According to the U.S. Department of State, has engaged in missile technology proliferation activities involving Category I items controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime; intended recipient of test instruments and accessories (spectrum analyzers, signal generators and network analyzers), the procurement of which was denied on September 14, 1998, by a member state of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Subordinate of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) that has purchased equipment for the Iranian missile program on AIO's behalf; reportedly purchased jet mills from Japan's Seishin Enterprise Co. for possible use in the production of missile fuel; allegedly, according to an officer of the Russian Federal Security Service, involved in an attempt in 1997 to obtain components for liquid fuel missile engines from Russia's NPO "Trud;" allegedly, according to an officer of the Russian Federal Security Service, involved in an attempt to construct a wind tunnel to conduct aerodynamic tests at Russia's Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI).

Sanctions

Designated by the U.N. Security Council on March 24, 2007, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; subsequently designated by U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); removed from the U.N. list on October 18, 2023, following the expiration of targeted sanctions contained in resolution 2231.

Listed by the European Union on April 21, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.

On July 18, 2006, added to the Specially Designated National (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity are subject to U.S. sanctions; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations; foreign financial institutions facilitating transactions for the entity may be prohibited from opening or maintaining correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States.

Sanctioned (with all successors and sub-units) by the U.S. Department of State on April 6, 2000, and November 17, 2000, for missile technology proliferation activities; sanctions apply for two years and prohibit the issuance of export licenses and U.S. government contracts to the entity and the importation into the United States of products produced by the entity.

Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.

Listed by the Japanese government in 2022 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to nuclear weapons and missiles.

Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.