Special Industries Group

Also Known As: 

Ministry of Defense Special Industries Group
Special Industries Organization (SIO)
Special Industrial Groups of the Ministry of Defense
Organization of Special Industries
Special Group
Ministry of Defense Special Industries Organization
Ministry of Defense Special Industrial Groups
Department 154
Special Industries Section
Special Industries Division
Special Industry Group
Special Industries
Organization of Special Industry
Special Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Industries

Weapon Program: 

  • Nuclear
  • Chemical
  • Biological
  • Military


- North Felestine Avenue, Tehran
- Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran
- P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
- Zartosht Street, Tehran

A subsidiary of Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO).

Has reportedly been involved in Iran's nuclear program and its chemical and biological weapons programs; allegedly obtained chemical weapon precursors and production information from Israeli businessman Nahum Manbar; produces military and commercial products; produces and exports nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protection gear, detection equipment, decontamination products, mobile laboratories, handheld chemical agent detectors, protective clothing and masks, and decontamination powders and systems.

According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), has attempted to obtain technology for production of nuclear weapons, and has conducted work on biological weapons; according to the NCRI, has a Biological Research Center, a chemical and biological laboratory called Vira (Sina Industry), and a chemical material storage site called Shahid Meisam; according to the NCRI, cooperates on biological weapons work with: Milad Industry in Mard-Abad, Be'ethat Industry and Shahid Salehi Industry in Qom, Sard-Shimi Industry (or Sard Chemical Industry) in Shiraz, Raja-Shimi Industry in Malard, Shahid Meysami Industry near Karaj, and Valasr Industry in Tehran; according to the NCRI, collaborates with Dr. Ali Pazirandeh; according to the NCRI, leaders have included Revolutionary Guard Brigadier General Farmanesh and Brigadier General Seyyedi.

In the early 1990s, reportedly attempted to obtain fermenters usable for biological weapons from Swiss firms; Bonyad e-Mostazafan Foundation reportedly finances the group's foreign procurement efforts; has five subsidiaries; reportedly established in 1993.


Designated by the U.N. Security Council on June 9, 2010, pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as an entity involved in Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; subsequently designated by U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); with some exceptions, the designation requires states to freeze assets that are owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and to ensure that assets are not made available to the entity.

Listed by the European Union on April 24, 2007, as an entity linked to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; with some exceptions, E.U. member states must freeze assets owned or controlled by the entity, directly or indirectly, and prevent assets from being made available to it.

Sanctioned by the governments of Australia and Japan, restricting business and financial transactions with the entity and/or freezing its assets in those countries.

Listed by the Japanese government in 2021 as an entity of concern for proliferation relating to missiles and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

Listed by the British government in 2013 as an entity of potential concern for WMD-related procurement, but removed in 2017 after the U.K. withdrew its Iran list; identified by the British government in February 1998 as having procured goods and/or technology for weapons of mass destruction programs.

Date Entered: 

January 26, 2004

Date Last Modified: 

September 24, 2021