Listed (as ERI/MAVT) by the Japanese government in 2008 as an entity of concern for missile proliferation; named (as ERI) by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2008 as a military related institute requiring better understanding of its role in Iran's nuclear program; listed (as DTSRC/ERI) by the European Union on April 24, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, and within their jurisdiction, E.U. member states must freeze all funds and economic resources owned, held or controlled by the listed entity, and must ensure that funds or economic resources are not made available to or for the benefit of the listed entity; listed (as DTSRC) as an entity of concern for military procurement activities in an early warning document distributed by the German government to industry in July 2005, urging caution when initiating commercial dealings with this entity, and suggesting that because this entity is involved with both military and civilian projects, civilian use must be shown by specific and verifiable evidence; also named (as ERI/MAVT) by the German government in 2005 as a mainly civilian institution which also conducts military research and development, posing a risk of scientific facilities being misused as cover addresses for military imports, and as an organization involved in the procurement of biotechnology equipment potentially useful in biological weapons production; identified by the British government (as ERI) in February 1998 as having procured goods and/or technology for weapons of mass destruction programs, in "addition to doing non-proliferation related business;" reportedly included (as ERI) in a February 1994 German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT) list of entities which, "because of harmless-sounding appellations having to do with research, training, or science, belie the fact that they are wholly or in part devoted to military projects, and are engaged in procurement activities for these projects, with the aim of supplying know-how, equipment, or materials".

Reportedly received orders from the Iranian Research and Development Organization (IRDO) to obtain defense-related research and development equipment; according to the E.U., subsidiary of the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO); according to the E.U., handles much of the procurement for DIO and is responsible for research and development; reportedly houses a missile design center; reported site of production lines for aluminum powder, hydroxy-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB) resin and potassium chlorite, useful in the production of solid rocket fuel; reportedly formerly known as Scientific-Research Group.