



MEMO

# AIPAC

Nov. 30, 2005

## Decisive U.S. Action Needed Against Iran's Nuclear Program

**The United States, which has led efforts to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons, backed away from previous policy by supporting a Russian proposal that would allow Iran to domestically manufacture all but one element of the nuclear fuel cycle and by again allowing the IAEA to defer referral of Iran's nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council. This decision will facilitate Iran's quest for nuclear weapons and undermines international efforts to stop Iran from achieving such a capability.**

The U.S. decision not to push for Iran's referral to the U.N. Security Council and its support of the Russian proposal rewards Iran's continued illicit nuclear activity.

- Since Iran's clandestine nuclear program was exposed in 2002—revealing Iran's nuclear program to be far more extensive and far more advanced than had been believed—Iran has repeatedly deflected efforts by the IAEA to fully assess the extent of its nuclear program.
- During the past two years of negotiations with the European Union, Iran has continued to make progress on its nuclear program, with officials boasting about how they have exploited the time to make improvements.
- Iran has ended the suspension of all of its nuclear fuel cycle activities, which were part of an agreement with the EU-3. Iran has resumed converting uranium ore into the gas needed to produce nuclear weapons, despite a resolution passed in September by the IAEA demanding that the suspension continue.
- The recently released IAEA report on Iran clearly documents Iran's continued failure to provide requested information and allow unfettered access to suspect sites and provides new evidence that the regime has obtained detailed data from the A.Q. Khan network critical to fabricating a nuclear weapon.

The Russian proposal allowing Iran to possess a key step in the nuclear fuel cycle is a dangerous concession made at a time of continued Iranian intransigence.

- The Russian proposal—endorsed by the EU-3 and the United States—would allow Iran to have the entire fuel cycle except for the last step of uranium enrichment, which is necessary to produce nuclear bombs. This contradicts the previous position of the United States and the E.U. that Iran must suspend, and ultimately dismantle, all nuclear fuel cycle capabilities.
- Allowing Iran to convert and stockpile uranium hexafluoride gas would provide Iran with the ability to produce nuclear weapons once its enrichment capabilities are in place.

The IAEA has once again failed to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council, the proper forum for halting Iran's nuclear weapons program.

- Since the IAEA Board of Governors in September found Iran in non-compliance with its obligations as a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has been found to possess blueprints for constructing the core of a nuclear weapon and called for Israel to be “wiped off the map.”

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- The Board of Governors' resolution stipulated that unless Iran, which hid much of its nuclear program from the world for almost two decades, satisfied the IAEA's concerns, it would (at an unspecified date) send the issue to the U.N. Security Council for consideration.
- Despite declaring Iran in non-compliance, the IAEA failed to fulfill its own obligations under Article XII requiring any member found in violation of its nuclear safeguard commitments to be referred to the U.N. Security Council.
- The U.N. Security Council is the proper world forum to decide whether to impose economic and political sanctions on Iran for its defiance and ongoing efforts to assemble nuclear weapons.

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