

108TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. CON. RES. 307

Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 20, 2003

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania (for himself, Ms. HARMAN, Mr. KIRK, and Mr. BERMAN) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons.

Whereas environmental sampling by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility revealed the presence of 2 types of highly enriched uranium that can be used to develop nuclear weapons;

Whereas the traces of highly-enriched uranium detected by the IAEA at the Natanz facility and the Kalaye Electric

Company could indicate that Iran has been secretly attempting to produce weapons-grade uranium at these facilities;

Whereas, in March 2003, the Director of the IAEA announced that Iran was constructing a facility to enrich uranium, a key component of advanced nuclear weapons;

Whereas, on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”);

Whereas the June 6, 2003, report of the Director General of the IAEA expressed concern over the failure of the Government of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities at its nuclear facilities, including those that have the potential to enrich uranium and develop nuclear weapons, in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

Whereas the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a resolution on September 12, 2003, that calls on Iran to provide the IAEA a full declaration of all imported material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment program, to grant unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, to the IAEA, to resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the IAEA experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country, to provide complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments, and to provide such other information and explanations and take such other steps as the IAEA determines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003, all out-

standing issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear activities;

Whereas, in June 2003, Iran conducted a successful test of the 800-mile range Shahab-3 missile, and Iran is also seeking to produce a 1,200-mile Shahab-4 missile;

Whereas Iran's known support for terrorism and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and technology, coupled with its nuclear weapons program, poses a serious national security threat to the United States and United States allies in the region; and

Whereas, by signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signatories such as Iran that are not declared nuclear powers commit themselves to abstaining from the acquisition of nuclear weapons, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and achieving nuclear disarmament: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate*
 2 *concurring), That Congress—*

3 (1) deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear
 4 weapons program and the failure of the Government
 5 of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities
 6 to the International Atomic Energy Commission
 7 in contravention of its obligations under the
 8 safeguards agreement it signed in connection with
 9 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
 10 Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow
 11 July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970

1 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the “Nu-
2 clear Non-Proliferation Treaty”);

3 (2) concurs with the view of the Department of
4 State, as delivered in testimony to the U.S.-Israel
5 Joint Parliamentary Committee on September 17,
6 2003, by the Assistant Secretary of State for
7 Verification and Compliance that the explanations
8 provided by the Government of Iran for its nuclear
9 activities are not credible;

10 (3) concurs with the conclusion reached in the
11 Department of State’s Annual Report on Adherence
12 to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-
13 proliferation Agreements and Commitments that
14 Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weap-
15 ons;

16 (4) calls on the President to use all appropriate
17 means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weap-
18 ons, including—

19 (A) urging the Government of Iran to ac-
20 cept in full the resolution adopted by the Board
21 of Governors of the International Atomic En-
22 ergy Agency on September 12, 2003 (hereafter
23 in this resolution referred to as the “IAEA res-
24 olution”), that calls on Iran to—

1 (i) provide the Agency a full declara-
2 tion of all imported material and compo-
3 nents relevant to the uranium enrichment
4 program;

5 (ii) grant unrestricted access, includ-
6 ing environmental sampling, to the Agency;

7 (iii) resolve questions regarding the
8 conclusion of the Agency experts who test-
9 ed gas centrifuges in that country;

10 (iv) provide complete information re-
11 garding the conduct of uranium conversion
12 experiments; and

13 (v) provide such other information
14 and explanations and take such other steps
15 as the Agency determines necessary to re-
16 solve by October 31, 2003, all outstanding
17 issues involving Iran's nuclear materials
18 and nuclear activities;

19 (B) taking such diplomatic measures as
20 are necessary to encourage other nations, espe-
21 cially Russia, to urge the Government of Iran
22 to fully and immediately comply with the such
23 resolution; and

24 (C) working with the United Nations and
25 other nations to urge the Government of Iran

1 to sign the Model Additional Protocol to give
2 the International Atomic Energy Agency great-
3 er access in Iran to ensure that—

4 (i) no undeclared facilities exist in
5 Iran; and

6 (ii) no materials or technologies have
7 been diverted from safeguarded facilities in
8 Iran;

9 (5) calls on Russia to—

10 (A) use all appropriate means to urge Iran
11 to accept in full the IAEA resolution; and

12 (B) suspend all nuclear cooperation with
13 Iran until Iran fully and completely complies
14 with the IAEA resolution;

15 (6) calls on member states of the United Na-
16 tions to join the United States in preventing the
17 Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and
18 develop programs or facilities that could be used in
19 a nuclear weapons program;

20 (7) calls on the International Atomic Energy
21 Agency to—

22 (A) find Iran in violation of its commit-
23 ments as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Pro-
24 liferation Treaty; and

1 (B) refer the matter to the United Nations
2 Security Council if Iran fails to meet its obliga-
3 tions to the International Atomic Energy Agen-
4 cy by October 31, 2003;

5 (8) calls on the United Nations Security Coun-
6 cil to immediately undertake consideration of—

7 (A) the threat to international peace and
8 security posed by Iran’s nuclear weapons pro-
9 gram; and

10 (B) the passage of a Security Council reso-
11 lution or the taking of other actions that may
12 be necessary to impose diplomatic and economic
13 sanctions against Iran if it fails to meet its obli-
14 gations to the International Atomic Energy
15 Agency by October 31, 2003; and

16 (9) calls on the Government of Iran to cease all
17 efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities until
18 it is able to verify that it is not engaged in a clan-
19 destine nuclear weapons program by—

20 (A) coming into complete and verifiable
21 compliance with its obligations under the IAEA
22 resolution, including the prompt and uncondi-
23 tional implementation of the Model Additional
24 Protocol; and

- 1 (B) fully meeting its obligations under the
- 2 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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Company could indicate that Iran has been secretly attempting to produce weapons-grade uranium at these facilities;

Whereas, in March 2003, the Director of the IAEA announced that Iran was constructing a facility to enrich uranium, a key component of advanced nuclear weapons;

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Whereas the June 6, 2003, report of the Director General of the IAEA expressed concern over the failure of the Government of Iran to report material, facilities, and activities at its nuclear facilities, including those that have the potential to enrich uranium and develop nuclear weapons, in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

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