

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHN DUNCAN, HEAD OF THE UK
DELEGATION TO THE FIRST PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE
EIGHTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY

VIENNA 30 APRIL 2007

Mr Chairman,

GENERAL

1. I would like to say at the outset how pleased I am to see you in the Chair at this Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is particularly apposite that you, as an Ambassador based in Vienna, should be able to bring your particular expertise to this meeting of States Party to the Treaty, which is taking place during the 50th anniversary celebrations of the IAEA. My delegation and I wish you every success, you will have our full co-operation and support over the days and weeks ahead.
2. May I also take this opportunity to endorse the statement made by Germany on behalf of the European Union.
3. Mr Chairman, the serious issues that face us in connection with supporting and strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty concern us all; because the proliferation of nuclear weapons is an issue that concerns us all, and where we all shoulder serious responsibilities. We must continue to meet these diligently over the coming years if the Treaty is to maintain its strength and integrity.

NPT REVIEW

4. Mr Chairman, we were all disappointed that the 2005 NPT Review Conference was not able to agree substantive measures to strengthen the Treaty regime. The threats and challenges that the Treaty faces continue to emerge and serve to underline its enduring importance. We believe that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the framework for nuclear disarmament. It retains our wholehearted and unequivocal support. In the absence of further measures being agreed in 2005, the UK continues to implement the decisions taken in previous review cycles. We abide by the undertakings we have given to non-proliferation, to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to those on disarmament.
5. Mr Chairman, the UK's hope is that the beginning of the 2010 NPT Review Cycle will see a real improvement in the atmosphere among States Party to the Treaty. We must trust one another to share the same eventual goals for the full implementation of this Treaty. And until it is fully implemented that we can together work, through negotiation and agreement, towards strengthening the provisions of the Treaty and the wider regime. This international success story should be sustained for the security of us all.
6. Mr Chairman, none of us should be in any doubt that the Treaty currently faces challenges from within. Article IV provides for the enjoyment of the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But these inalienable rights come hand in hand with obligations. Obligations to comply fully with the provisions of Articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Those who would develop clandestine nuclear weapons programmes through manipulation of Treaty rights should continue to be taken firmly to task by the international community. We must work together to ensure that all States Party fulfil their obligations to the Treaty so that all of us can enjoy those benefits in peace.
7. We were unable during 2005 to agree on provisions to address the serious issue of withdrawal from the Treaty. We are committed to ensuring that any State deciding to

withdraw cannot subsequently benefit from nuclear technologies obtained while a State Party, or seek to use them in furtherance of an illegal nuclear weapons programme.

DPRK AND IRAN

8. We deplore the DPRK's claimed possession of nuclear weapons, and its claim to have tested a nuclear device on 9 October 2006. We call on DPRK to return to compliance with all its international obligations, including those under the NPT and its IAEA safeguards agreement, and to comply with the requirements of UNSCRs 1695 and 1718. We welcome the successful work of the CTBTO Provisional Technical Secretariat in confirming the full extent and nature of the explosion, proving its invaluable importance in monitoring a future world free of nuclear weapons and testing. Hence, we continue to encourage all Annex II States to sign and ratify the CTBT in order that it may come into force as soon as possible. We continue to place our hope in the future success of the Six Party Talks.
9. Mr Chairman, the United Kingdom continues to be seriously concerned about the proliferation implications of Iran's nuclear programme; as a result of its particular character, Iran's history of safeguards violations, and now the more recent steps Iran has taken to reduce co-operation with the IAEA. These steps include ceasing to implement the Additional Protocol, modifying unilaterally the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and refusing access to inspectors to visit the Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak. Iran's reduction of co-operation with the IAEA further undermines confidence in the peaceful nature of its programme. We therefore strongly urge Iran to co-operate with the IAEA and to resolve all outstanding issues. We deplore the fact that Iran has so far failed to meet its obligations under UNSCRs 1696, 1737 and 1747. We call again on Iran to take the steps required by the international community and made mandatory by these resolutions, to suspend enrichment-related activity and allow negotiations to begin. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme would permit a completely new chapter to be opened in our relations with Iran, not only in the nuclear, but also more broadly in the political, economic and technological fields. As you will be aware, Mr Chairman, the United Kingdom, with the other members of the E3 and the E3+3, and indeed with the backing of the whole international community, has made enormous efforts in the last few years to find a mutually satisfactory way forward on this subject.

IAEA CSA/AP

10. Mr Chairman, these examples should underscore the need for all States Party to work towards a strengthened Treaty regime. We need to ensure that the tools we have to implement the regime are adequate to current challenges. The IAEA stands in the front line defending the integrity of the NPT, and the UK reaffirms its support for the Agency in all areas. We urge all non-Nuclear Weapon States that have not yet done so to agree, bring into force and comply with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols to those agreements. We continue to believe that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol should be accepted as a condition of supply for all sensitive nuclear items.

FUEL ASSURANCES

11. The United Kingdom has been actively involved in efforts to assist with implementation of Article IV through work on the secure provision of nuclear fuel. We await a forward looking and bold paper by the IAEA that seeks to balance the legitimate desires of those who would wish to develop nuclear energy against a robust set of non-proliferation criteria which should include the adherence to the full range of IAEA safeguards. We have put forward our own proposal for improving assurances of supply - an enrichment bond - and are looking for opportunities to develop these ideas with potential recipients, partners and others.

WIDER NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

12. Mr Chairman, we fully accept that the work entailed is not for a single entity such as the IAEA, or for a single nation. We all have a part to play. Nationally we seek to ensure that a broad range of counter-proliferation tools complements the provisions of the NPT and the work of the IAEA. Strong and comprehensive export controls, full implementation of UNSCRs 1540 and 1673, tackling proliferation finance including through the Financial Action Task Force, enhanced interdiction capability through the Proliferation Security Initiative, threat reduction through our own national programme and, jointly with others through the Global Partnership or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, are all necessary.

DISARMAMENT

13. Mr Chairman, as a nuclear weapon state the United Kingdom is aware that it also has particular responsibilities to fulfil. Let me first reiterate that we remain fully committed to a safer world free of nuclear weapons. We reaffirm our unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the relevant disarmament measures contained in the 1995 Review Conference decisions and in the 2000 Final Document.
14. Mr Chairman, you will be aware that at the end of last year we published a White Paper explaining the reasoning behind the UK government's decision to maintain a nuclear deterrent. In March, the UK Parliament voted to support this decision. Firstly, I should make clear what we have decided. The UK has decided to begin the concept and design work required to make possible a replacement for our current ballistic missile submarine fleet; and to maintain the option of using the D5 missile beyond its current life expectancy.
15. This does not mean that we have taken an irreversible decision that commits us irrevocably to possessing nuclear weapons in 40 or 50 years' time. Indeed, our White Paper is clear that the UK remains committed to the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. We do not believe that the circumstances currently exist for the UK safely to choose now *unilaterally* to renounce our nuclear weapons.
16. Mr Chairman, some suggest that it is hypocritical for the UK to maintain its nuclear weapons while calling on others to desist from their development. Let me make clear that the UK does not belong to an opposite camp that insists on "non-proliferation first." The UK fully accepts the proposition that progress must be made on the disarmament and non-proliferation tracks in parallel. The UK White Paper on the nuclear deterrent makes clear our continuing commitment to meet our disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT.
17. The UK has therefore decided to reduce its stockpile of operationally available warheads by a further 20%, to fewer than 160. The warheads that will be withdrawn from service won't simply sit on a shelf as a hedge against a future scenario – they will be fully dismantled. Significant enough though this is, it is just the latest in a series of dramatic reductions to the UK's nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, the explosive power of UK nuclear weapons will have been reduced by 75%. UK nuclear weapons now account for less than 1% of the global inventory.
18. We have withdrawn and dismantled our tactical maritime and airborne nuclear capabilities. We have terminated the nuclear Lance missile and artillery roles that we undertook with US nuclear weapons held under dual-key arrangements. As a consequence we have reduced our reliance on nuclear weapons to one system: submarine-based Trident. We are the only nuclear weapons state to have done this. We have also significantly reduced the operational status of our nuclear weapons system – our Trident submarines are normally at several days "notice to fire". Their missiles are not targeted at any country.
19. Building new submarines for our existing Trident D5 missile system does not reverse or undermine any of these positive disarmament steps. The UK is retaining not modernising

its deterrent. There is no change in the capabilities of the system, no move to produce more useable weapons and no change in nuclear posture or doctrine. The UK's nuclear weapon system will not be designed for war-fighting use in military campaigns. It is a strategic deterrent that we would only ever contemplate using in extreme circumstances of self-defence.

CTBT/FMCT

20. The United Kingdom reiterates its commitment to abide by its moratorium on nuclear testing, and its moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The United Kingdom continues to work towards the entry into force of the CTBT as soon as possible. We hope too that the recent positive indicators that the 10 year long blockage in the Conference on Disarmament may be broken herald a new phase of consensus building in that forum. In the first instance we would like to see the early negotiation, of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty – an issue that would represent an important and concrete step towards disarmament and one that is ripe and ready to be taken forward. We urge a spirit of compromise to be displayed by Member States in the CD to allow this work to commence.

NWFZ

21. The United Kingdom reaffirms its support for Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. These zones promote non-proliferation and reinforce regional stability. The UK has now signed and ratified protocols in respect of 3 Nuclear Weapons Free Zones and has, as a consequence, agreed treaty-based negative security assurances to over 100 countries. We were disappointed that the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty was signed in September 2006, before completion of consultations with the nuclear weapon states were complete. The ambiguous nature of the security arrangements in the Zone has meant that we are unable to ratify the Protocol to that Treaty. We urge the states of the region to ratify the Treaty quickly in order that further progress can be made to resolve these issues.
22. Mr Chairman, in addition to the security assurances we have made in connection with Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, we remain committed to the security assurances we gave to non-nuclear weapons states in 1995, as noted in UNSCR 984.

CONCLUSION

23. In conclusion, Mr Chairman, I would like again to underline that the United Kingdom remains fully committed to the NPT, and to fulfilling its own obligations under it. We will continue to work, in any relevant forum, to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. We continue to believe that full implementation of the NPT offers to all of us the best hope of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and of providing the security that all of us seek.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.