Iran Expresses Willingness to Resolve Remaining Problems on Nuclear Case

February 24, 2007

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear

The Islamic Republic of Iran has announced its readiness to settle the remaining problems with the International Atomic Energy Agency without interference of the UN Security Council.

"Regarding the few remaining outstanding issues, it has to be recalled that, as was duly reflected in the letter of 27 April 2006, H. E. Dr. Larijani, the Secretary of Supreme National Security Council, expressed to Your Excellency, the Islamic Republic of Iran's full readiness and willingness to negotiate on the modality for the resolution of the outstanding issues with the IAEA, subject to the assurances for dealing with the issues in the framework of the Agency, without the interference of the United Nation Security Council."

"In this context, it is prepared to regulate the future cooperation on the basis of the negotiated verification arrangements," read a letter presented to the UN nuclear watchdog chief Mohamed ElBaradei in Vienna on February 19 by Iran's IAEA ambassador Ali-Asghar Soltanieh.

The letter, a copy of which was made available to IRNA on aturday, was in reaction to ElBaradei's former letter and was submitted to him before he presented his new Iran report to the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council.

The full text of the letter is as follows:

I have the honour to refer to the letter no. MBA-IRA-30/2007-1, dated 15-02-2007 with the followings comments:

1. The International Atomic Agency is the sole and pivotal authority in the investigation of the peaceful nuclear activities of the Member States.

2. Considering the extensive cooperation of Islamic Republic of Iran with the Agency interference of United Nations Security Council on Iran's nuclear issues has no justification and legal basis in accordance with the Agency's Statute and the Comprehensive Safeguards.

This course of action is not only unhelpful for the resolution resolving the issue but would lead to further complication of the situation problem.

3. While the Islamic Republic of Iran is not demanding anything beyond its inalienable rights which is stipulated in the NPT, it has owever the intention to fulfill its obligations under this Treaty, provided that it shall benefit from the exercise of such rights.

According to the Article IV of the NPT, "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination..."

"In addition, all the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But some countries, specifically certain Nuclear Weapons States, instead of complying with their obligations and undertakings in accordance with the Article VI of the NPT, for the cessation of the nuclear arm race and nuclear disarmament, have prevented other Parties to the NPT from benefiting of their legal and inalienable rights."

4. The IAEA is the sole technical organization in providing services and co-operation in peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

Converting the Agency to a political body will deviate it from its statutory objectives. In accordance with the Article III of the Statute, out of seven functions on which the Agency is authorized, only one is on Safeguards. The remaining six functions are related to the promotional activities.

5. In order to remove the ambiguities and misunderstandings regarding its nuclear program, and implementing maximum transparency, the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken the following numerous measures vis-a-vis the IAEA;

- Close collaboration even beyond its legal obligations with the IAEA;

- Over 2000 man/day inspections on its nuclear activities and facilities during the last 3 years which is unprecedented in the history of the IAEA;

- Voluntary suspension of the uranium conversion and enrichment related activities, assured to be temporary, was continued for two and half years, with the aim of confidence building, where such measures have not being envisaged in any of the provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and even the Additional Protocol;

- It is essential to note that, following such voluntary suspension, a new verification regime for verifying the suspension, was established and conducted by the Agency in Iran, which has no precedence in the history of the IAEA;

- In the context of voluntary measure, a clear distinction has to be made between voluntary measures and legal obligations in order to prevent those voluntary measures not to be turned into legal and Safeguards obligations;

- Signature of the Additional Protocol in 2003; and voluntarily implementation of the Additional Protocol from December 2003 until February 2006;

- Granting full and unlimited accesses to all nuclear materials and facilities, particularly the Enrichment Facilities in Natanz and the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Esfahan;

- Granting more than 26 complimentary accesses to 55 locations in accordance with the Additional Protocol;

- Granting access to military sites (over 20 cases), where the results of the inspections proved the allegations against the Islamic Republic of Iran to be baseless;

- Submission of over 1300 pages of initial declarations in accordance with Additional Protocol on 21 May 2003 and subsequent updated declarations, which have been verified by the Agency;

6. In addition to the above measures, since Your Excellency last report (GOV/2006/64), in November 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran cooperated with the Agency, in facilitating the verification activities with over 132 man/day of inspections. Regarding the enrichment facilities in Natanz, PFEP (IRM-) and FEP (IRN-), as well as the under construction Heavy Water Research Reactor, IR40 (IRP), some of the following inspection activities have been performed are as follows:

FEP (IRN-): 15 inspections amounting to 38 man/day inspections; conducting Design Information Verification (DIV); installation of surveillance cameras, which are all in operation, and the application of the Agency's metal seals at 22 sensitive points in the facility;

PFEP (IRM-): 13 inspections amounting to 29 man/day inspections; conducting Interim Inventory Verification (IIV) and Design Information Verification (DIV);

IR40 (IRP): Two times inspections amounting to (four man/day) inspections; conducting Design Information Verification (DIV) during construction of the IR40.

7. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been and still is complying with its obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The Agency inspections have been conducted without any obstacle, in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement. All nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran including those on enrichment, are under the full and continuous Agency's Safeguards surveillance cameras, inspections and in full compliance with the Agency's Statute, NPT and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

8. As already been stated in several occasions, the 40MW Heavy Water Research Reactor (IR40) is intended to substitute the 5MW Tehran Research Reactor, where its normal lifetime has already been passed.

This reactor is mainly involved in production of radioisotopes for medical and agricultural application.

9. Regarding the few remaining outstanding issues, it has to be recalled that, as was duly reflected in the letter of 27 April 2006, H. E. Dr. Larijani, the Secretary of Supreme National Security Council, expressed to Your Excellency, the Islamic Republic of Iran's full readiness and willingness to negotiate on the modality for the resolution of the outstanding issues with the IAEA, subject to the assurances for dealing with the issues in the framework of the Agency, without the interference of the United Nation Security Council. In this context, it is prepared to regulate the future co-operation on the basis of the negotiated verification arrangements.

10. It is evident that the achievement of the aforementioned prospects is merely feasible through negotiation. In this respect, while appreciating the valuable efforts of Your Excellency and others, the Islamic Republic of Iran, on its part, is prepared to enter into constructive, but not a superficial, negotiation, aimed at resolving the outstanding issues.