



ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE
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Statement

by

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before

The IAEA Board of Governors

on

Report of the IAEA Director General (GOV/2021/29)

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In the Name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

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**Madam Chairperson,
Director General,
Excellencies, Dear Colleagues,**

At the outset, I would like to point out that the Director General's latest report under this agenda item includes some aspects which I deem it necessary to elaborate them more for the sake of establishing a better understanding about the work done and the future perspective in this regard.

I would like to highlight the fact that, once again, the current report of the Director General has a very important point, consistent with the previous ones, which, among others, confirms that there is no safeguards related issue regarding Iran's ongoing nuclear activities. This is unacceptable that for the past two decades, Iran's nuclear issue is occasionally raised in the Agency based on unfounded allegations, while there has been no single evidence of diversion of the nuclear materials to non-peaceful purposes. It should have been known so far that such fabricated allegations are aimed at creating a political and polarized environment in the Agency, which threatens its integrity and technical statutory mandate. Therefore, this unjustified and useless paly in the Agency has to be stopped before it is too late.

In this context, it is deeply disappointing that, while Iran entered into practical and constructive interactions and working relations with the Agency and made efforts in good-faith to address the alleged questions about a few trivial and non-urgent past issues, which have been closed once through the Board's resolution

in December 2015, the Secretariat has taken a counterproductive approach at the expense of its own credibility.

Madam Chairperson,

The current report of the Agency is one way or another, a repetition of the previous report without reflecting appropriately the latest development and progress between the two parties especially for the past two months. Such a repetition is neither necessary, nor constructive, unless it is aimed at establishing an unnecessary agenda in the work of the Agency. Therefore, this report shows the biased approach of the Secretariat vis-à-vis its interactions with Iran, which ignores the level of cooperation and engagement. While Iran positively responded to different initiatives and requests by the Director General (i.e. in August 2020, February and May 2021), unfortunately such positive and constructive approach shown by Iran was not reciprocated appropriately by the Agency, which could turn into an obstacle for future good-will interactions between the two sides.

In short, the report lacks triple C; it is not “**consistent**” in relations with the background of cooperation between Iran and the Agency and its achievements; the content of the report is not based on reliable sources, and therefore it is not “**credible**”; and, the report does not contain comprehensively all elements and aspects of the cooperation and progress made, therefore, is not “**convincing**”.

Having said this, allow me, **Madam Chair**, to explain some of the salient aspects of the progress we made during the past two months, parts of which were also raised in the report of the Director General, as follows:

1. It is noteworthy that, in addition to the previous interactions, only in the past two months and despite the intensity of consultations in Vienna with regard to the JCPOA, three rounds of expert level discussions were held in Vienna and

Tehran between Iran and the Agency. Furthermore, several communications were also exchanged between the two sides.

2. In the visit by the DDG on Safeguards to Tehran in May, the two sides agreed to continue discussions on three following issues first, and to deal with the remaining two issues later after the June Board meeting.

a) Iran has provided the Agency with the complete background information on activities in Location 4 both orally and in writing. According to this information, the supporting documents of which will be presented to the Agency very soon, this location was a fireclay mine which was discovered in late 1960s by a foreign company and was active until 1994. Since then, the mine became abandoned. Furthermore, based on our investigation into the background of the activities carried out in the location, there was no precedent of any nuclear activity; therefore, the origin of the contamination observed by the Agency is absolutely unknown to us. We have asked the Agency, if it had access to any credible reasoning and evidence for such reported contamination, may provide it to Iran for further consideration. Nevertheless, the depleted uranium contamination originating from commercially available uranium-derived products is nothing unusual and is not a significant issue.

On the false claim by the Agency about observing activities consistent with sanitization of part of the location, we have categorically rejected the claim during the May meeting in Tehran. In fact, in 2019, a bidding was held by the owner on the usable materials such as metals, and the winner of the bid carried out necessary activities to extract the materials. On this ground, we believe that this issue should be resolved and considered closed by the Agency. Needless to say that, in his visit to the location, the

Deputy Director General stated that it doesn't seem to be sanitized, so inclusion of this issue in the recent report of the DG raises a serious question about the intentions behind it.

- b) On the so-called natural uranium in the form of a metal disc at location 2, I should remind that the Agency's inspectors carried out in-field verification activity for the concerned location twice during second half of 2020. These are in addition to the annual PIV, usually carried out in the first half of the year, while we had agreed that only one verification activity be carried out in this location to address the issue. In the May meeting in Tehran, we challenged the Agency's claims on this issue which are merely based on a few unsubstantiated images without presenting any supporting evidence. We have stated vividly to the Agency that it is impossible for Iran to take any action based on such unsubstantiated images, and it is upon the Agency to rectify this improper practice. Nevertheless, as a sign of good-faith, Iran informed the Agency in May meeting in Tehran, that if an additional verification activity to the location in question, as requested by the Agency, would help the final resolution of the issue, we are ready to facilitate the implementation of the request. Now, it is upon the Agency to take a professional and proper decision in this regard.
- c) Having different opinions on the modified Code 3.1 is not a new issue between Iran and the Agency and dates back to almost two decades ago. It should be reminded that in the new phase, Iran, among the voluntary and transparency measures, accepted implementation of the modified Code 3.1 based on paragraph 65 of the JCPOA. During the May meeting in Tehran, while Iran established its different interpretation, it has informed the Agency that it does not have a plan to construct a new nuclear facility in

the near future, and of its readiness to work with the Agency to find a mutually acceptable solution to address the issue.

- d) On the Agency's findings about location 1 and its assessment on Iran's explanations and clarifications, our technical experts have different principled technical observations. We have proposed the Agency to hold a technical meeting between the experts of the two sides at mutually convenient time, with a view to share our observations with the Agency. The technical experts of the two sides can also continue their discussions about the issues related to location 3 in the same meeting.

Madam Chairperson,

On a broader note, as referred by Dr. Salehi, the Vice President and Head of AEOL, in his letter in response to Director General's letter of 24th of May on safeguards issues, Iran has so far done its utmost efforts to cooperate with the Agency in a substantive manner, actively engage with the Agency in all possible ways, and provide the necessary clarifications and responses. Dr. Salehi also welcomed that the DG expressed the availability and openness of the Agency to continue working with Iran to reach technical conclusion on the issues, and expressed Iran's readiness to continue to cooperate constructively with the Agency aiming at closing a few safeguards related issues.

In this context, while it is highly expected that such a mutual determination would result in reaching a visible practical outcome as quickly as possible, I would like to reiterate that constructive engagement requires positive environment, avoiding expressing any pre-judgment, raising artificial concerns or deadlines, as well as unnecessary and disproportionate overstatement of the trivial issues.

Iran remains committed to its obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and continues to comply with its provisions and provides any requested clarifications and access in accordance with its CSA and continues to comply with its provisions and provides the Agency with all requested clarifications and access in accordance with its CSA. It should also be reminded that all nuclear materials in Iran are under the Agency's safeguards in accordance with CSA and there is no indication of diversion in declared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

Madam Chair,

Turning to another issue of salient importance to my country, I would like to refer to a terrorist act was carried out against a nuclear facility in Iran, which was brought to the attention of the Members of the Board and Agency through Information Note No. GOV/INF/2021/30 dated 19 May 2021. On Sunday 11th of April 2021, a terrorist act was carried out against a nuclear facility in Iran, which could have become a human and environmental catastrophe. The perpetrators of such a sabotage act deliberately targeting a highly sensitive safeguarded nuclear facility with high risk of potential release of radioactive material must not remain unpunished, and anyone directly or indirectly involved in this heinous act should be held accountable as an accomplice to this terrorist act. Israeli and western media outlets tacitly confirmed, and even boasted about, the complicity of Israeli regime in this cowardly terrorist act.

It is highly imperative that this matter be immediately attended to by the Agency. The Islamic Republic of Iran takes all necessary measures, under international law, to respond firmly and protect and defend its citizens, interests and installations against any terrorist or sabotage acts. In view of this, the Islamic Republic of Iran strongly warns against any adventurism by Israeli regime.

Recurrence of such criminal acts and assassination of nuclear scientists, especially when faces with silence on the part of the Agency, not only will be responded decisively, but also certainly leave no option for Iran but to reconsider its transparency measures and cooperation policy with the Agency.

Madam Chair,

Reacting to some points raised in this meeting, I would like to reiterate that it is a bitter irony of the history that, the Agency overlooks Israeli regime's nuclear weapon program in the volatile region of the Middle East.

Regrettably, this regime continues to ignore the international community by downplaying the significance of the Treaty, denying acceding to the Treaty and refusing to place all its nuclear facilities and activities under the Agency's comprehensive safeguards regime. Quite to the contrary, Israel is now even enjoying a more preferential treatment as compared with that of the Nuclear Weapon States, who are members to the NPT and have several obligations specifically under Articles I and VI of the Treaty. While for being still out of the NPT, Israel is free from any obligations under the Treaty, and enjoys all advantages of the IAEA Statute which are interlinked with the NPT.

Such a situation has given this regime the audacity to ridicule the authority and mandate of the Agency in preventing the diversion of its nuclear materials and activities. Most importantly, this regime has become so cynically bold as to manipulate the realities and criticize other Members of the NPT on the account that they have obligations due to their membership in the Treaty, but Israel has not. This is a very serious shortcoming and failure in the work of the Agency, which should be addressed properly.

In this situation, what is the advantage of being both a NPT member and fully implementing the Agency's safeguards? How could the international community see the IAEA as a serious, professional and impartial partner when it does not pursue evenly and justly the implementation of its comprehensive safeguards regime for all its Members, and yet does not seriously discuss the necessity of verification activities and inspections of, for-instance, Israel's nuclear program? Doesn't the policy of silence and negligence about Israel's nuclear program send a negative message to the members of the NPT meaning that "being a member of the Treaty equals accepting the most robust monitoring and verifications, while being outside the Treaty means to be free from any obligation and criticism, and even be rewarded"?!

To conclude, **Madam Chair**, a regime which is not bound by the NPT and its Comprehensive Safeguards, and its terrorist activities against the peaceful nuclear programs and safeguarded nuclear activities of others are endangering the regional and international peace and security, should not be seen as a proponent of the non-proliferation regime, nor as a reliable source of information for the Agency, which only foments its destructive behavior in the region. The Agency should not act as if it is supporting, directly or indirectly, the political agenda of some against the others. Undoubtedly, this way of biased treatment with its members would not only damage the non-proliferation regime, but also undermines the confidence in the professional activities of the Agency and the level of cooperation between the members and the Agency. The Agency has to distance itself from any political agenda and must take a clear stand on the unacceptability of Israel's remaining outside the NPT framework and its continuing defiance to placing all its nuclear activities and facilities under the Agency's comprehensive safeguards system.

The Agency's lack of attention in this regard, along with its deafening silence in relations with the assassination of the nuclear scientists and the terrorist acts and sabotage against the safeguarded nuclear facilities are, in fact, putting the Agency's independence and credibility under serious question, as if it is turned into a political organization than a technical one. We hope that necessary measures would be taken to correct such practices.

Thank you Madam Chairperson.