in Syria”, 4 February 2016. Available at <http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13941115000734>; and Mehr News Agency, “Iran’s Mohajer-6, Qaem bomb deadly weapons against terrorists”, 10 February 2018. Available at <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/132045/Iran-s-Mohajer-6-Qaem-bomb-deadly-weapons-against-terrorists>.

¹³ See U.S. Central Command, “Coalition shoots down armed UAV in Syria”, 20 June 2017. Available at <http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/1219863/coalition-shoots-down-armed-uav-in-syria/>.

related technical documents. The Permanent Representative noted in his letter that no Ukrainian individual or entity had engaged in an illegal activity or action inconsistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The letter further noted that that missile type had not been in use in Ukraine since 1991 and that all remaining component parts were stored under the proper control of its armed forces.

B. Restrictions on arms-related transfers from the Islamic Republic of Iran

37. In paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council decided that all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.

38. In a letter dated 24 May 2017, the Permanent Representative of Bahrain brought to the attention of the Secretariat information regarding multiple seizures of arms and related materiel in Bahrain after 16 January 2016 that, in its assessment, had been produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran and transferred in a manner inconsistent with paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The authorities of Bahrain invited the Secretariat to examine those items in May 2018. The Secretariat observed that two assault rifles and ammunition rounds had characteristics of the Iranian-produced KL 7.62 x 39 mm assault rifles (featuring furnishing made of dark brown synthetic material, fire selector and rear sight markings, slanted screw-on compensator and dot-peen marking style) and 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition (featuring brass cartridge case and green primer annulus lacquer, and identifiable by the nature, position and format of the head stamp markings). The Secretariat also observed that three hand grenades, the packaging of C-4 explosive blocks, and electronic and electrical equipment that could be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices, were similar to those found in various arms shipments seized previously and assessed to have been shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the Secretariat is confident that some of the arms and related materiel it examined in May 2018 were manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran, it has found no indication of whether those items were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016. The Secretariat is still analysing other information collected and will report back to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.

39. The Secretariat obtained additional information on the unmanned surface vessel laden with explosives recovered by the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates (see [S/2017/1030](#), para. 34). In a letter dated 12 March 2018, the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates confirmed to the Secretariat that the vessel had been recovered on 19 September 2016, six miles east of the port of Assab, Eritrea (and not in Yemeni waters as previously indicated to the Secretariat). The Secretariat was provided with the opportunity to examine the vessel and to re-examine the guidance and detonation systems. In both the computer and the dome camera (both integral parts of the guidance system), the logo and/or name of an Iranian entity that produces terminals with characteristics similar to those found in the vessel were observed. The Secretariat confirmed that some of the previously presented photographs and geographical coordinates, including for locations in Tehran and in Iranian territorial waters, had originated from the recovered hard drive of the computer found in the unmanned surface vessel. However, the Secretariat could not confirm the actual dates on which they had been captured. The Secretariat has also received documentary evidence indicating that identical fuse plates and detonation device boosters seized in a separate incident had been shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran (see [S/2017/1030](#), para. 33). The Secretariat is confident that at least

parts of the detonation and guidance systems of the unmanned surface vessel had been manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, no indications have been found of whether those items were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.

40. In March 2018, the Secretariat was invited by the authorities of the United Arab Emirates to examine UAVs reportedly recovered in Yemen after 16 January 2016, which, in their assessment, were Iranian-made and had been transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). One was a composite assembly of parts from various seizures. The other one had reportedly crashed in Mukha', Yemen, in February 2018. The Secretariat observed that those were identical to the one examined during the previous reporting period (see S/2017/1030, para. 35) and had the same design features as the Iranian-made Ababil-2 UAV (featuring a pusher propeller, high-mounted canards at the front and larger wings at the rear, each fitted with a vertical stabilization fin with a rudder).¹⁴ They had similar serial number prefixes and were built using identical material, component and subcomponent parts. The Secretariat is still analysing the information collected on all three vehicles and will report back to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.

41. In identical letters dated 10 and 23 May 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/443 and S/2018/495), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that rockets launched from the Syrian Arab Republic towards Israel on 10 May 2018 had been launched "by the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard" and constituted an "Iranian breach" of resolution 2231 (2015). In a letter dated 14 May 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/459), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran recalled the identical letters dated 10 May by the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic (S/2018/447), in which it had been indicated that the Syrian Army had exercised its right to self-defence, and stated that the claim by Israeli authorities of "military action by Iran from the Syrian territory against their military positions in the occupied Golan Heights is false and unfounded".

42. In identical letters dated 28 November 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2017/1000), the Permanent Representative of Israel expressed concern at what he said was a statement by the Commander of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Major General Mohamed Ali Jafari, which he said expressed "Iran's intentions and actions taken to continue arming Hizbullah" in violation of Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2231 (2015). In response, in a letter dated 5 December 2017 addressed to me (S/2017/1019), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran accused Israel of making "false and baseless accusations".

43. In a televised interview broadcasted on 21 May 2018, the political leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had provided the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and other armed groups in Gaza with "money, [military] equipment and expertise" before and after the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict.¹⁵ That statement suggests that transfers of arms and related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran may have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

44. It appears that Iranian entities continue to exhibit what appears to be arms and related materiel in foreign exhibitions. Information released by the organizers of the seventh International Defence Exhibition in Iraq, held in Baghdad from 10 to

¹⁴ Catalogue of the Export Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Available at <http://www.mindexcenter.ir/product/ababil-2-uav-system>.

¹⁵ Available at <http://www.almayadeen.net/episodes/880421/حزب-حركة-رئيس-السوار-يحيى-خاص-حوار> غزوة في حماس.

13 March 2018, indicates that several Iranian entities participated in the exhibition for the third year in a row. Items displayed by those entities during previous exhibitions appeared to include small arms, artillery ammunition, rockets, anti-tank guided missiles and man-portable air defence systems. Furthermore, information released by the organizers of the Eurasia Airshow 2018, held in Antalya, Turkey, from 25 to 29 April 2018, indicates that several Iranian entities participated in that exhibition. According to Iranian media outlets, the items exhibited included reconnaissance drones.¹⁶ The Secretariat raised these issue with the Permanent Missions of Iraq and Turkey to the United Nations. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran had previously stated that it had believed that no prior approval had been required from the Security Council for that activity since the Islamic Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course as additional information becomes available.

VI. Implementation of the assets freeze provisions

45. Pursuant to paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)¹⁷ and ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available to those individuals and entities.

46. It appears that an entity presently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the Defence Industries Organization, may have participated again in the International Defence Exhibition in Iraq, which was held in March 2018 (see para. 44 above). Its name is on the exhibitors list released by the organizers of the exhibition. Any of the entity's funds, other financial assets and economic resources on Iraqi territory, on or after the date of adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, should have been frozen by the Iraqi authorities. The issue has been raised again with the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations, and I will provide an update thereon to the Council in due course.

47. It also appears that another entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, signed a memorandum of understanding in 2017 with the Syrian Engineers Syndicate "for joint cooperation in building sector, services and developmental projects, training cadres, conducting researches and holding symposiums".¹⁸ The Syrian authorities are to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the entity. The Secretariat has sought clarification from the

¹⁶ Fars News Agency, "Iran displays 2 reconnaissance drones in Eurasia 2018 Airshow in Turkey", 25 April 2018. Available at <http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13970205001259>.

¹⁷ Available at www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml. The list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) includes the individuals and entities specified on the list established under resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#) and maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#), as at the date of adoption of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), with the exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), who had been delisted on Implementation Day. The Council can delist individuals or entities, and list additional individuals and entities found to meet certain designation criteria defined by resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

¹⁸ Syrian Arab News Agency, "Syria, Iran to enhance cooperation on urban development", 26 September 2017. Available at <https://sana.sy/en/?p=114661>; and Financial Tribune, "Iran seeking role in Syria's power grid reconstruction", 7 November 2017. Available at <https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy/75756/iran-seeking-role-in-syrias-power-grid-reconstruction>.

Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course.

VII. Implementation of the travel ban provision

48. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), all States are to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the individuals on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). At the time of reporting, no travel exemption requests had been received or granted by the Security Council in relation to individuals presently on the list.

49. Since the issuance of my previous report, additional information has surfaced regarding travel by Major General Soleimani. According to Iraqi media outlets, the General reportedly travelled to Baghdad in mid-May 2018. The Secretariat sought clarification from the Permanent Mission of Iraq.

VIII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its Facilitator for implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

50. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs has continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Division has also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on all matters related to the procurement channel. In addition, the Division has provided induction briefings for the incoming Facilitator and members of the Security Council to assist them in their work on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

51. Through the Security Council website, the Division continued to promote the dissemination of publicly available information on the restrictions imposed by resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).¹⁹ Relevant documents in all official languages were regularly added to and updated on the website. The Division also continued to use outreach opportunities to promote the dissemination of information on the resolution, in particular the procurement channel, in line with paragraph 6 (e) of the note by the President of the Council dated 16 January 2016 ([S/2016/44](#)). In February 2018, the Division participated in the Twenty-fifth Asian Export Control Seminar, held in Tokyo, and jointly organized by the Centre for Information on Security Trade Controls, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In April 2018, the Division also participated in an outreach event, organized by the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to United Nations organizations in Vienna and hosted by the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, on the margins of a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The interactions of the Division with representatives of Member States and private sector entities during those events showed that outreach activities remained important to increasing awareness and allaying misunderstandings with respect to provisions set out in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), including regarding the procurement channel, and the actors involved in the implementation of the resolution and their respective roles.

52. During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the provisions of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), in particular on the procedures for the submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review process.

¹⁹ See <http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/>.