Hara Company

Also Known As: 

Hara Institute

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear
  • Missile

Address: 

Takhti three-way intersection, Tehran, Iran (central office for defense projects)

Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh, which is overseen by Khatam Al Anbia (KAA).

According to Alireza Jafarzadeh (formerly of the National Council of Resistance of Iran), has built tunnels and structures for nuclear and missile projects of Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and is experienced in building anti-radiation walls and ventilation systems; according to Jafarzadeh, is in charge of building a tunnel in the vicinity of Shahrak-e Bazi (northeast Tehran), code-named "Hormuz Tunnel," to be used for nuclear weapons research and development; the tunnel project is reportedly directed by engineer Hashemi-Tabar, and involves engineers Nowroozi-doust and Dehghan; according to Jafarzadeh, Hara Company's "Sadaf Workshop" is involved in building a tunnel at the Isfahan nuclear site; Sadaf Workshop and the Isfahan tunnel project are reportedly directed by engineer Madadi; carries out engineering and tunnel excavation projects throughout Iran, according to Jafarzadeh; directed by Brigadier General Ehtessam of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and includes members of the IRGC's engineering corps.

In 1998, reportedly contracted by Ab-Niroo to complete excavation for the Masjed Soleiman Hydroelectric Power Plant; in 2002, reportedly began construction activities, including excavation of an access tunnel and ventilation shafts, for the Lavarak Power Plant; reportedly contracted by Ab-Niroo to work on the Tehran-Karaj Water Conveyance Tunnel, and by Tehran Urban and Suburban Railway Company to complete Line 7 of the Tehran Metro; reportedly contracted by the Municipality of Tehran to work on the Niayesh Road Tunnel.

Sanctions

Designated by the U.N. Security Council on June 9, 2010, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); subsequently designated by U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); removed from the U.N. list on October 18, 2023, following the expiration of targeted sanctions contained in resolution 2231.

Listed by the European Union on June 18, 2010, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.

Added on October 25, 2007, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; also designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations; foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity are subject to U.S. sanctions.

Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.

Listed by the Japanese government in 2022 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to missiles and biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.

Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.

Mentioned Suspect Entities & Suppliers: 

Date Entered: 

August 27, 2008

Date Last Modified: 

December 21, 2023