Bond Opening Statement |
current and projected national security Threats
Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
February 5, 2008
Excerpts
OPENING STATEMENT OF
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER
A Senator from West Virginia, and
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: This hearing will come to order.
I would severely hope that there would be a couple other members. I think it
would be courteous and in their interest and in the national interest if several
of our members showed up. If they're a few minutes late, that's okay. If they
don't show up, that's not so okay. And we might have something more to say about
that.
In any event, we're presented with the full
array of our national intelligence structure. And the intelligence community
(sic) meets to hear from this community, intelligence community, about security
threats facing our nation. It is appropriate that we begin this annual threat
hearing and that we do it in public. We do it every year. Sometimes they've gone
on for a long time. And what we've done this is time is to ask each of you, with
the exception of the director, to hold your comments to five minutes, which will
be very interesting in the case of the CIA, to see if that can actually be done.
(Laughter.)
But anyway, you're the folks that keep us
safe. We in Congress authorize and appropriate funds for what you do. The
American people have a right to know where our resources are going insofar as
that's appropriate, what intelligence officials consider to be the greatest
threats, and what actions our government is taking to prevent those threats.
And as we've learned many times, our intelligence programs
will only be successful if the American people are informed. It's a relative
statement, but they have to feel that they're a part of this equation, and
that's what helps us get appropriations and gets bills passed, hopefully, and
makes the process work.
Today the committee will want
to hear how our intelligence community assesses the immediate threats from
terrorist organizations. We do that each year, starting with the continued
threat posed by al Qaeda. I believe this threat has actually grown substantially
since last year's threat review. I'll be interested if you agree, particularly
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And I hope to focus closely on that threat hearings
-- in today's hearings and throughout the year. It'll be part of the vice
chairman's and my schedule throughout the year.
As you
know, al Qaeda's war against the United States did not start on September 11. It
started before that and did not end on that tragic day. Since that time our
intelligence agencies have been successful in identifying and preventing new al
Qaeda attacks in this country, most of which cannot be discussed publicly. But
progress has been mixed. And unfortunately, many of our government's policies
have, in fact, hindered our counterterrorism activities.
After 9/11 the invasion of Afghanistan by U.S. and coalition forces
drove the Taliban from power, had Osama bin Laden on the run, and was on the
verge of depriving al Qaeda of the very sanctuary that it needs in order to plot
and carry out its murderous designs. Then the focus of America's military forces
and intelligence resources were mistakenly shifted from delivering a decisive
blow against al Qaeda, which is the enemy. Instead these resources were diverted
to the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and one can have
arguments about that.
Now, six and a half years later
after the 9/11 attack, bin Laden remains at large. That is a source of
embarrassment and concern to all of you. And al Qaeda operates in a terrorist
safe haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border from which it trains and
directs terrorist cells, perhaps with more confidence than ever.
Al Qaeda has used this border safe haven to reconstitute itself and
launch offensive operations that threaten to undo the stability of Afghanistan
and undermine, if not overthrow, the Pakistan government. And tragically, like
before 9/11, al Qaeda was once again secured a base of operation from which to
plot and direct attacks against the United States.
Unfortunately, our continued military occupation of Iraq compounds the
counterterrorism challenge that we face as it is used for terrorist propaganda
purposes to fuel the recruitment of Islamic jihadists. As evidenced by the
Madrid and London bombings, violent extremism is spreading at an alarming rate
and making inroads into disaffected populations in Europe and elsewhere. That
seems to continue to grow.
All of this leads to some
tough but necessary questions for our witnesses. Why has al Qaeda been allowed
to reconstitute a terrorist sanctuary along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border from
which to threaten the stability of the region and plot against the United
States? How is the threat posed by this al Qaeda safe haven different from the
one that al Qaeda benefited from prior to 9/11?
How
have the terrorist threats facing the governments in Kabul and Islamabad changed
in the past year? And how willing and capable are those governments to go after
al Qaeda within their own borders?
Are the United
States and its allies losing the war of ideas to the virulent message of the
terrorists? Does the continued existence and operation of a separate CIA system
of -- for terrorists employing secret interrogation techniques undermined our
moral standing and the willingness of other countries to cooperate with us?
Is our continued military presence in Iraq generating more
terrorists and more Islamic radicals around the world than we are capturing or
that we are killing?
Since last year's world-wide
threat review, another thousand American servicemembers have been killed in
Iraq, not to speak of those who have been wounded, externally and internally.
Polls consistently show that a large number of Iraqis oppose the presence of
coalition forces. That doesn't seem to deter us. The committee has ongoing
scrutiny of intelligence on Iraq, and that will continue -- mostly in classified
sessions -- but the public needs to know whether intelligence perceive that Iraq
is moving towards the kind of political reconciliation that was the objective of
the U.S. surge in the first place and of the whole effort in the first place. Is
it happening?
Going beyond the war and terrorist
threats of today, the committee is particularly concerned about the
proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and the threat posed to our security
by those who possess them and those who may possess them in the future. I'm
particularly concerned about the security and safeguard of weapons and fissile
material in Russia and states of the former Soviet Union. This is something I
have expressed concern about for several years, and many of us have, and
something our government must address but is not putting up the money to
address. But potential threat to our homelands are not just about al Qaeda and
nuclear proliferation. Threats can come in unfamiliar ways. And because our
society is very complex, we are vulnerable to threats that we may not fully
appreciate.
In this regard, I'm very concerned about
the potential of cyberattacks that have already been executed and our ability to
protect our critical infrastructure, that this is something that we have
discussed before. Cybersecurity is a growing subject of importance that will be
addressed by the committee in detail intensely in the coming weeks.
Climate change also poses a long-term threat to us, in all
ways that we are only beginning to understand. More attention needs to be paid
to it, and I'm extremely gratified that the intelligence community is grappling
seriously with the issue. We eagerly await the National Intelligence Council's
assessment of the national security impact of climate change due out this
spring.
Before introducing the witnesses who are
sitting in front of us, I want to pay tribute to a large number of anonymous
heroes who are risking their lives abroad or working long hours in headquarters
to collect the intelligence and provide the analysis on which your testimony
today is based. We have the rare privilege in this committee of seeing what most
of the public does not. We are constantly impressed with the dedication and the
professionalism of the intelligence officials that we encounter. Americans can
be proud of the men and women of the U.S. intelligence community. Indeed, our
occasional and, I hope, constructive criticisms are a measure of the high
standards that we routinely expect.
Now let me
introduce the distinguished witnesses before us today, and then I will turn to
the distinguished vice chairman. And they will speak in this order, please.
Admiral Michael McConnell, director of National Intelligence; General Mike
Hayden, director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Mr. Randall Fort, assistant
secretary of State for Intelligence Research; Mr. Robert Mueller, director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Lieutenant General Michael Maples,
director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
It's worth
noting that Director McConnell's remarks have been coordinated with his
intelligence colleagues, who will nonetheless have a chance to offer their own
comments after his statement.
I believe that this
procedure and format is not only symbolically important, it gives real meaning
to the structural reforms that were instituted under the 2004 Intelligence
Reform Act. We now have a DNI who authentically represents and oversees the 16
intelligence agencies, but who does so without suppressing their individual
perspectives or eliminating their necessary independence.
I now turn to Vice Chairman Bond.
OPENING STATEMENT OF
CHRISTOPHER BOND
A Senator from Missouri, and
Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
SEN.
CHRISTOPHER BOND (R-MO): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate you
holding this hearing. And as always, it's a very sobering reminder, to all of us
in public, the kinds of threats our nation faces and our men and women abroad,
military and civilian, face. We need to know about this. Obviously we discuss
much of it in the classified hearings, but this gives us an opportunity to lay
out what you see as the challenges.
Lots of change
since last year's worldwide threat. Everybody was saying that the situation in
Iraq was grave, and we were looking to failure. Now, a year after the surge, and
most importantly General Petraeus's leadership in adopting a counterinsurgency
strategy to clear, hold and build, we're seeing marked changes. And American
military men and women are coming home, returning on success which is, I
believe, the right way for them to return.
We're not
out of the woods yet. We are continuing to train and equip the military and
security forces. Our goal must be to establish a reasonably secure and stable
Iraq, from which the Iraqis can develop their own system of government. That
stability and security is necessary to prevent them from falling into chaos,
genocide, potentially regionwide civil war and giving a real safe haven to al
Qaeda, which they do not have in the mountain caves where they must reside
now.
I think it's fitting to remember that David Kay
and his Iraq Survey Group said, after they went in and examined some of the
intelligence failures, that Iraq was a far more dangerous place even than we
knew, because of the terrorists running wild, the chaos in that country and the
ability to provide weapons of mass destruction. We do realize that we must
maintain that commitment there, but we are concerned about the situation in
Afghanistan. The security situation has deteriorated, and we are adding 3,000
additional Marines.
It would be very helpful if our
NATO allies lived up to their commitments. The failure of the NATO allies to do
their jobs or to send over troops who care to go in harm's way, well, that's
nice. The business of sending troops is to send them into dangerous places to
pacify them.
Decades of civil war and other was have
devastated Afghanistan. But it appears, and I'd be happy -- I'm looking forward
to hearing your view that Afghanistan is past the tipping point, where the
Taliban and their terrorist allies are not going to take the country back; they
will continue to kill, maim and destroy.
But we can't
afford to ignore situations in other parts of the world. And I will look forward
to hearing about national threats in North Korea, Iran, Syria, Venezuela,
the Chinese military power, instability in Africa.
I
want to emphasize one item that the chairman said: that we need to look at how
we're winning the hearts and minds -- something I believe that's very important,
something that should be done primarily by the State Department, by other
agencies of government.
But I commend the U.S. Army,
which has done an excellent job in showing how clear, hold and build works in
the Mindanao, southern Philippines region. I'm proud to say that a Missouri
National Guard unit is deploying to Afghanistan with agricultural specialists to
bring modern agricultural techniques. These are the kinds of things that we must
be doing to help those countries which are on the verge of either opting for
democracy, human rights and free markets, or going the terrorist route.
Congressional oversight obviously is our part of the job.
We have reviewed the failures before 9/11. And I would say that we have made
tremendous progress, and I believe, Mr. Chairman, that this distinguished group
of leaders that we have before us today is the finest working team that the
intelligence community or any intelligence community has had. Now we just need
to make sure that everybody's playing on the team.
I
was not a supporter of the intelligence reform, because while I thought it was a
good idea, I thought we gave the DNI all kinds of responsibility and too little
authority. But the director has shown positive leadership, management and
oversight, and next week we look forward to receiving a report from him on a
list of legislative recommendations for intelligence reform, particularly how we
can make -- how we can ensure in statute that the working relationships that
have been developed because of the great cooperation among the people at this
table and your top leaders in your agency have been able to achieve.
Another area of congressional oversight obviously is the
FISA amendments, which are on the floor. And the chairman and I are delighted to
be able to take a few hours off and talk with you. We believe that the
bipartisan bill that the Senate Intelligence Committee passed, with the two
changes which we have worked out with your experts, are the best way to go.
Another important reform issue is something I've been very
much concerned on, and that's the leaking of intelligence, and our most
sensitive means of collection appear in the papers. I believe General Hayden
said in his confirmation hearings in 2006 -- when I asked him about the
collection of intelligence, I think he said it's almost Darwinian. The more we
put out there, the more we're going to kill and capture only the dumb
terrorists. And that is a frightening thing.
Obviously
a strong free press is important safeguard. We must, however, deal with those
government officials who for their own personal ends, either profit or
notoriety, leak information. The irresponsible officials have provided far too
much sensitive classified information, and I think, as we see more and more of
them in orange jumpsuits, there will be a much greater disincentive to share
that information.
I -- obviously the journalists will
have to make up their minds as -- what they want to cover, but I would just urge
my friends and colleagues in the fourth estate, if an irresponsible bureaucrat
somewhere in the operation tells you the intelligence community has detected an
event in county X -- in country X, and he tells you how the community detected
the event, and you feel you must print the story, consider leaving the details
of the how out.
That's really interesting only to a
very select few, but primarily the terrorists and those who need to know how we
get our information, not as much what.
Finally, on
analysis, I believe we have to take a continued look at the analytical process.
I think we have a long ways to go. As I've indicated, I thought the Iran NIE was very disappointing, not because of what it said, not because of the fact
that they had -- that the -- that significant new information had been
discovered, but how it was said and how it was used for public release. I don't
believe that NIEs should be used as political footballs, which they've become. I
think they should be confidential assessments for policymakers in the
intelligence community, the military, the executive branch and Congress.
The main news in the NIE was the confirmation that Iran had a nuclear weapons program, not that it had halted it
temporarily, for all we know, in 2003. And other sources say they question that.
But -- and some believe they've restarted it. But the NIE offered no confidence
in any intelligence on that, besides stating with moderate confidence that it
had not restarted last summer. The French Defense minister said publicly that he
believes the program has restarted. Now if our government comes to that
assessment, then we have set ourselves up to have -- release another NIE, or
leak intelligence, because this last one was given a false sense of security.
Once we start announcing the NIEs, we may have to change them if the situation
changes.
I think that to put it in summary, the NIE as
released put the emphasis on the wrong syllable. It should have stated that this
was a confirmation. We have information that one aspect -- one aspect, the
weaponization programs -- was shut down, but the long pole in the tent, the
nuclear enrichment, had not. So that's my humble suggestion, that the next NIE
be reviewed to see what is really important in -- for the broader intelligence
community efforts.
We will do everything we can in
Congress to help the intelligence community get the information and the support
you need and the resources, but we -- and we look forward to being able to work
in a nonpartisan manner. And we continue to expect that the community fulfill
its responsibility when it provides us intelligence in a nonpolitical manner.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. They are, as
I said, Mr. Chairman, some of the best minds in the business.
SEN ROCKEFELLER: They are indeed, and they will start with Director
McConnell, for 20 minutes.
STATEMENT OF
MIKE McCONNELL
Director of National Intelligence
. . .
I want to be very clear in addressing Iran's nuclear capability. First, there are three parts to an effective nuclear weapons
capability.
First is the production of fissile
material; second, effective means for weapons delivery, such as ballistic
missile systems; and thirdly is the design and weaponization of the warhead
itself. We assess in our recent National Intelligence Estimate that warhead design and weaponization work was halted, along with a covert
military effort to produce fissile material. However, Iran's declared
uranium enrichment efforts that will enable the production of fissile material
continues.
Production of fissile material is the most
difficult challenge in the nuclear weapons production cycle. Also, as in the
past, Iran continues its effort to perfect ballistic missiles that can
reach both North Africa and Europe. Therefore, we remain concerned about Iran as a potential nuclear weapons threat.
The
earliest possible date Iran could technically be capable of producing
enough fissile material for a weapon is late 2009, but we judge that to be
unlikely. As our estimate makes clear, Tehran halted their nuclear weapons
design-related activities in response to international pressure, but is keeping
open the option to develop nuclear weapons. If Iran's nuclear weapons
design program has already been reactivated or will be reactivated, it will be a
closely guarded secret in an attempt to keep us from being aware of its true
status. The Iranians till this point have never admitted the secret nuclear
weapons design program which was halted in 2003.
Iran also remains a threat to regional stability and to U.S.
interests throughout the Middle East. This is because of its continued support
for violent groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah and its efforts to undercut
pro-Western actors such as those in Lebanon. Iran is pursuing a policy
intending to raise the political, economic and human costs of any arrangement
that would allow the United States to maintain presence and influence in that
region.
. . .
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Director Mueller.
Director Maples.
GEN. MAPLES: Yes, sir.
Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Bond, members of the
committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and to represent the
dedicated men and women of Defense Intelligence. And thank you for your comments
about their service. My short remarks will focus on changes in military
operations and capabilities.
There are several general
global military trends that are of concern, including proliferation of the
knowledge and technology required to produce weapons of mass destruction,
longer-range ballistic missiles that are more mobile and accurate, improvised
devices and suicide weapons as weapons of choice, and the continued development
of counter space-and-cyber capabilities.
In Iraq, an
improved security situation has resulted from coalition and Iraqi operations,
tribal security initiatives, concerned local citizen groups and the Jaish al
Mahdi freeze order. While encouraging, the trends are not yet irreversible. Al
Qaeda in Iraq has been damaged but it still attempts to reignite sectarian
violence, and remains able to conduct high-profile attacks.
We have seen a decline in the movement of foreign terrorists into Iraq.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Qods Force, continues to provide
training and support, and DIA has not yet seen evidence that Iran has
ended lethal aid. Iraqi security forces, while reliant on coalition combat
service support, have improved their overall capabilities and are increasingly
leading counterinsurgency cooperations.
In Afghanistan,
ISAF's successes have inflicted losses on Taliban leadership and prevented the
Taliban from conducting sustained conventional operations. Despite their losses,
the Taliban maintains access to local Pashtun and some foreign fighters, and is
using suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices and small arms to increase
attack levels. While the insurgency remains concentrated in the
Pashtun-dominated South and East, it has expanded to some western areas. The
Afghan army has fielded 11 of 14 infantry brigades, and more than one-third of
Afghanistan's combat arms battalions are assessed as capable of leading
operations with coalition support.
We believe that al
Qaeda has expanded it support to the Afghan insurgency and presents an increased
threat to Pakistan, while it continues to plan, support and direct transnational
attacks. Al Qaeda has extended its operational reach through partnerships with
compatible regional terrorist groups, including a continued effort to expand
into Africa. Al Qaeda maintains its desire to possess weapons of mass
destruction.
Pakistani military operations in the
Federally Administrated Tribal Areas have had limited effect on al Qaeda.
However, Pakistan recognizes the threat and realizes the need to develop more
effective counterinsurgency capabilities to complement their conventional
military. At present, we have confidence in Pakistan's ability to safeguard its
nuclear weapons.
Iran is acquiring advanced
weapons systems and supporting terrorist proxies. New capabilities include
missile patrol boats, anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missile systems
and an extended range variant of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile. Iran is
close to acquiring long-range SA-20 SAMs, and is developing a new Ashoura
medium-range ballistic missile. Lebanese Hezbollah continues to receive weapons,
training and resources from Iran.
. . .
SEN. WHITEHOUSE: Thank you.
Director McConnell, recently -- in fact, today -- a prominent acolyte
of the Bush administration on foreign policy and intelligence matters has
described your national intelligence estimates as politicized
and policy-oriented. He describes them as of sufficient demerit that they put
the intelligence community's credibility and impartiality on the line. He says
that the NIE was distorted; that in order for it to be objective, it would have
to be rewritten; that it involves sleight of hand and grossly mischaracterizes
the subject at hand; and that is infected with policy bias as the result of the
work of policy enthusiasts within the intelligence community.
Obviously, the entire discussion we've had today is of very little
value or significance if the underlying intelligence estimate process is
corrupted either by policy bias or distortion, or gross mischaracterization, or
politicization.
Would you care to comment? Because it
sort of had been my impression that we were in recovery from that and not in
that state. But, I think it would be worth it to hear your views on where the
integrity of the intelligence community stands at this point, and specifically
with regard to this NIE.
MR. MCCONNELL: Sir, I'd start
by saying that the integrity and the professionalism in this NIE is probably the
highest in our history in terms of objectivity, and quality of the analysis, and
challenging the assumptions, and conducting red teams on the process, conducting
a counterintelligence assessment about were we being misled or so on.
So I would start by saying that the article you refer to
is a gross misrepresentation of the professionalism of this community now. From
there I would say, depending on one's political perspective, you can pick up
what this NIE has to say from different points of view. And I can also report
that both sides are angry with how we represented this NIE. Therefore we
probably got it about right.
Here was the issue. In the
history of NIEs, there have been very, very few -- I think I could number on one
hand -- that have been made public, unclassified key judgments. We got into that
mode because it was highly politicized and charged when we were doing NIEs on Iran, Iraq and the terrorism threat. There was an expectation.
Now, I made every attempt to establish a policy consistent
with some of the views that were acknowledged earlier or stated earlier, about
having our work be done in a confidential way and made available to those in the
administration and in the Congress who need to do their work where we're dealing
with classified information. And I worked that policy, I coordinated it, I
notified the committees this was going to be how we were going to go forward.
And then we had a dilemma. I promulgated my policy in
October. We were working through this analysis -- had been working from the
summer, come into closure in November. And the issue for us was that my
predecessor, Ambassador Negroponte and me were on public record making a
statement that was -- or statements about Iran that were different from
our conclusion. So now my dilemma was I could not not make this unclassified.
Now, so we finished the debate and the dialogue on the
27th of November. We briefed the president on the 28th of November. And the
issue was the position had changed somewhat. As I mentioned in my opening
remarks, there are three parts to a nuclear program. The only thing that they've
halted was nuclear weapons design, which is probably the least significant part
of the program.
So then the question became, what goes
in unclassified key judgments? Now, we had closed and I had signed on the 28th
of November the classified key judgment. So my dilemma now is -- I can't make
them different when I do unclassifieds. So now we're in a horse race. I've got
to notify the committee. I've got to notify allies. I've got to get unclassified
out the door. So if I'd had until now to think about it, I probably would have
changed a thing or two. But let me make a point. I've anticipated your question.
I want to go to the first key judgment and to make reference to the article that
you referenced in your remarks. First one: "We judge with high confidence in the
fall of 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program."
Footnote -- put it right here on the front page so everybody would see
it. We don't want to make any mistakes. We don't want to mislead anybody. For
the purposes of this estimate, nuclear weapons program, we mean Iran's nuclear weapons design and weaponization work and covert uranium
conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work.
Now, to someone who's familiar with weapons -- and this is the effort
-- that's part of a program. Now the argument in our group was we can't just say
that, we've got to attach it. So it's colon -- or pardon me -- semicolon. Same
sentence, semicolon. We also raised -- assessed with moderate to high confidence
that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.
We tried every way we could to put it all right in the beginning. It depends on
your perspective of how you pick up the issue.
SEN.
WHITEHOUSE: Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Chairman.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Gentlemen, I regret to say that we have an
inconsequential, thoroughly unsubstantive reflecting difficulties on the floor
between two political parties' vote, and we have four minutes left. So I'm going
to recess this for about six minutes, and I --
SEN.
EVAN BAYH (D-IN): Can I go ahead with my question?
SEN.
ROCKEFELLER: Yeah, if you can do it. I'll call on Senator Bayh if you can run
--
SEN. BAYH: I'm going to go ahead with my question,
and then run over for the vote, if that's okay, because I'd like to follow up on
Senator Whitehouse's questioning.
Director, I don't
agree with the aspersions that were cast upon the quality of the work of your
people in the article that Senator Whitehouse referred to, but I do think there
have been -- the work has been mischaracterized in the public domain, as you
were pointing out. And it's had some unfortunate consequences. As a matter of
fact, it may very well have made it more difficult to achieve the result that
our nation was hoping for, which was to find a way to end the Iranian nuclear
program without resorting to force. It's made diplomacy much more difficult
because of the way this was received around the world, including by the
Iranians, the Russians, the Chinese and others.
You
just mentioned that if you had to do it over again without the heat of the
moment, some time to reflect, you would have changed a couple of things. What
would you have changed?
MR. MCCONNELL: I think I would
change the way that we describe nuclear program; I mean, put it up front, a
little diagram, what are the component parts so that the reader could quickly
grasp that a portion of it, I would argue, maybe even at least significant
portion, was halted and there are other parts that continue.
SEN. BAYH: Well, just to clarify the record, and I'm referring only to
the public NIE. And I've read it. My synopsis of it -- and I'd be interested if
any of you would disagree with this -- was that they had an active -- all three
components: fissile material creation, weaponization, delivery systems. All
those were going forward. They decided a few years ago to suspend one component;
as you characterize it, the least consequential of the three -- at least
temporarily they decided to suspend it. They could recommence that at any point
in time.
MR. MCCONNELL: They could.
SEN. BAYH: It would be very difficult for us, as I think you pointed
out, to know when they have recommenced that, and ultimately, given their
industrial and technological capabilities, they are likely to be successful. We
don't know exactly when, but ultimately they're likely to be successful.
MR. MCCONNELL: Yes, sir.
SEN.
BAYH: Is that a fair synopsis?
MR. MCCONNELL: That's
exactly right. And that's what the unclassified -- if you read them all the way
through, that's unclassified key judgment -- make that point, and then there's
the full body of the 140 pages also, and (they did make that ?) point.
SEN. BAYH: Well, so my question to you is, you know, it's
difficult when we just, you know, have one footnote that kinds of clarifies, as
I say -- how can you and your people go about presenting this in a way that is
more likely to have a balanced presentation of your beliefs, to avoid the kind
of problem we've now got ourselves in going forward? And how can you think
through the consequences of the report? Because it's had unintended consequences
that in my own view are damaging to the national security interests of our
country.
MR. MCCONNELL: Sir, it's a challenge. We
tried, in the time we had left, to do just what you said. I thought at the
moment, at that point in time, we had gotten good balance. In retrospect, I --
as I mentioned, I would do some things differently.
But
let me make a couple of points. As you might imagine, I have focused very
intently on Iran in the aftermath of this. And there's a debate in Iran now, and some are debating that this is not a good-news National Intelligence Estimate; it's a bad-news National Intelligence Estimate, because that means that
international pressure and diplomacy efforts will be increased and sanctions
will be enforced to hurt their economy. And in fact the permanent five plus one,
Germany, have just -- they've just come to closure and agreement on new
sanctions, and they're going to take it to the United Nations and have that
--
SEN. BAYH: Are the Russians and the Chinese in
accord with this?
MR. MCCONNELL: They are.
SEN. BAYH: They are.
MR.
MCCONNELL: Perm 5.
SEN. BAYH: Well, I will be heartened
and I will be pleasantly surprised if they do more than verbally express their
support, but actually take the tough steps necessary.
MR. MCCONNELL: U.K., France, the United States, Russia and China.
SEN. BAYH: How do you interpret the Russians -- almost
immediately after the issuing of this NIE, they're beginning to supply nuclear
material to the Iranians for their reactor.
MR.
MCCONNELL: Sir, I think to help -- the background of that -- I think they're
actually helping make the point. Here's the issue. First of all, they -- the
Iranians are pursuing a fissile production capability.
The Russians, in negotiating with them, said to them: We will provide
you what you need to run a peaceful reactor, but everything is absolutely under
our control -- the material that's provided, the plutonium that's produced -- it
has to go back to Russia and so on. Russia's also making the argument to the
Iranians: The fact you're running an independent uranium enrichment program
makes you suspect. You have no need for it.
SEN. BAYH:
I agree with all that, and I've got a little bit of time left here. So I guess,
since I'm the last person standing -- (laughter) -- I'll have to recess the
hearing and run on over there -- but I agree with all that. But they had held up
the delivery beforehand, I assume, to make the point to the Iranians: Look, you
know, you've got to, you know, get your act together on some of these other
things, because this is the pathway forward. And then they immediately took that
pressure off. So --
MR. MCCONNELL: It's because the
Iranians in fact agreed to these very strict controls. So I -- my view is, they
were in this dialogue actually supporting the program that had been initiated on
a diplomatic level to impose sanctions through the U.N.
SEN. BAYH: Well, good. Let's hope that that proves to be the case going
forward.
My last question -- and General Hayden, it may
be more for you --
MR. FORT: Senator, excuse me. If I
might add, just in terms of the Russian and Chinese attitudes, there are
existing U.N. sanctions against Iran as a result of their failure to
abide by the will of the international community, to which China and Russia have
been compliant. And we are now negotiating another round of sanctions against Iran.
So they have not withheld or they have
not, I should say, the Russians have not just totally opened up the floodgates
in the one instance that you indicated, but the U.N. sanctions still stand
against Iran.
SEN. BAYH: Well, that's true, but
the question is whether the sanctions will be effective. And some observers, you
know, believe that a little more needs to be done there to try and finally get
the Iranians in the place they need to be.
MR. FORT:
That's why the secretary of State is continuing to pursue exactly that course of
action, to impose yet additional sanctions.
. . .