

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 12 December 2022 from the Security Council
Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), my six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 24 June 2022 to 12 December 2022.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fergal Mythen
Security Council Facilitator
for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)



Fourteenth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) sets forth the practical arrangements and procedures for the Council in carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.
2. According to the note, the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its Facilitator for the functions specified therein. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the note, and after consultations among the members of the Council, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2022 (see S/2022/2/Rev.3).
3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on its work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.
4. The present report covers the period from 24 June 2022 to 12 December 2022.

II. Summary of the activities of the Council in the “2231 format”

5. On 27 June, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations sent a letter addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2022/518), in which he outlined the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran with regard to the thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/490), as described further in paragraph 9 of the present report.
6. On 30 June, the Security Council was briefed (S/PV.9085 and SC/14956) by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the thirteenth report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/490), by my predecessor as Facilitator on the work of the Council and the implementation of the resolution (S/2022/510), and by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on the procurement channel (S/2022/482).
7. On 12 December, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) met in the “2231 format” and discussed the findings and recommendations of the fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution (S/2022/912).
8. During the reporting period, a total of 18 notes were circulated within the “2231 format”. In addition, I sent 12 official communications to Member States and/or the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. I received a total of 12 communications from Member States and the Coordinator.

III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

9. In the above-mentioned letter dated 27 June (S/2022/518), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran outlined the views of his country regarding the thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution. The letter contained 11 points, in which the Permanent Representative noted, *inter alia*, that “unilateral sanctions ... have continued unabated” and that the United States of America “has refrained from any positive steps towards honouring its commitments under the JCPOA or even making any practical move that may facilitate the ongoing efforts in this regard”. Stating that “the effective lifting of sanctions and normalization of Iran’s trade and economic relations are critical components of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the delicate balance of reciprocal obligations contained therein, without which the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action would be useless”, the Permanent Representative also recalled sections 3 and 7 of annex II to annex A to the resolution, which “elaborate on reciprocal commitments and underline the necessity of a balanced and realistic approach to JCPOA implementation”.

10. During the reporting period, the Joint Commission continued to convene, and its Coordinator continued to consult with the Plan of Action participants and the United States on addressing developments regarding the Plan, including the possible return by the United States to the Plan, and to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Plan by all.

11. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Plan of Action and to report at any time on any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments, the Director General submitted to the Agency’s Board of Governors, and to the Council, regular reports on 7 September (S/2022/854) and 10 November¹ on the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of the resolution.

12. In these reports, IAEA sets out the Agency’s continued view that, since 23 February 2021, its verification and monitoring activities in relation to the Plan of Action have been “seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol” and that the country’s decision to “remove all of the Agency’s equipment previously installed in Iran for surveillance and monitoring activities in relation to the JCPOA” has had “detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme”. During the reporting period, the Director General also provided the following updates: on 9 July (S/2022/850) regarding the Agency’s verification that the Islamic Republic of Iran had begun to use the cascade of IR-6 centrifuges with modified subheaders to produce enriched UF₆ at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; on 3 August (S/2022/851), regarding the increase in enrichment-related activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant; on 29 August (S/2022/852), reporting that the country had started using one of the cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at the Natanz Plant to produce low enriched uranium; on 31 August (S/2022/853), reporting that the country had started using a second cascade of IR-6 centrifuges at the Natanz Plant to produce low enriched uranium;² on

¹ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), document GOV/2022/62.

² See International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, “Seven updates since the Director General’s previous quarterly report” (GOV/2022/39, annex 2).

3 October³ regarding the switch of mode of production of enriched nuclear material at the Fordow Plant; on 10 October⁴ regarding the country's decision to install additional cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz Plant;⁵ on 22 November⁶ regarding the country's decision to start producing high-enriched uranium at 60 per cent U-235 at the Fordow Plant and the operationalization of advanced centrifuges at the Fordow and Natanz Plants; and on 29 November⁷ regarding enrichment-related activities at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and the Fordow Plant.

Ballistic missiles and launches

13. In identical letters dated 24 June (S/2022/514), the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations noted that the United States wished to bring to the attention of the Security Council “a recent incident of Iranian activity in defiance of paragraph 3 of annex B” to resolution 2231 (2015), regarding the launch of a Qased space launch vehicle to “place a satellite called Noor 2 into orbit”. She urged the Council to “continue to insist on full implementation of the binding measures in annex B”.

14. In response to the above identical letters, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 5 July (S/2022/544), noted his country's “consistent position” on this issue and that its space and missile programmes, including the launch of space vehicles, “fall outside the purview or competence of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and its annexes”. He stated that his country “categorically rejects those unfounded and misleading allegations” and that the country could exercise its “inherent rights” as part of “the exploration of space and its utilization for peaceful purposes”.

15. In response to the above letter, the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, in a letter dated 13 July (S/2022/554), reiterated his country's position that the Islamic Republic of Iran was “fully entitled to the advantages of space science and technology”. He noted that the Russian Federation continued to “proceed from its previous assessment that Iran is respecting in good faith the call addressed to it” in paragraph 3 of annex B to the resolution.

16. In a letter dated 22 November (S/2022/878), the representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations noted the 5 November “flight test of its Ghaem-100 satellite launch vehicle” and other tests constituted “an enduring trend ... despite the provisions in resolution 2231 (2015)”.

17. In identical letters dated 23 November (S/2022/861), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations expressed his position that the launches of space launch vehicles by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 24 June and 4 November were “in clear violation of article 3 of annex B to Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)” and that it was “important that the Council take steps to enforce the restrictions of annex B in a manner that will deter Iran from these violations”.

18. In response to the above identical letters, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his letter dated 28 November (S/2022/882), “reject[ed] all unsubstantiated allegations made” in the identical letters and reaffirmed that the

³ International Atomic Energy Agency, document GOV/INF/2022/22.

⁴ International Atomic Energy Agency, document GOV/INF/2022/23.

⁵ See IAEA Board of Governors, “Two updates since the Director General's previous quarterly report” (GOV/2022/62, annex 2).

⁶ International Atomic Energy Agency, document GOV/INF/2022/24.

⁷ International Atomic Energy Agency, document GOV/INF/2022/25.

missile and space programmes of his country “fall outside of the purview or competence of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and its annexes”.

19. In response to the above letter, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in his letter dated 29 November 2022 ([S/2022/889](#)), reiterated that “none of the existing international instruments and mechanisms ... either directly or implicitly prohibit Iran to develop missile and space programmes” and that it remains the assessment of the Russian Federation that “Iran is respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons”.

Transfers related to ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (as defined in paragraph 4 of annex B)

20. In a letter dated 17 October ([S/2022/771](#)), the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations drew attention to “the transfers of ... unmanned aerial vehicles from Iran to Russia ... specifically, in late August 2022”. He stated his view that these transfers, with regard to paragraph 4 of annex B, “should be considered as violations” of the resolution. He invited “United Nations experts to visit Ukraine at the earliest possible opportunity to inspect recovered Iranian-origin unmanned aerial vehicles in order to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)”.

21. In response to the above letter, in a letter dated 19 October ([S/2022/776](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that he “categorically reject[s] the unfounded allegation” and that such “claims and false statements” were based on “unsubstantiated ‘public information’”. He further noted that the claims made by Ukraine regarding paragraph 4 of annex B to the resolution were an “inaccurate and arbitrary interpretation of the letter and spirit of that paragraph”.

22. In their letter dated 21 October ([S/2022/781](#)), the representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom expressed their concern regarding the “transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles from Iran to Russia in violation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)” and referred to paragraphs 4 and 6 of annex B to the resolution.

23. In her letter of 21 October ([S/2022/782](#)), the Permanent Representative of the United States, making similar points, asked “that the United Nations Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) conduct a technical and impartial investigation that assesses the type of unmanned aerial vehicles involved in these transfers in the light of the prohibitions contained in the resolution”.

24. In response to the letter from the representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom ([S/2022/781](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in a letter dated 21 October ([S/2022/783](#)), stated his view that “no mandate has ever been given to the United Nations Secretariat by the Security Council for any ‘investigation’ in the context of” resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). He expressed his country’s most serious concern regarding what he stated were “the attempts of certain Member States to give instructions to the United Nations Secretariat in violation of Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations”.

25. In response to both aforementioned letters ([S/2022/781](#) and [S/2022/782](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 24 October ([S/2022/794](#)), a copy of which was sent to me as Facilitator, stated his country’s view “that the resolution itself provides no legal basis for ... such an investigation” by the

Secretariat and that “any findings resulting from such an illegal investigation would be null and void”.

26. The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, in a letter dated 5 December (S/2022/908), and the Permanent Representatives of Germany and France, in letters dated 6 December (S/2022/913 and S/2022/914), noted that Ukraine had formally requested that the Secretariat visit it in order to inspect recovered Iranian-origin unmanned aerial vehicles. Noting the vital role that the Secretariat plays in providing an independent assessment of such evidence, they also noted that on 19 October, in closed consultations, the Security Council had discussed the transfer of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles to the Russian Federation, and further noted the Security Council meeting called by the Russian Federation on 26 October, including the Legal Counsel’s comments.

27. In response to the above letters, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in letters dated 6 December (S/2022/911) and 7 December (S/2022/922), noted “the constant objections by the Russian Federation to any ‘investigation’”; underlined his country’s position that “the Secretariat has no authority to conduct, or in any other form engage in, any ‘investigation’ with regard to an alleged breach of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”, stating that doing so would “openly violate ... the Charter”; and reiterated his call “to the members of the Security Council to oppose such attempts”. He also referenced the Security Council meeting of 26 October, with regard to Article 100 of the Charter, and the Legal Counsel’s comments.

28. Also in response to the above letters (S/2022/908, S/2022/913 and S/2022/914), in letters dated 6 and 7 December (S/2022/915 and S/2022/923), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that his country “categorically rejects the false claims and unwarranted allusions made against it” and that “the use of conventional weapons, including unmanned aerial vehicles, in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is totally irrelevant to Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and its annex B”.

29. The above-mentioned letters, addressed to the Secretary-General and/or the President of the Security Council, were circulated in the “2231 format” of the Council during the reporting period.

IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications and exemptions

30. During the reporting period, no new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council.

31. Since Implementation Day, a total of 52 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To date, of the 52 proposals that have been processed, 37 have been approved, 5 not approved and 10 withdrawn. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in 50 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan of Action, the procurement channel continues to function, and the Joint Commission continues to stand ready to review proposals.

32. According to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), certain nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. In this regard, during the reporting period, eight notifications were submitted to the Security Council in relation

to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment and technology covered by annex B, section 1 of [INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1](#), intended for light water reactors.

33. No notifications were submitted to the Security Council related to the necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, and no notifications were submitted to the Council related to the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design.

34. On 5 December 2022, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to me the Group's fourteenth six-month report of the Joint Commission ([S/2022/919](#)) in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

V. Other approval and exemption requests

35. During the reporting period, no proposal was submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

36. Exemptions to the assets freeze provisions are contained in paragraph 6 (d) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). No exemption requests were received or granted by the Security Council in relation to the 23 individuals and 61 entities currently on the list maintained pursuant to the resolution.

VI. Transparency, outreach and guidance

37. As the Security Council's Facilitator, I am deeply committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as endorsed by the Council in its resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). I will seek to facilitate, strengthen and promote the implementation of the resolution, as my predecessor did before me, and I believe that dialogue, transparency and the utilization of the procurement channel remain critical for the present and the future. I note and welcome the active efforts by all Member States in promoting, supporting and engaging in dialogue and in acknowledging the importance of the Plan of Action as a multilateral agreement in nuclear non-proliferation. I encourage all of us to actively support this Plan.

38. Outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated by the note mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present report ([S/2016/44](#)), continued to foster awareness of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The website on the resolution, also managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, continues to provide relevant information.

39. In my role as Facilitator, I held numerous bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). As I continue to advocate for the Council's collective responses to international peace and security issues, I encourage the international community to act in line with paragraph 2 of the resolution, which calls upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.