



# Security Council

Distr.: General  
21 June 2021

Original: English

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## Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

### Eleventh report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The context for the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) has evolved considerably in the past six months. The United States rejoining the Plan, after having withdrawn from it in May 2018, would be a welcome development. In that regard, I take note of the letter dated 18 February addressed to the President of the Security Council from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission to the United Nations (S/2021/158), in which the United States affirmed its view that the measures contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of resolution 2231 (2015) remained in effect and that the provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010) that had been terminated by resolution 2231 (2015) remained terminated.<sup>1</sup> I also take note of the letter from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2021/183) in response to the above-mentioned letter from the United States, and its letter dated 3 June 2021 (A/75/914-S/2021/538).

2. I am encouraged by the recent diplomatic engagements taking place in and around the Joint Commission since April 2021 on the landmark agreement. They offer an opportunity for the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran to return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015). I appeal to the United States to lift or waive its sanctions outlined in the Plan, extend the waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and fully renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects in the framework of the Plan. These are needed steps to facilitate the full and proper implementation of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015), as well as to enable the Iranian people to secure tangible benefits from the Plan.

3. The Islamic Republic of Iran has taken a series of worrying steps to reduce its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan, in accordance with its December 2020 Law entitled "Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect Iranian Nation's Interests", following the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan and other developments related to its nuclear programme. In recent months, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented that the Islamic Republic of Iran has

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<sup>1</sup> Also in that letter, the United States withdrew its previous letters addressed to the Security Council dated 20 August 2020 (S/2020/815), 21 August 2020 (S/2020/822) and 21 September 2020 (S/2020/927).



installed new and advanced centrifuges, including types IR-2m and IR-4, for uranium enrichment not foreseen in the Plan; has undertaken uranium enrichment up to 60 per cent; and has begun research and development activities for the production of uranium metal for fuel for the Tehran research reactor. IAEA also reported that, while it had not been able to verify the total enriched uranium stockpile in the Islamic Republic of Iran, it estimated that, as of May 2021, its stockpile was 3,241 kg (above the limit of 202.8 kg).<sup>2</sup> The Islamic Republic of Iran has stated that all its measures taken since 1 July 2019 are reversible. I appeal to the Islamic Republic of Iran to return to full implementation of the Plan and urge it to consider carefully and address the other concerns raised by participants in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

4. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) remain a success of multilateral diplomacy and nuclear non-proliferation and continue to enjoy the full support of the broader international community. Member States, especially those in the region, should promote a conducive environment for the ongoing diplomatic efforts and avoid provocative rhetoric and actions that may have a negative impact on those efforts or regional stability. I continue to believe that a full restoration of the Plan remains the best way to ensure that the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran remains exclusively peaceful. I call upon Member States to support the Plan, and issues not related to the Plan should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments. I also call upon all Member States to work effectively, including through the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, in creating the conditions necessary for their economic operators to engage in trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran in accordance with the resolution. This is especially important given the current economic and health challenges posed by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

5. I commend the professional, factual and impartial work of IAEA on verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in line with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). I take note of the report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which he informed the Security Council of the decision by the Islamic Republic of Iran to suspend as of 23 February 2021 the implementation of voluntary transparency measures envisaged in the Plan, including the additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement.<sup>3</sup> I also take note of the 21 February 2021 joint statement issued by the Agency and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, in which the parties indicated that they had reached a temporary bilateral technical understanding that would allow the Agency to continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities for three months,<sup>4</sup> and their 24 May 2021 agreement to extend that understanding until 24 June 2021. In its most recent report ([S/2021/558](#)), the Agency reported that, since 23 February 2021, its “verification and monitoring activities have been affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol ... The agreement of 24 May 2021 is to enable the Agency to recover and re-establish the necessary continuity of knowledge.”

6. The present report, my eleventh on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings and recommendations, since the issuance of my tenth report ([S/2020/1177](#))

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<sup>2</sup> See [S/2021/230](#), [S/2021/231](#), [S/2021/232](#), [S/2021/233](#), [S/2021/234](#), [S/2021/235](#), [S/2021/236](#), [S/2021/237](#), [S/2021/238](#), [S/2021/239](#), [S/2021/547](#), [S/2021/548](#), [S/2021/549](#), [S/2021/550](#), [S/2021/551](#), [S/2021/552](#), [S/2021/553](#), [S/2021/554](#), [S/2021/555](#), [S/2021/556](#), [S/2021/557](#) and [S/2021/558](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [S/2021/239](#), para. 8.

<sup>4</sup> See [www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/joint-statement-by-the-vice-president-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-and-head-of-the-aeoi-and-the-director-general-of-the-iaea](http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/joint-statement-by-the-vice-president-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-and-head-of-the-aeoi-and-the-director-general-of-the-iaea).

on 7 December 2020. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

## II. Key findings and recommendations

7. In the reporting period, I did not receive any information regarding the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear-related items undertaken contrary to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

8. Since 7 December 2020, one new proposal has been submitted to and approved by the Security Council through the procurement channel. The procurement channel continues to be a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism, providing assurances that the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods and related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran is consistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), as well as the provisions and objectives of the Plan. I continue to encourage all participants in the Plan, Member States and the private sector to fully support and utilize the channel.

9. In the reporting period, several Member States brought to my attention and the attention of the President of the Security Council, information and their views relating to several ballistic missile launches and a space launch vehicle test undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran. I did not, however, receive any official information regarding transfers undertaken contrary to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), including on ballistic missile-related transfers from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

10. The Secretariat also did not receive any official information alleging action inconsistent with the asset freeze provisions contained in paragraph 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

## III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

11. Since 7 December 2020, one new proposal to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) was submitted to and approved by the Security Council through the procurement channel. In addition, the Security Council received eight new notifications pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Plan that do not require approval but do require a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission.

12. As noted above, the return of the United States to the Plan would be a welcome development, and I hope that it will once again facilitate the implementation of the above-mentioned activities in line with the Plan and resolution. These activities are related specifically to the existing unit at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, assistance to expand the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant beyond the existing reactor unit, the transfer of enriched uranium out of the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for natural uranium, the modification of infrastructure at the Fordow facility and activities related to the modernization of the Arak reactor.

## IV. Implementation of the ballistic missile-related provisions

13. In a letter dated 18 February 2021 addressed to me ([S/2021/163](#)), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland brought to my attention multiple ballistic missile launches conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 16 and 17 January 2021 and a *Zoljanah* space launch vehicle test announced on 1 February 2021. According to those States,

the missiles launched were category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime<sup>5</sup> and therefore designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. They stressed that the use of solid-propellant motors in the *Zoljanah* space launch vehicle was of concern as those motors could form the basis for the development of medium- to long-range ballistic missiles. They concluded that the missile launches and the *Zoljanah* space launch vehicle test were inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

14. In a letter dated 2 March 2021 addressed to the President of the Security Council and me (A/75/795-S/2021/216), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation reiterated the position of his country regarding the implementation of paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). He underscored that the Islamic Republic of Iran was not prohibited by multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms or resolution 2231 (2015) from developing missile and space programmes. He also reiterated that the category I criteria of the Missile Technology Control Regime “were never intended to be used in the context of resolution 2231 (2015) to determine whether or not certain ballistic missiles are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons”, and that the Russian Federation continued to consider that the Islamic Republic of Iran “is respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons”.

15. In a letter dated 4 March 2021 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/222), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations “categorically rejected” all allegations made by France, Germany and the United Kingdom in their letter dated 18 February 2021. He also restated that the Iranian missile and space programmes, including the launches of ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles, “fall outside of the purview or competence of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and its annexes”, adding that paragraph 3 of annex B to the resolution, in which the Council called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran “not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology”, “is crystal clear and needs no interpretation”. The Permanent Representative noted the absence of any implicit or explicit reference to the Missile Technology Control Regime or space launch vehicles in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

16. In identical letters dated 7 April 2021 addressed to the President of the Security Council and me (S/2021/338), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations referred to the multiple short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched by the Islamic Republic of Iran during the military exercise “the Great Prophet 15”, held in mid-January 2021, which he assessed had met the Missile Technology Control Regime category I criteria. Stating that “[a]ll these missile systems have a range of at least 300 km and the capacity to carry a 500 kg warhead, the recognized minimum properties to carry the mass of a nuclear warhead and the required distance to ensure self-preservation after delivery”, the Permanent Representative concluded that the launches were in “direct violation of paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)”. Concerning the *Zoljanah* space launch vehicle test announced on 1 February 2021, he assessed that these “latest technological advancements point once again to the close link between Iran’s space and military programmes, which work in tandem to develop its capacity to carry nuclear warheads”.

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<sup>5</sup> Such systems are defined as “complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg ‘payload’ to a ‘range’ of at least 300 km”. See Equipment, Software and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime, available at <https://mtcr.info/mtcr-annex/>.

17. In a letter dated 14 April 2021 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/361), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations referred to the abovementioned letter (S/2021/338) and reiterated that the missile programme, including the launches of ballistic missiles, fell outside the purview of resolution 2231 (2015) and its annexes. He also reiterated that the space programme, comprising scientific and technological activities, related to the peaceful uses of outer space and remained an inherent right under international law, and that the Islamic Republic of Iran was determined to vigorously pursue its realization.

18. In identical letters dated 12 January 2021 addressed to the President of the Security Council and me (S/2021/33), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran “has become the largest proliferator of ballistic and other missile technologies to Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Gaza”. In a letter dated 22 January 2021 addressed to the President of the Security Council and me (S/2021/72), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations “categorically reject[ed] all unfounded accusations against [his] country contained in the above-mentioned letter”.

## **V. Implementation of the assets freeze provisions**

19. During the reporting period, the Secretariat did not receive any official information alleging actions inconsistent with the asset freeze provisions of resolution 2231 (2015).

## **VI. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)**

20. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs has continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the Facilitator, for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division has also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related to the procurement channel. In addition, the Division provided induction briefings for the incoming Facilitator and members of the Council to assist them in their work on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).