



Security Council

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Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Seventh report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. On 14 July 2015, 12 years of intense diplomatic efforts and detailed technical negotiations by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European Union with the Islamic Republic of Iran culminated in the agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was subsequently endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2231 (2015). On 16 January 2016, upon completion of certain actions by the Islamic Republic of Iran (stipulated in the Plan) as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a decade of United Nations sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran were lifted in accordance with the Plan. As resolution 2231 (2015) came into effect, Member States and regional and other international actors mobilized in support of the resolution and the Plan, which are widely regarded as fundamental to regional and international peace and security, a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and in dialogue and diplomacy.

2. It is essential that these diplomatic efforts and hard-won achievements be preserved and built upon. In this regard, I regret that the United States – further to its withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 8 May 2018 – has further decided not to extend waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and not to fully renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects in the framework of the Plan. These actions are contrary to the goals set out in the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015). These actions may also impede the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement certain provisions of the Plan and of the resolution. I also note the concerns expressed in the letter dated 23 May 2019 (S/2019/429) from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to me and in the letter dated 11 June 2019 (S/2019/482) from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation addressed to me and the President of the Security Council.

3. I regret the 8 May 2019 announcement by the Islamic Republic of Iran to “not commit itself to respecting the limits on the keeping of enriched uranium and heavy water reserves at the current stage” and that it will further “suspend compliance with the uranium enrichment limits and measures to modernise the Arak Heavy Water Reactor” should the other participants not fulfil its demands, especially in areas of



banking and oil, within 60 days.¹ It is my firm belief that such actions are not in the interest of the participants and may not help preserve the Plan nor secure tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people. Thus far, as verified by IAEA, the Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to implement its nuclear-related commitments, albeit in the face of considerable challenges. I encourage it to stay the course.

4. I acknowledge again the important contribution of IAEA in supporting the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, especially by providing the international community with reports on its verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015), and commend its impartial, factual and professional work. Since January 2016, the Agency has reported 15 times to the Security Council (most recently in S/2019/212 and S/2019/496) that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. The Agency also reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities remained ongoing. The Agency further reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement and to apply the transparency measures contained in the Plan. The Agency also indicated that it had conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit.

5. I welcome the statement by the Chair of the Joint Commission following its 6 March 2019 meeting, which inter alia acknowledged that, alongside implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments, the lifting of sanctions allowing for the normalization of trade and economic relations constitute an essential part of the Plan. I also appreciate and share the deep sense of urgency and the need for tangible results expressed in the statement by the participants in the Plan regarding trade and economic relations. I am encouraged by their efforts to protect the freedom of their economic operators to pursue legitimate business with the Islamic Republic of Iran in full accordance with resolution 2231 (2015), and their other initiatives in support of trade and economic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. They should be given full effect as a matter of priority. It is essential that the Plan continue to work for all its participants, including by delivering tangible economic benefits to the Iranian people.

6. The continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015) continues to enjoy the full support of the broader international community. I again call upon all Member States to work effectively with the participants in the Plan towards its preservation, including in creating the conditions necessary for their economic operators to engage in trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran in accordance with the resolution. I also urge all Member States to avoid provocative rhetoric and actions that may have a negative impact on regional stability.

7. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is only one part of resolution 2231 (2015). Staunch support for the Plan among the participants and Member States continues to be accompanied with concerns about Iranian activities in relation to the restrictive measures contained in annex B to the resolution. Therefore, I again encourage the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider and urgently address these concerns as well.

8. The present report, my seventh on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings and recommendations, since the issuance of the sixth report of the Secretary-

¹ Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, statement of 8 May 2019, available at www.president.ir/en/109588.

General (S/2018/1089) on 6 December 2018. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as assets freeze and travel ban provisions.

II. Key findings and recommendations

9. Since 6 December 2018, two new proposals have been submitted to the Security Council for approval through the procurement channel. I welcome the reaffirmation in March 2019 by participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of the readiness of the procurement channel to evaluate proposals for transfers of certain goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The procurement channel is a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism ensuring that those transfers are consistent with resolution 2231 (2015) and the provisions and objectives of the Plan. I again encourage all States and the private sector to fully utilize and support this channel.

10. The United States announced on 3 May 2019 that participation in certain activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), such as the transfer of enriched uranium out of the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for natural uranium or assistance to expand the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant beyond the existing reactor unit, may now be exposed to its national sanctions. I wish to note that the exemptions set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to the resolution are designed to provide for the transfer of such items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Plan.

11. The Secretariat has not received new reports on the supply, sale or transfer of nuclear or dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods or technology to the Islamic Republic of Iran undertaken contrary to paragraph 2 of annex B. Regarding the transfer of two commodities previously brought to the attention of the Security Council, the authorities of the States of manufacture and of a State of re-export informed the Secretariat that they found no indication of actions inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).

12. During the reporting period, the Secretariat examined additional arms and related materiel recovered in Yemen, including a second partly disassembled surface-to-air missile, three sets of wings pertaining to a new type of unmanned aerial vehicle, and a new unmanned surface vessel laden with explosives. The Secretariat is confident that these arms and related materiel or parts thereof are of Iranian manufacture. However, it has no indication as to whether those items were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.

13. A televised speech by the political leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, and a statement by the Al-Quds Brigades spokesperson in the Gaza Strip, both in May 2019, point to ongoing Iranian military support to Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Any Iranian arms transfers after 16 January 2016 would have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

14. Since the issuance of my previous report, Major General Soleimani appears to have continued to travel despite the travel ban provisions and previous reporting on this issue. Another individual on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015)² appears to have engaged in foreign travel during the reporting period. In this instance, the lack of relevant identifiers may have hampered implementation of the

² Available at www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list. There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).

travel ban provision. To ensure its proper implementation, as well as that of the assets freeze provision, I reiterate my recommendation that the Security Council review and update the list as appropriate.

III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

15. Since 6 December 2018, 2 new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) were submitted to the Security Council, bringing to 44 the total number of proposals submitted since Implementation Day for approval through the procurement channel. At the time of reporting, 29 proposals were approved by the Council, 5 were not approved and 9 were withdrawn by the proposing States. In a letter dated 11 June 2019 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/482), he conveyed the view of his country that "in order to raise efficiency and ensure the stable work of the 'procurement channel' it is imperative to increase international trust in this mechanism" and "necessary to promptly elaborate, within the Procurement Working Group and the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, special security mechanisms in order to negate the effects of unilateral sanctions and thus ensure the continued implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)". Annexed to the letter was a proposal submitted to the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission to that end.

16. In addition, the Security Council received 7 new notifications pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that do not require approval, but do require a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. These activities include transfers of certain equipment for light water reactors, as well as certain transfers related to the modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, the export of the Islamic Republic of Iran's enriched uranium in excess of 300 kg in return for natural uranium, and the modernization of the Arak reactor. On 3 May 2019, the United States announced that involvement in some of the above-mentioned activities may now be exposed to its national sanctions, specifically assistance to expand the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant beyond the existing reactor unit and any involvement in transferring enriched uranium out of the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for natural uranium.³ It also announced that other activities, such as the redesign of the Arak reactor, modification of infrastructure at the Fordow facility, and work at the existing unit of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, would be permitted to continue for a renewable duration of 90 days but that it reserved the right to modify or revoke its policy covering these non-proliferation activities at any time. In a letter dated 23 May 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/429), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that these "sanctions and policies have prevented the implementation of relevant nuclear-related provisions of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) by Member States, including the Islamic Republic of Iran".

17. Since my most recent update regarding the dual-use items seized by the United Arab Emirates in May 2016 and April 2017 while in transit to the Islamic Republic of Iran (see S/2018/1089, para. 13), the Secretariat has received additional information about one of these items, a titanium rod. The authorities of the State of manufacture confirmed to the Secretariat that it was intended for an Iranian company

³ United States Department of State, "Advancing the Maximum Pressure Campaign by Restricting Iran's Nuclear Activities", Fact sheet, 3 May 2019, available at www.state.gov/advancing-the-maximum-pressure-campaign-by-restricting-irans-nuclear-activities/.

and that they would need to physically examine the rod to confirm the assessment of the exporting company that it did not meet the criteria set out in [INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2](#) and thus did not require prior approval from the Security Council. In addition, the authorities of the State of manufacture of the inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer have recently advised the Secretariat that their investigation is ongoing.

18. With regard to the information provided by the United States on the transfer of two commodities (carbon fibre and aluminium alloys) that, in their assessment, would have required prior approval from the Security Council (see [S/2018/1089](#), para. 14), the authorities of the State of manufacture of the carbon fibre indicated to the Secretariat that, in their assessment, it did not meet the criteria set out in [INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2](#) and therefore that its export to the Islamic Republic of Iran did not require prior approval from the Council.

19. The authorities of the State of manufacture of the aluminium alloys informed the Secretariat that they had conducted an investigation and that no actions inconsistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) had been identified on the part of their manufacturers or companies, as they did not transfer the aluminium alloys to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Meanwhile, the authorities of the State from which the aluminium alloys were reportedly re-exported informed the Secretariat that while a number of exports of aluminium to the Islamic Republic of Iran had taken place prior to May 2017, they had no indication that these items met the criteria set out in [INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2](#) and would therefore have required approval from the Security Council prior to their transfer.

IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions

A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran

20. In my most recent report, I noted that the Security Council discussed on 4 December 2018 the reported test firing of a medium-range ballistic missile by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 1 December 2018 (see [S/2018/1089](#), para. 19). During the reporting period, I also received a letter dated 18 December 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom ([S/2018/1171](#)) and a letter dated 7 March 2019 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission ([S/2019/216](#)) regarding this test firing. According to those States, the missile was a category I system under the Missile Technology Control Regime⁴ and therefore inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons. They concluded that this test firing was inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In letters dated 14 January and 12 April 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council ([S/2019/49](#) and [S/2019/315](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that there is no implicit or explicit reference in paragraph 3 of annex B to the Missile Technology Control Regime or to the criteria contained therein. He also reiterated the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran that its missiles programme "is 'designed' to be exclusively capable of delivering conventional warheads" and thus not inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B, but also falls outside the purview of the resolution.

⁴ Category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime are defined as "complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg 'payload' to a 'range' of at least 300 km" (see 1.A.1 of the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime).

21. In identical letters dated 2 April and 31 May 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/288 and S/2019/452), the Permanent Representative of Israel brought to my attention information regarding additional flight tests of ballistic missiles reportedly conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to the information provided, one Khorramshahr variant, one Shahab-3 variant, one Qiam, one Scud variant and three Zolfaghar ballistic missiles were flight-tested between December 2018 and February 2019. The Permanent Representative stated that their test-firing was inconsistent with the resolution because those missiles were all category I system under the Missile Technology Control Regime. In his letters dated 12 April and 3 June 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/315 and S/2019/457), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected the "fabrications" and "claims" raised in the aforementioned letters from the Permanent Representative of Israel.

22. I also received information on the launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran of Simorgh and Safir space launch vehicles on 15 January and 6 February 2019, respectively. In identical letters dated 18 January and 20 February 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/62 and S/2019/168), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that these were also category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime and that their launch constituted "another stage in Iran's development of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons". He further stated that the transporter erector launcher used to launch the Safir space launch vehicle was identical to that of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile. In letters dated 20 February and 25 March 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/177, annex, and S/2019/270), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom stressed that the Simorgh and Safir space launch vehicles are based on technologies shared with the Shahab-3 and Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missiles. They further stated that "the technologies necessary for the conception, fabrication and launch of a space launch vehicle are closely related to those required for the development of long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles" and that such launches provide the Islamic Republic of Iran "with empirical results that can be used to optimize capabilities related to the development of these missile systems". They concluded that these launches were inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B. In his letter dated 7 March 2019 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/216), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission also stressed that space launch vehicles use "technologies that are virtually identical and interchangeable with those used in MTCR Category I ballistic missiles", and underscored that these launches constituted "activities using technologies related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons", which the Islamic Republic is called upon not to undertake by the resolution.

23. In his letter dated 12 April 2019 (S/2019/315), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that paragraph 3 of annex B does not contain implicit or explicit references to space launch vehicles. He further stated that the technical characteristics and operational requirements of space launch vehicles are distinct from those of ballistic missile systems. He further stressed that the Simorgh is designed and developed exclusively for placing satellites into orbit and therefore does not "fall into the category of ballistic missiles, let alone one 'designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons'". He concluded that its launch cannot be considered inconsistent with the resolution. He underscored that the use of space launch vehicles by the Islamic Republic of Iran is "part of a scientific and technological activity related to the use of space technology" and that the country is "determined to continue to exercise this inherent right for its socioeconomic interests". He also recalled that, as noted in the fourth six-month report of the Facilitator on the

implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) (S/2017/1058), there was no consensus in the Security Council on how a previous Simorgh launch related to the resolution.

24. In their letter dated 25 March 2019 (S/2019/270), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom brought to my attention other recent actions that they considered inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B. They stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran revealed in early February 2019, in a public display in Tehran during the Ten Days of Dawn celebrations marking the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, a variant of the Khorramshahr ballistic missile with a manoeuvring re-entry vehicle that is likely to have increased its maximum range “to approximately 3,000 kilometres”. They also stated that a newly unveiled Dezful ballistic missile, with a purported range of 1,000 kilometres, is “highly likely to meet the Missile Technology Control Regime category-I criteria”. In identical letters dated 22 April 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/330), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran, during the same annual celebrations in Tehran in early February 2019, also showcased the Sejil, Emad and Ghadr in addition to the Khorramshahr. He stated that all these ballistic missiles are designed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads. He further stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran unveiled the production line of the Dezful missile. He considered that these activities “clearly violate” the resolution. In his letter dated 12 April 2019 (S/2019/315), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected speculations made by the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom “regarding Iran’s space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles, including their type and range”.

25. In a letter dated 18 April 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/339), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation reiterated the position of his country regarding the implementation of paragraph 3 of annex B. He underscored that the Islamic Republic of Iran is not prohibited by multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms or resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to develop missile and space programmes. He also noted that IAEA has consistently reported that Iran is in full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments and that there is no evidence that the Islamic Republic of Iran is developing or producing a nuclear weapon or means of its delivery. He concluded that the Islamic Republic of Iran was “respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons”. He reiterated that the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime were never intended to be used in the context of the resolution to ascertain whether certain missiles are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons and that such types of missiles included certain features and that no “evidence of the existence of such features on Iranian ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles” was presented to the Council.

B. Restrictions on ballistic missile related-transfers or activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran

26. As indicated in my previous report, the Secretariat worked on establishing the production date range of guidance system subcomponents retrieved from ballistic missiles launched at the territory of Saudi Arabia by the Houthis between March and June 2018 (see [S/2018/1089](#), para. 20). According to the information provided to the Secretariat by the foreign manufacturing companies, all of the retrieved guidance subcomponents traced by the Secretariat had been produced between 2000 and 2010, and some were sold as recently as 2012. As noted in my fifth report, that production and sale date range is incompatible with that of the Scud missiles provided by the former Soviet Union and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Yemen and

that were known to be in Yemeni stockpiles prior to the outbreak of the current conflict in early 2015 (see [S/2018/602](#), para. 32).

V. Implementation of arms-related provisions

A. Restrictions on arms-related transfers to the Islamic Republic of Iran

27. In November 2018, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom informed the Secretariat that three individuals had recently been found guilty in a United Kingdom court of knowingly exporting “prohibited military or dual use goods”, namely aircraft parts, to the Islamic Republic of Iran between February 2010 and March 2016. According to additional information since provided to the Secretariat, the three individuals transferred aircraft parts, including for MiG and F4 Phantom jets, from the United States to the Islamic Republic of Iran through several companies located in various countries to conceal the final destination of those transfers. Since 16 January 2016, the transfer of spare parts for combat aircraft as defined for the purpose of the Register of Conventional Arms requires prior authorization of the Security Council.⁵

B. Restrictions on arms-related transfers from the Islamic Republic of Iran

28. In my most recent report (see [S/2018/1089](#), para. 22), I brought to the attention of the Security Council that the Secretariat had examined in Riyadh in September 2018 a partly disassembled surface-to-air missile reportedly found in a consignment, seized in March 2018, destined for the Houthis. The Secretariat had observed that its features were consistent with those of the Iranian Sayyad-2C missiles seen in videos and photographs published by Iranian media outlets.⁶ In December 2018, in Washington, D.C., the Secretariat examined a second partly disassembled surface-to-air missile which was also missing its forward guidance nose section and fins. The Secretariat observed that its dimensions, other external features, paint and markings were consistent with that of the missile examined in Riyadh. The Secretariat observed that markings on that second missile’s airframe and quality control labels on internal components were also in Farsi. The Secretariat was also presented with photographs of that second missile’s components (flight computer, main relay box, navigation system and self-destruct unit) and subcomponents, which showed production date markings ranging between 2011 and 2015, including in Persian calendar format. According to United States authorities, that missile had been part of the above-mentioned consignment seized in March 2018. The serial numbers of the two missiles examined were a few digits apart from each other and from two missiles visible in a video on military exercises published by Iranian media outlets, suggesting that all these missiles came from the same production lot.⁷ The Secretariat is confident that the missiles it examined in Riyadh and Washington, D.C., are of Iranian manufacture.

⁵ Any such transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of resolution [1929 \(2010\)](#) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 8 of that resolution.

⁶ See, for example, Press TV, “Iran puts new military equipment on production line”, 6 February 2017, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZMTGXU02FI; and Fars News Agency, “Commander: Iran mulling change in Sayyad missiles to mount it on Mowj-class vessels”, 27 January 2014, available at <http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13921107000722>.

⁷ See, for example, Press TV, “Iran puts new military equipment on production line”, 6 February 2017, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZMTGXU02FI.

However, it has not been able to confirm whether these missiles were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.⁸

29. In May 2019, the Secretariat was provided with the opportunity to examine the gyroscope of a new type of unmanned aerial vehicle previously examined in Riyadh in September 2018 (see [S/2018/1089](#), para. 23). The Secretariat observed that this extended-range unmanned aerial vehicle, like other unmanned aerial vehicles reportedly recovered in Yemen it examined thus far, was equipped with a “Model V10” vertical gyroscope (manufacturer unknown). The Secretariat further observed that an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016 (see para. 30 below) was equipped with a “Model V9” of that same vertical gyroscope. The Secretariat is still analysing the information collected on this and other unmanned aerial vehicles and will report to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.

30. During its visits to Riyadh in September and December 2018, the Secretariat observed two similar sets of wings belonging to another new type of unmanned aerial vehicle, which, according to Saudi authorities, were part of the above-mentioned consignment seized in March 2018 destined to the Houthis. While in Washington, D.C., in December 2018, the Secretariat observed a third similar set of wings reportedly originating from the same seized consignment. The Secretariat also observed the remnants of an unmanned aerial vehicle which, according to United States authorities, was an Iranian Shahed-123 recovered in Afghanistan in October 2016. The Secretariat observed that all three sets of wings had the same dimensions and design features (anhedral, single-piece, V-shaped high wing; top-mounting configuration; ball and socket mounting system) as the wings of the unmanned aerial vehicle reportedly recovered in Afghanistan. The Secretariat further observed that the paint, numbering and other markings on the three sets of wings were consistent with those of the recovered unmanned aerial vehicle and that the serial numbers on all examined wings were only a few digits apart. The Secretariat also observed that the features of that recovered unmanned aerial vehicle (single round fuselage, high wing, V-shaped tail and pusher propeller) are consistent with those of an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle visible in video and photographs published by Iranian media outlets.⁹ The Secretariat also observed markings in Farsi on internal components of that recovered vehicle. The Secretariat is confident that the three sets of wings it examined in Riyadh and Washington, D.C., are of Iranian manufacture. However, it has not been able to confirm whether these wings were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.¹⁰

31. In April 2019, United Arab Emirates authorities invited the Secretariat to examine samples of an arms shipment which they believed was relevant to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). According to the United Arab Emirates, the shipment was seized in Aden in December 2018 and consisted of 178 automatic weapons, 48 rocket-propelled grenade launchers and 45 electro-visual systems for the launchers. The samples shown to the Secretariat, which consisted of assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and optical devices for those launchers, were all in new condition. The Secretariat observed that the grenade launchers, like those

⁸ Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of Security Council resolution [1747 \(2007\)](#) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 5 of that resolution.

⁹ See, for example, Press TV, “Iran’s IRGC holds massive drone drills in Persian Gulf region”, 14 March 2019, available at www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/03/14/591010/Iran-IRGC-combat-drone-drill; and IRIB News Agency, 1 October 2016, available at www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/1317539/بازدید-دبیر-شورای-عالی-امنیت-ملی-از-نمایشگاه-تبدیل-تهدید-به-فرصت.

¹⁰ Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of Security Council resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 7 of that resolution.

seized by the United States on 28 March 2016 on board a dhow, the *Adris* (see [S/2017/1030](#), para. 33), had characteristics similar to Iranian-produced RPG-7-type launchers (for example, markings and heat shields). The Secretariat established that the assault rifles did not have the characteristics of Iranian production, but were of the same make and manufacture as the AKMS-type assault rifles seized by the United States on 28 August 2018 en route towards Yemen in international waters in the Gulf of Aden (see [S/2018/1089](#), para. 25) and that their serial numbers fell within the same production batch and included sequential numbers, which indicated that they came from the same production lot. The Secretariat continues to analyse the information available on the shipment seized by the United Arab Emirates, and I will report back to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.

32. During its visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2018, the Secretariat examined the hull and engine of a custom-built unmanned surface vessel laden with explosives. The vessel was recovered in September 2018 by Saudi forces off the coast of Yemen close to the Saudi-Yemeni maritime border. In May 2019, the Secretariat was provided with the opportunity to re-examine the vessel, together with its detonation and guidance systems, as well as its warhead container. The Secretariat observed that the detonation system included a fuse plate identical to that of the unmanned surface vehicle recovered by the United Arab Emirates in 2017 (see [S/2017/1030](#), para. 34), as well as to those seized on board the *Adris* (see [S/2017/1030](#), para. 33). As I previously reported, documentary evidence provided to the Secretariat indicated that the fuse plates found on board the *Adris* had been shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran (see [S/2018/602](#), para. 39). The Secretariat also observed that the guidance system consisted of commercially available components and that some elements of the guidance and detonation systems used electrical cables bearing markings indicating Iranian manufacture. Data retrieved by the Secretariat shows that geographical coordinates were programmed into the guidance system in late August 2018. The Secretariat is confident that at least part of the detonation system of the unmanned surface vessel, recovered by Saudi forces in September 2018, was also manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, no indications were found as to whether these items were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.

33. In identical letters dated 4 April 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council ([S/2019/292](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that on 20 January 2019 “the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps” launched a surface-to-surface missile from the area of Damascus towards the Israeli-occupied Golan and that the missile had been transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Syrian Arab Republic after January 2016, in a manner inconsistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In his letter dated 12 April 2019 ([S/2019/315](#)), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected “the allegations and fabrications” raised in the aforementioned letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel. If additional information becomes available, I will report back to the Council accordingly.

34. In a letter dated 28 February 2019 addressed to the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations conveyed, on behalf of her Government, that “the Iranian regime continues to bolster Hezbollah’s weapons capabilities in various ways, including through the precision-guided missile conversion programme it has established inside civilian population centres across Lebanon, and the proliferation of mass weapons manufacturing capabilities to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic”. In the letter it was alleged that reports over the past few months had revealed a drastic increase in weapons transfers from Tehran to Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut. It was further stated that the “Iranian regime is also providing Hezbollah with technical training and assistance to manufacture, maintain

and use these weapons and advanced capabilities independently”. The Secretariat has not been able at this stage to corroborate this information and will report to the Security Council if new information becomes available.

35. On 30 May 2019, in a televised speech, the political leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, stated that rockets launched at Tel Aviv in 2014 were either “provided by Iran” or “locally made, with financial and technical support from Iran”. He also stated that, in case of another conflict, “Tel Aviv will be struck with several times the number of [missiles] than in 2014”. He further stressed that “if not for the support of Iran for the resistance in Palestine, we would not have obtained these capabilities”.¹¹ In addition, in a video release earlier in May 2019, the spokesman of the Al-Quds Brigades of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group claimed that a “new missile (Bader 3)” was developed with support of the Islamic Republic of Iran “in all disciplines”.¹² Those statements suggest that transfers of arms and related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran may have been undertaken after January 2016 contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

36. In my previous report, I brought to the attention of the Security Council the participation of an Iranian entity in the third Azerbaijan International Defence Exhibition, held in Baku in September 2018 (see S/2018/1089, para. 27). In January 2019, the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan informed the Secretariat that the “Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran” only exhibited mock-up military products and unmanned aerial vehicles, which were exported back to the Islamic Republic of Iran upon completion of the exhibition. Meanwhile, information released by the organizer of the eighth International Defence Exhibition in Iraq, held in Baghdad in March 2019, indicates that at least one Iranian entity participated again in the exhibition. According to media coverage of that exhibition, the items displayed by that entity appear to have been various arms-related materiel, including rifle scopes and other optical devices. The Secretariat has raised this issue with the Permanent Mission of Iraq. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran previously stated that it believed that no prior approval was required from the Council for that activity, given that the Islamic Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course as additional information becomes available.

37. In addition, in his above-mentioned identical letters dated 31 May 2019 (S/2019/452), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had transferred unmanned aerial vehicle technology to Iraq and that this transfer had been undertaken contrary to the provision of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In his letter dated 3 June 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/457), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected this claim.

VI. Implementation of the travel ban and assets freeze provisions

38. In his above-mentioned letter dated 31 May 2019 (S/2019/452), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that several entities also on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) “have been violating [...] the assets freeze restrictions”. In his letter dated 3 June 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/457), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected this claim. The Secretariat is still analysing the information received during the reporting period,

¹¹ Available at www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/955543/-الامة-العربية-في-يوم-القدس-تخلت-عنا-وايران-زودتنا-ب.

¹² Available at <http://saraya.ps/play/2033/2019-5-8-%20-حمزة-أبو-القدس-سرايا-القدس-كلمة-الناطق-باسم-سرايا-القدس-حمزة-20-%20-بتاريخ>.

including information that listed entities may have engaged in financial agreements with foreign entities, or changed name in order to thwart implementation of the assets freeze provisions. I intend to report back to the Security Council accordingly.

39. Since the issuance of my previous report, information has surfaced regarding additional foreign travel by Major General Soleimani. According to local media outlets, he reportedly travelled to Baghdad in late December 2018 and Lebanon in January 2019. The Secretariat sought clarification from the Permanent Mission of Iraq and Lebanon, and I will report back to the Security Council in due course.

40. Information available to the Secretariat suggests that another individual inscribed on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) may have travelled during the reporting period to several countries. The lack of relevant identifying information for that individual, including date and place of birth and current function, may have hampered proper implementation of the travel ban provision. In this regard, updated and more detailed list entries would facilitate the implementation of the restrictive measures of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

VII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

41. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs has continued supporting the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Division has also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related to the procurement channel. In addition, the Division has provided induction briefings for the incoming Facilitator and members of the Council to assist them in their work on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

42. During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the provisions of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), in particular on the procedures for the submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review process.
