INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT TO THE IAEA BOARD OF
GOVERNORS
DR. MOHAMED ELBARADEI,
DIRECTOR GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
March 5, 2007
Excerpts
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Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
You have before you a report on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of UN Security Council resolution 1737 in the Islamic Republic of Iran - as well as a report on cooperation between Iran and the Agency in light of this resolution. As you can see from the report before you on verification activities, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, nor its heavy water related projects, as required by the Security Council as a confidence building measure.
As you can also see, we have - pursuant to the Security Council resolution - conducted a review of the Agency's cooperation with Iran, and made the necessary adjustments to that cooperation. We have also put mechanisms in place to monitor the Agency's ongoing activities in Iran, to ensure continuing compliance with the resolution.
The Agency has been verifying Iran's nuclear programme for the past four years, with the aim of providing the required assurances that all nuclear material in Iran has been declared to the Agency and is under safeguards.
The current situation remains somewhat of a stalemate. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However, we continue to be unable to reconstruct fully the history of Iran's nuclear programme and some of its components, because we have not been provided with the necessary level of transparency and cooperation on the part of Iran. We have not seen concrete proof of the diversion of nuclear material, nor the industrial capacity to produce weapon-usable nuclear material, which is an important consideration in assessing the risk. However, quite a few uncertainties still remain about experiments, procurements and other activities relevant to our understanding of the scope and nature of Iran's programme. This renders the Agency unable to provide the required assurance about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.
Iran's verification case is sui generis. Unlike other verification cases, the IAEA's confidence about the nature of Iran's programme has been shaken because of two decades of undeclared activities. This confidence will only be restored when Iran takes the long overdue decision to explain and answer all the Agency's questions and concerns about its past nuclear activities in an open and transparent manner. Until that time, the Agency will have no option but to reserve its judgment about Iran's nuclear programme, and as a result the international community will continue to express concern.
The decision by Iran to link its readiness to resolve the Agency´s concerns to actions by the Security Council is difficult to understand. Only through full cooperation with the Agency, as the independent verification body - and irrespective of any progress or lack thereof in its negotiations with other relevant parties - can Iran dispel the doubts about its nuclear programme. Assurance by the Agency about Iran's nuclear programme will undoubtedly facilitate a solution to the Iranian issue - which would, on the one hand, take full account of Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and, on the other, provide the necessary level of confidence to the international community about Iran's nuclear programme and its future direction.
In this context, I earnestly hope that conditions will be created soon for the resumption of negotiations between Iran and all relevant parties. I remain convinced that only through negotiation can a comprehensive and durable solution be attained to the Iranian nuclear question and other issues related to it.
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