[Please note that only the original French text issued by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be considered official.]

. . .

Q: The Europeans have set a deadline for ending negotiations. (...)

A: I don't believe a deadline has been given. There's not a real timeframe. If I've understood correctly, the idea is to leave open the possibility for dialogue. Mr. Solana has said he is available to meet with Mr. Larijani. Then we'll have to see how the discussion goes, what clarifications we've obtained, and based on that we'll assess the situation.

Q: And will this be in September?

A: On the European side it's a question that will be addressed again at the general affairs/external relations council on September 15 in Brussels. The EU ministers will be meeting to discuss Iran again. As you know, there's also the idea of consultations among the six. It's based on these that we'll see what the timeframe will be. I can't tell you specifically today what it will be.

Q: After the Chinese statement at the UN, Europe seems to be closer to the Chinese and Russian position on this than the American position… Is true that the US position is harsher towards the Iranians and that Europe is sticking to its initial position of dialogue, with the Chinese and Russians?

A: I know it's a temptation to accentuate the differences. We have an existing common position, agreed at the July 12 meeting in Paris-and that's resolution 1696. It exists, it's a common basis among Europeans, Americans, Russians, Chinese and beyond, since the resolution commits the entire Security Council.

I don't believe one should highlight the differences even though it is true there are slightly varying sensibilities and Europe from the start has had a position in the middle, which explains perhaps why it was asked to conduct these discussions, because it is a bridge between the positions of various sides.

(...)

Q: A few months ago it was being said in the European capitals that no one doubted it was Iran's intention to gain a secret nuclear capacity and eventually to be able to manufacture a nuclear weapon. But the last report was clear that there was no irrefutable proof that Iran is developing a clandestine nuclear program. Where do things stand and what are you impressions with regard to Iran's intentions?

A: We've already discussed this. The IAEA report says there is no actual proof that Iran is developing a military nuclear program, but it also says doubts persist as to the end purpose of the Iranian nuclear program. It also says that the Agency has not had all the cooperation and transparency it was entitled to expect from Iran. That's the real problem in this dossier. We have to have a guarantee that the program does not have a military use. There's a doubt, it's fuzzy, there's a gray zone which persists, and that's the problem.

Q: … Is it possible to envision other types of guarantees aside from stopping enrichment activity? For example increased monitoring?

A: That's the whole question. What type of guarantee can we get from Iran? The reasoning which has been followed is that we were ready to provide Iran with cooperation, including in the nuclear field, to develop a civilian program but against which there would have to be a commitment to suspend enrichment activities, thereby effectively giving the international community a guarantee that there's no diversion for military purposes. That's the reasoning behind the offers made by the international community. That's where we are. Keep in mind that the word used is not stopping but suspending. The European proposals as you know leave open the possibility eventually, once confidence has been restored, when there's a new context, of reconsidering this question.

Q: The additional protocol isn't guarantee enough?

A: If the protocol had been considered sufficient by the international community, we would have said so. We consider that the best guarantee resides in the suspension of enrichment activities. The Iranians are often heard to complain about it, saying that we're contesting their right. There's no right to enrichment in the NPT. There's a right to civilian nuclear energy. The suspension would be matched, in the European offer, the international offer, in terms of cooperation in various areas, including the nuclear field.

Once again, in this matter the problem is how to rebuild confidence. Confidence is generated through commitments, through reciprocal commitments