Letter dated 11 December 2018 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), my six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 15 June to 11 December 2018.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Karel J. G. van Oosterom
Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)
Sixth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) set forth practical arrangements and procedures for the Council for carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.

2. In the note, it was established that the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its Facilitator for the functions specified therein. On 2 January 2018, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2018 (see S/2018/2/Rev.1).

3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on its work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.

4. The present report covers the period from 15 June to 11 December 2018.

II. Summary of the activities of the Council in the “2231 format”

5. On 20 June 2018, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) convened in the “2231 format” to discuss the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution (S/2018/602) to review the findings and recommendations contained therein, as outlined in the note by the President of the Council of 16 January 2016. During the meeting, the Secretariat introduced the report and representatives shared views on it.

6. On 26 June 2018, a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General was received by the President of the Security Council (S/2018/634). The letter transmitted the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), as described further in paragraph 17.

7. On 27 June 2018 (see S/PV.8297), the Security Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs on the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/602), by myself as Facilitator on the work of the Council and the implementation of the resolution (S/2018/624) and by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on the procurement channel (S/2018/601).

8. On 4 December 2018, the Security Council held informal consultations to consider the ballistic missile launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 1 December 2018.

9. On 10 December 2018, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) convened in the “2231 format” to discuss the sixth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution and to review the findings and recommendations contained therein. During the meeting,
the Secretariat introduced the report and representatives shared views on it. The representatives also discussed ballistic missile launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

10. During the reporting period, a total of 50 notes were circulated in the “2231 format”. In addition, I sent 44 official communications to Member States and/or the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. I received a total of 44 communications from Member States and the Coordinator.

11. There were no changes to the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), which, at present, comprises 23 individuals and 61 entities. Since Implementation Day (16 January 2016), no travel ban or asset freeze exemption request has been submitted.

III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action


13. In the quarterly reports, the Agency affirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran had not pursued construction of the existing Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 reactor) based on its original design, with all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies having remained in storage under continuous Agency monitoring. The Islamic Republic of Iran continued to inform the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in the Islamic Republic of Iran and allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of its heavy water stocks. The Agency also verified that the heavy water production plant was in operation and that the stock of heavy water in the Islamic Republic of Iran was no more than 130 metric tonnes throughout the reporting period.

14. With regard to activities related to enrichment and fuel, the reports also confirmed that no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges remained installed in 30 cascades at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and that the Islamic Republic of Iran had withdrawn 33–34 IR-1 centrifuges from those held in storage for the replacement of damaged or failed IR-1 centrifuges installed there. The Islamic Republic of Iran did not enrich uranium above 3.67 per cent U-235. At the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, the Agency verified that 1,020 IR-1 centrifuges were installed in six cascades for conducting initial research and research and development activities related to stable isotope production. The Islamic Republic of Iran also did not conduct any uranium enrichment or related research and development activities, and with no nuclear material at the Fordow Plant.

15. The Agency reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had continued to permit the Agency to use online enrichment monitors and electronic seals, which communicated their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors and facilitated the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices. It also issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors designated for the Islamic Republic of Iran as requested by the Agency, provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

16. The Agency reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, including
through the conduct of complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit. The reports noted that “timely and proactive cooperation” by the Islamic Republic of Iran in providing such access would facilitate the implementation of the Additional Protocol and “enhance confidence”.

17. The Agency also reported that it was continuing to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material has been customarily used, declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, and that evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities remained ongoing.

18. In a letter dated 26 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/634), the Islamic Republic of Iran stated the withdrawal of the United States of America from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was a “blatant material breach” and “a brazen non-compliance” with resolution 2231 (2015). The Permanent Representative reiterated the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the “prolonged and multiple cases of significant non-performance of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by the United States over the last three years ... have caused irreparable harm to Iran and its international business relations” and that “if, after the exhaustion of available remedies, the rights and benefits of the Islamic Republic of Iran are not fully compensated”, it was the right of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as recognized under the Plan and the resolution, to take “appropriate actions and to treat the reimposition of nuclear-related sanctions” by the United States “as grounds to cease performing its commitments under [the] JCPOA in whole or in part”.

19. In the light of its decision of 8 May 2018 to cease participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to reimpose all national sanctions lifted or waived in connection with it, the United States reimposed sanctions on 7 August and 5 November.

20. In a letter dated 5 November 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General (A/73/490-S/2018/988), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated that, while his country remained in compliance with its nuclear-related commitments, the reimposition of sanctions by the United States was in violation of several provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), including both its annexes, and ran counter to, inter alia, the Charter of the United Nations. He recalled that the Security Council, in the resolution, had called upon all Member States and regional and international organizations to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to refrain from action that would undermine it. He concluded that the withdrawal of the United States necessitated a collective response from the international community in order to uphold the rule of law, prevent undermining diplomacy and protect multilateralism.

21. The aforementioned letter was echoed in a letter dated 27 November 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1057), in which the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations also stated that the “reintroduction and reimposition of the United States sanctions” contravened, inter alia, resolution 2231 (2015).

**Ballistic missile launches**

22. In a letter dated 3 October 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/891), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated that its armed forces had acted
in legitimate self-defence recognized under Article 51 of the Charter and took limited and measured military action on 1 October 2018 in the Syrian Arab Republic targeting “terrorist elements” that were also linked to the terrorist act in Ahvaz.

23. In identical letters dated 19 October 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/939), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that the ballistic missiles, launched from western Iran towards targets in the eastern Syrian Arab Republic on 1 October 2018, had crossed the annex B threshold. In the letter, he called upon the Council to condemn the threatening activity and repeated violations of resolution 2231 (2015) on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

24. In response, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, in a letter dated 29 October 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/967), recalled the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as conveyed in the letter dated 3 October 2018, and reiterated that none of the Iranian missiles were designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons and were thus outside the purview of resolution 2231 (2015).

25. In a letter dated 20 November 2018 (S/2018/1062) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland noted that the 30 September and 1 October 2018 launches of short-range ballistic missiles by the Islamic Republic of Iran amounted to ballistic missile activity inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). They requested that the Secretary-General submit a thorough report on the ballistic missile activity of the Islamic Republic of Iran inconsistent with the resolution and that those launches be discussed in the “2231 format” of the Council in terms of appropriate responses.

26. In response, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, in a letter dated 28 November 2018 to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1061), stressed that Islamic Republic of Iran had only taken military action on 1 October, and the reference to “30 September” was inaccurate. He stated the Islamic Republic of Iran “firmly rejected any arbitrary interpretation” of resolution 2231 (2015), including paragraph 3 of its annex B, and that neither of the missiles launched by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 1 October were “designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”. He also emphasized that the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected “any attempt to reinterpret paragraph 3 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) by means of definitions or criteria contained in the Missile Technology Control Regime”.

27. In identical letters dated 23 November 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1047), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that, during the course of 2018, the Islamic Republic of Iran had conducted nine ballistic missile tests in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). In response, in a letter dated 29 November 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1073), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated that the alleged missile launches were completely fabricated. It was noted in the letter that the Islamic Republic of Iran did launch missiles on 8 September and 1 October 2018, which “on no account, fall within the purview of paragraph 3 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015)” and were “not inconsistent with its provisions”.

28. In a letter dated 30 November 2018 addressed to 30 November 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and President of the Security Council, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Russian Federation stated that Iran had been respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) to
refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons and that, as of yet, no viable information to the contrary was ever provided to the Council. In the letter, he expressed deep regret that certain Member States “continue with their attempts to abuse the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in order to inject baseless speculations of alleged violations by Iran of its obligations under the JCPOA”.

Ballistic missiles, arms-related and other transfers

29. In letters dated 26 June 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/636) and 26 July 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/561), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, in the context of the interception of two ballistic missiles aimed at its territory by the Houthi militia, noted that the supply of ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and sea mines by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Houthi militia was in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). In response, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, in a letter dated 8 August 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/580), stated that he “categorically reject[ed]” all such allegations.

30. In a letter dated 14 September 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/847), the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had provided the Houthis with ballistic missiles, guided anti-ship missiles and kamikaze aerial drones, along with landmines and improvised explosive devices, in direct violation of resolution 2231 (2015). In response, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, in a letter dated 6 November 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/994), stated that he rejected those allegations.

31. In a letter dated 26 September 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/878), the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations, in his capacity as representative of the State chairing the 150th session of the Council of the League of Arab States, shared the communiqué that had been issued at the ninth meeting of the quadripartite Arab ministerial committee. In the communiqué, the committee referred, inter alia, to the provision by the Islamic Republic of Iran of missiles to the Houthis, as well as the launch of Iranian-made missiles, and stressed the need for the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with resolution 2231 (2015).

32. In response, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, in a letter dated 27 November 2018 to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1054), stated, inter alia, that it firmly rejected the “baseless claims” of supplying arms to Yemen in violation of resolution 2231 (2015).

33. In a letter dated 22 November 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1046), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had delivered one Khordad air defence system, developed and manufactured by the military industries of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to the Syrian Arab Republic. The Permanent Representative stated that such activities were a violation of resolution 2231 (2015) and called upon the Council to remain vigilant with regard to violations of the resolution. In response, in a letter dated 29 November 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1073), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
United Nations, stated that the allegation was “entirely false” and had “nothing to do with annex B of resolution 2231 (2015”).

34. Those letters, as addressed to the Secretary General and/or the President of the Security Council and noted above, were circulated in the “2231 format” of the Council during the reporting period.

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

35. During the reporting period, five new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 or INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council. Four of these proposals have been approved and one is currently under review. In addition, some of the proposals that had been submitted during the previous reporting period were processed during this reporting period, of which two were withdrawn by the submitting Member State and one was disapproved.

36. Since Implementation Day, a total of 42 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To date, of the 42 proposals that have been processed, 28 have been approved, 4 disapproved, 9 have been withdrawn and 1 is currently under review. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in less than 50 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan, the procurement channel continues to function and the Joint Commission continues to review proposals.

37. According to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), certain nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or both the Council and the Joint Commission. In this regard, since my last report, four notifications were submitted to the Council in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment and technology covered by annex B, section 1, of INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 intended for light water reactors. One notification was submitted to the Council for an activity related to the necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production and no notifications were submitted to the Council related to the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design.

38. On 30 November 2018, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) its sixth six-month report of the Joint Commission (S/2018/1070), in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

V. Other approval and exemption requests

39. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council to participate in and permit the activities set forth in paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

40. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

41. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).
42. Exemptions to the asset freeze provisions and travel ban provisions are contained in paragraphs 6 (d) and 6 (e), respectively, of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). No exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to the 23 individuals and 61 entities currently on the list maintained pursuant to the resolution.

VI. Transparency, outreach and guidance

43. I recall that, in my introductory remarks as Facilitator during the first meeting in the “2231 format” in 2018, I outlined three areas that I could promote in my role: talks, transparency and trade. This included facilitating discussion in the “2231 format” related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), facilitating transparency on the work of the Security Council and encouraging the submission of proposals through the procurement channel to contribute to the implementation of the resolution. I hope that the next Facilitator will continue active efforts in this regard.

44. Further outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated in the note mentioned in paragraph 1 above, will continue to foster awareness of resolution 2231 (2015). The website on the resolution, managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat, through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs, continues to play a significant role in providing relevant information on the resolution. In this regard, I continue to encourage the Secretariat to regularly maintain, update and improve the website.

45. In my role as Facilitator, I also held several bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I am confident that the international community will continue to act in line with paragraph 2 of the resolution, in which the Security Council called upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.