



# Security Council

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## Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

### Ninth report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, concluded on 14 July 2015, was the result of 12 years of intense diplomacy and dialogue. The Plan was subsequently endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Council called upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to support the implementation thereof. Since then, the international community has expressed strong support for the Plan. The Plan is a testament to the efficacy of multilateralism and is a success in nuclear non-proliferation. It remains the best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and secure tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people. It is essential that the Plan continue to work for all its participants, and that issues not directly related to the Plan be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.

2. I regret the withdrawal of the United States of America from the Plan in May 2018, as well as the steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran since July 2019 to cease performing its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. I remain concerned that these actions by the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran do not advance the goals set out in the Plan and in resolution 2231 (2015). I call upon all Member States to avoid provocative rhetoric and actions that may have a further negative impact on regional stability.

3. Since May 2018, the United States has reimposed all of its national sanctions that had been lifted or waived pursuant to the Plan and has continued to implement its decision not to extend waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran and not to fully renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects in the framework of the Plan. These actions continue to be contrary to the goals set out in the Plan and in resolution 2231 (2015) and may also impede the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement certain provisions of the Plan and of the resolution. I note the most recent concerns expressed in the letter dated 8 May 2020 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to me (A/74/850-S/2020/380), and the concerns contained in the letter dated 27 May 2020 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to me and to the President of the Security



Council (S/2020/451), as well as the concerns expressed in the letter dated 8 June 2020 from the Permanent Representative of China addressed to me and to the President of the Security Council (S/2020/517).

4. Since July 2019, the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken a series of steps to cease performing its nuclear commitments under the Plan. These steps have been undertaken under the monitoring and verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see also para. 7 below). On 5 January 2020, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced<sup>1</sup> that it had taken its fifth and final step to “withdraw from its last operational limitation within the (JCPOA) scope, in other words, the limitations on the centrifuges numbers”. It was further indicated in the statement that “from now on, the Iran nuclear program will merely progress according to its technical requirements”, but that “Iran cooperation with IAEA will continue as in the past. In case of the imposed sanctions resolving and Iran’s subsequent benefiting from the (JCPOA) concerned privileges, then the country is ready to assume its admitted commitments”. I note that the Islamic Republic of Iran has stated that it wants to remain in the Plan and has emphasized that all of its measures since 1 July 2019 are reversible. I appeal again to the Islamic Republic of Iran to return to full implementation of the Plan. I also urge the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully take into account and urgently address the other concerns raised by other participants in the Plan and by Member States in relation to resolution 2231 (2015).

5. On 6 January 2020, France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland jointly issued a statement in which they called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to reverse all measures inconsistent with the Plan. On 14 January, the three countries announced that they had referred the matter to the Joint Commission under the dispute resolution mechanism, as set out in paragraph 36 of the Plan. During the meeting of the Joint Commission, held in Vienna on 26 February, to address both the steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran in terms of nuclear commitments under the Plan and long-standing concerns regarding the impact of the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan and the reimposition of its national sanctions, all participants reaffirmed the importance of preserving the Plan as a “key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture”. I urge them to resolve all differences within the dispute resolution mechanism under the Plan.

6. I am encouraged by the positive developments in the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, which started to process its first transactions. It is important that initiatives in support of trade and economic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran continue and be given full effect as a matter of urgency, especially during the current economic and health challenges posed by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. I also stress the important contribution of other Member States to preserving the Plan and continue to encourage them to work effectively with the participants in the Plan towards creating the conditions necessary for their economic operators to engage in trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran in accordance with resolution 2231 (2015).

7. The International Atomic Energy Agency plays an important role in supporting the full implementation of the Plan. Reports on its verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in line with resolution 2231 (2015), provide transparency and are important confidence-building measures. Since 1 July 2019, the Agency confirmed the activities announced and undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to cease performing its commitments under the Plan. In its two most recent reports (see S/2020/307 and S/2020/548), the Agency reported that it continued to

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<sup>1</sup> Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, “I.R. of Iran’s fifth step statement on JCPOA commitments reduction”, 6 January 2020, available at <https://aeoi.org.ir/EN/portal/home/?news/45799/69280/295927/i.r.-of-iran-s-fifth-step-statement-on-jcpoa-commitments-reduction>.

verify the non-diversion of nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, as declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. The Agency also reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol pending its entry into force, and that it continued to evaluate the declarations made by the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Additional Protocol. I commend IAEA for its impartial, factual and professional work.

8. The present report, my ninth on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings and recommendations, since the issuance of my eighth report ([S/2019/934](#) and [S/2019/934/Corr.1](#)) on 10 December 2019. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.

## II. Key findings and recommendations

9. Since 10 December 2019, four new proposals have been submitted to the Security Council for approval through the procurement channel. The procurement channel continues to be a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism, providing assurances that the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods and related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran is consistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), as well as the provisions and objectives of the Plan. I continue to encourage all participants in the Plan, Member States and the private sector to fully support and utilize the channel.

10. The United States announced on 27 May 2020 that participation in additional activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), namely the modernization of the Arak reactor, might now be exposed to its national sanctions. I wish to reiterate that the exemptions set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to the resolution are designed to provide for the transfer of such items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Plan.

11. Several of the items in the two seizures of arms and related materiel by the United States, in November 2019 and February 2020, have been assessed by the Secretariat as follows: (a) they were of Iranian origin (container launch units of the anti-tank guided missiles with production dates in 2016, 2017 and 2018); (b) they had been delivered to the Islamic Republic of Iran (15 POSP-type optical weapon sights) between February 2016 and April 2018; (c) they had design characteristics (such as thermal optical weapon sights) similar to those also produced by a commercial entity in the Islamic Republic of Iran; or (d) they bore Farsi markings (on a keyboard of a computer terminal associated with the anti-ship missile, the relay box tester of an unidentified missile, as well as the navigation antenna and navigation module of the cruise missile). The items may have been transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

12. The Secretariat observed that some items in the two seizures by the United States were identical or similar to those found in the debris of the cruise missiles and the delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicles used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2019 (see [S/2019/934](#), paras. 27–34).

13. The Secretariat assessed that the examined cruise missiles and/or parts thereof used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia and those seized by the United States were of

Iranian origin. Components of the fuel-feed system of the examined cruise missiles used in the attacks were exported to the Islamic Republic of Iran in March 2018. The sections of the cruise missiles recovered after the attacks and the sections seized by the United States in November 2019 form part of the same missile system, and it is highly likely that they were produced by the same entity. The cruise missile jet engines recovered after the attacks, as well as those seized in November by the United States, are similar to an Iranian jet engine exhibited by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 21 August 2016. The control mechanism and some of the electronics of the examined debris, as well as the navigation module and some of the electronics of the cruise missile seized in November, show similarities to those of the Iranian short-range ballistic missile “Labbayk-1”, as displayed in October 2019 in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

14. The Secretariat assessed that the examined delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicles and/or parts thereof used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia were of Iranian origin. The engines found in the uncrewed aerial vehicles show similarities to an Iranian engine designated as “Shahed 783”, presented by the Islamic Republic of Iran at a military exhibition held in May 2014. The gyroscopes and some of the engines recovered from among the debris are similar to the gyroscope and the engine seen in an Iranian uncrewed aerial vehicle reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016. In addition, one of the ignition coils recovered from among the debris of the attacks was exported to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2016.

### III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

15. Since 10 December 2019, four new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the Security Council for approval through the procurement channel. Of the 48 proposals received from 16 January 2016 to 11 June 2020, 33 were approved by the Council, five were not approved, nine were withdrawn by the proposing States and one is currently under review. It is vital that the procurement channel continue to work effectively and efficiently, and in a manner that promotes increased international engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

16. In addition, the Security Council received six new notifications pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Plan that do not require approval, but do require a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. As previously reported, in May and November 2019, the United States announced that involvement in some of the above-mentioned activities might now be exposed to its national sanctions, specifically assistance to expand the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant beyond the existing reactor unit, any involvement in transferring enriched uranium out of the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for natural uranium, and the modification of infrastructure at the Fordow facility.<sup>2</sup> On 27 May, the United States further announced that participation in activities related to the modernization of the Arak reactor would also be exposed to its national sanctions after a 60-day period for companies to wind down their activities.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, the United States announced its intention to issue a 90-day extension of the waiver covering activities related to the existing unit

<sup>2</sup> United States Department of State, “Advancing the Maximum Pressure Campaign by Restricting Iran’s Nuclear Activities”, Fact sheet, 3 May 2019, available at [www.state.gov/advancing-the-maximum-pressure-campaign-by-restricting-irans-nuclear-activities/](http://www.state.gov/advancing-the-maximum-pressure-campaign-by-restricting-irans-nuclear-activities/); and “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo Remarks to the Press” on 18 November 2019, available at [www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press/](http://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press/).

<sup>3</sup> “Keeping the World Safe from Iran’s Nuclear Program”, Press statement, 27 May 2020, available at [www.state.gov/keeping-the-world-safe-from-irans-nuclear-program/](http://www.state.gov/keeping-the-world-safe-from-irans-nuclear-program/).

at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, while noting that the waiver could be modified at any time.

## **IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions**

### **A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran**

17. In letters addressed to me and the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, dated 20 February 2020 (S/2020/138) and 20 May 2020 (S/2020/428), from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, dated 8 May 2020 (S/2020/382) and from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the United Nations, dated 3 June 2020 (S/2020/400), I was informed about the launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran of a Simorgh space launch vehicle on 9 February 2020 and of a Qased space launch vehicle on 22 April 2020. These Member States mentioned that both space launch vehicles incorporate virtually identical technologies to those used in ballistic missiles designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the latter classified by the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States as Missile Technology Control Regime category-1 systems.<sup>4</sup> These Member States reiterated that the Council, in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake launches using such ballistic missile technology. The involvement of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the 22 April launch was also noted as a point of concern.

18. In a letter dated 16 March 2020 addressed to me (A/74/752-S/2020/212), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations reiterated the position of his country regarding the implementation of paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). He underscored that the Islamic Republic of Iran was not prohibited by multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms or resolution 2231 (2015) from developing missile and space programmes. He stated that the Russian Federation continued to consider that the Islamic Republic of Iran “is respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons”. In a letter dated 28 May 2020 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2020/454), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran is “fully entitled to the advantages of space science and technology” as “none of the existing international instruments and mechanisms, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Missile Technology Control Regime, either directly or implicitly, prohibit Iran to peacefully explore space for the purposes of development”. In a letter dated 9 June 2020 (S/2020/522) addressed to me and to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation reiterated that the Islamic Republic of Iran “is fully entitled to the advantages of space science and technology” and that none of the international instruments or mechanisms “directly or implicitly prohibit Iran from developing missile and space programmes”. He further stated that applying “the Missile Technology Control Regime category-1 systems criteria” would effectively “prohibit any non-State actor, including private entities, from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using

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<sup>4</sup> Category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime are defined as “complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg ‘payload’ to a ‘range’ of at least 300 km” (see 1.A.1 of the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime).

any space launch vehicles” “regardless of claimed intent”, affecting private-public partnerships in the area of space exploration. Noting that all provisions of resolution 1929 (2010) had been terminated, including the provision that “prohibited Iran from undertaking ‘any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons’”, the Permanent Representative stated that concluding that “the Qased ‘shares these inherent design features thereby making it nuclear-capable’” was a “deliberate fallacy”.

19. In a letter dated 26 May 2020 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2020/443), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations “categorically rejected” all the allegations made by the United States and Israel regarding their launches of space launch vehicles on 9 February and 22 April 2020. The Permanent Representative stated that paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) does not concern the space launch vehicles as “there is no explicit reference to ‘space launch vehicles’”, and that “space launch vehicles do not incorporate technologies identical to ‘ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons’”. Moreover, “space launch vehicles, which are exclusively designed to place satellites into orbit, are not ‘designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons’ and [...] ‘space launch vehicles are not capable of delivering nuclear weapons’”. The Permanent Representative also noted that the addition of the phrase “designed to be” to the wording “capable of delivering nuclear weapons” was “a deliberate modification following lengthy negotiations in order to exclude Iran’s defensive missile programme that is ‘designed’ to be exclusively capable of delivering conventional warheads”. The Permanent Representative re-iterated that “there is no implicit or explicit reference” in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) “to the Missile Technology Control Regime itself or to its definitions.” In a letter dated 8 June 2020 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2020/513), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated the previously raised points, including that the Iranian missile programme “falls outside of the purview or competence of the Security Council resolution and its annexes”. The Permanent Representative said that those who had cited “the name of certain places in Iran, referring to the launch of the space launch vehicle by Iran from a ‘mobile launch pad’, as well as mentioning the name of the organization involved in the development and launch of the space launch vehicle concerned” were to “make their own arbitrary conclusions”. Finally, the Permanent Representative underscored that “activities related to ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles” were within “inherent rights under international law” and highlighted “the right to the peaceful use of outer space, and its space programme”.

20. The Security Council discussed the launch of the Qased space launch vehicle on 13 May 2020. There was no consensus among Council members on how that launch related to resolution 2231 (2015).

## **B. Restrictions on ballistic missile related-transfers or activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran**

21. In a letter dated 31 March 2020 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2020/257), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations reported that on 28 March 2020, “Iran-backed Houthi militia” launched two ballistic missiles towards civilians and civilian objects in Saudi Arabia. The Secretariat received from the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia photographs of the debris of the two ballistic missiles launched at Jazan and Riyadh on 28 March 2020. The photographs of the debris from the launch at Riyadh showed parts of a liquid-propellant ballistic missile that had similarities with the Borkan-3 ballistic missile,



the first launch of which the Houthis announced on 2 August 2019.<sup>5</sup> In their letter dated 21 November 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/911), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the United Nations stated that the Borkan-3 was “clearly an adaptation of earlier Borkan-2H missiles” with similar features to the Iranian Qiam-1 missile. In a letter dated 3 June 2020, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated that the above-mentioned information was “baseless allegations and disinformation”, which he rejected “unequivocally”. The Secretariat will continue its analysis of this issue and I intend to report to the Council in due course, as appropriate.

## V. Implementation of arms-related provisions

### *Arms and related materiel seized by the United States, 25 November 2019*

22. In December 2019, at the invitation of the United States, the Secretariat examined arms and related materiel which the United States indicated were seized on 25 November 2019 in “international waters (seaward of the territorial sea of Yemen and any other State)” and assessed to be “evidently of Iranian origin” (S/2020/322). The arms and related materiel shown to the Secretariat consisted of:

- Two portable surface-to-air missiles (one fully assembled, the other partly disassembled)
- Sections and components of a cruise missile
- Sections of two types of anti-ship cruise missiles and items (assessed by the United States to be) associated with these anti-ship cruise missiles
- 21 anti-tank guided missiles
- Three thermal optical weapon sights with accessories
- Components of uncrewed aerial vehicles
- Components (assessed by the United States to be) used in the assembly of uncrewed surface vessels
- More than 80 boxes of non-electric detonators

### *Analysis of arms and related materiel seized on 25 November 2019*

23. The Secretariat observed that the disassembled surface-to-air missile was fitted with a digital air data computer identical to those found among the debris of the delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicles used in the attacks on the Saudi oil facilities in Afif in May 2019 and Abqaiq in September 2019 (S/2019/934, para. 33). This disassembled missile was also equipped with a “Model V10” vertical gyroscope (manufacturer unknown). A “Model V9” (manufacturer unknown) of that same vertical gyroscope had been observed in an Iranian uncrewed aerial vehicle, reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016 (S/2019/492, para. 29) as well as among the debris of the delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicles used in the aforementioned attacks on Saudi Arabia (S/2019/934, para. 33).

24. Based on the Secretariat’s analysis, the sections and components of the cruise missile seized by the United States form the front section of the cruise missile used in the attacks on Saudi Arabia (S/2019/934, para. 31) at Abha International Airport in June and August 2019, and in Abqaiq and Khurays in September 2019. The debris of

<sup>5</sup> See “Unveiling of Ansar Allah’s new long-range missile ‘Borkan 3’”, Islamic World News, 2 August 2019, available at <https://english.iswnews.com/6561/images-unveiling-of-ansar-allahs-new-long-range-missile-borkan-3/>.

the rear section of this cruise missile was examined by the Secretariat in 2019 in Saudi Arabia. These front and rear sections are identical in structure, material and assembly, in addition to having identical reference numbers and project labels. Other seized parts of this cruise missile (the control surfaces and the section fitted with a jet engine) are also identical to the corresponding parts of this same type of cruise missile used in the aforementioned attacks on Saudi Arabia. The jet engine is also similar (dimensions, design characteristics and configuration) to an Iranian jet engine exhibited in the Islamic Republic of Iran on 21 August 2016.<sup>6</sup> The Secretariat further observed that the digital air data computer in a section of the seized cruise missile is identical to those found among the debris of the delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicles (S/2019/934, para. 33) and also to that in the surface-to-air missile detailed in paragraph 23 above. In addition, Farsi markings were observed on a quality control sticker on the navigation antenna and on two navigation modules of the seized cruise missile.

25. In relation to the seized anti-ship missiles and associated items, the Secretariat noted that one of the items (a computer terminal) included a keyboard modified with Farsi markings. In terms of the 21 anti-tank guided missiles (one of which was a training unit), the container launch units of the missiles had characteristics consistent with those of the Iranian-produced Dehlahieh anti-tank guided missile (see S/2018/1089 and S/2018/1089/Corr.1, para. 24). Twenty of the container launch units had 2017 and 2018 production dates (the training unit did not reflect a production date). The thermal optical weapon sights (one marked as RU90/120G and two units marked as RU60G) had 2017 production dates on their rechargeable batteries, and had design characteristics similar to thermal optical weapon sights also produced by a commercial entity in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

*Arms and related materiel seized by the United States, 9 February 2020*

26. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Secretariat that the “allegedly seized anti-tank guided missiles and thermal optical weapon sights do not conform to the products manufactured by the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

27. In February 2020, at the invitation of the United States, the Secretariat examined arms and related materiel which the United States indicated were seized on 9 February 2020 in “international waters (seaward of the territorial sea of Yemen and any other State)” and assessed to be “evidently of Iranian origin” (S/2020/322). The arms and related materiel shown to the Secretariat consisted of:

- Three portable surface-to-air missiles
- 150 anti-tank guided missiles
- 17 thermal optical weapon sights with accessories
- 15 optical weapon sights
- Ground support and test systems of an unidentified missile
- Items (assessed by the United States to be) associated with an anti-ship cruise missile and components of uncrewed surface vessels

*Analysis of arms and related materiel seized on 9 February 2020*

28. The anti-tank guided missiles examined by the Secretariat (90 of the 150) had container launch units with characteristics consistent with those of the Iranian-

<sup>6</sup> “President of the Republic inspects the aircraft capacities of the Ministry of Defence” (‘بازدید از ظرفیت‌های هواپیما در وزارت دفاع و توانمندیهای از جمهوری ریس’), Official website of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 August 2016, available at <http://president.ir/fa/94798>.



produced Dehlahvieh anti-tank guided missile and had 2016, 2017 and 2018 production dates. The 17 thermal optical weapon sights (one marked as RU90/120G and 16 units marked as RU60G) had 2017 production dates on their rechargeable batteries and had design characteristics similar to thermal optical weapon sights also produced by a commercial entity in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

29. The Secretariat was able to confirm, with the assistance of the manufacturing State, that the serial numbers of the 15 POSP-type optical weapon sights (ten 4x24 models and five 8x42 models) matched those delivered to the Islamic Republic of Iran between February 2016 and April 2018. The State of manufacture informed the Secretariat that the importer of the 4x24-model sights was the “State Purchasing Organization of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Support of Iran”, while the importer of the 8x42-model sights was a commercial entity located in Tehran. This same commercial entity was previously identified as the importer of the semi-knock-down kits for PGO-7V-type optical sights, seized in Aden in December 2018, for the end user listed as “Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Iran” in 2016 (S/2019/934, para. 26). In addition, the Secretariat examined a flight computer tester, a relay box tester and a missile simulator of an unidentified missile and observed that the relay box tester contained an electronic component with an inspection sticker in Farsi from the Iranian “Ministry of Industry, Mining and Trade”.

30. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran shared information with the Secretariat relating to the anti-tank guided missiles and thermal optical weapon sights (see para. 26 above), and noted that “similar optical sights... claimed to be exported to Iran and later seized in Aden, were examined... and it was verified that the imported optical sights -- distributed to different military units -- are still in use”.

31. In a letter dated 22 May 2020 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2020/434), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations indicated that “it has not been the policy of Iran to export weapons in violation of relevant arms embargoes of the Security Council” and that it will “continue to actively cooperate with the United Nations in that regard”. The Permanent Representative referred to “false assumptions and distorted speculations regarding the characteristics and markings of Iranian weapons” which “clearly indicate how unreliable the relevant information is and how incredible the relevant assessments are”. He also stressed that “Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) does not prohibit the transfer of arms from Iran” and that “the temporary arrangements in paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to that resolution were set only to authorize, on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from Iran”.

#### *Updates on 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia*

32. Since the publication of my eighth report (S/2019/934, paras. 27–34), the Secretariat has continued its analysis of the debris of the cruise missiles and delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicles used in the attacks on Saudi oil facilities in Afif (May 2019), in Abqaiq and Khurays (September 2019), and in the attacks on the Abha International Airport in south-western Saudi Arabia (June and August 2019).

33. On the cruise missiles used in the attacks, the Secretariat:

(a) Identified the manufacturer of two fuel pressure sensors (of the fuel-feed system) of these missiles, who indicated that these subcomponents were exported to its distributor in the Islamic Republic of Iran in March 2018;

(b) Ascertained that the jet engines of these cruise missiles (seen in both the debris from the attacks as well as the arms and related materiel seized by the United

States in November 2019)<sup>7</sup> are similar (dimensions, design characteristics and configuration) to an Iranian jet engine exhibited by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 21 August 2016;<sup>8</sup>

(c) Observed that the control mechanism, the navigation module (also observed in the arms and related materiel seized by the United States in November 2019) and some of the electronics of the cruise missile show similarities (markings, dimensions, configuration) to those of the Iranian short-range ballistic missile “Labbayk-1”, as displayed in October 2019 in the Islamic Republic of Iran;<sup>9</sup>

(d) Noted that the debris of the cruise missiles recovered from the attacks and the sections and components of the cruise missiles seized by the United States in November 2019, form part of the same missile system (see para. 24 above), and were highly likely made by the same entity – based on identical structure, material and assembly, in addition to having identical reference numbers and project labels.

34. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Secretariat that “the concerned pressure transmitter is not a dual-use item to be monitored by the government”.

35. Taking into consideration the above findings (and the information provided to the Security Council in S/2019/492, para. 31), the Secretariat assessed that the cruise missiles and/or parts thereof used in the four attacks were of Iranian origin.

36. In terms of the delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicles used in the attacks on Saudi oil facilities in May and September 2019, the Secretariat:

(a) Observed that some of the engines found on these uncrewed aerial vehicles show similarities (design characteristics, dimensions and configuration) to an Iranian engine designated as “Shahed-783”, presented by the Islamic Republic of Iran in a military exhibition in May 2014;<sup>10</sup>

(b) Identified that the ignition coils of the engines recovered from among the debris are the same type of ignition coil observed in a similar engine of an Iranian uncrewed aerial vehicle, reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016 (S/2019/492, para. 29);

(c) Confirmed that one of the ignition coils recovered from among the debris of the uncrewed aerial vehicles used in the May 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia was exported to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2016.

37. Taking into consideration the above findings (and the information provided to the Security Council in S/2019/492, para. 33), the Secretariat assessed that the uncrewed aerial vehicles and/or parts thereof used in the two attacks were of Iranian origin.

<sup>7</sup> The Secretariat has identified the manufacturer of some components of the jet engines. The manufacturer informed the Secretariat that it had only produced these components but not the jet engines, and that these components were exported as part of similar jet engines to a Member State in 2010 and 2011 (S/2019/934, para. 31).

<sup>8</sup> “President of the Republic inspects the aircraft capacities of the Ministry of Defence” (‘بازدید از هواپیماهای حوزه در دفاع وزارت توانمندیهای از جمهوری رییس’, Official website of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 August 2016, available at <http://president.ir/fa/94798>).

<sup>9</sup> “Iran’s army unveils new military gear”, Tasnim News Agency, 3 October 2019, available at [www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2019/10/03/2110500/iran-s-army-unveils-new-military-gear](http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2019/10/03/2110500/iran-s-army-unveils-new-military-gear).

<sup>10</sup> “Preparations for an exhibition of the achievements of the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps” (‘سپاه پاسداران + تصاویر هوافضای نیروی دستاوردهای نمایشگاه تجهیزات’), Young Journalists Club, 12 May 2014, available at [www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4836689/-تجهیزات-نمایشگاه-دستاوردهای-نیروی-هوافضای-سپاه-پاسداران-تصاویر](http://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4836689/-تجهیزات-نمایشگاه-دستاوردهای-نیروی-هوافضای-سپاه-پاسداران-تصاویر).

*Other notifications by Member States*

38. In his letter dated 8 May 2020 (S/2020/382), the Permanent Representative of Israel noted the existence of imagery of four Iranian Dehlabieh anti-tank guided missiles being employed in Libya. In response, in a letter dated 26 May 2020 (S/2020/443), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran “categorically rejected” the “so-called violation” of resolution 2231 (2015) as “totally baseless”. The Secretariat is still in the process of reviewing the information in connection to this report and I will report back to the Security Council, as appropriate.

39. In a letter dated 17 March 2020 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2020/217), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia shared information regarding the “Houthi militia backed by Iran” and “an attempted terrorist attack that was planned to target an oil tanker [...] south-east of the Yemeni port of Nishtun” on 3 March 2020. In a letter dated 3 June 2020, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the abovementioned information was “baseless allegations and disinformation”, which he rejected “unequivocally”. The Secretariat has contacted Saudi authorities for further details and I will report back in due course, as appropriate.

40. On 19 May 2020, the Australian authorities provided to the Secretariat relevant information pertaining to the seizure in June 2019 of arms and related materiel.<sup>11</sup> The authorities informed the Secretariat that while on operations in the Middle East region, the *HMAS Ballarat*, an Australian vessel, boarded a dhow in international waters off the Gulf of Oman, about 150 km south-east of Muscat. The materiel seized onboard included “approximately 476,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, and 697 bags of chemical fertiliser”. The crew of the dhow had Iranian passports and identification cards and claimed to have sailed on 19 June 2019 from Bandar Abbas in the Islamic Republic of Iran, en route to Somalia and Yemen. A crew member also claimed that the materiel had been delivered to the dhow by Iranian military personnel. The Secretariat is reviewing the information provided and I will report back to the Security Council, as appropriate.

## **VI. Implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze provisions**

41. In a letter dated 3 January 2020 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2020/13), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran referred to the “assassination of Major General Qasem Soleimani, the Commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [...] on 3 January 2020 at Baghdad International Airport”. Major General Soleimani is on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015); no travel exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to this travel undertaken by Major General Soleimani to Iraq.

42. In my most recent report, I shared information about an academic organization in a Member State which, in 2017, signed a memorandum of understanding with an entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). In response to the Secretariat’s request for clarification, the concerned Member State explained that the signed memorandum of understanding is not legally binding and does not involve any financial commitment. During the reporting period, the Secretariat received new information indicating that additional memorandums of understanding were signed with the same entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) and has

<sup>11</sup> “*HMAS Ballarat* conducts boarding”, 28 June 2019, Australian Government Department of Defence, available at <https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/hmas-ballarat-conducts-boarding>.

reached out to the Member State for clarification; I will report back to the Council in due course.

43. In my most recent report, I informed the Council that the Secretariat was aware of several cooperation agreements in the construction sector between companies in several Member States and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2019/934, para. 39). A Member State informed the Secretariat that it had conducted an investigation of the concerned company in its territory and concluded that, since 16 January 2016, the company has not engaged with any entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). I will report back if further updates become available from other relevant Member States.

44. I previously reported to the Council regarding an entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, which signed a memorandum of understanding with an entity in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2017 (S/2018/602, para. 47). Local media reports from 2019<sup>12</sup> indicate that the Ministry of Transport of the Syrian Arab Republic conducted a study for a project related to the establishment of a port in Tartus Governate and held several meetings with Khatam al-Anbiya for this purpose. Another media report also described that there are several bids from foreign companies, the most important of which is a bid from the Iranian Khatam al-Anbiya company.<sup>13</sup> The Secretariat sought further clarification from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic. I intend to report back to the Council, as appropriate.

45. The United States informed the Secretariat of a possible financial transaction involving a subsidiary of an entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), which occurred in 2018. The Secretariat is reviewing the information provided and will report back to the Security Council, as appropriate.

## VII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

46. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs has continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division has also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related to the procurement channel. During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015).

<sup>12</sup> See “Iranian port on the Syrian Mediterranean coast”, Alalam TV, 16 August 2019, available at [www.alalamtv.net/news/4381061/مرفأ-إيراني-على-ساحل-البحر-المتوسط-السوري](http://www.alalamtv.net/news/4381061/مرفأ-إيراني-على-ساحل-البحر-المتوسط-السوري); and “Ministry of Transport considers establishing a multi-purpose port in Hamidiyah district” (إقامة تدرس النقل)، الحميدية منطقة في الأعراض متعدد مرفأ، Al-Baath, 29 August 2019, available at <http://newspaper.albaathmedia.sy/2019/08/29/في-الأعراض-متعدد-مرفأ-إقامة-تدرس-النقل>.

<sup>13</sup> Inas Abdulkareem, “Syria will establish new sea port in South Tartous”, Syria Times, 2 September 2019, available at <http://syriatimes.sy/index.php/tourism/43419-syria-will-establish-new-sea-port-in-south-tartous>.