WMD TERRORISM AND PROLIFERANT STATES
Hearing
Before the
House Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attacks Subcommittee
September 8, 2005
JOHN
LINDER
A Representative from Georgia, and
Chairman, House Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attacks Subcommittee
LINDER: The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, will come to order.
I would like to welcome and thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. We may not always be able to precisely predict and anticipate the devastation that Mother Nature unleashes, however we must ensure that we anticipate a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction.
We only have to imagine that it was a 10-kiloton nuclear device that was set off in the middle of New Orleans to fully comprehend the devastation that we would be facing today. What we would be doing is recover from a deliberate large-scale biological attack. As we recognize the strong effort by the Department of Homeland Security to assist the people in the devastated Gulf Coast region, we must not lose sight of the fact that a terrorist assisted by a state actor who is intent on killing a large number of U.S. citizens will dwarf in magnitude the devastation that we have observed in Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana.
While natural disasters can only be mitigated, attacks of manmade origin can and must be prevented. Prevention can only be achieved with accurate assessments of the threat, combined with the effective action. It is with this outcome in mind that we focus today on a particularly challenging threat: states which sponsor terrorists, who also pursue weapons of mass destruction. The WMD attack always raises questions about the capabilities of specific terrorist organizations.
Given the hurdles that individual terrorist organizations must overcome, assistance by a state may be critical to a terrorist group wishing to launch a more sophisticated WMD attack. Such states could enable terrorist groups to overcome multiple hurdles in mounting a successful chemical, biological and nuclear attack, sanctuary for planning and preparation, resources, expertise, material and technology, all vital to such an enterprise, to be provided by a state that is sympathetic to the terrorists.
As a nation with a nascent nuclear program, the well-documented links to Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations, Iran is a particular concern. While Iran is by no means the only state of this type, its continued hostility toward the United States, its past attacks on U.S. forces, and its current well-publicized proliferation activities give it a well-deserved special status. Iran continues to convert uranium into a form suitable for enrichment, in defiance of IAEA requests to stop. Talks between European Union negotiators and Iran aimed at resolving the nuclear question have broken down, further dimming the prospect for halting Iranian enrichment activities.
Direct Iranian support for international terrorist organizations continues. The State Department's most recent country reports on terrorism states that Iran remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism. The Wall Street Journal reports that Iran's new president has called for a wave of Islamic revolution. This sponsorship of terror extends to Iraq as well. Time magazine recently published a report entitled Inside Iran's Secret War for Iraq, and other media reports have chronicled Iranian assistance for insurgent attacks against U.S. forces and civilians in Iraq. This was confirmed in the recently collected charges in Iraq that clearly shows an Iranian pedigree.
Collectively, these actions give us concern. While historically no state, including Iran, has provided WMD to any terrorist organization, the future holds no such guarantees. We must remain vigilant and informed in this dynamic environment.
I look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses today and their views of the threat as it exists today and how it might evolve in the future.
I now recognize my colleague from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin.
JAMES
LANGEVIN
A Representative from Rhode Island, and
Ranking Member, House Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attacks Subcommittee
LANGEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome our witnesses here today. I certainly look forward to hearing the testimony. After listening to witnesses at previous hearings and briefings held by the subcommittee, I feel that our government must move quickly to accelerate its efforts to secure nuclear material at its source. However, this cannot occur in a vacuum, and we must monitor the activities of nations such as Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran.
I notice that all of our witnesses' prepared testimony focused on Iran, and rightly so. Given that it is the most active state sponsor of terrorism, combined with the unsuccessful attempts by our European allies to prevent the Iranians from enriching uranium, we must not underestimate the threat a nuclear Iran would pose to our national security.
I also believe that other nations pose a threat as well. North Korea is a designated state sponsor of terrorism and has stepped up their weapons-making activities. I have said before that North Korea has never developed a weapon system that they have not sold, which makes them a likely source for terrorists to obtain a weapon of mass destruction on the black market. Pakistan is another concern, given the large-scale proliferation activities of the A.Q. Khan network. In fact, Pakistan sent enrichment technology to Iran and North Korea and it remains unknown whether or not Khan assisted terrorist groups.
Finally, a large portion of the Russian nuclear stockpile is not secure. Given that Russia is the largest source of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear material, we must ensure that our government does all it can to ensure that these weapons are secured or destroyed.
I look forward to today's testimony and I would be particularly interested in hearing our witnesses' thoughts on North Korea and Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for holding this hearing and I yield back.
LINDER: I thank the gentleman.
We now turn to our panel of expert witnesses. Other members are reminded that they may submit written statements for the record.
Mr. Gregory Giles is a national security consultant with extensive experience in developing threat assessments for the U.S. government, specializing in weapons of mass destruction. He has published several reports on Iranian unconventional weapons programs.
Dr. Daniel Byman comes to us from Georgetown University where he is an associate professor in the School of Foreign Service. Dr. Byman served as a professional staff member with both the 9/11 Commission and the Joint 9/11 inquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. He has recently published a book entitled Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism.
Dr. Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council of Foreign Relations and is a noted expert on Iran. He has published extensively on the Middle East and has a forthcoming book entitled The Guardians of the Revolution: Iran's Approach to the World.
We welcome you all. We thank you for being here.
Mr. Giles?
GREGORY
GILES,
Senior Director for Competitive Analysis,
Hick & Associates, Inc.,
Center for Adaptive Strategies & Threats
GILES: Good morning, Chairman Linder and Ranking Member Langevin and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the potential threat of Iranian WMD terrorism against the United States.
As we approach the fourth anniversary of the September 11 attacks, we are sadly reminded of the tragic costs of underestimating our adversaries. It is against this backdrop that we must continue to strengthen our efforts to anticipate emerging threats against the United States.
The first part of my testimony suggests that the Islamic Republic of Iran stands at a very dangerous nexus of deep hostility towards the United States, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism. Therefore, it is only prudent that we consider the risk Iran might one day undertake or sponsor a WMD terrorist attack against the United States. I will provide some scenarios for such a possibility.
I will then propose a framework that considers on one hand possible impediments, and on the other possible enablers or inducements to Iranian WMD attack on our country. Finally, I will suggest some implications of this threat for U.S. national security planning.
In the interests of time, I would like to proceed directly to the scenarios as a way to try and structure our thinking about this potential threat. Among the possibilities are the following scenarios arranged in order from lesser to greater awareness and sanction by Iran's ruling elite.
Number one, zealots and profiteers in Iran's WMD scientific and industrial communities might engage in an A.Q. Khan-like network supplying WMD on the black market for terrorist groups.
Number two, rogue elements within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which oversees Iran's WMD programs and supports international terrorism, might orchestrate a WMD terrorist attack of their own.
Number three, Iran provides terrorist groups with advice on how to procure WMD technology, equipment and materials.
Number four, Iran provides WMD to terrorist proxies and trains them to carry out specified attacks.
And number five, Iran uses its own IRGC or intelligence operatives to carry out a deliberate covert WMD attack.
This list is by no means exhaustive, and analysts have different views as to the likelihood of each scenario. But in thinking about the likelihood of the scenarios, I put forward a framework and emphasize that to date there are no public indications that Iran has engaged in WMD terrorism, so it is useful to try and assess why that might be and how things might change. So I offer the following political, security and economic impediments to Iranian involvement in WMD terrorism.
Certainly, Iranian engagement in this kind of behavior would fly in the face of various Iranian religious edicts and policy pronouncements condemning the use of WMD, and I believe would further undermine the mullahs' claim to legitimacy. Also, turning over WMD to terrorist proxies could give such groups greater political leverage over Teheran, including the potential for blackmail.
On the security front, certainly Iran fears the possibility of retaliation and would not want to stimulate its own opponents to engage in WMD activity by setting a dangerous precedent.
Finally on the economic front, nearly 80 percent of Iran's foreign income is derived from the sale of oil and natural gas, with the very risky prospect of an embargo for such behavior.
Turning to possible enablers or inducements, on the political front, should Israel and the Palestinians appear to be making progress toward a peaceful settlement, Iran might try to derail the process by dramatically escalating the level of violence. Use of WMD by Palestinian rejectionist groups would certainly provide such a shock. Extremes within Iran might once again initiate a wave of international terrorist attacks in order to embarrass their more pragmatic factions in Teheran as they did in the 1980s.
In terms of security, Iran might wish to remind its main adversaries of their vulnerabilities by subjecting them to a symbolic WMD attack by proxy, in essence an asymmetric shot across the bow to deter any preemptive attacks that might be under consideration.
In terms of economics, Iran's mullahs might be less inhibited to engage in this kind of activity if they thought they could undermine an international oil embargo. Their relationship with China in this regard is an interesting consideration.
So in terms of implications, I think in the end whether Iran would engage in this kind of activity depends on three factors: the regime's risk propensity, which is generally regarded as low, but not zero; the perception that the benefits of such involvements significantly outweigh the costs; and how well the mullahs can control the WMD programs and terrorists operations within the IRGC and other organizations elsewhere in the regime.
This concludes my prepared statement. With the subcommittee's permission, I request that my formal statement be submitted for the record.
LINDER: Without objection, it will be.
GILES: Thank you, Chairman Linder and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I would be happy to answer any questions you have.
LINDER: Thank you, Mr. Giles.
Dr. Byman?
DANIEL
BYMAN,
Associate Professor, Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service,
and
Director, Security Studies Program,
Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University
BYMAN: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to speak before you today.
To make my position clear from the start, although Iran is one of the world's leading sponsors of terrorism, I believe it is not likely to transfer chemical, biological or other unconventional weapons to terrorist groups. My spoken remarks will concentrate on this theme, while my prepared remarks discuss Iran's support for terrorism more broadly.
Iran has supported terrorism steadily for 25 years. It has had chemical weapons at least for 15 years. Yet during this time, it has not transferred these systems. Several reasons explain this restraint. First, Iran is aware that any major escalation in its support of terrorism would incur American wrath and the wrath of much of the international community, possibly leading to UN sanctions and possibly even to a military strike. Iran has not transferred much of its advanced conventional weapons to terrorist groups in the past. That would be a logical prelude to transferring things like chemical or biological weapons.
Iranian leaders are also extremely well aware that the transfer of WMDs would be a U.S. red line that would provoke a U.S. response. Traditionally, Iran has tried to have some degree of deniability in its use of terrorism, working through terrorist groups like the Lebanese Hezbollah to disassociate itself from attacks. For the most part, unfortunately, this has worked. The United States has not retaliated when Iran has used proxies to kill Americans in the past. If Iran were to have its proxies use WMD, however, that disassociation would not work. The United States and other countries would not accept that very arbitrary and artificial division.
Also, Iran's favorite proxies, like the Lebanese Hezbollah, do not seek these types of weapons. They, too, recognize the red lines the United States and other powers have drawn and their current tactics on weapons systems also enable them to kill the numbers of people they want to kill. At this time, they do not need these weapons. It is arguable that some of the more advanced chemical and biological weapons systems would be difficult for even a skilled terrorist group like the Lebanese Hezbollah to operate properly. Although it is worth pointing out a very important point for homeland security, the psychological effect would be tremendous, even if the number killed were extremely small.
September 11 also had a limiting effect. A number of states and terrorist groups around the world recognized the increased U.S. concern with terrorism and have made great attempts to try to disassociate themselves or reduce their involvement in this as a result.
In my judgment, Iran is not likely to change its behavior with regard to support for terrorism except in the most extreme circumstances. Iran might increase its support for terrorism if the United States is determined to remove Iran's influence in Iraq; if it appears that the United States is going to stay indefinitely in Iraq; or if the United States escalates over other issues like Iran's nuclear program. Yet even here it is not likely to transfer chemical or other unconventional weapons to terrorist groups. It would instead rely first on traditional methods.
Only in the event of a truly grave threat to the Iranian regime, like an invasion, would these restraints go out the window. I believe Iran would start overseas, rather than in the American homeland.
Let me conclude by talking briefly about some of the implications for homeland security. First of all, the risk of Iranian-sponsored terrorism involving WMD in the United States is extremely low, in my judgment. That said, it should remain an intelligence priority. Given the catastrophic consequences of this, it is something that we should be watching, even though the chances are quite low.
I will make an aside at this moment to address what the ranking member has noted about Pakistan and North Korea. Pakistan in particular is an extremely dangerous state that deserves careful watching. The regime stability there is unclear. Unlike Iran, it has a large nuclear arsenal. Also, it has an extremely large jihadist presence, and in contrast to groups like the Lebanese Hezbollah, these groups want WMD. In my judgment, Pakistan deserves particular scrutiny because of this combination of nuclear weapons, jihadist terrorism and internal instability. I am quite concerned over the future of that country.
I will conclude by saying a last recommendation for the committee to consider for homeland security is fear management. Weapons of mass destruction like chemical weapons and biological weapons, most of the systems available to terrorist groups that are simple and easy to use are actually not that lethal. They can kill dozens at times, but far fewer than bullets, far fewer than car bombs. The real effect is psychological.
The comparison I would make is with the anthrax attacks in the United States, where tragically I believe five people died, but the overall effect was relatively low in terms of actual violence, but the psychological effect around the country was tremendous. Educating our population, having officials on television ready to go to say that while it is scary, it is not something to panic over, is very important.
I will conclude my remarks right now, but I would like to thank you for offering me this opportunity to talk before you, and ask that my prepared remarks be submitted for the record.
LINDER: They will, without objection. Thank you, Dr. Byman.
Dr. Takeyh?
DR.
RAY TAKEYH,
Senior Fellow, Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
TAKEYH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me. Some of my comments will echo what my colleagues have said.
What we do know is that Iran is rapidly developing the necessary infrastructure for construction of nuclear weapons. The question therefore is, would it consider a transfer of these weapons to some of its terrorist allies should it achieve that capability.
Here, what we need to consider first of all is that much of Iranian terrorism today is actually confined to the Israeli- Palestinian arena and much of the most reliable and intimate of its terrorist allies are Hezbollah and to a lesser extent the Palestinian rejectionist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Certainly, even a cursory examination of Iranian rhetoric reveals that they tend to reject Israel as an illegitimate state that is usurping sacred Islamic land and is acting as sort of an agent of American imperial aggrandizement in the Middle East.
But Iran as a regime does not seem inordinately concerned about Israel's nuclear monopoly, nor does it necessarily feel threatened by Israel's formidable armed forces. For the Islamic Republic, Israel may be an ideological affront, but it is not an existential threat mandating provision of nuclear weapons or offering such weapons to its terrorist clients.
Despite Iran's inflammatory conduct in the Palestinian-Israeli arena, it is important to reflect that during the past quarter- century, it has sought to regulate its low-intensity conflict with Israel and has avoided direct military confrontation with Jerusalem. This is a conflict that is largely waged by proxies in a controlled manner. For such a strategy to succeed, Iran does not need to necessarily transfer such weaponry or escalate the conflict. For example, as Dan Byman mentioned, Iran has not transferred its chemical and biological weapons to terrorist organizations, nor for that matter its more powerful and sophisticated missile technology.
For Iran it may be important for these groups to persist, to survive, to conduct violence against the Israeli state, but such conflict has to take place within distinct red lines. A policy of restrained hostility best serves Iran's strategic and ideological purposes.
Moreover, the most critical mission for Iran's ruling class is survival of the regime and preservation of Iran's territorial integrity. As such, transferring nuclear arms to a terrorist client that may be difficult to restrain or discipline would certainly expose the regime to an unacceptable degree of danger in terms of Israeli and potential American military retaliation. Any measure that could threaten the clerical leaders' hold on power will be strongly resisted by Iran's relatively risk-adverse rulers.
The mullahs may be hostile to Israel, but they do appreciate that such hostility should it escape their controlled parameters could confront them with dangers to their regime's survival. So long as Iran's rulers remain focused on their power, they would recoil from rash measures such as giving nuclear arms to third parties, however reliable and longstanding that relationship with those third parties may be.
Moreover, in the aftermath of September 11, there has been a subtle calculation in Iran's approach to Hezbollah and other terrorist clients. At a time when the United States is waging a global war against terrorism, Iran is becoming a bit more circumspect and cautious in its support for Hezbollah. While Iran sustains its support for such organizations, it has in the past tried to restrain them. One of the ironies of the current situation is the Iranian leadership that had sought so much to instigate Hezbollah violence, in some cases it is seeking to restrain that organization. The theocratic rulers are beginning to discern that tempering their approach to the peace process is a policy that may soon be in their interests.
I conclude my statement by suggesting that Iran becoming the next nuclear weapons state is not necessarily an inevitability. There is much that the United States and the international community can still do to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold and therefore avoiding some of the problems such as those we are discussing today.
I will stop there. Thank you.
LINDER: Thank you, Dr. Takeyh.
I will begin the questioning with Mr. Giles. We believe there is still a remnant A. Q. Khan network out there. Are there other copycats out there?
GILES: Mr. Chairman, I would first of all say that the information I have is based strictly on open sources, but what I would suspect is that this has been an extremely profitable black market for those engaged in it. Where we may have rolled up some of the members, I think that leaves a vacuum that others motivated by greed or ideology would be willing to fill.
LINDER: Would you anticipate Israel would make a strike on nuclear facilities in Iran, Dr. Byman?
BYMAN: No, it would not. I would say that is certainly something Israel would consider. The problem is when you look at the military options, they are quite poor. The Israeli raid on the Iraqi facility succeeded in part because it had never been done before. But as soon as that happened, every country that was pursuing a clandestine weapons program began to disperse its facilities. Often they are co-located with civilian facilities. From even an American military point of view, a military attack is extremely difficult. So knowing the political and diplomatic consequences, I am not sure the Israelis believe it would succeed.
LINDER: Dr. Takeyh, you seem to think that the Iranian rulers are much like American political parties, just trying to keep their power. Would you anticipate that North Korea would have the same response?
TAKEYH: I am not actually a North Korea expert, but I do tend to believe that all these states that engage in terrorism and engage in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, they do tend to base their calculation on some from the perspective of relatively judicious security calculations. For the Iranian regime, and I suspect that may actually have some sort of an impact on the North Korean regime, these are essentially weapons of deterrence, deterrence against an entire range of threats, perceived threats even, whether it is the American threat, whether it is the potential Pakistani threat, which is felt rather acutely in Iran.
LINDER: Excuse me. You don't think Iran would make an offensive effort against Israel is they had the power to do so?
TAKEYH: The argument that you can make is perhaps Iran's engagement with terrorism would be more intensified because they perceive certain immunities because of the acquisition of nuclear deterrence, but I do not believe that you will begin to see an escalation or intensification of Iran's participation in anti-peace process affairs.
LINDER: Dr. Byman, you indicated that Iran has not transferred any of its WMD to any other terrorist groups, or I think you said any of its conventional armaments. But wasn't it an Iranian ship that was captured going to the Palestinian Authority?
BYMAN: I am sorry. I should have clarified that. What I meant to say is the most sophisticated conventional armaments it has, such as missile systems. My judgment would be we would see Iran if it were trying to escalate, transferring its most sophisticated weapons before it transferred things like unconventional weapons. So it has provided a wide, wide range of small arms to numerous terrorist groups, but it has not provided its most advanced systems to them.
LINDER: You talked about the number of nukes in Pakistan. Can you quantify that?
BYMAN: This is based on unclassified sources. My understanding is that it is actually in the dozens, but there are some questions in terms of both not only the number, but the capabilities. The Pakistani nuclear tests were successful, but the weapons that were exploded were actually relatively small. It is unclear whether that is because they did not have enough fissile material, or because there was no point in doing a large explosion. The whole point was simply to demonstrate. I do not know the rest of that information.
LINDER: The instructions in A.Q. Khan network have been passed around everywhere. Would it still take the sophistication of a nation-state to be able to build on those instructions?
BYMAN: To build on those instructions, yes. The infrastructure required for a nuclear program is considerable, but there are a couple of other options.
LINDER: Is that the enrichment process?
BYMAN: Is it partly the enrichment process; it is part the delivery process. From blackboard to delivery, there are a number of steps that are quite extensive. However, you can buy a bomb off the shelf, in theory. Also, there is the problem of radiological material which is actually not terribly lethal in most cases, but psychologically could be quite effective.
LINDER: Thank you.
Mr. Langevin?
LANGEVIN: Thank you.
Dr. Byman, I would just like to probe you on a few of your points, if I could for just a minute. You said that Iran has not shown a propensity to transfer WMD technology, either overtly or covertly. But isn't it true, though, that the United States in many ways is the only thing that stands between them and a stated goal of theirs to spread radical Islam around the world?
Simply transferring other types of WMD such as chemical weapons would not necessarily achieve the result that a detonation of a nuclear device would achieve if, for example, a device were detonated in Washington and they felt that they could decapitate the United States government. It would clearly be a very different situation than just transferring chemical weapons. Can you talk about that a little bit? I do not know that I buy into the argument that just because they have not transferred other types of WMD that they would not covertly, especially if they felt they could get away with it covertly, that they would not consider transferring WMD technology with respect to nuclear weapons.
And also, just one other thing on that point. You also spoke about Pakistan. I agree that we should be concerned about Pakistan, of the A.Q. Khan network and the instability that potentially exists in Pakistan. But you mentioned that dedicated Islamic extremists exist within Pakistan. Wouldn't you also say that dedicated Islamic extremists also are present to a great extent in Iran as well, and that we could very easily see a duplication of an A.Q. Khan-type emerge from Iran if they were to develop nuclear weapons?
So just on those two points, if you could elaborate.
BYMAN: I would be happy to.
As odd as it sounds, Iran's efforts to spread the revolution have declined precipitously in the last 25 years. If we were having this hearing 20 years ago, we would be talking about Iranian active activities in Europe, the Persian Gulf, Latin America, Asia. Today, as Dr. Takeyh pointed out, Iran's support for terrorism is primarily concentrated against Israel.
However, your point about the decapitation strike on the United States is an interesting one because Iran, of course, has tremendous enmity towards the United States. However, Iran is intensely aware, and Iranian leaders have discussed this, of their military inferiority towards the United States. They believe the United States is waiting to pounce on Iran. I believe quite strongly that were there to be any nuclear attack on the United States, the consequence for U.S. foreign policy is the United States would immediately be at war with any of the suspects. I do not think that we would be deliberating for months trying to figure out exactly who was responsible, but anyone who might vaguely be on the list would quickly be under attack.
The Iranians have looked at our response to September 11, where we overthrew two governments and that was in response to a tragic and horrible attack, but it killed 3,000 people, something far less than a nuclear attack. I believe they know that the Islamic Republic would be no more if they did such an attack, even if we could not have the evidence that would hold up in a court of law.
Your point about Pakistan, certainly by any definition Iran has many Islamic extremists. What is a distinction I would like to draw is between the Sunni jihadists who have shown themselves committed to complete annihilation and violence in many cases, and who have demonstrated that they actively seek weapons of mass destruction. They have had programs. They have made statements saying it is a duty. The Shia radicals in Iran have been far more cautious in recent years and have not had the same degree of the desire to kill in large numbers that we have seen from the jihadists. That is why I am so concerned about Pakistan, sir.
LANGEVIN: Thank you.
And to your point, you would agree that the potential exists for an A.Q. Khan-type to emerge from Iran if they were to develop nuclear weapons. There are dedicated Islamic extremists in Iran, just as there are in Pakistan. I agree that Pakistan is a problem and a concern, but could you elaborate a little more on what your concern would be in Iran?
BYMAN: I am concerned about any country's control of its nuclear material. The ones on the head of the list would be Pakistan and Russia at the moment. Were Iran to go nuclear, I would also be concerned about control over its nuclear program. I would add, I think there has been useful fiction on A.Q. Khan, which is that this was done wholly without the knowledge of the Pakistani government. Given the sheer number of people involved, given the rank of the individuals involved, given the activities involved, it is shocking to me that the Pakistani government could not be largely aware of at least some activities. To me, we must make clear in the future to every government around the world that we will hold them accountable for the activities of their citizens, and the excuse that they simply did not know, that is not acceptable to the United States, especially for something like an illicit nuclear arms network.
LANGEVIN: Thank you. I see my time has expired, so I thank you for your testimony and I yield back.
LINDER: The gentleman from Washington state is recognized for five minutes.
DICKS: Do we have any evidence of any states providing any weapons of mass destruction assistance to any terrorist groups?
BYMAN: To my knowledge, there has been no deliberate transfer of chemical, biological and nuclear or radiological material to a terrorist group. We know that the Taliban was openly tolerating al Qaeda when it was openly seeking this in Afghanistan. The Taliban, of course, was too poor and primitive to provide electricity, so I think WMD programs are unlike there, but that is the closest. Also, the government of Sudan was involved in some murky activities, the details of which I have never been able to uncover, at a time when al Qaeda was present there and quite active there.
DICKS: What are the steps that any of you would suggest we take to ensure that states are not tempted to supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction or their components?
TAKEYH: On the specific issue of Iran, as I mention in my testimony, I do not believe there is anything inevitable or necessary about Iran becoming the next member of the nuclear club. I think should Iran achieve that weaponry, it is a failure of American and international diplomacy. So one way of preventing Iran from actually transferring such weapons or having this decentralized government being tempted into such activities for ideological, political or strategic reasons, is actually trying to foster a situation where Iran does not cross the nuclear threshold. I think we are increasingly in a disturbing way beginning to move away from the idea of prevention to management, namely preventing Iran from achieving a nuclear status, as opposed to managing it. I am not quite sure we need to be at that level yet.
There is still much the United States and the European allies and the international community can do to obstruct Iran's drive toward nuclear weapons or a nuclear energy or nuclear capability period. I think that is what most of the diplomatic efforts should try to focus on.
DICKS: What is the basis of the negotiations between the Europeans and Iran?
TAKEYH: It might take place under three specific baskets. The first basket has to do with economic and trade cooperation between Iran and the European states and expansion of those commercial relationships should Iran restrain its program. The second basket has to do with security concerns, namely that the Europeans are trying to enhance Iran's security and therefore to lessen its motivation for nuclear arms. The final category is technology transfers, namely the Iranian claim that they have a right to peaceful use of nuclear technology and the European acceptance of the fact that should Iran cease its own indigenous activities they could be receiving some degree of nuclear cooperation from the international community.
DICKS: What are the prospects for these negotiations between Iran and the Europeans?
TAKEYH: If you look at those three specific baskets, you begin to see that at least two or those, all three of those, it is impossible for these negotiations to succeed without some degree of American participation. On the issue of trade and cooperation, one of the principal obstacles, certainly not the only one, but one of the obstacles to greater Iranian integration into the international economy is American resistance, sanctions policy and so on. So the technology and cooperation basket that the Europeans are negotiating is unlikely to succeed without the American prohibitions being on the table.
The security basket, I mean, what sort of security assurances are Germany and France going to give to Iran at a time when Iran is surrounded by a substantial amount of American forces? So that basket in and of itself is of limited utility. Finally, on transfer of nuclear technology, it is inconceivable to me that the Europeans will transfer such transfer such technology to Iran so long as Iran continues to have its problems with the IAEA in terms of the ambiguity of its nuclear program, and so long as the United States finds that particular practice legitimately objectionable.
So these negotiations are taking place and moving forward because everyone is interested in the process and not everyone is sanguine about the prospects of actually the EU-three resolving those very critical matters.
DICKS: Why has the United States taken the position, what is the administration's policy here?
TAKEYH: As far as I can decipher it, the United States policy at this particular point is that it refuses to engage in negotiations in a more direct manner with the Iranian regime because it does not want to legitimize that regime. To me, a regime's legitimacy comes from its own internal democratic processes. By that definition, the Islamic Republic is an legitimate regime. It is not for the president of the United States to ascribe that legitimacy to a government that does not enjoy the approbation of its citizenry, and the president of the United States cannot revoke that legitimacy either. So the legitimacy argument is a curious one.
DICKS: You think it would be better for the United States to engage in these talks, right?
TAKEYH: I think it is getting late, because increasingly we have a government in Iran that may not necessarily be interested in negotiations. So it is late, but may not necessarily be too late, but the time certainly is passing us by. A more robust American diplomacy two years ago or three years ago would have been more advisable, but at this particular stage in time I think we are getting to a point where diplomacy, there might not be a deal out there, Congressman.
DICKS: Yes. Mr. Chairman, could I have another minute?
LINDER: We will have another round. We will just go another round.
DICKS: We will just go another round. That is perfect. Thank you.
LINDER: Are you saying the train has left the station?
TAKEYH: All the passengers are on board. The conductor is in there. The train is fully fueled and stocked. It is not leaving the station, but if I am approaching the platform, I am saying to myself, this train is about to leave the station.
LINDER: Can any of you tell me if there are any internal political divisions in Iran? Mr. Giles?
GILES: On the nuclear program in particular, I think what is interesting is to take the historical perspective. This program has been conducted in secret for the better part of two decades. You have seen basically three different factions ruling Iran during that time. You had the presidency of Ayatollah Khamenei, who is the current supreme leader. You had the presidency of Rafsanjani, and you had most recently the presidency of President Khatami, each representing a different spectrum within Iranian politics, and yet that program has proceeded all along. I think you can conclude from that, and in addition to their public statements, that there is widespread political support and investment in bringing that nuclear program to fruition.
LINDER: Dr. Byman, a recent State Department report concluded that Iran has a offensive biological weapons program. Can you comment on that? Would they be inclined to share it with terrorists?
BYMAN: I think it would be even less likely that Iran would share a biological weapons program than a chemical weapons program. So my judgment is that it is unlikely they would share it with terrorists. Nevertheless, this program is of grave concern for a number of reasons. I mentioned before the apparatus needed to run a nuclear program and how it is quite considerable. That is not true for a biological program. It is much harder to detect from the outside. It is much harder to target from the outside.
Biological programs are of concern from a military point of view. They are also of grave concern because their effects simply are not known anymore. We fortunately had a world where these programs have not been used for many years. Much of what can be done with modern medicine, modern biochemistry is unclear at this point. I am horrified that some day we will find out.
LINDER: At a meeting in the back of this very room some months ago with some Swedish scientists, I was informed that some Iranian families had emigrated from Iran to Sweden. All the children had been vaccinated for smallpox. Why would they do that? We haven't vaccinated anyone in this country since 1980. Any comments anybody?
TAKEYH: I do know that is a large and growing Iranian community in the entire of Scandinavia, but I just do not have any informed judgment on that issue.
LINDER: Any comments?
BYMAN: To my knowledge, the State Department report was not referring to smallpox as one of the biological weapons.
LINDER: That is correct, but I was just curious about vaccinating children for smallpox.
BYMAN: This gets into the issue that Mr. Giles knows so well, which is the risk of the attack versus the other consequences, which every doctor I talk to revolts when I say "should we vaccinate against smallpox." I have discussed it with my own doctor with my own children for this very reason. Their response is the small percentage of individuals who have a negative reaction to the vaccination will be far more suffering than the likelihood of an attack.
We have seen no serious smallpox program to my knowledge, outside of a very limited handful of countries, but this, to me, should be one of the overwhelming intelligence priorities, because if we see the spreading, the answer may be that vaccination is necessary.
LINDER: It has been pointed out that the technical assistance in terms of weaponry provided by Iran to Hezbollah has been limited, but in the past several months it has been reported that more sophisticated shaped charges that are effective against armored vehicles, including tanks, have appeared in Iraq linked to Hezbollah. Doesn't this suggest a higher level of technological assistance?
BYMAN: Hezbollah is quite good a guerrilla warfare and the tactics involved in guerrilla warfare. It has spent 18 years attacking the Israelis and eventually removing them from Lebanon in part by getting better and better with Iranian help; in part by getting better and better on its own. It has a very formidable guerrilla cadre. The shaped charge is something that is technically a little difficult, but for a large guerrilla army to do, and having as Hezbollah does, effectively a safe haven in Lebanon from which to operate, it is not a dramatic change. This is more a way of using existing technologies in more effective means. It is deadly, and that is part of the issue with WMD. I would say that a shaped charge is actually far more deadly in most cases than a chemical weapons attack. Therefore, these groups, for their own purposes, do not need unconventional systems.
LINDER: Thank you.
Mr. Langevin?
LANGEVIN: Thank you.
Dr. Takeyh, if I could just ask a few questions on your testimony. If I understood you right, you stated that Iran is not very concerned or feels threatened by Israel's nuclear capabilities, nor are they threatened by their overwhelming military superiority. If I understood you correctly in those two statements, then why develop a nuclear weapons program? What do they need it for?
TAKEYH: If you look at the totality of what Iranian leaders have said about their nuclear program since the mid-1990s, if you kind of examine that, what struck me as rather curious was that Israel was never invoked in those discussions, or it was invoked I think with few exceptions. What derives from those commentaries, sermons, media reporting, speeches, the impression that one gets is that they seek such weaponry for, as I said, for deterrence against a variety of threats or perceived threats.
For a long time, it was the potential resurrection of Iraq and the impact of the Iran-Iraq war on Iranian calculations and defense procurement policies is just remarkable, namely that they felt they had to develop an independent deterrent and retaliation capability in the realm of weapons of mass destruction. Eventually that started out with chemical weapons, and escalated into nuclear arms.
In more recent times, there are a range of actors that have motivated Iran's unconventional aspirations: the United States, the strained relationship between these two countries that has become much more strained recently; the potential collapse of Pakistan to a radical Sunni regime with pronounced hostilities to Iran, this sort of a Talibanization of Pakistan. That is an important security concern.
Beyond that, the unpredictable nature of the Iraqi state, what type of Iraq will emerge; will there be a Iraq with a close alliance with the United States; will there be an Iraq that will house American forces; will there be an Iraq that will act as an adjunct of American power in the Persian Gulf. Would Iran need to hedge against a potential resurrection of a close Iraqi-American alliance in the Gulf by possession of such weapons?
If you want to do down the threats, potentially Israel is there, but it is not in my view the foremost motivator of Iran's nuclear aspirations today. That may change. When we talk about the nuclear program, we have to talk about it as a dynamic and fluid proposition. It is not static. The list of motivations do change over time. Should there be a more active military confrontation between Israel and Iran, maybe Iranians will feel that they need the possession of this strategic weapon for deterrence of a now-escalated Israeli- Iranian hostility.
For the past 25 years, the two states, Iran and Israel, have largely limited their conflict and have both worked hard to prevent that conflict from escalating into a direct military confrontation. Should that change, then I suspect Iran's strategic calculus will alter as well. But we have to look at this program both in terms of its technological aspects and both in terms of the motivations as a changing, fluid picture that alters from time to time.
LANGEVIN: You mentioned that you think that diplomacy is still possible, but isn't a very likely reason why they are developing nuclear weapons is, in a sense, Islamic pride, and that it is not only a threat issue, but they see it as a obligation of Islam to develop nuclear weapons. I believe it was Iran who said that they have the obligation within the next 10 years to develop nuclear weapons.
TAKEYH: I think if you kind of look at this program, you have to differentiate between, at least in Iranian rhetoric, between the nuclear program as sort of a means of modernization of the economy, and the nuclear weapons program. They try to draw those delineations I think in a rather unconvincing way.
In today's Iran, I actually do not believe that the phenomena that we saw in Pakistan and India has happened, namely the nuclear program merges with the sense of national identity and national prestige. This is largely an elite-driven program, not one that the Iranian population has embraced. For the Iranian population, the nuclear program is the regime's program. It is not a national program. It is the government's program. And the gap between the regime and the society, between the rulers and the ruled, is still wide. The Iranians are so alienated from the regime that they are unwilling to embrace it even when it is on the process of a seeming international confrontation.
Again, we have to look at this program as a dynamic one. That may change. Maybe the nuclear program will become embraced by the population as it develops and it crosses successive technological demarcations. But the sort of embrace of the nuclear program that you saw in Pakistan and you saw in India, that has not happened as of yet in Iran. If you ask an Iranian, do you think your country should have nuclear weapons? He says, oh yes. If you ask him the second question, do you think it should have nuclear weapons if it provokes international multilateral sanctions, then you get a different sort of an answer.
Again, as I said, this is a changing landscape. So that is why the sooner there can be some sort of an agreement to suspend this program on a more permanent basis, the sooner we can avoid a great deal of problems down the road.
LINDER: The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Dicks?
DICKS: What do you think the United States should do about this situation with Pakistan? It appears to me, as your testimony clearly demonstrates, that Pakistan has more serious problems in terms of stability and a much more advanced program, and clearly has nuclear weapons. Should we be reassessing our position regarding Pakistan?
BYMAN: Sir, I will give you my opinion. To me, the Bush Administration's policy of embracing the Musharraf regime is a correct one in general, but I think it has been a bit too enthusiastic. There are few good alternatives in Pakistan. I cannot sit here and tell you that there is a great alternative that no one is doing. All the choices are bad. But the problem is that our embrace has weakened many of the sources of opposition to Musharraf that are not Islamist. Musharraf has forged a deal with some of the Islamists in the country. As a result, much of the more secular opposition, much of the more traditional opposition has become very weak.
We need to hedge our bets a bit. Although it is important to maintain ties to this regime in the important day-to-day efforts we have against terrorism, we need to be able to reach out to others. That is, first of all, in case there is a shift in regime, but it is also a way of gaining leverage over the Musharraf regime. So he right now believes that we need him more than he needs us. That limits our influence. For me, having as many points of influence in the country is vital.
DICKS: Does he have control over the entire situation in his country? There has been some discussion that maybe there are elements within his society, maybe the intelligence arena in one particular area, where he may not have complete control; that they may be operating independently of the government and causing difficulties. Do you think that is an accurate assessment, or is that a possible problem?
BYMAN: I think that is an accurate assessment. I would say several things about that. The regime exercises control in most of the urban areas, but it does not exercise control in all the countryside. It relies heavily on local groups, some of which are loyal to the regime; some of which work with it on a fitful basis.
In terms of the military and intelligence, the senior officials are loyal to the regime, but they do not always have control over their forces all the way down. So you may have the border guard commander who actually wants to try to help stop Taliban from going back and forth, but the local border patrolman is sympathetic to the Taliban and lets them go back and forth.
As the more junior officers become promoted, many of them have Islamist sympathies. I am concerned that over time we are going to see a regime that is not al Qaeda, is not jihadist, but is much more sympathetic to some of their objectives. A particular concern I have is much of the effort Pakistan is waging against India and Kashmir involves using jihadist groups as proxies. These jihadist groups overlap in terms of training, recruitment, arms, passports, with groups linked to al Qaeda. It is impossible for Pakistan to say it is fighting al Qaeda as hard as it can, but not be dismantling the apparatus it uses to wage war in Kashmir.
DICKS: It is true that some of the people who are involved in the recent bombings in London had been trained or spent time or whatever in Pakistan? Isn't that correct?
BYMAN: They spent time in Pakistan. What they were doing there at this point, we do not know, or at least I do not know, I should say. But that is, to me, one of the areas to watch. There are camps in Pakistan where people will go for training and the training is generic. It is meant in part to help in Kashmir, but if you learn to build a bomb in Kashmir, the bomb also works in London.
DICKS: Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
LINDER: Mr. Langevin has another question.
LANGEVIN: Just briefly, if I could, and thank you for the extra time, Mr. Chairman.
According to the latest intelligence estimates, Iran is approximately 10 years away from developing a nuclear weapon. There are others who have said that the time is probably sooner. I do not know if any of you have read my colleague's book, Mr. Curt Weldon, Countdown to Terror. He would suggest that the time is much shorter. Would you care to speculate?
TAKEYH: There is another study that came out from the International Institute of Strategic Studies which I think suggests five years, but much of this depends on what type of a program it is. Is it a crash program? Is it an accelerated program? Is the country going to devote its resources to development of a nuclear weapon with the singular focus that Pakistan did, or is it going to move along on its current procurement and funding practices?
So I think it is difficult to gauge that particular timeline. The current efforts that Iran is making and with its continued reliance on international technology to some extent, then we could see that being problematic. But I would actually suggest that the time that Iran develops nuclear weapons is not as significant as the point that they crossed the decision, the sort of point of no return where all political forces are determined to actually construct the bomb. That, to me, is a more difficult timeframe to gauge than the technological aspect of it because if that happens, if the regime makes a fundamental determination to utilize all national resources behind a crash program to develop a nuclear bomb and a delivery system, then I think that timeframe is going to lessen dramatically.
LANGEVIN: What data do you have to support, though, that suggested that they have not already made that political decision? It would seem to me all indications now, especially the fact that the program has been conducted in secret, that they have already made that political decision. In addition to the fact that the material that they are reprocessing right now, they are attempting to make weapons- grade uranium. It could very easily lead to the creation of a nuclear device. In fact, you mentioned in your testimony that the Europeans are unlikely to help transfer nuclear weapons technology, given the context.
TAKEYH: Well, nuclear technology, yes.
LANGEVIN: Nuclear weapons-type technology. But if they were developing weapons-grade uranium, they could simply make a gun-type device and they do not quite frankly need European technology.
TAKEYH: Here is where we get into a difficult position. Much of the technology that you require to build a civilian nuclear program is quite similar to the technology that you require to build weapons. There is a break-off point at some point. But at this particular point, the latest IAEA report indicates that there is no evidence that international inspectors have uncovered that Iran has transferred its nuclear technology from military purposes. The activities that are taking place right now in Isfahan, I believe you mentioned, actually take place under the auspices of the inspection and the inspection process.
What the Iranians are suggesting they are doing is developing indigenous uranium enrichment capability, but not at the weapons- grade, but for actually peaceful uses. That is the problem with the ambiguity of technology, because enrichment up to a certain level is suitable for energy purposes. Beyond a certain level, then you can have a weapons capability. This is why the development of Iranian nuclear infrastructure is worrying.
I think the critical timeframe at this particular point, we still believe that Iran requires external assistance for completion of this nuclear program. But increasingly, it will get to a point which you are suggesting, namely it will have indigenous technological capability to complete the program without any sort of a reliance on external actors. I do not believe it is there yet in terms of the completion of the centrifuge machines, which they still require technology from abroad. They could get it from the black market. They used to get it from A.Q. Khan network and others. But it is still a program that as far as we know is still to a certain extent reliant on external assistance, whether it is from black markets in Russia or elsewhere. But that may change. Again, that is going to change over time.
LANGEVIN: What data are you using to support the conclusion that they have not yet made the political decision to cross that red line yet?
TAKEYH: I just haven't seen any evidence that suggests it. I would say, based upon my examination, that the Iranian regime is committed to development of a sophisticated nuclear program that may give them the opportunity to weaponize that program should that situation be reached. In a faction-driven Iranian system, I think that is as far as you can go.
I think they have delayed the decision to actually cross the threshold, but they are doing everything they can to build the technological capability that allows them to make that decision at some point in the future.
LANGEVIN: In timeframe, gentlemen, do you agree that five years or ten years?
GILES: Congressman, I have been following the public side of this issue for some time. I will just say that these estimates are very fungible and they have changed over the years. Estimates from the Israelis have said they would be there by now. They go up and down. The IAEA had its own estimate. It seemed to fall around the five-year range. The latest swing is that they are now pushing the estimates out, according to the press, our own intelligence estimate. The Israelis have fallen in line with those for the most part.
It is consistent with the IASS. I am just concerned that you are seeing conventional wisdom maybe shifting too far in the other direction. There are people who have noted that we are talking about technology from the 1940s, essentially, in trying to fabricate a weapon. So it depends on your assumptions whether or the Iranians have a secret military program in addition to the civilian program.
So I am generally skeptical about all of the estimates that I have seen discussed publicly.
LINDER: Thank you all. Thank you, gentlemen, for giving us a couple of hours of your time. I am sorry we were so late getting started. We are grateful for your time. Thanks.