Overseen by Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO); identified by the U.S. Department of the Treasury as an end-user of various items provided by Karl Lee, also known as Li Fangwei (Li Fang Wei), and front companies affiliated with LIMMT Economic and Trade Company (LIMMT); allegedly was provided weapons-usable materials by Li Fang Wei and LIMMT, which were indicted on April 7, 2009, by the District Attorney's Office of New York County for charges relating to the misuse of Manhattan banks and the proliferation of illicit missile and nuclear technology to Iran; according to the indictment, in December 2006, a LIMMT representative sent an agent of Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries an invoice addressed to Yazd Metallurgy Industries for 200 metric tons of high power graphite electrodes in the amount of £220,400; according to the indictment, in February 2007, an LIMMT representative acknowledged payment by Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries for a shipment of high power graphite electrodes; in April 2007, according to the indictment, an agent of Shahid Sayyad Shirazi Industries received an invoice sent by Li Fang Wei confirming the sale of 450 metric tons of furnace electrodes.

A subsidiary of Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG); according to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), is involved in the production of improvised explosive devices (IEDs); has cooperated with Olyapey Technical and Engineering Co. on the demolition, reconstruction, and modernization of Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) buildings.

Produces large caliber items and cartridge cases; products reportedly include steel castings, induction furnaces, cylinder tape, and high voltage panels; foreign commercial manager is reportedly Mohammad Mohammadi; company officials reportedly include Ehsani Sadr; reportedly established in 2001.

Sanctions

Designated by the U.N. Security Council on June 9, 2010, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; subsequently designated by U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); removed from the U.N. list on October 18, 2023, following the expiration of targeted sanctions contained in resolution 2231.

Listed by the European Union on June 18, 2010, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.

Added on April 7, 2009, to the Specially Designated National (SDN) list maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), freezing its assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. parties, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; also subject to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations; foreign parties facilitating transactions for the entity or otherwise assisting the entity are subject to U.S. sanctions.

Sanctioned by the governments of Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.

Listed by the Japanese government in 2022 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to missiles and biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.

Listed by the British government in 2015 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list.